The problem of evil

[polytropos]

I think I grant that Catholics have come up with a perfectly cogent explanation for the problem of evil, that is internally consistent and well worked-out.

And that has really been my main point. Catholicism is internally consistent, and if it is false, it would not be because of an after-the-fact assessment of evil.

With Thomism, which I admittedly have zero expertise in, I certainly have an admittedly “vague” sense in which I’m not convinced that the definitions given of pure actuality/potentiality, change, causality, substance, etc. are necessarily definitions that link up with the things themselves, with the phenomenon they are seeking to explain. It’s unclear to me whether the words are describing actual things, or whether they are concepts “blowing in the wind” (“casuality” is one such concept; David Hume, for example, took to task the argument of “First Cause”, positing that our very notion of causality is suspect).

I find most of these metaphysical concepts pretty thoroughly defensible, although there certainly have been arguments against them. Many of them are reflected in the “new essentialist” school of philosophy of science, which reconsiders the empiricist view of the world. For instance, no one really thinks that what we know of the nature of electrons is an approximation or “most likely.” We don’t suppose that, empirically, most electrons have a negative charge or behave a certain way when in a certain atom’s valence shell. It is rather intrinsic to the nature of electrons that they have a negative charge and behave in certain ways. Events, like the bonding of two atoms, are not really, as Hume put it, “loose and separate.” This, however, does not pertain so much to the problem of evil.

I’m admittedly baffled as to the notion of the interchangeability of Goodness with Being; or of evil as privation. But if one takes this for proven then, yes, its application to the problem of evil is certainly coherent. But if I haven’t disproven these claims – and I’m not sure if that’s even possible – then I wouldn’t go so far as to say, “in the interim, I am obliged to consider it proven, otherwise I am begging the question.” I certainly woudln’t say that regarding not being convinced by the story of the Fall, or of Pandora’s box, either. Again, I can disprove neither of those stories.

I wouldn’t say that you have to consider the privation view of evil or convertibility of the transcendentals as proven to avoid begging the question. My point is that, if on those views Catholicism is internally consistent with evil, then there is no problem of evil. If, disregarding those views, evil becomes problematic for Catholicism, then there is still no problem of evil, there is just a disagreement on those particular doctrines (which would certainly be problematic for a proof of Catholicism).

For example, suppose someone disagrees that a metaphysical demonstration could ever be certain. They then propose that evil in the world counts as evidence against the existence of God as conceived by the classical Christian tradition, and that the theist cannot get out of it by saying that his proof of God is a necessary metaphysical demonstration because metaphysical demonstrations cannot be necessary. But in that case, it is not the evil in the world that is relevant at all; it is the fact that metaphysical demonstrations could not be certain, which would prevent the proof for God’s existence from going through anyway.

 

[Portofino]

It is quite possible - and essential - on a philosophy forum to discuss these questions objectively:

1. Do you accept the moral teaching of Jesus?

You’d have to define which aspect of the moral teaching of Jesus you’re referring to. I’m assuming it’s the “love your neighbor” one in particular. I personally don’t find “keep holy the Sabbath” to be a compelling injunction, because I believe it offers no proof for itself.

Nor am I bothered by a woman who has been remarried multiple times – or, for that matter, not married at all. I see no reason to regard marriage as anything but a human institution, but I don’t intend to stray off topic.

The “love your neighbor” as yourself has more to it, I think. For one thing, it appears to bear an unlikely relationship with “be happy.” I am not at all far from associating love with happiness; and if happiness is human value, then so too is love. Even sacrificing for love would not be a case of courting unhappiness, but of trading the lesser happiness for the greater happiness (but it depends on one’s own make-up, the constitution of one’s own temperament, I would grant).

Whether “love your neighbor as yourself” can be proven – no, I don’t believe that it can. I don’t believe that human values can be proven as objectively binding in an ontological sense. What I do observe is that “love your neighbor as yourself” could be an important constituent in our survival as a species, and in our happiness as individuals. If the survival of the species and of the individual are held to be values – and we seem to hold them as values “by nature”, just as we see and hear by nature – then “love your neighbor as yourself” has definite value, in turn.

