The Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense

[john_doran]

Now back to the “free will defense”. It it hopelessly confused, wishing to “have it both ways” when it comes to libertarian vs. compatibilist free will, and misunderstanding Molinism and counterfactuals of freedom, and ends up sacrificing at least some aspect of classical theism.

A) even though you have not shown me to have “misunderstood” molinism, i have already pointed out that i am willing to call the position i have explained and defended by whatever name you please: nothing of any substance follows from the name given to the position.

B) you haven’t even explained what you understand as “classical theism”, and why it’s even worth defending.

SeekingCatholic:

But God, by definition, is capable of actualizing any universe with any combination of contingent facts. It is only necessary facts which “constrain” Him, so to speak.

sure, but necessarily, god cannot actualize the free choices of other beings.

ergo, god is constrained with regard to the worlds he can actualize.

SeekingCatholic:

In the free will defense, there is a possible world in which A does not do C, but it is a world which somehow God cannot actualize. Why can God not actualize it? It is argued because of the contingent fact that A in fact does C, which attempts to make this a necessary fact, contradictory to libertarian free will. Or it is argued that God simply cannot choose to create a world with His choice of contingent facts, which simply denies His omnipotence (as classically defined).

…you can keep saying it and saying it, but that’s not going to make it so.

you still have not explained why god’s inability to actualize the free choices of other beings is a denial of omnipotence any more than is god’s inability to create square circles or rocks heavier than he can lift.

SeekingCatholic:

Or, it is argued that what God really actualizes is the world-segment prior to A’s choice, with A himself actualizing the world with either C or ~C. But then how does God know what A will choose in this hypothetical world, given that both C and ~C are possible worlds?

because god knows every true proposition, and among those propositions are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, such as “if P were in situation S, then P would choose C”.

SeekingCatholic:

God does not cause A’s choice. The situation B does not pre-determine it. God has not chosen a priori which world - with C or ~C - to actualize. His knowledge must be as a result of A’s choice.

no, not at all: his knowledge is a result of what A would choose if A were in those circumstances. that’s what a counterfactual of freedom is.

SeekingCatholic:

This is making God’s knowledge not prior to the world He creates but as a result of it, which is contrary to the classical idea of omniscience.

again, wrong: he knows what every free being would do in any world god might actualize; so god knows before he actualizes any world, what free choices will be made by the freely choosing inhabitants of that world, because he knows in which circumstances the subjects of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom will actually find themselves.

so you have demonstrated neither (A) that god’s inability to actualize the free choices of other beings mitigates his omnipotence; nor (B) that his knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom mitigates his omniscience.

which means that you have not made your case against the free will defense.

 

[Camron]

I still contend that free-will exists but that free-will is not required for the joys in heaven, just as baptized infants going to heaven (as per their parent’s will as moving via the Holy Spirit within the sacramental community of their Church) seems to demonstrate.

I don’t think this is about “free-will”. Free-will appears to be nearly accidental and the cause of much suffering to be frank. To be honest, I think that God would most certainly (and gladly) overide our own selfish will if we would only let Him

The question seems to be more about the “New Creation” than “Free-Will” to be honest.

For example…

1Therefore, there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus, because through Christ Jesus the law of the Spirit of life set me free from the law of sin and death.

For what the law was powerless to do in that it was weakened by the sinful nature, God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful man to be a sin offering. And so he condemned sin in sinful man, in order that the righteous requirements of the law might be fully met in us, who do not live according to the sinful nature but according to the Spirit.

Those who live according to the sinful nature have their minds set on what that nature desires;** but those who live in accordance with the Spirit have their minds set on what the Spirit desires**.

The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the Spirit is life and peace; the sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God’s law, nor can it do so. Those controlled by the sinful nature cannot please God.

You, however, are controlled not by the sinful nature but by the Spirit, if the Spirit of God lives in you. And if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Christ. But if Christ is in you, your body is dead because of sin, yet your spirit is alive because of righteousness. And if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead is living in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit, who lives in you.

Therefore, brothers, we have an obligation—but it is not to the sinful nature, to live according to it.

For if you live according to the sinful nature, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the misdeeds of the body, you will live, because those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God.

For you did not receive a spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the **Spirit of sonship. And by him we cry, “Abba, Father.” **

The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God’s children.

Now if we are children, then we are heirs—heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ, if indeed we share in his sufferings in order that we may also share in his glory.
I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will be revealed in us.

