The "Problem Of Evil" does not exist

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One more time, Pete: if God is omnipotent, he does not need to produce any undesired effects, by definition. If suffering is an effect that displeases God, yet he doesn’t eliminate it, it would seem that he’s not omnipotent or that he possesses conflicting desires. If he can remove suffering, but doesn’t, he is (a) sadistic, (b) he doesn’t care about our suffering, or (c) possesses conflicting desires. Every possibility excludes him from being praiseworthy, in my opinion.
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Just a thought. God is pure spirit. Therefore, it is most difficult to ascribe human definitions and human estimations to Him. At best, all we can say is that we are attempting to describe. The complete reality of God is beyond the capability of current knowledge in this life. Eternal life is a different story.

Blessings,
granny

All human life is meant for eternal life.
 
If he can remove suffering, but doesn’t, he is (a) sadistic, (b) he doesn’t care about our suffering, or (c) possesses conflicting desires. Every possibility excludes him from being praiseworthy, in my opinion.
And (d), a great good will come out of the situation. Let’s try to be thorough and give all the possibilities.
But most people admit that Aquinas’ proofs are not airtight (which actually would exclude them from being considered proofs) and that they only cushion the belief of those who already believe in God.
And you are willing to take this as fact by another person’s testimony? Would you be justified in believing this in a court of law, or laughed at?
 
You’ve seen an actual definition of “secularism” that said this? Where?
encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/secularism
Philosophy a doctrine that rejects religion, esp in ethics

Definitions of secular humanism on the Web:
humanism: the doctrine emphasizing a person’s capacity for self-realization through reason; rejects religion and the supernatural
wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn

Secular humanism is a humanist philosophy that upholds reason, ethics, and justice, and specifically rejects the supernatural and the spiritual as the basis of moral reflection and decision-making. …


A form of religion that believes in humanistic values. Placing man before God. The thought that man is practically a god.
www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/dictionary/foundations.htm

An outlook or a philosophy that advocates human rather than religious values.
137.122.14.197/BIO1120/Includes/Glossary.htm

And here’s the problem with those definition. If Human Rights are Universal as defined by the United Nations then how could Human Rights be anything but (for lack of a better term) supernatural?

And It is an observable fact that human values very from one culture to another. Just because you respect the life of one person within your social group it doesn’t necessarily follow that that value extends to anyone outside your culture.
 
Let me put this another way, Shike. If you or anyone could prove evil you could also paradoxically prove God is real too. If you could prove evil (or murder a moral truth) Faith would have no virtue.

That’s why the true nature of morality is unresolvable by debate.

What I can do, using epistimiology, is argue to the consistence or inconsistency between metaphysical beliefs and a meta-ethical belief.
I agree that the true nature of morality is unresolvable by debate. I think one attempt at such a synthesis is called “the second tablet project” or something similar; trying to keep morals without God in the picture. But anyway, who’s to say a little debate won’t help someone see the light?

When I said to argue that murder is ever okay, I wasn’t aiming for him to present me with a strict proof (regardless if possible). What I was doing was to elicit the response, however deep inside, that “I guess I know murder is wrong and can’t say it ever right”… thus giving way to the possibility of more-than-temporary moral truths.
 
Philosophical Materialism
[14] “An evolutionary account of the origin of moral judgment in human beings does not tell us what (if anything) makes a specific action moral. On a materialist view, all codes of conduct must ultimately be man-made or socially constructed; there are no objective moral laws existing independently of sentient beings in the way that laws of nature do. Thus there are no objective criteria for determining if human actions are right or wrong. The objectivity of laws of nature is clear–our approximations to them (laws of physics) are publicly falsifiable and can be corroborated by empirical evidence. Moreover, unlike natural laws, moral laws can be violated. But if what we call moral laws are really man-made inventions, our ethical rules are arbitrary and thus individuals are not obligated to follow them. Nothing makes an action objectively moral or immoral; individual and social codes vary because ethics, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. But then there are no compelling grounds for arguing that Aztec human sacrifice, Nazi or Serbian genocide, or infanticide is really wrong. Core ethical rules are no doubt determined by intersubjective consensus across cultures–for example, incest and murder are universally prohibited. But such consensus does not demonstrate the objectivity of ethics; it merely demonstrates that human beings or societies are largely ‘built’ the same way and react similarly to certain types of behavior. Suppose we have inherited an aversion to committing murder. That such a genetic disposition would be widespread makes evolutionary sense. A known murderer’s neighbors will fear that the murderer might kill them. Out of mutual self-interest they would be wise to band together and eliminate the murderer before he could eliminate them. Since murderers would tend to be eliminated before they could reproduce, individuals with a genetic inclination to commit murder would tend to dwindle. But this is merely an accident of natural selection, and trying to base morality on the fact that adhering to certain ethical norms will make you more “fit” to stay alive and reproduce is insufficient. The origin of behavior is irrelevant to whether a behavior is right or wrong; what makes an individual evolutionarily ‘fit’ (e.g. infidelity) is not necessarily moral. There will no doubt still be some individuals who are genetically inclined to commit murder; but we do not conclude that they are exempt from moral prohibitions on murder because of this. Furthermore, the fitness of certain evolutionary traits changes when the environment changes. Would murder suddenly become morally acceptable–even obligatory–if it provided us a selective advantage? On a materialist account, the only foundations for behavioral codes are preserving self-interest and satisfying one’s conscience–there are no additional ‘moral facts’ which motivate behavior.”

