The Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense

[tobias]

If the Catholic view of “free will” is equivalent with “libertarian free will” (which it must be, because the “compatibilist free will” is just a euphemism for “determinism”), then I gave a mathematical proof that it would be possible to instantiate a world with “libertarian free will” and without sin. This proof is based upon the libertarian view of free will, and does not need nor depends on the different schools. Praise be good ole’ math!

All your mathematical proof did was to back up the catholic notion that this is that world of libertarian free will. What is lacking is in repudiating that the fall was the most probable outcome because of said free will. Again, what tenant of catholicism is on trial here?

 

[ateista]

All your mathematical proof did was to back up the catholic notion that this is that world of libertarian free will.

Looks like we have some serious misunderstandings here. This world is the result of God’s decision where he instantiated the world, where the fall of man happened. It was not a logical necessity.

The usual “free will defense” says that God values “free will” so much that he is willing to “put up” with “moral evil”, because moral evil is the necessary, unavoidable consequence of free will.

And precisely that defense is what has been proven to be false. The proof shows, that God could have instantiated a world, where free will is allowed, and yet no one will choose to do evil, that there will be no “fall of man”.

What is lacking is in repudiating that the fall was the most probable outcome because of said free will.

And, pray tell, what has “probability” have to do with God’s decisions? God cannot instantiate worlds with square circles, married bachelors and other logically impossible scenarios. But improbable ones? Surely God can (or could) instantiate any logically possible world, no matter how improbable that world might be.

Again, what tenant of catholicism is on trial here?

None at all. The “free will defense” is used both by Catholics and Protestants. And it is proven to be a bogus defense.

Now comes the real question: if the existence of free will does not explain why this world contains evil, then what does? Why did God instantiate a world with moral evil?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

tobias:

 I've read a lot in this thread about problems that different schools of philisophical thought have with the free will defense, but have yet to see repudiation of the catholic stance on free will and the purported undermining of other catholic tenants that follow.
  Or are we mistakingly equating Thomism with catholicism?

Let’s look at the possibilities for free will:

Libertarian free will is true. Then the free will defense fails. God could actualize a world in which all chose the good. God is supposed to be intensely desirous of our salvation, yet refuses to do what will bring it about.

Compatibilist free will is true, in the sense our choices are caused by God. Then the free will defense also fails, and the argument follows as above.

Now all this may fit in a Calvinist framework where God doesn’t want the salvation of all, but only the elect. But it’s Catholic doctrine Christ died for all, not just the elect, and that God really does desire the salvation of all.

All this could also fit in an open-theist framework where God doesn’t know what world to actualize in order to bring about the desired result; He only knows what choices we make as a result of our making them. But it’s Catholic doctrine (and also classical theism) that God, being immutable, cannot “learn” anything.

Finally:

Compatibilist free will is true, in the sense our choices are pre-determined by external circumstances. In this case the free will defense succeeds, against the logical problem of evil. It is (epistemically) possible that the counterfactuals are such that God cannot, no matter how He arranges things, bring about the salvation of all. But then humans are constrained by some sort of necessity to sin, making God’s punishment unjust.

 

[Camron]

The usual “free will defense” says that God values “free will” so much that he is willing to “put up” with “moral evil”, because moral evil is the necessary, unavoidable consequence of free will.

I think it’s more like God loves “us” so much that He is willing to “put up” with our “free-will”, the unnecessary and yet unavoidable consequence of sinning.

This would need to be clarified further. But that’s generally how I see it.

 

[ateista]

I think it’s more like God loves “us” so much that He is willing to “put up” with our “free-will”, the unnecessary and yet unavoidable consequence of sinning.

This would need to be clarified further. But that’s generally how I see it.

That is the direct opposite of the usual reasoning, which goes like this:

God wishes to be loved by us, but he does not want that love to be coerced or forced. He does not want the “programmed” love of automatons. He wants that love to be freely given. Therefore he made us free agents, who have the freedom to love or reject him. So far, so good, no problem.

The problem is that the proponents of this scenario also argue that our freedom necessarily and unavoidably leads to moral evil (or sin). And that consequence is now proven false. It is possible to have a world of free agents, all of which will freely choose moral behavior, and avoid moral evil.

So the question arises again: Since God wishes to be loved freely, and desires the “salvation” of all, and that scenario is logically and metaphysically possible - then why did not create the world so?