The creation waits in eager expectation for the sons of God to be revealed.

For the creation was subjected to frustration, not by its own choice, but by the will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be liberated from its bondage to decay and brought into the glorious freedom of the children of God.

We know that the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth right up to the present time.

Not only so, but we ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait eagerly for our adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies.

For in this hope we were saved. But hope that is seen is no hope at all.

Who hopes for what he already has?

But if we hope for what we do not yet have, we wait for it patiently.

In the same way, the Spirit helps us in our weakness.

We do not know what we ought to pray for, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groans that words cannot express. And he who searches our hearts knows the mind of the Spirit, because the Spirit intercedes for the saints in accordance with God’s will.

 

[ateista]

OK. Time to cut to the chase. I am going to prove with mathematical induction that it is possible to actualize a world where everyone is “saved” and they all have libertarian free will.

For simplicity’s sake I will use the phrase “choose correctly” to indicate “make the necessary choices to be saved” and “choose incorrectly” to indicate “fail to make the necessary choices to be be saved”.

Also, if there is libertarian free will, then the choices exercised by a person are independent from the choices of any other persons. This is the crux of the matter, since that is what “free will” means.

Step #1:

Let’s examine the world which contains one human being “A” (someone who has the capacity to differentiate between moral and immoral - whatever they may be).

There are two possible worlds:

W1 - where “A” will choose correctly, and
W2 - where “A” will choose incorrectly.

If only W2 can be instantiated - because for whatever reason W1 cannot be instantiated - then obviously “A” does not have the freedom to choose correctly. Therefore it is meaningless to speak of “A”-s free will.

Therefore it is possible to instantiate W1 - where “A” will choose freely and correctly.​

Step #2:

In the next scenario we shall investigate the hypothetical world with two inhabitants: “A” and “B”.

There are 4 possible worlds:

W1 - where both “A” and “B” choose correctly.
W2 - where “A” will choose correctly and “B” will choose incorrectly.
W3 - where “A” will choose incorrectly and “B” will choose correctly.
W4 - where both “A” and “B” will choose incorrectly.

Of these 4 worlds we need to examine W1 and W2 only, because according to Step #1, “A” can choose correctly. This is the inductive step, so pay close attention, please.

If, of these two worlds (W1 and W2), only W2 can be instantiated, then “B” has no free will. Therefore W1 can be instantiated, and thus all the inhabitants can choose correctly.​

And that concludes the proof.

The point is (just in case someone is not familiar with mathematical induction) that we examine the case for “N” inhabitants, and from that we inductively prove that the theorem holds for “N+1” inhabitants.

As such we only need to prove directly for one person (and it is done) and then from any “N” we can inductively prove it for “N+1”. Therefore, no matter how many inhabitants are in a world, it is always possible to instantiate the version, where all will choose correctly.

QED.

PS: If you don’t understand the method of mathematical induction, go back and sue your high school. They deserve to be taken for every penny they have.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

A) even though you have not shown me to have “misunderstood” molinism, i have already pointed out that i am willing to call the position i have explained and defended by whatever name you please: nothing of any substance follows from the name given to the position.

OK, fair enough.

B) you haven’t even explained what you understand as “classical theism”, and why it’s even worth defending.

“Classical theism” is the Divine attributes (particularly omnipotence and omniscience) as classically understood, e.g. by Augustine and Aquinas. To be distinguished from modern theologies, e.g. open-view theism. The problem of evil is IMO the big reason why many have discarded classical theism in favor of something else.

sure, but necessarily, god cannot actualize the free choices of other beings.

ergo, god is constrained with regard to the worlds he can actualize.

And this is precisely where the FWD becomes self-contradictory. If necessarily God cannot actualize a given set of free choices of other beings, constraining God to create a world where a certain set of choices exist then those choices are necessary facts and not contingent facts. Yet the FWD continues to insist they are contingent facts.

…you can keep saying it and saying it, but that’s not going to make it so.

you still have not explained why god’s inability to actualize the free choices of other beings is a denial of omnipotence any more than is god’s inability to create square circles or rocks heavier than he can lift.