Now you can wax all you want about Utilitarian ethics but that will not get you to a cross-cultural, universal morality.

All of this begs a question to you atheists/agnostics here, if there are no universal moral truths/codes binding on any society, and the notion of moral progress is meaningless with an acknowlegement of meta-physical moral realism, why are you debting over something your metaphysics deems ultimately pointless?

In the meta-ethics of Moral Anti-realism (the rejection of objective morality) one culture trying to institute human rights onto another culture is no different than…say…Al Qaida, who rejects those rights, trying to institute it’s moral codes onto you and your culture. To argue otherwise is to imply there is an objective principle by which we could measure one code against another.

IOW, you guys, to Materialism debating over the nature of God and which moral code we should follow would be ultimately pointless.

One code cannot, factually, be supperior to any other. To argue otherwise implies moral progress and an objective morality. A code evolved out of a democracy cannot be superior to one instituted from a dictatorship. Wana bet you try to argue against that?

The reason you are here is because you feel not believing in a God and His moral codes are some how factually superior. Your actions, which speaks louder to me, belie your own arguments => radicalacademy.com/ethicsmyth.htm
 
If there is such a thing as perfect happiness, then it is good that God permits suffering in exchange for the existence of living persons. If you value people, the you value their perfect happiness. Their perfect happiness may require the permitence of potential suffering as a neccesary result of their possible existence. Also perfect happiness requires being perfectly moral, and the worshiping of love. Human beings are not perfectly moral. Their freedom allows them to make mistakes, but huma beings learn from experience and thus learn the value of the greater good. The only way that human beings can be perfectly happy therfore is for them to exist in a world where great suffering is a pontetial possibility.
 
I agree that the true nature of morality is unresolvable by debate. I think one attempt at such a synthesis is called “the second tablet project” or something similar; trying to keep morals without God in the picture. But anyway, who’s to say a little debate won’t help someone see the light?

When I said to argue that murder is ever okay, I wasn’t aiming for him to present me with a strict proof (regardless if possible). What I was doing was to elicit the response, however deep inside, that “I guess I know murder is wrong and can’t say it ever right”… thus giving way to the possibility of more-than-temporary moral truths.
I use to try the “light of reason” when arguing similar points to athiests about how morality must be realism…but the fact is nobody can prove morals are real or not real anymore than God lends Himself to a proof.

Where God and the devil are supernatural entities good and evil are supernatural qualities impose upon actions. Both rely upon faith…on self evidence.

In a debate it’s better to make the materialist stick to moral anti realism. I have yet to meet one that could. The Problem of Evil does not exist unless Evil is realism.

Keep in mind that an atheist can reject God but still believe in the universal notion of human rights (or even spirits), but…by his/her very act in doing so he/she inadvertantly is phylosophcally rejecting materialism – whether they realize it or not. To matericalism such atheists are still engaged in the stuff of mythology, of myth making.
 
It doesn’t matter what I believe. All that matters is that it’s conceivable that they’re lying and I have no way of knowing definitively if that’s the case. The reason that I believe people aren’t lying about the continents is basically derived, as you’ve read, from psychoanalysis (and because I doubt such a variety and quantity of resources could be accumulated within this one continent, but it’s still possible that they’re lying about certain continents).