Honestly, though, I don’t see what this has to do with the problem of evil. I don’t have evidence that the universe cares whether we’re good to each other, or destroy each other. But if we care, then that is the “efficient cause” of its constituting a human value.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

**In his 1907 introduction to the Book of Job Chesterton says this:

“Job is not told that his misfortunes were due to his sins or a part of any plan for his improvement. But in the prologue we see Job tormented not because he was the worst of men, but because he was the best. It is the lesson of the whole work that man is most comforted by paradoxes. Here is the very darkest and strangest of the paradoxes; and it is by all human testimony the most reassuring. I need not suggest what high and strange history awaited this paradox of the best man in the worst fortune. I need not say that in the freest and most philosophical sense there is one Old Testament figure who is truly a type; or say what is prefigured in the wounds of Job.”**

I think Chesterton is onto something there. Innocent Job suffers from evil (undeserved) wounds, prefiguring the Innocent Jesus suffering from evil (undeserved) wounds. He accepts his wounds, as Jesus accepts his. The paradox is that undeserved wounds of the innocent are not fatal in the end. We all survive to enter a new and a hopefully more glorious life.

 

[Portofino]

And that has really been my main point. Catholicism is internally consistent, and if it is false, it would not be because of an after-the-fact assessment of evil.

Internally consistent, yes, even in terms of resolving apparent internal inconsistencies. Some of this resolving of contradictions is really just tautological, as when it says “Jesus is fully God, fully man” and it’s not a paradoxical impossibility, because it’s the truth I can’t argue with that, though I can’t say it satisfies me.

Free will as an explanation for human evil makes sense enough – that making choices is important, even if it’s contingent on the possibility of evil – except Catholicism hasn’t proven the inherent value of free-will. It simply takes it as axiomatic that free will not only does exist, but ought to exist, and is of greater value than a universe in which evil does not exist, but neither does freedom.

Free will as an explanation of natural evil begs the question even more severely; the story of Adam and Eve, and of the Fall, begs the question, because there is no proof of that event having ever occurred. It seems rather forced to me to use the Fall of Adam as an explanation for why there are hurricanes and tsunamis, and cancer, and all manner of things which – if man-made – would be great moral evils (it is not dissimilar to the myth of Pandora’s Box). But there’s no proof that they’re man made, so attributing natural evil to free will – via the Fall of Adam – begs the question.

No proof of the existence of Satan, and that Satan fell from heaven through a misuse of free will, so that too doesn’t satisfy me. If one accepts the axiom that Satan exists, it makes sense; but one has not demonstrated that axiom that Satan exists.

No proof that the “imperfection” of human, animal, or plant life, in comparison with God, makes suffering and evil “natural” occurrences, insofar as we fall short of perfection. Our very notion of love is that the stronger protects the weaker. If I say that I, as the strong, refrain from protecting the weak for their own good, I am dubbed immoral. When I say that God is all good, but is not beholden to human concepts of goodness, I am engaging in special pleading. To say that it is “natural” for evil to exist among imperfect beings – who were created imperfect by a perfect God, thus strength creating weakness – is to take a neutrally realist stance, that actually goes beyond good and evil. It’s akin to an irritated William Buckley, who responded to the fact of poverty in the world by saying, “don’t ask me if I’m ‘in favor of something’ that happens. If it happens, it happens.”

Finally, I’m not satisfied with the Catholic explanation of things because I have yet to hear a coherent response regarding whether:

—natural evil is wholly the result of human free will (presumably through the Fall of Adam, though it’s surprising to me that Adam would have such power to re-shape the very fabric of all of nature)
—natural evil is punishment from God (it seems as if the Old Testament is being given short shrift, in this thread), this idea of God intervening to cause suffering and death (the destruction of Sodom; the Ten Plagues; the killing of the Egyptian first-born); the point is ignored, which makes me begin to suspect that this is a “softer” belief these days, not necessarily insisted upon, that God can “cause damage” as a form of punishment to sinful humanity
—natural evil is caused by the devil (so which is it, who was the “efficient cause” of the destruction of Sodom, God or the devil? The OT posits that the efficient cause was God, which must mean that the destruction of human life is not always evil)
—natural evil serves the greater good; even to say “natural evil serves the greater good of allowing us to make free choices” belongs here, whereas I sense that there is resistance to saying that evil is anything but something that humans are wholly and entirely responsible for. But there is no evidence of this.

