The Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense

[ateista]

The scenario provided by you is only concrete if it is applied to 1 choice. I will repeat, the acceptance of God is not a singulary action at 1 instance of time ( apart from the abnormal conversion at the hour of death, which is atypical). Acceptance of God means taking on what God has for you, following in obedience, in other words being- in action- what God wants us to be.

No… it is just the first step! It is easier to take “baby-steps”. Once we can agree on this first one, I can show you how we progress from here.

I can understand your confusion. It is not a very difficult concept to master, but you have to get familiar with it.

Your scenario fails in application, because a free agent, unlike an object, is not fixed in action, therefore for free to remain, probability is a necessary part of the equation. So I should maybe ask you in a different way. What are the mathematical odds of say 6 billion free agents, not predestined to act in a given way, given equal opportunity to choose between 2 distinctly different paths would all choose the same path? Your scenario did not factor in the odds.

Odds are not relevant, even though I can see why you think so. Please bear with me.

For given multiplicity of possible actions and reactions, since the agents are not fixed, N and N+1 are different from one another and vastly different from N+6,000,000,000.

They are not different at all. Again, I will show you the “trick”.

A fixed free agent is as logically valid as a married bachelor, so the decisions must be made by the free agent, not from without.

That is a true observation.

Having said that, here is the introduction.

Suppose a “hypothesis” is true for one starting value (in this case: one). If we can prove that the hypothesis is inherited (and this is the buzzword) from an arbitrary “N” to “N+1”, then it will be proven to be true for any number of “N”, be it 100 or a bazillion.

Indeed each individual makes many choices in his lifetime. And there are many individuals, each of whom make zillions of decisions. Strangely enough it does not matter, even though your intuition says otherwise.

All we need to do is establish that in the starting scenario (one person only, making one decision) it is possible that he makes the right decision - freely! - and thus gets saved.

From here we can propagate to have one person with zillions of decisions and making all of them “correctly”. From there we can propagate again to have gazillions of persons, each making bazillions of decisions and all of them will be made “correctly”.

It seems to be highly improbable, I grant you that. But in math, “looks” can be deceiving. One cannot consider the result of “common sense”, rather one must sit down and calculate.

But not logically impossible. And since God is able to instantiate any highly improbable scenarios (this comes from omnipotence). but cannot actualize impossible ones (like married bachelors) - it follows that God can actualize a world with zillions of human beings, who each make bazillions of decisions (all freely!) and in each and every instance they make the right decisions.

I know this is a tough concept. But, nevertheless it is a mathematical induction, which is true.

 

[tobias]

Off-topic and ad hominem.

 Yes it was off topic, just do not appreciate the label, sorry.

seekingcatholic:

 Where is it that you see a contradiction here? God knows our choices because we made them and knows them inherently, outside of time. These are not mutually exclusive statements.  If read together; God knew the choices we would make in time from outside of time. No contradiction unless you see the contradiction in the knowledge of beings in time had by a being outside of time.

seekingcatholic:

No it is not flawed, if God could have actualized a world without a fall.

 So what are they being saved from in your premise.

 

[tobias]

No… it is just the first step! It is easier to take “baby-steps”. Once we can agree on this first one, I can show you how we progress from here.
I can understand your confusion. It is not a very difficult concept to master, but you have to get familiar with it.

Didn’t really appreciate the sarcasm.

ateista:

Odds are not relevant, even though I can see why you think so. Please bear with me.
They are not different at all. Again, I will show you the “trick”.

Suppose a “hypothesis” is true for one starting value (in this case: one). If we can prove that the hypothesis is inherited (and this is the buzzword) from an arbitrary “N” to “N+1”, then it will be proven to be true for any number of “N”, be it 100 or a bazillion.

And that is exactly the flaw. In what sense possible can you demonstrate a decision making capacity, temperance, outlook, bias and any other thing that could be attributed to the will as being inheritable? I am overly anylitical of people. 1 of my five children has learned this from me, using much the same tone and inflection when verbalizing it. 4 of my children are not.
I am not familiar with any demonstrable evidence that mind function or action is inherited (not brain function).
atiesta:

Indeed each individual makes many choices in his lifetime. And there are many individuals, each of whom make zillions of decisions. Strangely enough it does not matter, even though your intuition says otherwise.