 

[john_doran]

And this is precisely where the FWD becomes self-contradictory. If necessarily God cannot actualize a given set of free choices of other beings, constraining God to create a world where a certain set of choices exist then those choices are necessary facts and not contingent facts. Yet the FWD continues to insist they are contingent facts.

this is just false. period.

all that’s necessary for some state of affairs to be logically possible is that it be logically consistent.

all that’s required for somet state of affairs to be metaphysically possible is that it be actualizable by someone.

you are simply making the undefended assumption that metaphysical possibility requires that god be capable of actualizing the state of affairs in question. i, for one, reject it (as do most if not all other molinists).

why should anyone believe this assumption of yours?

SeekingCatholic:

Yes I have explained it. I am saying that God’s omnipotence demands He be able to create any world with any set of contingent truths. If these free choices are contingent truths, then God’s omnipotence demands He be able to actualize them. If they are necessary truths (such as a circle can’t have four corners), then, and only then, is His failure to able to actualize a given set of choices not a denial of His omnipotence. However this demands compatibilist free will and is irreconciliable with libertarian free will, which the FWD incoherently posits.

propositions about free choices are contingent truths that are not up to god to make true.

what is impossible is that god actualize any state of affars that contains a free choice that is not his own (more precisely, perhaps, god cannot actualize a state of affars which contains a free choice being actualized by someone other than the chooser; that state of affairs is self-contradictory).

and you have yet to explain why there cannot be contingent truths that are not up to god to make true; just reiterating your point over and over again does not constitute an explanation.

SeekingCatholic:

You’re presuming that counterfactuals are, in fact, true propositions. That has implications fatal to your case.

none that you have demonstrated.

SeekingCatholic:

This presupposes that the statement “A would choose C in circumstance B” has a truth-value of true or false. If A does not in fact choose C in circumstance B in every possible world then the counterfactual does not have a truth-value of true or false, but null, and hence can’t be known by God.

no: if A chooses D in circumstances B in some possible world, then the proposition “A would choose C is circumstances B” is ***false ***at that world.

SeekingCatholic:

Do these counterfactuals apply in all possible worlds or only in a particular set of possible worlds?

i don’t know what this means.

if a proposition *P *is true in some possible world, W, then the proposition "P is true in W" is true at every possible world.

SeekingCatholic:

According to Molinism they apply in all possible worlds:

in the simple modal sense that i have outlined above, no one denies that they “apply” in all possible worlds.

SeekingCatholic:

that’s where they get their truth value from.

i’m not sure how to understand this, since, on the face of it, it is so badly wrong that i have to assume that you must have used the words idiomatically.

SeekingCatholic:

The circumstances don’t cause, but they do pre-determine, A’s action *necessarily. *This you admit when you say that God knows what A’s choice will be because He knows the circumstances B in which A will find himself. A choosing C in circumstance B is a necessary truth in a Molinistic framework.

no, no no.

…your understanding iof the modalities involved in the molinist position seems to be wildly off-base, which makes me at a loss as to how to continue; it’s like we’re speaking different languages which have some words that just happen to sound the same…

SeekingCatholic:

But then you have to back-track in order to maintain that a world in which A chooses otherwise is still a possible world, and thus open yourself up to the argument made by Molina’s Dominican opponents. In your version the counterfactuals only really apply in a particular set of possible worlds, for there are possible worlds in which the counterfactual is false. Your “counterfactual” therefore actually has no truth-value and as such could not be “known by God”.

this makes no sense…

there is a possible world where A chooses otherwise, because it ***is ***possible for A to choose otherwise, since A is free; it is possible that ***A ***chose differently than she did. it just happens that A doesn’t choose otherwise, and since (those segments of) possible worlds containing free choices are only capable of being actualized by the beings whose free choices they are, god cannot actualize those world-segments which contain a different choice than was actually made.

SeekingCatholic:

What is known by God is only the set of contingent truths in the world He chooses to actualize. No classical theist of any flavor would deny this.

sure, if by “contingent truth”, you mean “state of affairs that is actual”; how could god know what’s actual unless it is, in fact, actual?

but nothing i’ve said contests this (how could it? it’s a simple tautology).

