The problem of evil

[Semangelof]

the PoE tries to show that IF an all-omni God exists and IF evil exists, those two are incompatible.

This is the part im trying to understand, how does it show this?

 

[belorg]

Your denial that evil exists prevents you from regarding it as a problem.

If evil doesn’t exist - as you claim - neither of those statements make sense. You’re trying to have it both ways…

“best” also implies that “good” - and “evil” - is a valid description.

I don’t deny that evil exists but even if I denied it, it still would be a problem for those who don’t deny it.
The rest of your post is one huge misrepresentation of my position, so I’d rather not comment on it.

 

[belorg]

This is the part im trying to understand, how does it show this?

I said 'tries to show…’ I did not say it actually shows this. If it did, it would be lethal to most brands of Christianity.
If you truly want to know more about the logical problem of evil, you should read J.L.Mackie.

 

[belorg]

It would be without purpose if God created a universe incapable of producing evil. It would be as if he was just creating more of himself. Nonsense. So the problem of evil goes away when you see that God tolerates his opposite without having to love it.

No it doesn’t, because a truly good being does not tolerate evil.

 

[davidv]

No it doesn’t, because a truly good being does not tolerate evil.

Why?

 

[Aloysium]

No it doesn’t, because a truly good being does not tolerate evil.

How do you define “good”?
Are you sticking with, “pleasing to someone and if it does not involve inconvenience for anyone.”
So God is good if He is pleasing to me and not causing people any inconvenience.
I would suggest reflecting more on the matter.

 

[Semangelof]

I said 'tries to show…’ I did not say it actually shows this. If it did, it would be lethal to most brands of Christianity.
If you truly want to know more about the logical problem of evil, you should read J.L.Mackie.

I’ve heard some from Stephen Law but if it’s not a working theory I’ll just leave it where it is. I’ll probably still check out who Mackie is though. Thanks.

 

[belorg]

Why?

Because he is good.

 

[belorg]

How do you define “good”?
Are you sticking with, “pleasing to someone and if it does not involve inconvenience for anyone.”
So God is good if He is pleasing to me and not causing people any inconvenience.
I would suggest reflecting more on the matter.

For the purpose of the PoE I define good the way most Christians define it, at least when they are not being circular.

 

[polytropos]

You are talking about the logical problem of evil, to which Alvin Plantinga answered with his famous Free Will Defense, in which he came up with an extremely far-fetched scenario in which God and evil were compatible.
And I agree, if there is one possible sufficient reason for God to allow evil, then the logical PoE is defeated. However, this is like saying that the fact that there is a 1 in 10^10000000000000000000000000000000 chance that the constants of the universe are fine-tuned by chance alone defeats the fine-tuning argument and yet, technically, it does if the fine-tuning argument is posited as a logical argument.
But there is still the evidential problem of evil, which does not disappear in light of the beatific vision and the eternal soul, especially when at least some of those eternal souls run the risk of eternal torture (or unpleasantness)

For the evidential problem of evil to carry any weight against Catholicism (as opposed to brands of theism which posit God as a quasi-scientific, “most likely” hypothesis - which we will leave to defend themselves), you’d have to articulate why the empirical observation of evil, which as you admit does not lead to a necessary contradiction, should be able to falsify necessary metaphysical demonstrations like Thomas’s proofs for the existence of God. But that doesn’t really make sense; it’s like rejecting a mathematical proof because you have a feeling that something might contradict it, even though you are unable to demonstrate the actual contradiction. Since the premises and logical steps are laid out, there is no need to grasp for a contradiction of the conclusion. At most, the existence of evil would lead you to question God’s existence and take a more skeptical look at the proofs.

You may, of course, disagree as to whether metaphysical demonstrations are valid or whether Thomistic metaphysics lead to the conclusions Catholics claim they do (or whether Thomistic metaphysics are valid in the first place) - but yet again, that relegates the problem of evil (evidential or otherwise) to being a red herring, when the real disagreement lies with more basic philosophical and theological matters.