Yes I have explained it. I am saying that God’s omnipotence demands He be able to create any world with any set of contingent truths. If these free choices are contingent truths, then God’s omnipotence demands He be able to actualize them. If they are necessary truths (such as a circle can’t have four corners), then, and only then, is His failure to able to actualize a given set of choices not a denial of His omnipotence. However this demands compatibilist free will and is irreconciliable with libertarian free will, which the FWD incoherently posits.

because god knows every true proposition, and among those propositions are counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, such as “if P were in situation S, then P would choose C”.

You’re presuming that counterfactuals are, in fact, true propositions. That has implications fatal to your case.

no, not at all: his knowledge is a result of what A would choose if A were in those circumstances. that’s what a counterfactual of freedom is…

This presupposes that the statement “A would choose C in circumstance B” has a truth-value of true or false. If A does not in fact choose C in circumstance B in every possible world then the counterfactual does not have a truth-value of true or false, but null, and hence can’t be known by God.

again, wrong: he knows what every free being would do in any world god might actualize; so god knows before he actualizes any world, what free choices will be made by the freely choosing inhabitants of that world, because he knows in which circumstances the subjects of the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom will actually find themselves.

Do these counterfactuals apply in all possible worlds or only in a particular set of possible worlds? According to Molinism they apply in all possible worlds: that’s where they get their truth value from. The circumstances don’t cause, but they do pre-determine, A’s action *necessarily. *This you admit when you say that God knows what A’s choice will be because He knows the circumstances B in which A will find himself. A choosing C in circumstance B is a necessary truth in a Molinistic framework.

But then you have to back-track in order to maintain that a world in which A chooses otherwise is still a possible world, and thus open yourself up to the argument made by Molina’s Dominican opponents. In your version the counterfactuals only really apply in a particular set of possible worlds, for there are possible worlds in which the counterfactual is false. Your “counterfactual” therefore actually has no truth-value and as such could not be “known by God”.

What is known by God is only the set of contingent truths in the world He chooses to actualize. No classical theist of any flavor would deny this. But your “counterfactual” really is this: “A would choose C in circumstance B in given world W”. Then to the argument why isn’t there a possible world W’ in which A chooses ~C
(possible meaning a world God can actualize)

The Thomist replies: there is. God chose to actualize W.
The Molinist replies: there is not. A choosing C is a necessary fact, just like a circle can’t have four corners.
You reply: God can’t actualize W’ because A in fact chooses C in circumstance B. But he only does so in world W according to your “counterfactual”. Thus the truth value of “A chooses C in circumstance B” is not true, but “null” and you are bereft of argument as to why God can’t actualize W’.

so you have demonstrated neither (A) that god’s inability to actualize the free choices of other beings mitigates his omnipotence;

No, I have not demonstrated that, nor did I claim to. What I did demonstrate was if God cannot actualize the free choices of other beings (meaning choose between two worlds W and W’), that makes their choices *necessary, *and not contingent facts given the circumstances, which demands compatibilist free will (at least to the extent choices are pre-determined by circumstances).

nor (B) that his knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom mitigates his omniscience.

How could knowledge of something “mitigate” His omniscience? What I did say is that it is against classical theism and the traditional definition of omniscience to say that God knows how his creatures act only as the result of them so acting. Now if the truth-value of the counterfactual is in fact “null”, and God does not cause or predetermine his creatures’ actions, then God can have such prior knowledge only as the result of the specific choice He makes as to which world to actualize.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

PS: If you don’t understand the method of mathematical induction, go back and sue your high school. They deserve to be taken for every penny they have.

Most of the posters here are American. I’ll wager that at least 95% of American students don’t get taught about mathematical induction in high school. Unfortunately, the secondary education system is already bankrupt, so “taking them for every penny they have” sums to zero. Maybe we should sue colleges instead?

 

[ateista]

Most of the posters here are American. I’ll wager that at least 95% of American students don’t get taught about mathematical induction in high school. Unfortunately, the secondary education system is already bankrupt, so “taking them for every penny they have” sums to zero. Maybe we should sue colleges instead?

Hehe, sure thing! Truth is I was born, raised and educated in Europe, so I may be misinformed.

Fortunately, I have some time, (and used to be a math prof) so, if someone would like to learn about mathematical induction, I can help them out. It is a simple concept.

Do you think that I just wasted my time to prove (mathematically) that God can indeed create a world where everyone chooses freely and correctly?

 

[tobias]

As such we only need to prove directly for one person (and it is done) and then from any “N” we can inductively prove it for “N+1”. Therefore, no matter how many inhabitants are in a world, it is always possible to instantiate the version, where all will choose correctly.

