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thinkandmull
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He probably will just repeat Aquinas’s incomplete reflection on this
Well, you’ll never know if you don’t try.He probably will just repeat Aquinas’s incomplete reflection on this
Aside from, you know, being a potential and supportable answer to the literal topic of discussion… yeah… totally not relatedThe points I stop talking about was Molinism because it is off topic
The knowledge and understanding of God is totally independent of things.
I know. You play a different con game.No, not by definition. That is your type of con-game, not mine.
In fact, there are problems with your definitions, too.The definition of “possible worlds” and the concept of “necessary” and “contingent” existence say nothing about the actual existence of a being who (what) is “necessary”.
The definition of “contingent being” is something that exists in some, but not all possible worlds.
The definition of “necessary being” is something that exists in all possible worlds.
The definition of “possible world” is a state of affairs which does not contain a contradiction.
Agreed; but you’re using it in service of your “proof” of God’s non-existence.That is all. God is never mentioned.
An algorithm. In other words, one possible algorithm. You did not prove that your algorithm was the only possible one, nor that all other possible algorithms reach the same conclusion. So… no, you didn’t disprove the notion that there is no such thing as a necessary being.Then I gave the algorithm to find if a necessary being exists or not.
Which I refuted, based on the fact that your ‘proof’ only takes into account physical realities and nothing more. See what I mean? If the only proof you’ll consider is one that does not include the transcendental, and you use it in an attempt to prove that the transcendental does not exist, then we’re in a situation with two results: you look foolish for presenting an illogical argument, and you reveal yourself as someone who isn’t acting in good faith. Sorry.Then I gave the proof that there are at least two possible worlds, which have nothing in common, so there cannot be a necessary being.
It does no such thing. But it was a nice try, nevertheless.The “necessary” being is not defined out of existence, the proof only shows that it is just an empty concept without referents in the real world.
So, here’s the thing: even in a universe in which there are particles and anti-particles, the universe still exists! Oh, sure, the particles destroy each other… but that doesn’t prove anything about the plausibility of the universe you’ve posited! And then, not only do you assert that it has, you go on to conclude that it proves an assertion about a transcendental being in those potential, plausible universes! Really, LV… for someone with a handle like yours, you don’t really truck in the love of truth, do you?No, the proof works, period. It does not assume anything about the structure of the possible world. The proposition: “a state of affairs which does not contain a contradiction” says nothing about physical existence. It does not exclude non-physical existence (of which we have examples in concepts), it does not exclude even the concept of God. It only stipulates the lack of contradictions.
To a dyed-in-the-wool materialist, only physical proof is possible. We’re at loggerheads.You do again the unacceptable: you wish to incorporate God in the concept of “possible world”. In other words: “you try to define God into existence”. There are only two ways to prove God’s existence. One is to pray to God to manifest himself to everyone in the world, submit to some question-and-answer sessions, present physical evidence for his power and knowledge. Not like to succeed knowing that God is notoriously camera-shy. The other one is to start with some well know feature of the physical world, for which not only there is no natural explanation, there never will a natural explanation - ever!
That’s cute.Furthermore, you guys like to add some off-the-wall (mostly nonsensical) properties to God
When I have some time to demonstrate that I’ve already done so, I’ll look up the thread. But don’t try to con me by saying “you haven’t done it in the past”; I know I have. You can keep on trotting out your “four possibilities” theory all you want; it’s still wrong.But I cut you some slack. If you think you can do that, go ahead, make my day. But don’t try to con me by saying: “I already did… go and dig it out”.
I understand the point you think you’re making, I really do. However, you need to keep two things in mind.
#1: God did not chose differently, He chose this reality. This was his choice throughout all of eternity, period. As such, even if you could argue that his knowledge could change (which I am not admitting, only discussing a theoretical), you still have to acknowledge the fact that His knowledge has not changed.