Given a Thomist analysis, though, as I replied to Portofino, there’s very little reason to be surprised that there is evil in the world, that the highest activity of man is to apprehend the Supreme Intellect’s will, and that failing to direct one’s own will toward one’s final causes could have negative consequences. So I don’t think the evidential problem of evil has much force anyway (besides its emotional force - but no one has ever denied it that).

 

[polytropos]

Your denial that evil exists prevents you from regarding it as a problem.

I think belorg is being fairly consistent in acknowledging that the problem of evil requires him to assume the Catholic definition of evil for the sake of argument, which many atheists will not do.

No it doesn’t, because a truly good being does not tolerate evil.

Because he is good.

However, here I don’t think he can use this claim in his argument from evil without qualification. It does not obviously follow from the the Thomistic conception of good, final causality, convertibility of the transcendentals, or doctrine of analogy. To reject those in an argument from evil would be begging the question (although he could try to do so in a separate, more philosophically basic argument, in which case it is not the existence of evil that is problematic but specific Catholic doctrines).

 

[Peter_Plato]

No it doesn’t, because a truly good being does not tolerate evil.

I am not clear that this can be demonstrated from any conception of evil, like yours, that is based upon subjective pain as the determiner of evil.

It seems to me that when you propose your concept of good as a premise to bolster a claim that a truly good being would not “tolerate” evil, you nullify your own argument.

Your definition is self-defeating regarding the problem of evil.

You defined “good” as what is pleasing but causes no inconvenience. Evil must then be what is displeasing or causes inconvenience.

This definition is problematic precisely because pleasing is subjective and varies widely among individuals.

A masochist is pleased paradoxically by their own displeasure. Some individuals are very tolerant of others and situations such that not much is displeasing to them, while others are very intolerant and are displeased by very slight perturbances around them.

How is your definition capable of adjudicating between different views of what is good and therefore moral? Moral becomes a meaningless concept because there is no possibility of using this definition to determine which of two parties has the morally correct position since they may be pleased or displeased by very different behaviours or outcomes.

This is problematic for your case against the PofE precisely because by grounding good as what is pleasing and does not inconvenience, the fact that pleasing and conveniencing are subjective, makes it entirely possible that a supreme being could be pleased by the general state of things and would be inconvenienced by having to “clean things up.” By your definition, the state of existence in the human world could very well be pleasing and convenient (and, therefore, good) for a supreme being who is, thereby, completely justified in tolerating things as they are because they are “good” as far as this being is concerned.

There would be no reason to make it incumbent upon this being to be responsible for any one else who might find the current situation displeasing or inconvenient since these are very relative views concerning the situation for which your very definition of “good” cannot resolve.

Since you provide no objective grounds for claiming otherwise, your own definition nullifies the problem of evil and absolves any deity of responsibility for what you or others might find displeasing and inconvenient since a moral agent could not be compelled to act contrary to its own state of pleasure or convenience.

If you wish to hold onto this conception of good and evil, you have nothing to complain to a supreme being about.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I think belorg is being fairly consistent in acknowledging that the problem of evil requires him to assume the Catholic definition of evil for the sake of argument, which many atheists will not do.

From my last post, it would seem clear why belorg must assume a more coherent definition of good (or evil) than his own in order to make a case.

 

[Portofino]

For the evidential problem of evil to carry any weight against Catholicism (as opposed to brands of theism which posit God as a quasi-scientific, “most likely” hypothesis - which we will leave to defend themselves), you’d have to articulate why the empirical observation of evil, which as you admit does not lead to a necessary contradiction, should be able to falsify necessary metaphysical demonstrations like Thomas’s proofs for the existence of God. But that doesn’t really make sense; it’s like rejecting a mathematical proof because you have a feeling that something might contradict it, even though you are unable to demonstrate the actual contradiction. Since the premises and logical steps are laid out, there is no need to grasp for a contradiction of the conclusion. At most, the existence of evil would lead you to question God’s existence and take a more skeptical look at the proofs.