I already pointed out that it possible and is in fact this world, according to any classical catechetical approach. You must not understand catholicism very well ( like many catholics)

 

[fhansen]

Hehe, sure thing! Truth is I was born, raised and educated in Europe, so I may be misinformed.

Fortunately, I have some time, (and used to be a math prof) so, if someone would like to learn about mathematical induction, I can help them out. It is a simple concept.

Do you think that I just wasted my time to prove (mathematically) that God can indeed create a world where everyone chooses freely and correctly?

Doesn’t step one just prove that everyone can choose freely and correctly?

 

[ateista]

I already pointed out that it possible and is in fact this world, according to any classical catechetical approach. You must not understand catholicism very well ( like many catholics)

This is a mathematical proof, and it does not depend on Catholicism at all. It only depends on the classical definition of libertarian free will. As such it completely demolishes the “free will defense” for the existence of moral evil.

Now the question again arises: why did God instantiate a world where there is moral evil? The “free will” defense does not apply any more.

 

[ateista]

Doesn’t step one just prove that everyone can choose freely and correctly?

Yes, it does only that.

It is the second step (the inductive step) which propagates this fact from “N” people to “N+1” people. This is the beauty of mathematical induction.

The first step is only needed as a starting point. If we could only prove that a property gets inherited from “N” to “N+1” without having a starting point established, the whole process would be “hanging in the air” - so to speak.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

This is a mathematical proof, and it does not depend on Catholicism at all. It only depends on the classical definition of libertarian free will. As such it completely demolishes the “free will defense” for the existence of moral evil.

Now the question again arises: why did God instantiate a world where there is moral evil? The “free will” defense does not apply any more.

To be precise, you (and I) have only refuted the “free will defense” in the case of libertarian free will. It could still apply in the case of compatibilist free will, where the choices of creatures are pre-determined by the circumstances. Here though the objection is that those actions are metaphysically pre-determined.

 

[ateista]

To be precise, you (and I) have only refuted the “free will defense” in the case of libertarian free will.

Yes, exactly. The assumption of undetermined, libertarian free will is essential to this reasoning.

It could still apply in the case of compatibilist free will, where the choices of creatures are pre-determined by the circumstances. Here though the objection is that those actions are metaphysically pre-determined.

And precisely that is the reason that I am disinclined to call it “free will”.

Of course, libertarian free will cannot be established, it is just a very plausible assumption. In theory it could be proven or refuted. This proof would be:

1. take a “snapshot” of the Universe
2. store the snapshout “outside” the Universe
3. “rewind” the Universe to a previous state, and allow it to resume
4. comparing the “new” state with the snapshot.

If they are different, then libertarian free will exists. But this is just a thought experiment, which cannot be carried out. Even if time reversal would be possible, the snapshot cannot be stored “outside” the Universe.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Of course, libertarian free will cannot be established, it is just a very plausible assumption.

I do not consider it plausible in the framework of classical theism. In classical theism, God is the First Cause of all that exists, and all that is good (evil, in classical theism, is the privation of some good). But in libertarian free will a good choice of a free creature, choosing salvation, exists without cause or even explanation. The LFW defender may put on a Molinist hat and claim that God, knowing the counterfactuals of freedom, arranges things such that the elect choose salvation but the counterfactual of freedom itself exists without explanation, since it is not a necessary truth.

Although I haven’t followed this debate much, even among secular philosophers libertarian free will has fallen into disfavor. Compatibilism is the preferred position. If things “just happen” without explanation there is no philosophy. Of course science had this debate a long time ago about the implications of randomness in quantum mechanics, but science got off the hook because it is not concerned with ultimate explanations. A physicist can say “shut up and calculate”. A philosopher cannot.

 

[ateista]

I do not consider it plausible in the framework of classical theism.

I don’t know about that. But then again, classical theism does not carry a lot of weight for me.

In classical theism, God is the First Cause of all that exists, and all that is good (evil, in classical theism, is the privation of some good).

I strongly disagree with this view. The privation of some good is either neutral or bad. Evil - moral evil (of course) cannot exist if there are no conscious beings, who have the capability to conceptualize. Yet, privation of some goods can happen.

Although I haven’t followed this debate much, even among secular philosophers libertarian free will has fallen into disfavor.

Interesting, and I completely unfamiliar with this. What is this debate?