But is it reasonable for me, a person who hasn’t experienced Antarctica and probably won’t visit it, to trust the authorities and assume it exists? It’s not enough to be able to validate something–if I don’t seek to validate my claims by visiting other continents and by subjecting my medications to chemical analysis, am I justified in my assumptions?

Nonsense, you’re simply refusing to see the similarities.
it is a false analogy because in the situation of G-ds morality, there is no physical evidence to consider, and in the matter of antartica there is, there is a difference in the substance of the situtation. you use this difference to claim that that its ok to draw draw conclusions in the face of the evidence you have. however if there were no physical evidence for the existence of antartica, then you would be in the same boat as before and it would be just as invalid then to draw conclusions. consider if we replaced antartica with atlantis, would you then be justified in saying its ok to claim that atlantis exists? of course not.

not that its important because you still cant draw valid conclusions from insufficient information. your trying to show why thats ok, using a false analogy, but it still doesnt affect the bare fact that drawing conclusions on insufficient informtion results in invalid conclusions.
Yes, I think they’re making it up. Unlike the proposal of other continents, they have reasons to lie about their religious experiences; usually they’re attempting to make you subordinate to some sort of religious institution
why is that a problem? what are you doing that the Church condemns?
or they persist to maintain the delusion that the world is a happy place (or, rather, that it will be a happy place) watched over by a loving god who wouldn’t allow for death to cause eternal slumber (a lack of consciousness). No, that reality would be too harsh to accept as even a possibility to many Christians.
there is no harshness in a reality in which there is no afterlife, life would be much easier if we didnt have to follow rules that restrict our ability to act in any way we chose. i could bed who i wanted, party all the time and feel great about it. once you decide we are nothing but bags of chemicals there is no harshness to life because you are free to act as you please and not worry about consequences.

this idea you have that somehow religion makes life easier is demonstrably false.

and i could just as well say the power companies want you to believe electrons exist because they have a financial interest in such a belief.
They may not lack evidence, but I still do, since another person’s allegation that something is true is never sufficient evidence. Just ask any judge what happens when someone expects to win a case in court with their own testimony as their only defense. They’d be lucky not to be the laughingstock of the town.
Again: is it acceptable for me to use my trust of another as a justification for a belief?
no, so why do you believe that antartica exists? because you trust the people with the physical evidence, thats why. do you believe atlantis exists? some people claim it but they dont have physical evidence, yet you dont believe them. see the contradiction?
One more time, Pete: if God is omnipotent, he does not need to produce any undesired effects, by definition. If suffering is an effect that displeases God, yet he doesn’t eliminate it, it would seem that he’s not omnipotent or that he possesses conflicting desires. If he can remove suffering, but doesn’t, he is (a) sadistic, (b) he doesn’t care about our suffering, or (c) possesses conflicting desires. Every possibility excludes him from being praiseworthy, in my opinion.
i understand the argument, but the problem is that it is only your opinion that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent G-d wouldnt allow suffering. a child who suffers from touching a hot stove benefits from that suffering in that he now knows not to touch a hot stove, clearly suffering can be beneficial. a loving omnipotent G-d would do the best thing for us, that may well include suffering. as the OP shows, there is always a possible reason for any event of suffering to be justified.
The Summa (I’ve read some of it, but not all) offers five “proofs” of God. Obviously, if we can’t prove that God exists, everything that is derived from that “fact” is an assumption. But most people admit that Aquinas’ proofs are not airtight (which actually would exclude them from being considered proofs) and that they only cushion the belief of those who already believe in God. They are not meant to be persuasive or irrefutable. They are meant only for reinforcement.
St. Thomas assumes the necessary being to be the Christain G-d, the arguments are pretty much air tight for a god, the leap to the Christain G-d is the assumption you are refering to, but at the time it wasnt an issue, however i can make the leap mathematically from convergent prophecy. a unique and mathematically undeniable feature exclusive to Christianity. the only denial being a gigantic conspiracy spanning thousands of years and thousands of people, for no apparent reason, as many of the conspirators suffered lives of deprivation, and eventual martyrdom.

they do not however assume the existence of G-d in the actual arguments. you apparently didnt examine them further than that.

atheism is symptomatic of a lack of knowledge about what we believe and why, your demonstrating the truth of that here.
 
For any argument made about moral qualities the argument can easily be changed to that of god entities. For example.