SeekingCatholic:

But your “counterfactual” really is this: “A would choose C in circumstance B in given world W”. Then to the argument why isn’t there a possible world W’ in which A chooses ~C
(possible meaning a world God can actualize)

…and let’s stop there.

until you can demonstrate that “possible” can only reasonably mean “capable of being actualized by god”, we cannot usefully continue this discussion.

 

[john_doran]

There are 4 possible worlds:

W1 - where both “A” and “B” choose correctly. W2 - where “A” will choose correctly and “B” will choose incorrectly.W3 - where “A” will choose incorrectly and “B” will choose correctly.W4 - where both “A” and “B” will choose incorrectly.Of these 4 worlds we need to examine W1 and W2 only, because according to Step #1, “A” can choose correctly. This is the inductive step, so pay close attention, please.

If, of these two worlds (W1 and W2), only W2 can be instantiated, then “B” has no free will. Therefore W1 can be instantiated, and thus all the inhabitants can choose correctly.
​

this makes the assumption that god can actualize any logically possible world; the ***molinist ***position that you and SeekingCatholic are attempting to discredit, however, rejects this assumption.

as i have pointed out numerous times on this thread, it is up to the beings making the choices in each world to actualize those world-segments containing those choices.

so. even if a world where everyone chooses freely to be saved is logicaly possible, it may not be actualizeable; that is, it is possible that a world full of freely saved beings not be capable of being actualized by god.

and that just ***is ***the free will defense: that god may not be able to actualize a world where everyone freely choses to be saved.

ergo, the free will defense goes through.
QED.

 

[ateista]

this makes the assumption that god can actualize any logically possible world; the ***molinist ***position that you and SeekingCatholic are attempting to discredit, however, rejects this assumption.

You can reject any assumption you like, but unless you can substantiate that there are logically possible worlds, which cannot be actualized, your rejection is empty and void. It should be easy: all you need is one example. (And no, I will not accept that it “may” not be possible. That is pure BS.)

as i have pointed out numerous times on this thread, it is up to the beings making the choices in each world to actualize those world-segments containing those choices.

As long as the beings have true, libertarian free will. The “compatibilist free will” (if I am not mistaken that is the Molinist stance, please correct me if I am wrong) is just a fancy euphemism for “determinism”.

As a matter of fact we seemed to agree that it is possible to instantiate a world with one human being and without sin. All that is needed to show that the mathematical induction goes through. The inductive step from “N” to “N+1” beings only assumes the existence of libertarian free will, nothing else.

 

[john_doran]

You can reject any assumption you like, but unless you can substantiate that there are logically possible worlds, which cannot be actualized, your rejection is empty and void. It should be easy: all you need is one example. (And no, I will not accept that it “may” not be possible. That is pure BS.)

i’m not sure what you’re looking for from me, but i’m simply pointing out that one of your assumptions is such that the molinist free-will defender does not, in fact, grant it.

and he doesn’t grant it because the very basis of the “libertarian” free will that she is assuming holds true is that only beings with free will can make their own choices.

i assume that you have misunderstood my post, because asking for an example of the position makes no sense: if the molinist is correct about free will, then god cannot actualize world-segments containing the free choices of beings other than himself; i can point you to an example of a free choice (e.g. my becoming a lawyer rather than a doctor), but what do you suppose would constitute an example of “it being impossible for any being but me to actualize my choice to become a lawyer”? that impossibility follows logically from the premises of the libertarian thesis.

ateista:

As long as the beings have true, libertarian free will.

sure, but that’s precisely the kind of freedom that the molinist does, in fact, assume human beings to have.

ateista:

The “compatibilist free will” (if I am not mistaken that is the Molinist stance, please correct me if I am wrong) is just a fancy euphemism for “determinism”.

i agree.

ateista:

As a matter of fact we seemed to agree that it is possible to instantiate a world with one human being and without sin. All that is needed to show that the mathematical induction goes through. The inductive step from “N” to “N+1” beings only assumes the existence of libertarian free will, nothing else.

A) i don’t necessarily agree that it there is a possible world with one sinless human - it is difficult for me to understand how the only free being in a whole universe could be relevantly “human” (where did she come from? how does she know anything? how does she survive? etc.);

B) but assuming that there is a logically possible world with some number of beings who always choose correctly (let’s call it world ACC), it still doesn’t follow that such a world is actualizable by god; to the contrary: if the libertarian assumption is granted, then ACC* cannot*** be actualized by god, simply because world-segments containing free choices can only be actualized by the beings whose free choices those segments contain.

but possibly there is no world (sufficiently like this one) where all of its free beings actually always choose correctly. and the possibility of that follows simply and straightforwardly from the fact that there is no (obvious) logical inconsistency in such a concept.