Compatibilism is the preferred position.

For me “compatibilist free will” is just a euphemism for “determinism”. Of course none of our decisions happen in a vacuum, and our decisions are influenced by the external circumstances and our internal disposition toward them. If our decisions are fully determined by these, then it is not “free” in any sense of the word. So “compatibilist free will” is an oxymoron.

Taking a simple example: “one debates whether to buy a lottery ticket” or not. The chances of significant winnings are very small, but the amount of risk is also small. One may toss a “mental” coin, and decide accordingly. Or one may even base the decision on a random quantum event. Yes, it could be argued that the decision was “caused” by the outcome of this random event, but that would be stretching the “causation” a bit too far.

If things “just happen” without explanation there is no philosophy.

I have no problem with this view. After all philosophy is the mind-game of well-fed individuals, who don’t have to worry where their next meal will come from. I don’t “value” philosophy a whole lot. It is a fun game, but games are for those who can afford to “waste” time on such fruitless endeavors.

Of course science had this debate a long time ago about the implications of randomness in quantum mechanics, but science got off the hook because it is not concerned with ultimate explanations. A physicist can say “shut up and calculate”. A philosopher cannot.

Right on. The philosophers “painted” themselves into a corner. I say: good luck and good riddence. Now, not all of the pieces of philosophy are fruitless. Epistemology is useful. Ethics can be also. But “ultimate” explanations sound a bit silly to me. The more we know the larger the amount we don’t know.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I don’t know about that. But then again, classical theism does not carry a lot of weight for me.

Obviously, given your screenname.

I strongly disagree with this view. The privation of some good is either neutral or bad. Evil - moral evil (of course) cannot exist if there are no conscious beings, who have the capability to conceptualize. Yet, privation of some goods can happen.

Not following you here. Since this is a problem of evil thread, perhaps you could elaborate. You seem to be agreeing that evil is the privation of good.

Interesting, and I completely unfamiliar with this. What is this debate?

Try here for a good review.

For me “compatibilist free will” is just a euphemism for “determinism”. Of course none of our decisions happen in a vacuum, and our decisions are influenced by the external circumstances and our internal disposition toward them. If our decisions are fully determined by these, then it is not “free” in any sense of the word. So “compatibilist free will” is an oxymoron.

Indeed, “compatibilist free will” is just a consequence of determinism. However, “libertarian free will” doesn’t fare too well either.

Taking a simple example: “one debates whether to buy a lottery ticket” or not. The chances of significant winnings are very small, but the amount of risk is also small. One may toss a “mental” coin, and decide accordingly. Or one may even base the decision on a random quantum event. Yes, it could be argued that the decision was “caused” by the outcome of this random event, but that would be stretching the “causation” a bit too far.

Given that mind function correlates with brain function, let’s say a random quantum event in our brain causes a different set of neurons to fire than otherwise, resulting in a different decision. Well, granted, this decision was undetermined by circumstances or disposition but nevertheless in what sense is it “our” decision?

I have no problem with this view. After all philosophy is the mind-game of well-fed individuals, who don’t have to worry where their next meal will come from…

That used to be the case, but nowadays many don’t have tenure…

 

[ateista]

Not following you here. Since this is a problem of evil thread, perhaps you could elaborate. You seem to be agreeing that evil is the privation of good.

Sorry. “Good” is a very generic term. The language does not differentiate between a “naturally beneficial” event and “intentionally beneficial” action. Interestingly enough its opposite gets subdivided into simply “bad” or “detrimental event” (natural event) and “evil action” (morally bad). And in both cases there is the middle ground, something that is neither beneficial, nor detrimental, which is neutral or indifferent.

The “negation” of good is “not good” (or ungood in 1984 ), which can be neutral or bad. The “opposite” of good is “bad”. The word “privation” is synonymous with “negation” (or “lack of”) and not the opposite - at least that is my understanding.

Something is morally evil if it intentionally causes something that is detrimental. It is more than just being unhelpful (after all help is not always needed), it actively and intentionally attempts to harm someone.

Try here for a good review.

Thanks. The SEP is good source…

Indeed, “compatibilist free will” is just a consequence of determinism.

As such it does not “deserve” the label “free will”.

However, “libertarian free will” doesn’t fare too well either.

Given that mind function correlates with brain function, let’s say a random quantum event in our brain causes a different set of neurons to fire than otherwise, resulting in a different decision. Well, granted, this decision was undetermined by circumstances or disposition but nevertheless in what sense is it “our” decision?