Pardon my ignorance, but how does Aquinas manage to get from positing that God exists to positing that God is supremely benevolent?

Is it is a case of – “existence is a supreme good, and God is the basis of our continuing existence; therefore, God is supremely good?” If that’s the case, I don’t see where subjective valuations – about the value of existence, for example – aren’t creeping in. If somebody says, “I wish I were never born,” I’m not sure how one would prove that their viewpoint is objectively wrong.

a Thomist analysis, though, as I replied to Portofino, there’s very little reason to be surprised that there is evil in the world, that the highest activity of man is to apprehend the Supreme Intellect’s will, and that failing to direct one’s own will toward one’s final causes could have negative consequences. So I don’t think the evidential problem of evil has much force anyway (besides its emotional force - but no one has ever denied it that).

I don’t think I follow the reasoning here; if I throw a child into the deep end of the pool and he doesn’t know how to swim, of course he’s going to sink. That’s common sense – so, indeed, he failed to swim, whereas I could be a champion swimmer. He failed to swim; therefore, he sinks. But he, of course, is not me. That’s this “God is great, I’m not” argument, which makes sense enough.

You could say, “but God taught us everything we need to swim; therefore, there is nothing disturbing about having thrown us into the deep end of the pool of life” (yet, free will or not, we did not create ourselves, nor did we define what the consequences would be for failing to use that freedom with sufficient skill; and, of course, even when we do use that freedom skillfully, the fact is that the extent of our skill is infinitesimal in comparison with God. We cannot control everything; if we could, there would be no distinction between moral evil and natural evil. Smothering an infant would be a grave example of moral evil; but a baby who, when it was born, got its umbilical cord wrapped around its neck while exiting the womb, and emerged from its mother’s body purple and lifeless (pardon the example, but we’re talking about the problem of evil here) would be an example of natural evil. It’s unclear to me why it’s rational – indeed, a moral imperative – to condemn the first, yet to believe that the second casts absolutely no legitimate doubt as to the benevolent nature or intentions of the creator of the universe (if we can’t control it, then only God can) or even to believe that this is a non-question, even a borderline uninteresting – a borderline insipid – question. A part of me wants to say, “or perhaps we’re just insensitive.”

 

[Portofino]

From my last post, it would seem clear why belorg must assume a more coherent definition of good (or evil) than his own in order to make a case.

Perhaps belorg is making a distinction between “hurt” and “harm,” and using harm as the standard. Heroin may feel good, but it is harmful; on the other hand, a tonsillectomy may hurt extremely badly upon waking in the recovery room, yet promotes health and not harm.

Other things – like beating someone with a blunt object – would be both hurtful and harmful.

From there, he is simply using reasonable human standards as to what is harmful, what isn’t. Thus, anyone who would claim to beat someone to death yet say, “you’ve proven that was unpleasant, but not that this constituted harm” would be speaking an absurdity, from the standpoint of someone who believed that such an action was immoral because it caused harm in the sense of (say) physical damage to the organism. To say that it’s not proven that this was harmful – just that it’s subjectively unpleasant – would undermine morality.

Likewise, in human terms, it would be absurd to say, “he tortured her and killed her, but that doesn’t mean he didn’t love her.”

Yet with the problem of evil vis-a-vis God, that’s more or less exactly what we’re saying; anything goes, really. If God does it, God must have reasons that are wholly compatible with supreme benevolence and perfect, unconditional love.

I’ve been meaning to share a funny Woody Allen quote, in connection with the problem of evil, and this is as good a juncture as any to cite it: “I ran into my brother today at a funeral. We had not seen one another for fifteen years, but as usual he produced a pig bladder from his pocket and began hitting me on the head with it. Time has helped me to understand him better. I finally realized his remark that I am ‘some loathsome vermin fit only for extermination’ was said more out of compassion than anger.”