 

[polytropos]

Free will as an explanation for human evil makes sense enough – that making choices is important, even if it’s contingent on the possibility of evil – except Catholicism hasn’t proven the inherent value of free-will. It simply takes it as axiomatic that free will not only does exist, but ought to exist, and is of greater value than a universe in which evil does not exist, but neither does freedom.

I am reading The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil by Brian Davies right now, which you might find interesting (unfortunately, it is rather pricey). I started reading it after we began this discussion, but as it happens, Davies devotes an entire chapter to disputing the proposition “God is morally good” (which, as he notes, seems to have slipped into the modern lexicon even though it has little biblical support and has not been widely held until the last few centuries). He also is, like you, not satisfied with many of the standard theodicies (free will defense, evil as a means to an end, etc.), and seems to argue that most of them look at the problem of evil the wrong way. The crux of the book, for instance, is a pair of chapters titled “How Not to Exonerate God.”

 

[Bahman]

Premise 1. God could not know the fate of a being “before” its creation for two reasons.

1. God is in eternity. He is not in time. With God there is no before or after but only a timeless now in which all time is present to him. He does not know the fate of a creature “before” its creation, he simply knows the fate of the creature.
2. God cannot know the fate of a being with free will without the creation of that being to determine its fate. Its fate is not determinable “prior” to its creation (see reason #1), but, rather, its fate is logically dependent upon its creation, since no fate could be determinable without the free will of the agent to, paradoxically, “determine” that fate. Its fate is not dependent upon God, but upon the agency of the creature and therefore can only occur with the creation of the free agent. God does not know that fate “before” the creature is created because there is no “before” for God. He is eternal.

Do you mean that God cannot plan its creation since it does not know its fate prior? To me this sounds that act of creation of God looks like to throwing a dice!? Anyhow the formal problem of evil is not resolved yet since:

1. The being with the eventual evil fate has not any control on its fate (since its fate only depends on the number that dice shows) .
2. The being with the eventual evil fate did not have any control on its creation.
3. The act of hating devil and punishing them is wrong.

More over I didn’t understand what do you mean with the following sentence:

since no fate could be determinable without the free will of the agent to, paradoxically, “determine” that fate

To me God cannot even predict the fate an agent after creation as the knowledge of God acts as a strong constrain on agent decision. Simply, the agent cannot do anything against what God know since it contradicts God knowledge.

 

[Abu]

Portofino #224
Finally, I’m not satisfied with the Catholic explanation of things because I have yet to hear a coherent response regarding whether:

—natural evil is wholly the result of human free will (presumably through the Fall of Adam, though it’s surprising to me that Adam would have such power to re-shape the very fabric of all of nature)
—natural evil is punishment from God (it seems as if the Old Testament is being given short shrift, in this thread), this idea of God intervening to cause suffering and death (the destruction of Sodom; the Ten Plagues; the killing of the Egyptian first-born); the point is ignored, which makes me begin to suspect that this is a “softer” belief these days, not necessarily insisted upon, that God can “cause damage” as a form of punishment to sinful humanity
—natural evil is caused by the devil (so which is it, who was the “efficient cause” of the destruction of Sodom, God or the devil? The OT posits that the efficient cause was God, which must mean that the destruction of human life is not always evil)
—natural evil serves the greater good; even to say “natural evil serves the greater good of allowing us to make free choices” belongs here, whereas I sense that there is resistance to saying that evil is anything but something that humans are wholly and entirely responsible for. But there is no evidence of this.

Since the world and everything in it was created for the benefit of mankind, as good, and Adam was given a specific order/warning NOT to commit a specific act, which he disobeyed, losing for his descendants Sanctifying Grace, Integrity, Immortality, Happiness, and Enlightenment, justice, charity and hope were restored in the Redemption by God the Son.

Adam failed himself and God, resulting in his downfall. Since when is “power” shown by degradation? God acted to punish disobedience as forewarned, in His super human being and his descendants. Without punishment from God evil would run riot and thus the obvious examples of Sodom etc. as fair warning. The devil entices to evil. Failure to accept the facts is no excuse for confusion. Obviously God acts with the perfection of His infinite goodness. .

Any attempt to deny free-will to act for good or evil is totally unreasonable. Naturally, failing to examine and to accept these facts is inexcusable.

 

[tonyrey]

You’d have to define which aspect of the moral teaching of Jesus you’re referring to. I’m assuming it’s the “love your neighbor” one in particular. I personally don’t find “keep holy the Sabbath” to be a compelling injunction, because I believe it offers no proof for itself.

