The "Problem Of Evil" does not exist

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How do you determine what is in balance and harmony with nature?
Easy. If it provides a perceptual experience leading to feelings of emotional well being and positive reflection and sets a universal standard of attractiveness which is recognised across different cultures and civilisations.
 
Easy. If it provides a perceptual experience leading to feelings of emotional well being and positive reflection and sets a universal standard of attractiveness which is recognised across different cultures and civilisations.
That seems like an ambitious standard. So, theoretically, the first civilization couldn’t have recognized beauty?

I think we’re missing the heart of the issue though. You said that if a thing causes these feelings, then it is beautiful. But is a thing beautiful because it causes these feelings, or does it cause these feelings because it’s beautiful? If it’s the former, then beauty is simply the quality of being pleasing, i.e., if the act of rape is pleasing to a particular person, then it is beautiful to that person. The beauty of the act doesn’t exist outside of that person’s appreciation for the act. If it’s the latter, then beauty is an objective quality that would persist even in objects regarded as ugly. And if this happens, your verification method would become an impossibility.
 
Yes. What’s beautiful about it? Or, more to the point, how do you prove that something is beautiful?
How is this question relevant, Oreo? Do you take it that “anything that is true must be capable of proof”? If so, you are begging the question.
 
How is this question relevant, Oreo? Do you take it that “anything that is true must be capable of proof”? If so, you are begging the question.
In a roundabout way, yes, I’m saying that a statement must be descriptive in order to possess a truth value. By “descriptive” I mean that it refers to a state of affairs in reality. This means that any descriptive statement could conceivably be proven or disproven by some sort of observation. The alternative is that a statement can possess a truth value without describing anything, in which case I must ask what your idea of “truth” is.

For example, “Take out the trash,” lacks a truth value because it isn’t descriptive and consequently cannot be verified. The same is true of all demands. Do you agree?
 
…any descriptive statement could conceivably be proven or disproven by some sort of observation.
The above statement cannot conceivably be proven or disproven by some sort of observation. Therein lies the weakness that discredited logical positivism.

(I agree, by the way, that some statements – “Take out the trash” – lack truth values. We just differ on *which *statements these are.)
 
The above statement cannot conceivably be proven or disproven by some sort of observation. Therein lies the weakness that discredited logical positivism.
I disagree. The statement can be proven by observing the definition of “description.” If we assess real affairs through observation, and propositions provide an account of real affairs (hence their descriptive nature), then we are able to determine the truth of propositions based on our observations of real affairs. It necessarily follows from the premises, the premises being definitions.

I feel the need to ask: How can a non-descriptive statement have a truth value? Or: How can a descriptive statement’s truth value not be determined through some observation?

By the way, I don’t know whether I’m advocating logical positivism here. More accurately, I would call my position either “verificationism” or “falsificationism.”
 
I disagree. The statement can be proven by observing the definition of “description.” If we assess real affairs through observation, and propositions provide an account of real affairs (hence their descriptive nature), then we are able to determine the truth of propositions based on our observations of real affairs. It necessarily follows from the premises, the premises being definitions.
How does the concept “description” entail that it must be falsifiable? If there is a meow coming from a permanently closed container in my room, that no one will ever be able to open, does not the statement “there is a cat in that box” describe something? It could be true or false, and perhaps we will never know, but it most certainly is a description.

Now, you might say that, in principle, the cat hypothesis is falsifiable. But I wonder what you mean by “in principle” here, then. How does principle differ from reality? If you can – in principle – open an unopenable box, then why can you not – in principle – discover that (lo and behold!) there exists a real standard of beauty? You might ask, “In what sense is this principle real?” To which I would respond, “In what sense is the computer you’re sitting at real?” As soon as you can give me a non-question-begging answer to my question, I will give you a non-question-begging answer to yours! 🙂
I feel the need to ask: How can a non-descriptive statement have a truth value?
It cannot.
Or: How can a descriptive statement’s truth value not be determined through some observation?
Your expectation that it *always *can is indefensible, except as a rationalist principle that could be false. I choose not to accept that principle.
By the way, I don’t know whether I’m advocating logical positivism here. More accurately, I would call my position either “verificationism” or “falsificationism.”
They’re all pretty much synonymous, and I find them quite sensible theories, but not comprehensive. Wittgenstein seems to have grown out of positivism later in life. You might look into his work; he made a definite effort not to overstate his own case, which is a virtue among philosophers. He was not religious, but he had a deep respect for those who were, a deep respect for those who chose to question the dogmas of the “educated”.
 