Of what point would it be for an atheist to argue that any piticular god should the be the universally adopted diety by all cultures given the fact atheism rejects theistic realism?

The same holds true for meta-ethics.
Of what point would it be for a materialist to argue that any piticular moral code should be the universally adopted ethic by all cultures given the fact materialism rejects moral realism?

The atheist, or materialist, could express a preference for a god over another, or of a moral code over another, but so what. The arguement is pointless. Either way you cut it atheist would simply be trying to get/force others to adopt arbitrary values.
 
The atheist, or materialist, could express a preference for a god over another, or of a moral code over another, but so what. The arguement is pointless. Either way you cut it atheist would simply be trying to get/force others to adopt arbitrary values.
I take issue with some of the phrasing, here, but I do agree that moral values have no ultimate universal basis. So, in that sense, they are indeed arbitrary.

However, this in no way deters me from encouraging others to adopt my personal moral values, so that we can share similar moral codes, if that is what I desire to do. So, you are incorrect to assert that moral arguments are “pointless” just because moral values are arbitrary.
 
I take issue with some of the phrasing, here, but I do agree that moral values have no ultimate universal basis. So, in that sense, they are indeed arbitrary.

However, this in no way deters me from encouraging others to adopt my personal moral values, so that we can share similar moral codes, if that is what I desire to do. So, you are incorrect to assert that moral arguments are “pointless” just because moral values are arbitrary.
Just a thought. There is universal truth and thus there would be universal morals.
 
If you mean that evil exists in the sense that I am repulsed by certain actions, then I agree. However, every ethical system equates goodness and badness with certain objects (for Christians, union/separation with/from God; for utilitarians, happiness/suffering, etc.). Obviously, an object is not good in the same way that it is round, or that it consists of iron, etc. Goodness and badness describe our emotional reactions to the perceptions of these objects, and are not qualities of the objects themselves.
That sounds like A.J. Ayer.
In order for a statement to be a fact, every term within the statement must pertain to something in reality (and the terms must cooperate to describe the real state of things). Words such as “should” and “ought” describe nothing in reality. They are words used to express how the world–if I may be circular, for a moment–ought to be, not how it is. This is, by definition, a disconnect, since most theories of ethics beg for reality to be a certain way when it is not, so it seems that ethics also fail to describe the real state of things. The only way to prevent this would be to say that everything that happens is moral, but then we still have the problem of what “should” and “ought” pertain to.
Terms such as “should” and “ought” are not problems for the moral realist. On the contrary, it is expressivism that somehow has to give a rational account of these terms. They certainly exist and are intended by people every day as normative statements. There are several reasons why I believe the non-realist’s position is untenable.

First, moral sentences are not always expressive of emotions or feelings. This is particularly true of conditional statements. There is no expressive content in statements like (1) If X lies to Y, then X has committed a morally wrong act. That being the case, we can form the following non-expressive syllogism:

(1’) If X lies to Y, then X has performed an action he should not have.
(2) X lies to Y.
(3) Therefore, X performed an action he should not have.

Propositions like these do not contain emotive content. In fact, they look like any other assertion that contains truth value. The non-realist’s claim that these moral propositions should be treated any differently than other assertive propositions is arbitrary.

Second, non-realists in practice use normative statements all the time to denote the actual existence of this or that particular moral standard (whether only existing in the mind or not). Just go ahead ask them whether black slavery ought to be reinstutionalized in the United States. Or whether a woman in Saudi Arabia should be punished with 100 lashes for being gang raped. You won’t get any equivocation like: “well, it’s personally distasteful to me, but there is nothing objectively wrong with it. I can’t say that black slavery shouldn’t be legalized or that the woman shouldn’t get 100 lashes, except to voice my own personal preference of distaste.” Apparently non-realists like to delude themselves just as much as moral realists.

And that leads to the third point. If normative statements are just illusions of realism, if they are really just ways to emote, then what is the point of making them? You can’t come here and tell me how I ought to believe in moral non-realism or how I should view moral statements as merely emotive and expressive. Why would I give any credence to your emotive statements?

These are some of the reasons why I reject moral non-realism.
 
First, moral sentences are not always expressive of emotions or feelings. This is particularly true of conditional statements. There is no expressive content in statements like (1) If X lies to Y, then X has committed a morally wrong act. That being the case, we can form the following non-expressive syllogism:

(1’) If X lies to Y, then X has performed an action he should not have.
(2) X lies to Y.
(3) Therefore, X performed an action he should not have.