I understand this objection. However, the neurological ways and means are simply unknown. We don’t actually know how the mind reaches a decision.

My view is that the complexity of the brain “creates” the mind, which so complex that the “free will” is an emergent property. This is no explanation, of course. Now, we do know that only a fraction of mind “resides” in the conscious part of the brain, most of it “dwells” in the subconscious. And its workings are unknown to us.

Regardless of the theological consequences, in our everyday life we must assume that we are free agents, who are held responsible for our actions. If it could be shown that the “free will” is just an illusion, then we would have to re-evaluate all our judicial system and the whole moral system. Justice and morality would become something that is a “farce”, since “we” (our minds) are not responsible for our decisions and actions.

Moreover, if we would deny that we are “free agents”, we would have to deny the concept of “I”, too. We would have to view ourselves as highly complicated automatons, whose “programming” decides what we are going to do. All the “art” could be reduced to very complex mathematical functions. I wonder how could anyone seriously contemplate this. To me the hypothesis that we are free agents, without actually knowing how this “freedom” emerges is much more plausible than the opposite.

As a matter of fact, if one could show that our free will is just an illusion, it would be a very good proof for God’s existence, but it would also throw the whole classical theology into the trash can.

 

[fhansen]

Taking a simple example: “one debates whether to buy a lottery ticket” or not. The chances of significant winnings are very small, but the amount of risk is also small. One may toss a “mental” coin, and decide accordingly. Or one may even base the decision on a random quantum event. Yes, it could be argued that the decision was “caused” by the outcome of this random event, but that would be stretching the “causation” a bit too far.

In Catholic teaching or theology, the question of free will is important mainly in regard to whether or not we decide to obey God-and not so much about the motivation behind our decision to go to the ballgame. And the decision for obedience is not so much an all-at-once event or statement or declaration but rather a way of life-many ongoing or continuous decisions- which make our lives an overall statement as to our choice. The circumstances, such as how much time we’re given, all play into the equation but in any case our entire lives are an expression of faith or lack of faith in God and even then its not static-conversion is considered to be a life-long process.

Something is morally evil if it intentionally causes something that is detrimental. It is more than just being unhelpful (after all help is not always needed), it actively and intentionally attempts to harm someone.

Catholic theology would, I believe, consider this scenario to reflect the privation of love-the ultimate good.

 

[ateista]

In Catholic teaching or theology, the question of free will is important mainly in regard to whether or not we decide to obey God-and not so much about the motivation behind our decision to go to the ballgame. And the decision for obedience is not so much an all-at-once event or statement or declaration but rather a way of life-many ongoing or continuous decisions- which make our lives an overall statement as to our choice. The circumstances, such as how much time we’re given, all play into the equation but in any case our entire lives are an expression of faith or lack of faith in God and even then its not static-conversion is considered to be a life-long process.

That is quite all right. The problem at hand is the questoin of “free will”. If we do not have libertarian free will, then there is no personal responsibility.

Catholic theology would, I believe, consider this scenario to reflect the privation of love-the ultimate good.

The lack (privation) of love is not hate. Neutrality toward something is not the same as actively attempting to cause intentional harm. I don’t think this is hair-splitting.

 

[tobias]

I restrict this discussion to moral evil, and specifically, moral evil leading to damnation. I will show that this remains an unsolved, and in fact, insoluble problem. While there exist logical solutions, they come at the cost of some other tenet of classical theism or **Catholicism. **

 I've read a lot in this thread about problems that different schools of philisophical thought have with the free will defense, but have yet to see repudiation of the catholic stance on free will and the purported undermining of other catholic tenants that follow.
  Or are we mistakingly equating Thomism with catholicism?

 

[ateista]

I’ve read a lot in this thread about problems that different schools of philisophical thought have with the free will defense, but have yet to see repudiation of the catholic stance on free will and the purported undermining of other catholic tenants that follow.
Or are we mistakingly equating Thomism with catholicism?

If the Catholic view of “free will” is equivalent with “libertarian free will” (which it must be, because the “compatibilist free will” is just a euphemism for “determinism”), then I gave a mathematical proof that it would be possible to instantiate a world with “libertarian free will” and without sin. This proof is based upon the libertarian view of free will, and does not need nor depends on the different schools. Praise be good ole’ math!