#2: His knowledge includes all possibilities, including the possibilities of actuality. His knowledge of that which does not exist is perfect, meaning that it would have to be as complete and full as the knowledge of what does exist.
There are two ways a thing can be contingent. It either has to be subject to chance, or it has to occur or exist only if other things are true. Neither of these conditions are met.
First, I did not create these definitions. Why don’t you Google “necessary and contingent existence”? (google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=necessary+and+contingent+existence&spf=1497485721724) Second, the definition I gave is exactly the same as the one you presented.And yet, you really are creating a set of definitions in which a ‘necessary being’ is an impossibility. Therefore, “by (your) definition”, a necessary being is impossible. Call it what you wish… but that’s the game you’re playing here.
Same concept, slightly different wording.In fact, there are problems with your definitions, too.
A “contingent being” is one whose existence is possible.
A “necessary being” is one whose non-existence is a logical impossibility.
If I present an algorithm which proves that there are no whole numbers, the ratio of which cannot be equal to square root of 2, then it is just one of the possible algorithms. But that does not make it questionable. If you can present an algorithm, which proves that there is a “necessary being”… go for it. Make sure that you investigate ALL the possible worlds, and show me that your proposed being is present in ALL of them. Don’t forget the “empty world” (or null-world), which has no elements at all. Such a world may be physically impossible, but not logically impossible.An algorithm. In other words, one possible algorithm. You did not prove that your algorithm was the only possible one, nor that all other possible algorithms reach the same conclusion. So… no, you didn’t disprove the notion that there is no such thing as a necessary being.
You could have read the whole post I wrote. I specifically allowed for non-physical entities. By the way, you have no idea what a refutation might be. Even if I would have considered only the physical worlds (which I did not) and showed that there is no intersection among them, that would have been sufficient to disprove the concept of “necessary existence”. Before you could even consider the so-called “transcendental entities” you would be obliged to show that such entities actually exist. Not just as concepts, but actual, ontological entities.Which I refuted, based on the fact that your ‘proof’ only takes into account physical realities and nothing more. See what I mean? If the only proof you’ll consider is one that does not include the transcendental, and you use it in an attempt to prove that the transcendental does not exist, then we’re in a situation with two results: you look foolish for presenting an illogical argument, and you reveal yourself as someone who isn’t acting in good faith. Sorry.![]()
You really don’t pay attention. I never spoke about “plausible” universes. The concept of necessary existence has nothing to do with “plausibility”, only with logical possibility.So, here’s the thing: even in a universe in which there are particles and anti-particles, the universe still exists! Oh, sure, the particles destroy each other… but that doesn’t prove anything about the plausibility of the universe you’ve posited! And then, not only do you assert that it has, you go on to conclude that it proves an assertion about a transcendental being in those potential, plausible universes!
I never heard of a materialist who insists on presenting a physical “proof” for Fermat’s last theorem.To a dyed-in-the-wool materialist, only physical proof is possible.
That is exactly what I call “define into existence”. God is assumed to be the creator of this world. Everything else is “fluff”. From this assumption there is only one logical corollary": God was able to create the world. Nothing else follows “logically”.The argument is this: if there is a God, then he must have certain attributes. (Or else, as it were, he’s not God.) .
Allegedly!!! But just because SOME philosophers insist that God MUST have those attributes, that does not make it happen.If you disagree that any of those are reasonable attributes for him, then you can argue the definition. If you feel that one can be ‘God’ without a particular attribute, then you can argue that assertion. But, these attributes I’ve presented are precisely the attributes that the philosophers have considered. You know… the “god of the philosophers” that you like to reference all the time? Yeah… him. That god has these attributes.
You don’t need to dig into hundreds of pages. If you can present a “fifth option”, you can do it here and now.When I have some time to demonstrate that I’ve already done so, I’ll look up the thread. But don’t try to con me by saying “you haven’t done it in the past”; I know I have. You can keep on trotting out your “four possibilities” theory all you want; it’s still wrong.![]()
Actually… no.A “contingent being” is one whose existence is possible. = It exists in some (but not all) possible worlds.