All we need to do is establish that in the starting scenario (one person only, making one decision) it is possible that he makes the right decision - freely! - and thus gets saved.

From here we can propagate to have one person with zillions of decisions and making all of them “correctly”. From there we can propagate again to have gazillions of persons, each making bazillions of decisions and all of them will be made “correctly”.

It seems to be highly improbable, I grant you that. But in math, “looks” can be deceiving. One cannot consider the result of “common sense”, rather one must sit down and calculate.

But not logically impossible. And since God is able to instantiate any highly improbable scenarios (this comes from omnipotence). but cannot actualize impossible ones (like married bachelors) - it follows that God can actualize a world with zillions of human beings, who each make bazillions of decisions (all freely!) and in each and every instance they make the right decisions.

I am not an idiot. I understand the induction as was laid out. And it could only carry weight if, say it were blonde hair that was inherited or some determined genitic trait, but equivocating genetics and functioning of the will is illogical. It is only logical if determinism and free will could coexist, which we have both rejected in this thread.
atiesta:

I know this is a tough concept. But, nevertheless it is a mathematical induction, which is true.

Only true if certain facts are altered, but then that is a different scenario altogether, one you could demonstrate to a calvinist.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Yes it was off topic, just do not appreciate the label, sorry.

Well, if the label applies, then it applies, too bad if you don’t like it. You can’t expect to say “God doesn’t exist” and not be labeled an atheist. And you can’t expect to say “God knows our choices because we made them” and not be labeled an open theist.

 Where is it that you see a contradiction here? God knows our choices because we made them and knows them inherently, outside of time. These are not mutually exclusive statements.  If read together; God knew the choices we would make in time from outside of time. No contradiction unless you see the contradiction in the knowledge of beings in time had by a being outside of time.

You are confusing God’s knowledge temporally prior to our choices to that metaphysically prior to our choices. Yes, God can know our choices because we make them and yet before we make them, temporally - either because He exists outside of time or because one adopts a B-theory of time. But if He knows our choices because we make them our choices are metaphysically prior to His knowledge of them. This is open theism, absolutely irreconciliable with classical theism. If our choices are metaphysically prior to God’s knowledge God has “learned”.

So what are they being saved from in your premise.

In context “saved” means “going to heaven”. If the fall had not occurred the same questions would still come up. Thus, the fall is irrelevant.

 

[ateista]

Didn’t really appreciate the sarcasm.

Sorry, it was not meant to be sarcastic at all. I am a mathematician, who has been lecturing these topics for decades, and I know when something looks “weird” at the first glance.

And that is exactly the flaw. In what sense possible can you demonstrate a decision making capacity, temperance, outlook, bias and any other thing that could be attributed to the will as being inheritable? I am overly anylitical of people. 1 of my five children has learned this from me, using much the same tone and inflection when verbalizing it. 4 of my children are not.
I am not familiar with any demonstrable evidence that mind function or action is inherited (not brain function).

I am not referring to those traits at all.

I am referring to mathematical “inheritence”, where a formula “f” is true for some “n” and this trait (of being true) is “inherited” from “n” to “n+1”. If that formula is true for one starting value, then it will be true for all “n”-s no matter how large that “n” might be.

The point is that this world is not “random” - according to classical theism. It was selected by God, from among the logically possible worlds. Among those logically possible worlds there is one where all people always freely choose “correctly” and there is one where all people always freely choose “incorrectly” and zillions of others, where some people sometimes choose correctly and other people do not. All these are logically possible worlds - and God could have selected any one of them.

Let me repeat: one of those logically possible worlds is the one, where everyone freely chooses “correctly” and gets saved. The contention revolves around the question, whether that logically possible world can be actualized or not.

And the inductive proof establishes that it can be actualized.

A short overview (and that is not the proof, its just a short layout for later reference):

It is possible to actualize a world, where there is one free agent, who makes one free decision and that decision allows him to be saved. This seems quite trivial, but it is absolutely necessary. It is the “anchor” point for the whole process.

From this fact we can show that it is possible to actualize a world, where there is one free agent, who makes many free decisions, and all the decisions are “correct” - so he can be saved.