In a roundabout way, yes, I’m saying that a statement must be descriptive in order to possess a truth value. By “descriptive” I mean that it refers to a state of affairs in reality. This means that any descriptive statement could conceivably be proven or disproven by some sort of observation.
Well, take the current discussion in physics academic circles concerning the existence of a multiverse which is implied by several theoretical considerations such as the huge number of solutions to string theory equations, or the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, or the huge number of Hubble bubble volumes, Richard Feynman’s multiple histories, or the M-theory solutions, but in the end the multiverse is unobservable in this universe. The multiverse is taken very seriously, and follows from theoretical considerations, but I don’t see how it can be proven or disproven by any sort of observation.
 
How does the concept “description” entail that it must be falsifiable?
Alone, it does not. A statement being descriptive only means that it gives an account of reality. Along with the ability to observe the conditions being described, we can test the veracity of such statements. The only alternative I can see is that there may be some statement describing conditions in reality that are not observable, by which I mean that they can’t be conceived, perceived, or inferred based on our conceptions or perceptions.
If there is a meow coming from a permanently closed container in my room, that no one will ever be able to open, does not the statement “there is a cat in that box” describe something? It could be true or false, and perhaps we will never know, but it most certainly is a description.
As you’ve noticed, my position is not that we can verify all propositions with this method, only that we could if we were able to make the ideal observations.

I’ll grant you the point about falsifiability being a rationalist principle, though I do feel that your description of the box as “unopenable” is a bit cheap. Why exactly is it unopenable? How could it be possible that some worldly condition cannot be observed or at least inferred? I think the assumption that some conditions are unobservable dismisses the overwhelming evidence that all things are observable given the proper tools and ideal conditions.
Wittgenstein seems to have grown out of positivism later in life. You might look into his work; he made a definite effort not to overstate his own case, which is a virtue among philosophers. He was not religious, but he had a deep respect for those who were, a deep respect for those who chose to question the dogmas of the “educated”.
I’m sure I’ll eventually get around to his work, but I’m quite busy at the moment. I’m currently learning about modal and first-order logic.

Anyway, it’s not that I’m a verificationist in the most devout sense, I just think that it demonstrates my point about morality nicely. Ethics are impossible to prove under any conditions, just as demands are impossible to prove. There isn’t a single observation that would verify “I should not lie,” for example. If there is, then by all means tell me! And the inability for a statement to be verified by any observation casts much doubt on its descriptive ability. At the very least, I would wager that it’s inconceivable that ethics are descriptive, if not impossible.
 
The multiverse is taken very seriously, and follows from theoretical considerations, but I don’t see how it can be proven or disproven by any sort of observation.
“Theoretical considerations” being the key phrase. If I’m not mistaken, string theory is the result of the second most respected of the quantum interpretations, not the first. Anyway, I must ask what these scientists mean by “universe.” The most popular definition is “all that physically exists” or something of that nature. It follows that whatever doesn’t exist in this universe doesn’t physically exist. The only way to bypass this inconvenient fact is to alter the definition of “universe.”
 
“Theoretical considerations” being the key phrase. If I’m not mistaken, string theory is the result of the second most respected of the quantum interpretations, not the first. Anyway, I must ask what these scientists mean by “universe.” The most popular definition is “all that physically exists” or something of that nature. It follows that whatever doesn’t exist in this universe doesn’t physically exist. The only way to bypass this inconvenient fact is to alter the definition of “universe.”
With the multimverse theories, there are many different universes, each in its own bubble. which cannot be accessed from another except by a virtual wormhole.
 
Prodigal Son

(I agree, by the way, that some statements – “Take out the trash” –* lack truth values**. We just differ on which statements these are.) *

I’m perplexed by this statement. How can any statement lack “truth values” – either explicit or implicit?

Even “Take out the trash” implies the “truth” that there is some trash needs to be taken out.

Can you give another example of a statement which does not explicitly or implicitly imply some specific truth?
 
Prodigal Son

(I agree, by the way, that some statements – “Take out the trash” –* lack truth values***. We just differ on which statements these are.)

I’m perplexed by this statement. How can any statement lack “truth values” – either explicit or implicit?

Even “Take out the trash” implies the “truth” that there is some trash needs to be taken out.

Can you give another example of a statement which does not explicitly or implicitly imply some specific truth?
“This sentence is false.” 😉
 
The statement Prodigal has given does imply a specific truth, namely, that self-referential statements can be contradictory.
If the sentence is contradictory, though, Sid, it would entail that the sentence is false – because all contradictory sentences are false. But if the sentence is false, then the sentence is true! Ack! :eek:

This is why we call it a paradox, because calling it a contradiction would get us into even more trouble. 😃
 
Prodigal Son

*“This sentence is false.” *

Well done ;). Yet tautologies are not part of our normal communications. I’ll concede your tautology as an exception to the rule that every sentence implicitly or explicitly implies a truth.

Other than a tautology (a sentence that contradicts itself) can you provide a sentence that does not implicitly or explicitly imply a truth?

If “The problem of evil does not exist” is true, why do people keep debating the answer to why evil exists? Evidently it is a problem at least for some, if not for all.
 
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