 

[tobias]

Looks like we have some serious misunderstandings here. This world is the result of God’s decision where he instantiated the world, where the fall of man happened. It was not a logical necessity.

 Yes we do have misunderstandings! I say the fall was logical probability.

ateista:

The usual “free will defense” says that God values “free will” so much that he is willing to “put up” with “moral evil”, because moral evil is the necessary, unavoidable consequence of free will.

 No! Moral evil is the necessary, unavoidable consequence of the misuse of free will. Look at our American freedom. Are we free to do what we will? No, we are not free to murder, or take what we will. When these evils are commited there is a breach in the proper use of freedom, and punishment is applied. As with God, freedom isleft unhindered that the good may freely be chosen.

ateista:

And precisely that defense is what has been proven to be false. The proof shows, that God could have instantiated a world, where free will is allowed, and yet no one will choose to do evil, that there will be no “fall of man”.

No! You merely demonstrated that  God could instantiate a world where all are free to choose rightly, but in no way backed up that a fall could be unaquivically avoided without interference of free will ( of course without predestination, which is contrary to free will).

ateista:

And, pray tell, what has “probability” have to do with God’s decisions? God cannot instantiate worlds with square circles, married bachelors and other logically impossible scenarios. But improbable ones? Surely God can (or could) instantiate any logically possible world, no matter how improbable that world might be.

 How can you not correlate decisions with probability?  If I toss a coin in the air 3 million times it is very improbable that it will land on heads each time, though not impossible. If free will is free, able to choose one side or the other, do not the laws of probability have to be factored in. Or are we selective in our application of mathematics, they either apply or they do not concerning free will. 
 It seems your trying to make a square circle, by saying free will can be fixed. A circle has no angles, as soon as you say it can have 4 angles, you no longer have a circle. A will that is free has choices, as soon as you say there is only 1 choice it is no longer free. A fixed free will is oximoronic, like a coin toss at the start of a ball game with a 2 headed coin.

ateista:

None at all. The “free will defense” is used both by Catholics and Protestants. And it is proven to be a bogus defense.

 The only proof thus far given is in disagreement.

atiesta:

Now comes the real question: if the existence of free will does not explain why this world contains evil, then what does? Why did God instantiate a world with moral evil?

 The existence of truly 'free' will does in fact explain the existence of moral evil as I have pointed out. God did not instantiate a world 'with' moral evil, but one where it is possible and plausible. It is illogical to keep trying to insert the square peg of fixed decision into the circle of 'free' will.
  The real question is:If there is no capacity to freely choose, how then are acts considered to be moral evil? Your conclusions could only lead one to deny moral evil as a reality.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

this is just false. period.

all that’s necessary for some state of affairs to be logically possible is that it be logically consistent.

all that’s required for somet state of affairs to be metaphysically possible is that it be actualizable by someone.

We’re agreed so far.

you are simply making the undefended assumption that metaphysical possibility requires that god be capable of actualizing the state of affairs in question. i, for one, reject it (as do most if not all other molinists).

why should anyone believe this assumption of yours?

It’s not “my” assumption. It’s the assumption of classical theism. It’s the classic definition of omnipotence.

Again, I do not deny that you can uphold the free will defense if you deny one of the bedrock assumptions of classical theism. But then, bye-bye Five Ways.

I’ll go through it logically step by step.

1. There exist, potentially, metaphysical goods (right choices by free creatures in some metaphysically possible world) which nevertheless God is incapable of actualizing (your assumption).
2. There exist, actually, right choices by free creatures in the present world. (premise).
3. There exist, actually, metaphysical goods which God has not actualized. (From 1 & 2).
4. An actualized good is actualized by something else. (premise)
5. There exist metaphysical goods actualized by some other entity than God. (From 3 & 4).
6. This entity must be either actualized by God, or some other entity besides itself (from 4).
7. If this entity is actualized by God, then the metaphysical goods in 3) are also actualized by God (from transitivity of causation).
8. Therefore, this entity is not actualized by God, but by some other entity (3 & modus tollens).
9. But this entity must be either actualized by God, or some other entity besides itself (from 4).
10. 1. through 9) keeping looping over and over again. Therefore, an infinite regress exists, with no entity in the series actualized by God, and no First Cause.