Then we can prove that it is possible to actualize a world where there are many free agents, and all of them make one free, correct decison - so all will be saved.

Finally, we can prove that it is possible to actualize a world, where there are many free agents, each of whom make many free decisions, and all the decisions are “correct” - so all will be saved.

 

[tobias]

You are confusing God’s knowledge temporally prior to our choices to that metaphysically prior to our choices. Yes, God can know our choices because we make them and yet before we make them, temporally - either because He exists outside of time or because one adopts a B-theory of time. But if He knows our choices because we make them our choices are metaphysically prior to His knowledge of them. This is open theism, absolutely irreconciliable with classical theism. If our choices are metaphysically prior to God’s knowledge God has “learned”.

Could you please back up your contention with CATHOLIC teaching?

 

[SeekingCatholic]

Could you please back up your contention with CATHOLIC teaching?

I don’t need to, since this is a philosophical, not a theological, debate. You therefore concede the debate on philosophical grounds by bringing in this red herring.

Nevertheless, what I said IS Catholic teaching. God’s knowledge cannot in any way be dependent on creatures. And indeed, in the traditional Molinistic formulation it is not. His scientia media is prior to the acts of the creature.

But since you asked, right from the Catholic Encyclopedia.

Everything, in a word, which to our finite minds signifies perfection and completeness of knowledge may be predicated of Divine omniscience, and it is further to be observed that it is on Himself alone that God depends for His knowledge. **To make Him in any way dependent on creatures for knowledge of created objects would destroy His infinite perfection and supremacy. **Hence it is in His eternal, unchangeable, comprehensive knowledge of Himself or of His own infinite being that God knows creatures and their acts, whether there is question of what is actual or merely possible…

That God knows infallibly and from eternity what, for example, a certain man, in the exercise of free will, will do or actually does in any given circumstances, and what he might or would actually have done in different circumstances is beyond doubt – being a corollary from the eternal actuality of Divine knowledge. So to speak, God has not to wait on the contingent and temporal event of the man’s free choice to know what the latter’s action will be; He knows it from eternity…

The Dominican contention is that God’s knowledge of future free acts depends on the decrees of His free will which predetermine their actuality by means of the praemotio physica. God knows, for example, that Peter will do so and so, because He has decreed from eternity so to move Peter’s free will that the latter will infallibly, although freely, cooperate with, or consent to, the Divine premotion…

The Jesuit school, on the other hand – with whom probably a majority of independent theologians agree – using the scientia media maintains that **we ought to conceive God’s knowledge of future free acts not as being dependent and consequent upon decrees of His will, but in its character as hypothetical knowledge or being antecedent to them. God knows in the scientia media what Peter would do if in given circumstances he were to receive a certain aid, and this before any absolute decree to give that aid is supposed. **Thus there is no predetermination by the Divine of what the human will freely chooses; it is not because God foreknows (having foredecreed) a certain free act that that act takes place, but God foreknows it in the first instance because as a matter of fact it is going to take place; He knows it as a hypothetical objective fact before it becomes an object of the scientia visionis – or rather this is how, in order to safeguard human liberty, we must conceive Him as knowing it.

**But one must be careful to avoid implying that God’s knowledge is in any way dependent on creatures, as if He had, so to speak, to await the actual event in time before knowing infallibly what a free creature may choose to do. **From eternity He knows, but does not predetermine the creature’s choice. And if it be asked how we can conceive this knowledge to exist antecedently to and independently of some act of the Divine will, on which all things contingent depend, we can only say that the objective truth expressed by the hypothetical facts in question is somehow reflected in the Divine Essence, which is the mirror of all truth, and that in knowing Himself God knows these things also.

 

[tobias]

I don’t need to, since this is a philosophical, not a theological, debate. You therefore concede within the debate on philosophical grounds by bringing in this red herring.