A “necessary being” is one whose non-existence is a logical impossibility. = Which exists in ALL the possible worlds, and as such it cannot not exist.
Exactly the same concepts!
You realize, though, that this is not what you presented us with… right? You just demonstrated that there’s (at least) one algorithm that’s NP-complete. Great – there’s one algorithm that can’t be proven to produce a result. Do you really think that this proves there’s no God?If I present an algorithm which proves that there are no whole numbers, the ratio of which cannot be equal to square root of 2, then it is just one of the possible algorithms.
I’ll humor you on this one. How does a ‘world’, then, with particles and anti-particles, preclude the existence of a transcendental being?You could have read the whole post I wrote. I specifically allowed for non-physical entities.
Trust me… I do. Yours just ain’t, though.By the way, you have no idea what a refutation might be.
Yeah… no. It wouldn’t. It would only preclude the inclusion of these putative worlds into the set of “possible worlds”. But hey… keep trying.Even if I would have considered only the physical worlds (which I did not) and showed that there is no intersection among them, that would have been sufficient to disprove the concept of “necessary existence”.
Non sequitur, much?I never heard of a materialist who insists on presenting a physical “proof” for Fermat’s last theorem.
Then stop complaining that ‘we’ don’t respect the ‘god of the philosophers’, ok?Allegedly!!! But just because SOME philosophers insist that God MUST have those attributes, that does not make it happen.
OK. So… you dislike the arguments of one philosopher. It doesn’t mean that all are wrong.Anselm suggested … But it is meaningless, since Anselm asserted that “existence” is just an attribute, which may or may not be present. And other philosophers pointed this out very quickly.
I got bored.You cannot present a “fifth” one and could not do it in the past - because there is none.
That is not true. The sentence that I am using is timeless: “God experience the nothing and the universe at His eternal point.”What I noted is correct. Your not approaching God as God but as a creature in time.
Once you realize that - and turn rather to God - then doors will open more readily in understanding.
One mind one conscious experience. Things get mixed and garbled if God experience more than one thing.You’re right, I can’t. Neither can you. We’re limited in our ability to comprehend things.
God is not subject to that kind of limit, or to any limits at all.
I don’t think so. Saying so is like evading the argument.As such, He can experience both realities fully.
This has been repeated more times than I care to count. You need to stop treating God as just a bigger version of us; God is limitless, he does not have a finite capacity for comprehension or experience. If He did, I’d agree with you, there would be a problem, but He does not, and there is not.
I will read it later. I am sorry that I am very busy with other readings.Once again, this is all covered by various philosophers, and can be read about in the Summa. (Either Theologica or Gentiles)
If you’re going to keep insisting on arguing by this faulty, limited concept of God then there’s really no reason to keep debating this point, because you’re talking about apples, and we’re talking about oranges.
The only possibility is through experience. Things must be consciously present to God. What else?The knowledge and understanding of God is totally independent of things.
Created things are not its object…the understanding of God is its own object.
God knows very differently than how we creatures know.
Your not approaching God as God but as a creature in time. No matter how you form the sentence. What I noted is correct- please revisit the post.That is not true. The sentence that I am using is timeless: “God experience the nothing and the universe at His eternal point.”
Your talking about how creatures know.The only possibility is through experience. Things must be consciously present to God. What else?
God is not a “mind,” God is existence itself. YHWH, “I Am Who Am.” Again, God is not just a bigger version of us. You need to move beyond that understanding. That is the nature of Paganism’s false gods and idols, not the Nature of God.One mind one conscious experience. Things get mixed and garbled if God experience more than one thing.
Well, unless you can disprove the philosophical proofs for God’s attributes, such as his omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence, what you think doesn’t really matter. You can’t simply discard these qualities because you personally don’t think they’re true. It is not evading the argument because it is the answer to the argument.I don’t think so. Saying so is like evading the argument.