Or, alternatively, 4) is wrong and there are self-actualizing entities, and thus many different first causes of causal chains besides God. Either way, classical metaphysics, metaphysical proofs for God’s existence, and the God as First Cause are in the trash can.

propositions about free choices are contingent truths that are not up to god to make true.

And if they are not up to god to make true, how are they not necessary truths? It is impossible they be otherwise.

what is impossible is that god actualize any state of affars that contains a free choice that is not his own

Where’s the proof of this? Classical theism says just the opposite.

(more precisely, perhaps, god cannot actualize a state of affars which contains a free choice being actualized by someone other than the chooser; that state of affairs is self-contradictory)…

No, God can actualize things such that the chooser infallibly, though freely, makes the choice. This is the traditional explanation of efficacious grace. And there is no self-contradiction in that.

and you have yet to explain why there cannot be contingent truths that are not up to god to make true; just reiterating your point over and over again does not constitute an explanation.

No, what I keep explaining is that if there are contingent truths that are not up to god to make true, then this goes against the classical idea of omnipotence and God as First Cause.

What is the definition of a contingent truth?

A truth that is only the case in some possible worlds, not all.

What makes a world a possible world? A world actualizable by someone.

But if the world not be actualizable by God, then there are metaphysical goods not actualizable by God, and thus not actualized by God.

no: if A chooses D in circumstances B in some possible world, then the proposition “A would choose C is circumstances B” is ***false ***at that world.

Yes, false, in that world. But that does nothing whatsoever to establish the truth-value of the counterfactual. Your argument is essentially circular. It goes like this:

God could not create a world in which A chooses C in circumstance B.
Why not?
Because of the counterfactual in which A always chooses ~C.
From whence derives the truth value of the counterfactual?
Because A chooses ~C in circumstance B in world W.
But what about a world W’ in which A chooses C?
It’s impossible for God to actualize because of the counterfactual in which A always chooses ~C.
How is the counterfactual true?
Because A chooses ~C in circumstance B in world W.

Etc…

if a proposition *P *is true in some possible world, W, then the proposition "P is true in W" is true at every possible world.

Don’t be silly. It’s the proposition P not “P is true in W” that you need to have a counterfactual forbidding the creation of world W’ in which P is false.

in the simple modal sense that i have outlined above, no one denies that they “apply” in all possible worlds.

Then there is no possible world in which A chooses C, if the counterfactuals apply in all possible worlds.

there is a possible world where A chooses otherwise, because it ***is ***possible for A to choose otherwise, since A is free; it is possible that ***A ***chose differently than she did. it just happens that A doesn’t choose otherwise, and since (those segments of) possible worlds containing free choices are only capable of being actualized by the beings whose free choices they are, god cannot actualize those world-segments which contain a different choice than was actually made.

You’re putting the actual choice metaphysically and ontologically prior to God’s actualization of the world segment. Since A doesn’t in fact choose otherwise, you say, God can not actualize a world-segment in which A chooses otherwise. This is nonsense. A can’t in fact choose otherwise until A is actualized!

sure, if by “contingent truth”, you mean “state of affairs that is actual”; how could god know what’s actual unless it is, in fact, actual?

Then I bid you a grand welcome to open-view theology. God knows our choices as a result of our having made them. This is what you’re saying, right? Traditionally God knows what’s actual as it is what He has willed to actualize (because He is simple His knowing and willing are one and the same thing). But you’re stuck because (in your view) there are actualized things that God has not willed to actualize.

Open-view theology is absolutely irreconciliable with classical theism, where God cannot “learn”.

until you can demonstrate that “possible” can only reasonably mean “capable of being actualized by god”, we cannot usefully continue this discussion.

OK, I’ve demonstrated it, rigorously, above.

 

[ateista]

i’m not sure what you’re looking for from me, but i’m simply pointing out that one of your assumptions is such that the molinist free-will defender does not, in fact, grant it.

and he doesn’t grant it because the very basis of the “libertarian” free will that she is assuming holds true is that only beings with free will can make their own choices.