 **You** are the individual, who, having started this thread, declared that your assertions undermined some tenants ( held teachings ) of classical theism and** catholicism. **

You cannot seperate Catholic theology from Catholic philosophy, to do so would be to render the term catholic philosophy oximoronic. Apart from theology there is no meaningful use of the word Catholic in English.
Don’t be the boy who crird ‘red herring’ ,and mean what you say, or is the case as I said earlier that you are merely focused on schools of philosophy.

seekingcatholic:

Nevertheless, what I said IS Catholic teaching. God’s knowledge cannot in any way be dependent on creatures. And indeed, in the traditional Molinistic formulation it is not. His scientia media is prior to the acts of the creature.

But since you asked, right from the Catholic Encyclopedia.

I in no way said God's knowledge is **contingent **upon our action, you sir read that into what I posted. I saw nothing whatever in the quotion you provided which contradicted my posts ( save for the discrepencies in the **scools **of thought ). Read what I posted again, if you still have trouble understanding what I wrote I will break it down for you.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

You are the individual, who, having started this thread, declared that your assertions undermined some tenants ( held teachings ) of classical theism and** catholicism. **

Indeed. However the statement under discussion was a philosophical statement. It’s out of bounds to bring theology into a philosophical discussion. It wouldn’t matter whether it is Church teaching that a certain proposition is contradictory to classical theism, if it can be demonstrated through philosopy and logic.

IOW, I don’t need Church teaching to say that classical theism forbids our choices being metaphysically prior to God’s knowledge. It can be proven from the definition of God in classical theism. Church teaching is irrelevant; although, as it happens, that is also Church teaching.

You cannot seperate Catholic theology from Catholic philosophy,

Yes you can; theology and philosophy are two separate disciplines. You can’t bring in theological principles into a philosophical discussion. Theology is what can be known through divine revelation; philosophy is what can be known through human reason without divine revelation.

to do so would be to render the term catholic philosophy oximoronic.

Not so, if Catholic philosophy means “philosophy conducted by Catholics”.

Apart from theology there is no meaningful use of the word Catholic in English.

OK, that contradicts what you said above.

Don’t be the boy who crird ‘red herring’ ,and mean what you say, or is the case as I said earlier that you are merely focused on schools of philosophy.

Oh, I certainly mean what I say.

 I in no way said God's knowledge is **contingent **upon our action, you sir read that into what I posted.

Yes, you did. You said this:

God knows our choices because we made them

That means our choices caused His knowledge, by definition. If a causes b then b is contingent on a.

I saw nothing whatever in the quotion you provided which contradicted my posts

Then you’d better read again, more closely.

 

[tobias]

Yes, you did. You said this:

That means our choices caused His knowledge, by definition. If a causes b then b is contingent on a.
.

First you take my words out of context, now you misquote.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

First you take my words out of context, now you misquote.

Not at all. They were your direct words. You wrote the following:

God knows our choices because we made them and knows them inherently, outside of time. These are not mutually exclusive statements. If read together; God knew the choices we would make in time from outside of time. No contradiction unless you see the contradiction in the knowledge of beings in time had by a being outside of time.

 

[tobias]

Not at all. They were your direct words. You wrote the following:

First I applied the wrong verbage, then didn't take enough time reviewing my own posts. My apologies, I will stop posting hastily. And take a break.

 

[john_doran]

It’s not “my” assumption. It’s the assumption of classical theism. It’s the classic definition of omnipotence.

so much the worse for whatever it is you’re calling “classical” omnipotence.

SeekingCatholic:

Again, I do not deny that you can uphold the free will defense if you deny one of the bedrock assumptions of classical theism. But then, bye-bye Five Ways.

I’ll go through it logically step by step.

1. There exist, potentially, metaphysical goods (right choices by free creatures in some metaphysically possible world) which nevertheless God is incapable of actualizing (your assumption).
2. There exist, actually, right choices by free creatures in the present world. (premise).
3. There exist, actually, metaphysical goods which God has not actualized. (From 1 & 2).
4. An actualized good is actualized by something else. (premise)
5. There exist metaphysical goods actualized by some other entity than God. (From 3 & 4).
6. This entity must be either actualized by God, or some other entity besides itself (from 4).
7. If this entity is actualized by God, then the metaphysical goods in 3) are also actualized by God (from transitivity of causation).