 

[Peter_Plato]

Pardon my ignorance, but how does Aquinas manage to get from positing that God exists to positing that God is supremely benevolent?

Is it is a case of – “existence is a supreme good, and God is the basis of our continuing existence; therefore, God is supremely good?” If that’s the case, I don’t see where subjective valuations – about the value of existence, for example – aren’t creeping in. If somebody says, “I wish I were never born,” I’m not sure how one would prove that their viewpoint is objectively wrong.

You have a marvelous gift for honing in on and asking the difficult questions.

Could it be that any, at least human, person who says, “I wish I were never born,” must, by default, be in a delimited state and is not, at that moment, clearly considering what “being born” or “existing” fully entails? Perhaps that is what is meant by privation? That the person in the state you depict is not fully aware of what it means to exist and therefore does not appreciate what they have in their grasp? It is, perhaps, this “foreshortening” of their own existence that is the result of evil - i.e., “privating” - choices and, perhaps even, evil itself; the state of privation of being that the person has ended themselves in.

The question to be asked, then, is: How should God “intervene” in that person’s consciousness to enlighten their darkness so they can regain the capacity to see beyond their current darkened state?

Perhaps the darkness itself is God’s presence demonstrably revealing the precarious state of that person’s existence in as clear a way as possible - they are fully aware of the darkness (evil) of their own state by contrast to the abiding presence of God. In Catholic tradition, I suppose, this would be considered the “dark night” of the soul. It would also place that person in a kind of lacuna from which they can choose to reach out beyond their own being and relinquish, finally, the delimiting prospects of sin by faith in God to see them through to fullness of being or relapse into ego and continue to search for limited and incomplete “fixes” for their existential dissatisfaction.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Perhaps belorg is making a distinction between “hurt” and “harm,” and using harm as the standard. Heroin may feel good, but it is harmful; on the other hand, a tonsillectomy may hurt extremely badly upon waking in the recovery room, yet promotes health and not harm.

Other things – like beating someone with a blunt object – would be both hurtful and harmful.

That is precisely my point. Pain is a kind of indicator of harm, but not the harm itself. Pain, suffering or anguish are not equivalent to harm but proceed from physical, emotional or spiritual harm. It is in putting this into perspective and identifying what is harmed by tracing where the pain, suffering or anguish originates that we come upon the “existential” good, i.e, being, that is susceptible to harm.

If we lose sight of this and focus on pain, suffering or anguish as the evil, then we are missing a very important aspect of what “moral” means. Likewise, if we focus on pleasure or convenience we are wrongly locating the good in an emotional byproduct rather than in being. Again, we are missing the moral “boat.”

Aquinas contends that good is convertible to “being.” In this I think he is correct. Evil is harm done to beings as beings, not in the resultant emotional states which reveal the harm done as the symptoms of a disease show the toll the disease is taking.

To treat the symptoms of the disease and forget to deal with the cause is bad medicine, just as taking pain, suffering or anguish as the only morally relevant considerations is practicing bad ethics.

 

[polytropos]

From my last post, it would seem clear why belorg must assume a more coherent definition of good (or evil) than his own in order to make a case.

I agree. He has said that he would need to assume the Catholic definition of evil for the purposes of the problem of evil, but you are right that the definition you quoted is not the Catholic definition of evil and could not be construed as such without additional argumentation.

 

[polytropos]

Pardon my ignorance, but how does Aquinas manage to get from positing that God exists to positing that God is supremely benevolent?

Is it is a case of – “existence is a supreme good, and God is the basis of our continuing existence; therefore, God is supremely good?” If that’s the case, I don’t see where subjective valuations – about the value of existence, for example – aren’t creeping in. If somebody says, “I wish I were never born,” I’m not sure how one would prove that their viewpoint is objectively wrong.

There are a few factors at play. The most important, perhaps, is the convertibility of the transcendentals (two of which are being and goodness). So for God to be Pure Being is the same as His being Pure Goodness.