I am seriously confused. Is the Molinist concept of free will “libertarian” or “compatibilist”?

I said:

As long as the beings have true, libertarian free will.

sure, but that’s precisely the kind of freedom that the molinist does, in fact, assume human beings to have.

And then:

The “compatibilist free will” (if I am not mistaken that is the Molinist stance, please correct me if I am wrong) is just a fancy euphemism for “determinism”.

i agree.

Your two replies seem to contradict each other. Is the Molinist free will libertarian or compatibilist?

A) i don’t necessarily agree that it there is a possible world with one sinless human - it is difficult for me to understand how the only free being in a whole universe could be relevantly “human” (where did she come from? how does she know anything? how does she survive? etc.);

Ex nihilo, like Adam?

B) but assuming that there is a logically possible world with some number of beings who always choose correctly (let’s call it world ACC), it still doesn’t follow that such a world is actualizable by god; to the contrary: if the libertarian assumption is granted, then ACC* cannot*** be actualized by god, simply because world-segments containing free choices can only be actualized by the beings whose free choices those segments contain.

Now that is interesting. It seems to me that you deny that God played any “real” role in the “creation” of this world. He just “kicked it off”, and let things happen. That is quite acceptable to me.

You said many times that God can “actualize” a world. Now you seem to retract it and now you say that only we can actualize a world. Which one will it be?

For simplicity’s sake:

Lets assume a hypothetical world with one free, conscious being, who makes one choice. He can make the “right choice” and will get saved. Or he can make the “wrong choice” and will not get saved. If he has the freedom to do either, then there is a hypothical world “A”, where he makes the right choice and there is a hypothetical world “B” where he makes the wrong choice.

It seemes to me that you assert that God cannot actualize either world, rather he can instantiate “just-a-world”, and waits which choice will be made.

If that is what you say, that is quite all right by me. I would like to see clearly what is your stance on this issue. Maybe I was misunderstanding you this whole time.

but possibly there is no world (sufficiently like this one) where all of its free beings actually always choose correctly. and the possibility of that follows simply and straightforwardly from the fact that there is no (obvious) logical inconsistency in such a concept.

Why does it have to be “sufficiently like this one”?

 

[ateista]

Yes we do have misunderstandings! I say the fall was logical probability.

Agreed.

No! Moral evil is the necessary, unavoidable consequence of the misuse of free will.

Agreed.

No! You merely demonstrated that God could instantiate a world where all are free to choose rightly, but in no way backed up that a fall could be unaquivically avoided without interference of free will ( of course without predestination, which is contrary to free will).

We are back to square “one”. I thought that for the sake of this discussion we both agreed that God can actualize a certain world, with certain actions without “stepping on” the freedom of the beings. Does this still apply?

I will repeat the simple scenario I presented earlier:

There is a hypothetical world with one free, conscious being, who makes one choice. If he chooses rightly, he will be saved. If he chooses wrongly, he will not be saved.

Can God instantiate a world “A” where the being will choose rightly? Or can God instantiate a world “B” where the being will choose wrongly? Or are these both impossible for God, who can only instantiate a world “C” where God must “wait” and see how this being will actually decide?

Looks like the whole conversation depends on this question.

 

[tobias]

Let’s look at the possibilities for free will:

Libertarian free will is true. Then the free will defense fails. God could actualize a world in which all chose the good. God is supposed to be intensely desirous of our salvation, yet refuses to do what will bring it about.

 No, He did choose to do what would bring about the salvation of all; the incarnation, crucifixtion and resurection. But those beings with libertarian free will still possess said 'free' will. Declaring that God desires the salvation of all in no way necessitates that it be 'at all costs.'  Nor does a lack of doing so at all costs necessitate an impotency on God's part. Rather, 'free' will is demonstrated to have value by God's unwillingnes to hinder it.

seekingcatholic:

Compatibilist free will is true, in the sense our choices are caused by God. Then the free will defense also fails, and the argument follows as above.

 No, this argument fais on its own because free is removed from free will.

seekingcatholic:

Now all this may fit in a Calvinist framework where God doesn’t want the salvation of all, but only the elect. But it’s Catholic doctrine Christ died for all, not just the elect, and that God really does desire the salvation of all.