That’s fine. I understand that you’re busy, and the Summa is a beast of a text. I’m still working my way through it as well.I will read it later. I am sorry that I am very busy with other readings.
thinkandmull, if you’re still reading this, I had an additional thought as I was contemplating this topic this morning that I wanted to share with you.
Your example is incorrect, deficient. You presented a subset of the possible worlds. If an entity does not appear in any of (infinitely large number) of possible worlds, then this being is IMPOSSIBLE.Actually… no.
A being whose existence is possible might exist in all possible worlds. However, his existence in any (or all) isn’t guaranteed by the possibility of his existence. The difference is subtle, but real. I’ll give you an example from mathematics, since you purport to like those.
The possibility that one billion flips of a coin will result in zero instances of ‘heads’ exists. However, it is not guaranteed that, in one, or one million, or one billion, or even one google sets of one billion flips, there will be even one instance of one billion “tails flips”. So… no, you’re wrong, on the “contingent being” concept. “Contingent being” does not imply “existence in some possible worlds.”
I did not define the “possible world” as one “without a necessary being”, so you are wrong. As I said, it is your con-game to define something into existence. The idea of the existence of “necessary being” is not an a-priori presupposition, it must be established via reasoning. The method would be to examine ALL the possible worlds and ascertain that this being is present in all of them. Which is impossible, since the null-world is not logically contradictory. So there.Let’s go with your take on the “necessary being” concept, then. That, too, fails. All you have to do is define a world as “a world without a necessary being” – as a ‘possible’ world – and you think you’ve defeated the concept. Sorry. Doesn’t work that way.
I did not even mention God. I was talking about the concept of a “necessary being”, one, which appears in ALL the possible worlds.You realize, though, that this is not what you presented us with… right? You just demonstrated that there’s (at least) one algorithm that’s NP-complete. Great – there’s one algorithm that can’t be proven to produce a result. Do you really think that this proves there’s no God?
It does not, and I did not say it would. It is ONE of the possible worlds, and your stipulated transcendent being is an element of it. Fine - that is what we call a possible world. But from that it does not follow that this transcendent being is an element of ALL possible worlds. As I mentioned, the simplest possible world is the “null-world”, the one which has no elements at all. This world is not physically possible, but it is logically possible, exactly like the “null-set” in set theory.I’ll humor you on this one. How does a ‘world’, then, with particles and anti-particles, preclude the existence of a transcendental being?![]()
Does the hypothetical world which has only physical elements contain a contradiction? No, so it is a possible world. You are the one, who tries to declare a state of affairs without transcendent beings to be an “impossible world”. Where is the logical contradiction in a world without transcendental beings? There is none, just like there is no logical contradiction in world without any physical elements. Both are logically possible, therefore they are both possible worlds. However, there is no intersection between them. No element can be BOTH physical AND transcendent. This is another proof that there cannot be a “necessary being”.Yeah… no. It wouldn’t. It would only preclude the inclusion of these putative worlds into the set of “possible worlds”. But hey… keep trying.![]()
Dismembered? That thread was only 5 pages long, and went all over the place (as it usually happens). Nowhere did you present a fifth alternative. God being outside of time does not add a new alternative. And we do not talk about temporal connection between the world and God’s alleged knowledge, we talk about causative or logical relationships.So I went back and searched. And then, I remembered the context. It was in your “about omniscience” thread that you made this same claim. Which, if you care to browse the thread again, I dismembered.
I don’t approach God as a creature in time. It is matter how I form the sentence.Your not approaching God as God but as a creature in time. No matter how you form the sentence. What I noted is correct- please revisit the post.
What do you mean when you say that God sees thing?Your talking about how creatures know.
Again your approaching not God - but an idea of God as if God were a creature in time.
The knowledge and understanding of God is totally independent of things.
Created things are** not **its object…*.the *understanding of God is its own object.
God knows very differently than how we creatures know.