7 is false. it does not follow that god actualizes any state of affairs actualized by some entity that god actualizes: it doesn’t follow precisely for any state of affairs that is actualized by the free choice of a created entity.

transitivity fails in the case of free choices (my parents caused me, but they do not thereby cause my son when i freely choose to procreate with my wife; nor did charles manson’s great-great grandparents cause the death of manson’s victims).

this is, again, rock-bottom stuff here: we disagree about this, but it is a disagreement about axioms, and as such you are not going to come up with arguments against my use of the axiom which do not, of necessity, simply assume it to be false.

SeekingCatholic:

1. Therefore, this entity is not actualized by God, but by some other entity (3 & modus tollens).
2. But this entity must be either actualized by God, or some other entity besides itself (from 4).
3. 1. through 9) keeping looping over and over again. Therefore, an infinite regress exists, with no entity in the series actualized by God, and no First Cause.

again, this is also completely wrong, since it is based on your faulty premise 7, above.

the free chooser is actualized by god; just not the free choices of that chooser. and absolutely nothing in your proof even slyly suggests anything different.

SeekingCatholic:

Or, alternatively, 4) is wrong and there are self-actualizing entities, and thus many different first causes of causal chains besides God. Either way, classical metaphysics, metaphysical proofs for God’s existence, and the God as First Cause are in the trash can.

again, not so.

SeekingCatholic:

And if they are not up to god to make true, how are they not necessary truths? It is impossible they be otherwise.

sigh. no: it is possible that we made them true - we just chose not to do so.

look, it is a contingent truth that this world is the actual world - god could have freely chosen to actualize some other possible world.

but he didn’t, and nothing he can do can change the truth of the proposition “god freely chose to actualize this world”.

does that make this world necessary?

SeekingCatholic:

Where’s the proof of this? Classical theism says just the opposite.

what do you mean, “proof”?

and why do you keep insisting on this slavish devotion to titles like “classical theism”?

i keep telling you: i don’t care what (your version of) “classical theism” is - i care what’s true.

my “proof” that god canot actualize the free-choices of others follows from my definition of “free choice”.
SeeingCatholic:

No, God can actualize things such that the chooser infallibly, though freely, makes the choice. This is the traditional explanation of efficacious grace. And there is no self-contradiction in that.

here’s a quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia on “efficacious grace”:

“As to whether the infallibility of its success is the result of the physical nature of this grace or of the infallible foreknowledge of God (scientia media) is a much debated question between Thomists and Molinists which need not be further treated here. Its existence, however, is admitted as an article of faith by both sides and is established with the same firmness as the predestination of the elect or the existence of a heaven peopled with innumerable saints.”

so the mere efficacy of the grace decides nothing in the instant case.

 

[john_doran]

Yes, false, in that world. But that does nothing whatsoever to establish the truth-value of the counterfactual. Your argument is essentially circular. It goes like this:

but i’m not trying to “establish” that there are true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, much less present an argument for them: i am assuming that they exist.

you, on the other hand, need to throw your lot in with guys like Hasker who try to establish that there cannot be true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (which is typically done by presenting some variation of the grounding objection).

SeekingCatholic:

Don’t be silly. It’s the proposition P not “P is true in W” that you need to have a counterfactual forbidding the creation of world W’ in which P is false.

…

Then there is no possible world in which A chooses C, if the counterfactuals apply in all possible worlds.

you lost me…

SeekingCatholic:

You’re putting the actual choice metaphysically and ontologically prior to God’s actualization of the world segment. Since A doesn’t in fact choose otherwise, you say, God can not actualize a world-segment in which A chooses otherwise. This is nonsense. A can’t in fact choose otherwise until A is actualized!

no. you’re assuming that the there must be a “ground” for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and that the ground must be what the freely choosing creature is doing.

what makes counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true is simply that the creature in question would choose X if she were in circumstances C.

and that’s true logically prior to anything god chooses to do.

SeekingCatholic:

Then I bid you a grand welcome to open-view theology. God knows our choices as a result of our having made them. This is what you’re saying, right?

no. not at all.

 

[SeekingCatholic]

so much the worse for whatever it is you’re calling “classical” omnipotence.

It’s not just I who am calling it that. Anyway, that’s a pretty astounding admission.

7 is false.