Yes, Calvinism implodes upon itself.

seekingcatholic:

All this could also fit in an open-theist framework where God doesn’t know what world to actualize in order to bring about the desired result; He only knows what choices we make as a result of our making them. But it’s Catholic doctrine (and also classical theism) that God, being immutable, cannot “learn” anything.

 If god doesn't know, it is not God. God knows our choices by us making them at the instance of our willed existence, for God, in catholicism ,is omnipresent. So it cannot be spoken of as learned, but as known

seeking catholic:

Compatibilist free will is true, in the sense our choices are pre-determined by external circumstances. In this case the free will defense succeeds, against the logical problem of evil. It is (epistemically) possible that the counterfactuals are such that God cannot, no matter how He arranges things, bring about the salvation of all. But then humans are constrained by some sort of necessity to sin, making God’s punishment unjust.

 Calvanism by another name.

If there is no ‘free’ will there is no moral evil, only neutral action. Moral evil and moral good are only meaningful propisitions about created beings if there is individual determination. Otherwise good and evil cannot be ladened with the term ‘moral’, but are relegated to mere action.
As stated in a previous post, the moral evil of deciet was commited against Man which dirrectly increased the capacity to choose moral evil ( one could argue was the direct cause ). God permits moral evil that good may be restored. If not God would truly be unjust in punishing all for the choice of the rejectors.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I am seriously confused. Is the Molinist concept of free will “libertarian” or “compatibilist”?

The answer is: they are seriously confused about it. I can do no better than refer you to the Catholic Encyclopedia’s article on Molinism.

The consideration of these serious difficulties leads us to the very heart of Molina’s system, and reveals the real Gordian knot of the whole controversy. For Molinism attempts to meet the objections just mentioned by the doctrine of the Divine scientia media. **Even Molinism must and does admit that the very idea of efficacious grace includes the free consent of the will, and also that the decree of God to bestow an efficacious grace upon a man involves with metaphysical certainty the free co-operation of the will. From this it follows that God must possess some infallible source of knowledge by means of which he knows from all eternity, with metaphysical certainty, whether in the future the will is going to co-operate with a given grace or to resist it. **When the question has assumed this form, it is easy to see that the whole controversy resolves itself into a discussion on the foreknowledge which God has of the free future acts; and thus the two opposing systems on grace are ultimately founded upon the general doctrine on God and His attributes. Both systems are confronted with the wider and deeper question: What is the medium of knowledge (medium in quo) in which God foresees the (absolute or conditioned) free operations of His rational creatures? That there must be such a medium of Divine foreknowledge is evident. The Thomists answer: God foresees the (absolute and conditioned) free acts of man in the eternal decrees of His own will, which with absolute certainty produce prœmovendo as definite prœdeterminationcs ad unum, all (absolute and conditional) free operations. With the same absolute certainty with which He knows His own will, He also foresees clearly and distinctly in the decrees of His will all future acts of man. **However, the Molinists maintain that, since, as we remarked above, the predetermining decrees of the Divine Will must logically and necessarily destroy freedom and lead to Determinism, they cannot possibly be the medium in which God infallibly foresees future free acts. **Rather these decrees must presuppose a special knowledge (scientia media), in the light of which God infallibly foresees from all eternity what attitude man’s will would in any conceivable combination of circumstances assume if this or that particular grace were offered it.

On the one hand, they claim God knows with metaphysical certainty how a creature will behave in a given situation; on the other, they decry the Thomists for “Determinism” and destruction of “freedom”. What do the Molinists mean by “freedom”? And how can a truth be “metaphysically certain” if there is a metaphysically possible world in which it is false? That is the very definition of “metaphysical certainty”. This is why I interpreted Molinism as upholding the logical possibility of a creature’s acting otherwise, but denying the metaphysical possibility. John doran and others obviously have a different understanding, but they appear to be deviating from traditional Molinism, at least it appears to me.

It seemes to me that you assert that God cannot actualize either world, rather he can instantiate “just-a-world”, and waits which choice will be made.

If that is what you say, that is quite all right by me. I would like to see clearly what is your stance on this issue. Maybe I was misunderstanding you this whole time.

That’s exactly what john doran is asserting. It comes at the cost of traditional theism though.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

If god doesn’t know, it is not God. God knows our choices by us making them at the instance of our willed existence, for God, in catholicism ,is omnipresent. So it cannot be spoken of as learned, but as known

You are an open theist. This is not the classical understanding of omniscience. God’s knowledge is dependent on what we choose to do - he has his knowledge as the result, metaphysically and ontologically, of what we do. Metaphysically, God has “learned” - there is something He knows after the creation of the world but not before.