Nor am I bothered by a woman who has been remarried multiple times – or, for that matter, not married at all. I see no reason to regard marriage as anything but a human institution, but I don’t intend to stray off topic.

The “love your neighbor” as yourself has more to it, I think. For one thing, it appears to bear an unlikely relationship with “be happy.” I am not at all far from associating love with happiness; and if happiness is human value, then so too is love. Even sacrificing for love would not be a case of courting unhappiness, but of trading the lesser happiness for the greater happiness (but it depends on one’s own make-up, the constitution of one’s own temperament, I would grant).

Whether “love your neighbor as yourself” can be proven – no, I don’t believe that it can.

Can you “prove” that you exist?

I don’t believe that human values can be proven as objectively binding in an ontological sense. What I do observe is that “love your neighbor as yourself” could be an important constituent in our survival as a species, and in our happiness as individuals. If the survival of the species and of the individual are held to be values – and we seem to hold them as values “by nature”, just as we see and hear by nature – then “love your neighbor as yourself” has definite value, in turn.

Do you think survival is the sole explanation of human behaviour?

How did the urge to survive originate?

Honestly, though, I don’t see what this has to do with the problem of evil. I don’t have evidence that the universe cares whether we’re good to each other, or destroy each other. But if we care, then that is the “efficient cause” of its constituting a human value.

At this stage you need to explain what you think “evil” means. Is it just a meaningless word?

 

[Bahman]

To reject free will is to destroy the foundation of rational conclusions. There is no reason to believe biological machines are capable of reasoning!

We are in fact excellent in reasoning, being creative, being imaginative as there are several systems of thought like materialism, idealism, solipsism, … which are equivalently possible since we cannot disprove the axioms which any of them are based on them using our sole personal experiences.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Portofino

Whether “love your neighbor as yourself” can be proven – no, I don’t believe that it can.

You do not think it can be proven to have moral value? Your neighbor is just another you.

 

[tonyrey]

We are in fact excellent in reasoning, being creative, being imaginative as there are several systems of thought like materialism, idealism, solipsism, … which are equivalently possible since we cannot disprove the axioms which any of them are based on them using our sole personal experiences.

Anything is logically possible but not everything is equally credible - or consistent with the fact that we are reasoning. If you deny that we are reasoning you are contradicting your statement that we are excellent in reasoning!

 

[Portofino]

I am reading The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil by Brian Davies right now, which you might find interesting (unfortunately, it is rather pricey). I started reading it after we began this discussion, but as it happens, Davies devotes an entire chapter to disputing the proposition “God is morally good” (which, as he notes, seems to have slipped into the modern lexicon even though it has little biblical support and has not been widely held until the last few centuries). He also is, like you, not satisfied with many of the standard theodicies (free will defense, evil as a means to an end, etc.), and seems to argue that most of them look at the problem of evil the wrong way. The crux of the book, for instance, is a pair of chapters titled “How Not to Exonerate God.”

I appreciate the recommendation, Polytropos, thank you. Carl Jung liked the book of Job very much and had a more ambiguous conception of God – he believed that God had a “light” side (easy to understand, pleasant, gentle, agreeable) and also a “shadow” side. Parts of the OT deals with the “shadow” side of God (asking Isaac to sacrifice his son) but so too, in a way, does the aspect of God sacrificing his own Son (though the NT is somewhat of a pivot point here, because it bridges the OT idea of a son being sacrificed with God sacrificing himself).

The aesthetic concept of the “sublime” is also appropriate in this context, I think. This idea of an encounter with God filling one with “fear and trembling” – with a kind of dread, even (like the shepherds, “quaking”). I’m vaguely remembering that, in the accounts of the apostles finding the tombs empty, they are reported to be “afraid.” Ironically, the Polish composer Penderecki (who composed Catholic/Christian music as a form of rebellion, in communist Poland) and who composed music portraying the resurrection of Christ, had that same music used in horror films! (The Shining; the Exorcist). His piece “The Dream of Jacob” also has this sense of the uncanny, the strange, the unfamiliar, the “terrible”, even, and awe-inspiring. That too was used – or perhaps misused – in a horror movie, The Shining.

youtube.com/watch?v=tOTQ9TVkG98 “And Jacob awaked out of his sleep, and he said, Surely the Lord is in this place; and I knew it not.”]