If 7 is false, then 4 is true, as I said. Take your pick.

it does not follow that god actualizes any state of affairs actualized by some entity that god actualizes:

Yes, it does, when “actualize” applies, as it is meant to apply, to sufficient (not merely necessary) causes. If a is a sufficient cause of b, and b is a sufficient cause of c, then a is a sufficient cause of c. You are arguing thus, God’s will is a sufficient cause of my existence, my existence is only a necessary cause of my action, therefore transitivity of causation doesn’t apply, so we can’t say God’s will is a sufficient cause of my action. Of course not. Of course God’s keeping me in existence is only a necessary, not sufficient, cause of my choice, whereas God’s keeping me in existence is a necessary and sufficient cause of my existence.

But if there is not a sufficient cause for a choice from something else then it is not actualized by something else. That is what “actualization” means. You are not going to evade the proof I gave by this equivocation about “actualization”.

IOW, there is another “entity” besides the choice God is actualizing which actualizes, necessarily, as sufficient cause, the choice. Or else no such “entity” exists and the choice is unactualized.

it doesn’t follow precisely for any state of affairs that is actualized by the free choice of a created entity.

Only if you define “free choice” to, tautologically, have no sufficient cause. In which case it is unactualized. Take your pick.

transitivity fails in the case of free choices (my parents caused me, but they do not thereby cause my son when i freely choose to procreate with my wife; nor did charles manson’s great-great grandparents cause the death of manson’s victims).

It doesn’t fail if choices can be caused.

this is, again, rock-bottom stuff here: we disagree about this, but it is a disagreement about axioms, and as such you are not going to come up with arguments against my use of the axiom which do not, of necessity, simply assume it to be false.

True, but I can flesh out the implications of your axiom. I don’t know how you can possibly prove libertarian, or compatibilist free will, true or false. But I can prove libertarian free will incompatible with classical theism. You don’t care, obviously; you simply say, libertarian free will is right and classical theism is wrong. That’s certainly your prerogative.

again, this is also completely wrong, since it is based on your faulty premise 7, above.

the free chooser is actualized by god; just not the free choices of that chooser. and absolutely nothing in your proof even slyly suggests anything different.

Yes, so the free choices of the chooser are, in fact, unactualized. Or, if you say, he actualized them, then that act of actualization also requires to be actualized itself by something else; otherwise, there is a self-actualizing entity.

sigh. no: it is possible that we made them true - we just chose not to do so.

But we didn’t choose to do so prior to the instantiation of the world! Our choosing is a **contingent **truth. How can God be bound by a **contingent **truth? It is a contingent truth that the earth is 93,000,000 miles away from the sun. The very word “contingent” implies God could have created a solar system with the sun 1,000,000 miles away.

i keep telling you: i don’t care what (your version of) “classical theism” is - i care what’s true.

my “proof” that god canot actualize the free-choices of others follows from my definition of “free choice”.

Then it’s just a meaningless tautology. It makes as much sense as this: I have proof God cannot actualize an apple. It follows from my definition of apple. My apple is both spherical and cubical.

here’s a quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia on “efficacious grace”:

“As to whether the infallibility of its success is the result of the physical nature of this grace or of the infallible foreknowledge of God (scientia media) is a much debated question between Thomists and Molinists which need not be further treated here. Its existence, however, is admitted as an article of faith by both sides and is established with the same firmness as the predestination of the elect or the existence of a heaven peopled with innumerable saints.”

so the mere efficacy of the grace decides nothing in the instant case.

No, but the infallibility sure is. It means God can infallibly move a a will to choose the good. You do admit this, right?

 

[ateista]

so much the worse for whatever it is you’re calling “classical” omnipotence.

Classical omnipotence says that God is able to do anything that is not logically contradictory.

Yes, he can temporarily “suspend” your existence, take over, and do the same free actions you were supposed to do and then reinstate your existence as if nothing had happened. Minor miracle. As long as an action is not self-contradictory, or does not lead to a contradictory state of affairs, God can do it.

It is easy to prove that free, proper decisions of free individuals (no matter how many they are and how many decisions they make) does not entail a logical contradiction per se. It follows from the fact that one person can make one correct, free decision and then apply the method of mathematical induction from there.