Aquinas’s Fifth Way also is meant to show (beginning from final causality in the way that other proofs begin with motion or efficient causality) that God is Supreme Intellect, so it would follow that He wills the structure of final causes we observe in the world.

The idea of “subjective” valuations really did not come around until the Enlightenment, and the Scholastics would have rejected it (there is no fact/value distinction, and there is no is/ought gap). The “value” of existence is not subjective. The final cause of any living thing is to preserve its own life (and pathological cases, such as a person who is clinically depressed, are not counterexamples to this - they are just instances of less than perfect instantiation of the form of a human being, in the same way that any triangle you draw on a sheet of paper will be a less than perfect instantiation of triangularity).

What Aquinas did argue is that the will proceeds from the intellect, so what the intellect perceives as good, it will direct the will toward. So the clinically depressed person might perceive existence as bad, but Thomas would hold that existence was nevertheless actually good.

I don’t think I follow the reasoning here; if I throw a child into the deep end of the pool and he doesn’t know how to swim, of course he’s going to sink. That’s common sense – so, indeed, he failed to swim, whereas I could be a champion swimmer. He failed to swim; therefore, he sinks. But he, of course, is not me. That’s this “God is great, I’m not” argument, which makes sense enough.

You could say, “but God taught us everything we need to swim; therefore, there is nothing disturbing about having thrown us into the deep end of the pool of life” (yet, free will or not, we did not create ourselves, nor did we define what the consequences would be for failing to use that freedom with sufficient skill; and, of course, even when we do use that freedom skillfully, the fact is that the extent of our skill is infinitesimal in comparison with God. We cannot control everything; if we could, there would be no distinction between moral evil and natural evil. Smothering an infant would be a grave example of moral evil; but a baby who, when it was born, got its umbilical cord wrapped around its neck while exiting the womb, and emerged from its mother’s body purple and lifeless (pardon the example, but we’re talking about the problem of evil here) would be an example of natural evil. It’s unclear to me why it’s rational – indeed, a moral imperative – to condemn the first, yet to believe that the second casts absolutely no legitimate doubt as to the benevolent nature or intentions of the creator of the universe (if we can’t control it, then only God can) or even to believe that this is a non-question, even a borderline uninteresting – a borderline insipid – question. A part of me wants to say, “or perhaps we’re just insensitive.”

I hope it does not seem like I find the question unimportant or insipid. I think evil is something that has preoccupied the classical theistic tradition for quite a long time - certainly longer than Christianity has been around. As I expressed much earlier in this topic, there is an unfortunate disconnect between how we deal with the problem of evil emotionally and philosophically which can put many off. I do not intend to brush aside the emotional ramifications of evil at all.

My point is not at all that anyone who doesn’t accept all evil, natural or otherwise, with a straight face is irrational or stupid. I am pointing out that neither the logical problem of evil nor the evidential problem of evil are effective indirect proofs against the existence of God, the former because it cannot in principle demonstrate the contradiction which it must, the latter because it would be an empirical falsification of a necessary metaphysical demonstration.

Regarding the “Thomistic analysis” (which I did not flesh out in the quote you posted), I am referring to the fact that any created thing will not be perfect (for something to be perfect, it would have to be Pure Being/Pure Goodness, which would mean that it would be indistinguishable from God). So the implication of that would be that of metaphysical necessity, anything God creates is less than perfect (which does not mean that it is not good, but it could not be perfect). In that respect, the potential for evil, natural or otherwise, would be inevitable of created things. That is perhaps a cold and philosophical notion, but I’m not really putting it forth as a “solution” to the emotional ramifications of the problem of evil.

 

[tonyrey]

I think belorg is being fairly consistent in acknowledging that the problem of evil requires him to assume the Catholic definition of evil for the sake of argument, which many atheists will not do.

He goes further than that! He proceeds to refer to “good” which makes no sense without evil…