 

[ateista]

The answer is: they are seriously confused about it. I can do no better than refer you to the Catholic Encyclopedia’s article on Molinism.

Thank you! That was my impression, too.

That’s exactly what john doran is asserting. It comes at the cost of traditional theism though.

Sure seems like it!

 

[tobias]

We are back to square “one”. I thought that for the sake of this discussion we both agreed that God can actualize a certain world, with certain actions without “stepping on” the freedom of the beings. Does this still apply?

I will repeat the simple scenario I presented earlier:

There is a hypothetical world with one free, conscious being, who makes one choice. If he chooses rightly, he will be saved. If he chooses wrongly, he will not be saved.

Can God instantiate a world “A” where the being will choose rightly? Or can God instantiate a world “B” where the being will choose wrongly? Or are these both impossible for God, who can only instantiate a world “C” where God must “wait” and see how this being will actually decide?

Looks like the whole conversation depends on this question.

 The scenario provided by you is only concrete if it is applied to 1 choice. I will repeat, the acceptance of God is not a singulary action at 1 instance of time ( apart from the abnormal conversion at the hour of death, which is atypical).  Acceptance of God means taking on what God has for you, following in obedience, in other words being- in action- what God wants us to be. 
 Your scenario fails in application, because  a free agent, unlike an object, is not fixed in action, therefore for free to remain, probability is a necessary part of the equation. So I should maybe ask you in a different way. What are the mathematical odds of say 6 billion free agents, not predestined to act in a given way, given equal opportunity to choose between 2 distinctly different paths would all choose the same path? Your scenario did not factor in the odds. For given multiplicity of possible actions and reactions, since the agents are not fixed, N and N+1 are different from one another and vastly different from N+6,000,000,000.

A fixed free agent is as logically valid as a married bachelor, so the decisions must be made by the free agent, not from without.

 

[tobias]

You are an open theist. This is not the classical understanding of omniscience. God’s knowledge is dependent on what we choose to do - he has his knowledge as the result, metaphysically and ontologically, of what we do. Metaphysically, God has “learned” - there is something He knows after the creation of the world but not before.

I am not a cafeteria christian. Why do you feel the need to label me as such? I Have read your posts, and get the impression that you are a nondenominationalist masquerading your views in athiestic language because you seek to undermine the faith of catholics. But that is merely an impression, so I don’t say ‘you are.’
You are mistaken to assert that God has any knowledge contingent upon His creations actions. To be omnipotent means an ‘all powerfull’ active will. When a creation or being or whatever may be is willed, it is. Actively willing is actively doing. This assertion goes all the way back to Genesis 1, God spoke and it was.
In addition to being omnipotent and omniscient God is also held in catholicism to be omnipresent. So for God to learn of our actions and not have inherant knowledge of creation, would mean He is subject to the constraints of time. Which I cannot accept as a catholic.

I feel the need to reiterate the fact that your whole premis on the subject is flawed. Without a fall their vis no need of salvation or redemption, and no they are not the same thing in catholicism.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

I am not a cafeteria christian. Why do you feel the need to label me as such?

I didn’t.

I Have read your posts, and get the impression that you are a nondenominationalist masquerading your views in athiestic language because you seek to undermine the faith of catholics. But that is merely an impression, so I don’t say ‘you are.’

Off-topic and ad hominem.

You are mistaken to assert that God has any knowledge contingent upon His creations actions.

I didn’t assert it. You did. You wrote:

If god doesn’t know, it is not God. God knows our choices by us making them at the instance of our willed existence, for God, in catholicism ,is omnipresent. So it cannot be spoken of as learned, but as known

“God knows our choices by us making them” is open theism.

So for God to learn of our actions and not have inherant knowledge of creation, would mean He is subject to the constraints of time. Which I cannot accept as a catholic.

So which is it? Does God know of our actions metaphysically prior to them or does He know of them because we do them? You’ve contradicted yourself.

I feel the need to reiterate the fact that your whole premis on the subject is flawed. Without a fall their vis no need of salvation or redemption, and no they are not the same thing in catholicism.

No it is not flawed, if God could have actualized a world without a fall.