If you wish to argue that “somewhere down the line” it may lead to a logical contradiction then you have to bring up arguments for this assumption. Simply saying that it “might” is insufficient.

7 is false. it does not follow that god actualizes any state of affairs actualized by some entity that god actualizes: it doesn’t follow precisely for any state of affairs that is actualized by the free choice of a created entity.

transitivity fails in the case of free choices (my parents caused me, but they do not thereby cause my son when i freely choose to procreate with my wife; nor did charles manson’s great-great grandparents cause the death of manson’s victims).

this is, again, rock-bottom stuff here: we disagree about this, but it is a disagreement about axioms, and as such you are not going to come up with arguments against my use of the axiom which do not, of necessity, simply assume it to be false.

7 is not false. The examples you bring up are perfect, but they are fundamentally different from the case under consideration.

Let’s go back to the simplest possible world: one free agent making one free choice.

Scenario #1: God actualizes world W1, where the free agent makes the “good” choice.

Scenario #2: God actualizes world W2, where the free agent makes the “wrong” choice.

Scenario #3: God is unable to actualize either W1 or W2, rather he actualizes world W3, where the free agent will make a decision, which will in turn actualize either W1, or W2.

If either scenario #1 or #2 are accepted, then the transitivity is correct.

However, based upon your posts, it seems to me that you hold only scenario #3 as possible, where transitivity does not apply.

In this case both God’s omnipotence and omnisicence are in jeopardy. His knowledge is metaphysically preceeded by the choice, in other words: God learns. And God is unable to actualize a world without a logical contradiction.

Can you clarify?

 

[Mike_Cooksey]

It seems clear from simple basic Catholic instruction that God wants all people to make it to heaven. That I believe is a simple Catholic tenant. “He made no one for Hell”

We are responsible for credible information we are given plus our conscience functionality, that also seems clear.

Then, with free will the individual chooses what he wants to become in the environment he is assigned.

At the end of life then our Lord takes our choices and sends us to the destination we belong in from those choices.

Evil then becomes not a problem, but a possible choice. God chooses himself, that is a choice. If we want to belong to him then we also choose him.

Where then is the difficulty in comprehension of our job?

 

[Sarpedon]

Classical theism demands infallible Divine foreknowledge of creatures’ actions in some way.

I have not read the entire post, so I apologize if my argument has already been addressed.

For the sake of this discussion, I will presume that God can only have knowledge of that which exists (of course, drawing its existence from God timelessly). I know this to be the opinion of some participants of this thread, and I will presume it is true, regardless of my opinion.

It seems to me that your post asks the question, “If God knows what our final fate is (freely chosen by us), then why doesn’ God only create those that freely choose Him?” This would not impact our free will to love, because we would still be making the choice.

Think about what this means. For God to choose to not create beings based on His knowledge of their actions, this would mean that God knows the actions of non (and never) existent beings. God would thus have knowledge of non-existent entities, which has been claimed as impossible by some atheists I have debated.

Yes, God does know what our final fate is, but this assumes He created us in the first place so that our fate can become knowable. God knows our final fate, but we have to exist with free will before this knowledge becomes attainable. God cannot take our final fate into consideration when He decides to create us, for He can only have knowledge of that final fate after the fact.

God therefore cannot chose to create a world in which all individuals with free will choose salvation, because He cannot know how individuals will respond until after the fact of creation.

 

[Isa_Almisry]

Thanks. I will, but first a question.

How should one understand that something is “logically possible” but not “metaphysically possible”? As far as I understand the only limitation on God’s alleged omnipotence is that he cannot create logically contradictory objects - like married bachelors.

LOL. It might be logically contradictory objects, but they exist. I’ve known quite a number of married bachelors.

Since believers assert that God can create “miracles”, temporarily suspending the “laws of nature”, how is that different from creating a “horse with 3 horns”? It would be just a minor genetic manipulation. Maybe there is a better example.

Since the “laws of nature” are constantly willed by God, we aren’t deists, there is nothing different with “miracle.” So the definition of a “miracle” must lie elsewhere.

 

[Isa_Almisry]

I restrict this discussion to moral evil, and specifically, moral evil leading to damnation. I will show that this remains an unsolved, and in fact, insoluble problem. While there exist logical solutions, they come at the cost of some other tenet of classical theism or Catholicism.