Propositions like these do not contain emotive content. In fact, they look like any other assertion that contains truth value. The non-realist’s claim that these moral propositions should be treated any differently than other assertive propositions is arbitrary.
Nobody is asserting they treat such statements differently. Rather, we insist that, in this case, you mind a proper definition of “should.” In that definition, you will find the emotive content you seek (or a term which, properly defined, leads you there).
 
Nobody is asserting they treat such statements differently. Rather, we insist that, in this case, you mind a proper definition of “should.” In that definition, you will find the emotive content you seek (or a term which, properly defined, leads you there).
What is the proper definition? The claim is that it is merely an expressive device, yet that is not at all apparent in conditional statements as in the example I offered. Perhaps you can help by pointing it out.
 
What is the proper definition? The claim is that it is merely an expressive device, yet that is not at all apparent in conditional statements as in the example I offered. Perhaps you can help by pointing it out.
A word like “should” implicates a relationship to some kind of value system or set. In the case of morality, those values are derived from human desires and habits.
 
A word like “should” implicates a relationship to some kind of value system or set. In the case of morality, those values are derived from human desires and habits.
That is a conclusion. I might give some credence to that conclusion except that moral sentences in a conditional statement look just like any other proposition. So should we also conclude that all other propositions are simply derived from human desires and habits? I guess I’m having trouble figuring out why the case of “morality” is treated any differently from other non-expressive statements.
 
Their freedom allows them to make mistakes, but huma beings learn from experience and thus learn the value of the greater good.
I don’t see why human beings should have to learn from their mistakes. Heck, I don’t see why they should have to learn. Why not simply prevent them from making mistakes in the first place?

But I know you’ll just say, “We can’t be perfectly happy without free will.” but that would be downright absurd. Firstly, if thinking about committing a sin is as bad as committing one, God could simply prevent the sin from being committed and still know if that person loves him enough to “keep his Word.” (I think the “you only love me if you obey me” dogma is ridiculous, though. It suggests that we don’t love our parents or our peers if we disobey them even occasionally.) Or God could simply alter our psyches so that we could be perfectly happy without free will. I could be controlled by a god as we speak and never know it.
That sounds like A.J. Ayer.
I don’t know such a person.
They certainly exist and are intended by people every day as normative statements.
Intended, yes, but they aren’t. A child could be perfectly honest when saying that he believes blue is the best color of all, but it’s still just an opinion based on preference, no matter how much certainty accompanies it.
(1’) If X lies to Y, then X has performed an action he should not have.
(2) X lies to Y.
(3) Therefore, X performed an action he should not have.
We can cover this up with collegiate logical terms all day, but in the end I’ll ask: why does the person presenting this argument claim that lying is wrong? Did some imaginary law of the universe force him to, or was it his emotions rebelling when he discovered that he was deceived? The catalyst for the ethic “Humans should not lie” is the displeasure of being deceived or acting on misinformation only to have the action backfire.
Propositions like these do not contain emotive content. In fact, they look like any other assertion that contains truth value.
Really? What does the term “should” point to? Is it like addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division in that it can be applied to objects? Does it point to chemical properties? How does “should” describe the nature of things in reality?
Second, non-realists in practice use normative statements all the time to denote the actual existence of this or that particular moral standard (whether only existing in the mind or not). Just go ahead ask them whether black slavery ought to be reinstutionalized in the United States. Or whether a woman in Saudi Arabia should be punished with 100 lashes for being gang raped. You won’t get any equivocation like: “well, it’s personally distasteful to me, but there is nothing objectively wrong with it. I can’t say that black slavery shouldn’t be legalized or that the woman shouldn’t get 100 lashes, except to voice my own personal preference of distaste.” Apparently non-realists like to delude themselves just as much as moral realists.
I’ll be the first to step forward and say that it’s just my opinion, though I feel that my opinion should count for a lot (such is human nature).
And that leads to the third point. If normative statements are just illusions of realism, if they are really just ways to emote, then what is the point of making them?
Whatever you want it to be. It’s like asking what the meaning of life is.

You can’t expect me to feel that my feelings are worthless because they’re feelings, can you?
 
Feelings are never worthless. Though at times, they are not the best judges of truth.
I couldn’t agree more. 🙂 Now, if only we could all agree on what matters pertain solely to objects and which rely partly on emotions.
 
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