Just for full disclosure, I’ll argue for the Orthodox definition of Catholic thought, not the Vatican’s.

We assume the classical theistic God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Relevant to this discussion, God could actualize any logically and metaphysically possible world (omnipotence), He knows the actions of His creatures prior to their occurrence (omniscience), and He does not permit gratuitous (unnecessary) evil (omnibenevolence). We also assume the Christian God Who loves humanity to such an extent He sent His own Son that they might not perish but possess eternal life, but punishes the wicked with eternal damnation, should they choose to reject Him.

Punish the wicked. Hmmm. Sounds vindictive.
God did not say “eat the fruit and I will KILL you,” but “eat the fruit and you will DIE.”

We use modal logic, with the distinction between “logically possible” worlds and “metaphysically possible” worlds. A logically possible world entails no contradictories (e.g. there are no squared circles) but it is not necessarily a metaphysically possible world, which is one that is actually possible given the nature of being, which we do not know everything about. (A three-horned horse is logically possible but may be metaphysically impossible.)

How about a Three Person God?

The “standard” answer is that, in order for there to exist moral good, there must also be moral evil.

That is the “standard” answer’s first mistake: darkness is the absence of light. Light does not require the existence of darkness, which has no existence. Evil is the metaphysically existent indulging in logical impossibility: a being trying not to be.

But logically there must only exist the potential for moral evil, not its actuality. Why did God not actualize a world in which all are in fact saved,

You mean, like Eden, when He blessed it and said “it is very good?”

even if it were logically possible for them not to be? There is no good answer. There are only in fact two logically possible answers, the “free will” defense and the “greater good” defense. I’ll first discuss the “free will” defense.

The “free will” defense argues that it is (epistemically) possible (that is, for all we know, it could be the case) that there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which all creatures always choose right, or a fortiori in which all are saved.

it’s possible, it just didn’t work out that way.

(

This assumes the Molinistic position of Divine scientia media and counterfactuals of freedom in order to preserve Divine omniscience.) This defense succeeds, as far as it goes. I cannot prove to metaphysical certainty, with our limited knowledge of metaphysics and philosophy, that there exists a metaphysically possible world in which all choose right and are saved.

But let’s consider the implications for a moment. In the first place, this is entirely unacceptable from a Catholic point of view; …Catholicism demands the metaphysical possibility of salvation for all and denies that Christ died for the elect only. And there are other philosophical problems.

I don’t see the first problem.

Let’s (to simplify the issue, but it doesn’t really change anything) imagine God choosing between two worlds: one in which person A is saved and person B damned, and one in which person A is damned and person B saved. A world in which both A and B are saved is, we presume, metaphysically impossible.

Why do you presume that?
A world is metaphysically possible where both A and B are damned.

Let’s say God chooses the first one, with A saved, since He desires A saved (His motive in creating the world is His creatures’ good, being omnibenevolent as He is). B’s damnation therefore follows as a matter of metaphysical necessity, for given A’s salvation, there are no metaphysically possible worlds in which B is saved. It was metaphysically impossible for B to have chosen otherwise than he did, given the external circumstances. Now it is unjust to punish anyone for acting when it was impossible for him to act otherwise…Of course the same argument applies if God chooses to instantiate the second world for the sake of B’s salvation; A’s actions then follow by metaphysical necessity. Now to act from metaphysical necessity seems to me to be the antithesis of “free will” - it’s ironic that the “free will” defense should end up, in fact, denying “free will”. Of course some Protestants do, in fact, deny free will.

Yes, they do. But I’m not sure you aren’t.

Now, it may be objected to this that I am assuming A’s (or B’s) salvation to be directly willed by God. Certainly, the argument is airtight if this is the case. There are no metaphysically possible worlds in which A’s or B’s salvation is directly willed by God and yet it doesn’t happen. And salvation must be willed by God, the source of all good in classical theism. But couldn’t God actualize a world in which either A or B would be saved, but then kind of let things “play out”? The answer is “no”, according to classical theism.

Actually since He has, the answer is “yes” according to Orthodoxy.