The problem with those that bring up "the problem with evil"

[John_Russell_Jr]

… evil does not exist full stop , it is a delusion that it exists in , or non - reality , but existing in the delusion is existing ourside reality , and in reality evil cannot and does not exist at all , i’ll write my whole theory later , it’s long and rather late here , tired now , the solution solves all atheistic arguments of the types of problems with evil , suffering and many of them when delved into , i’m intending to do it in reasonable detail on my thread atheists - a new way of knowing if god exists … etc or similiar name on this forum , you might find them interesting , may seem out of touch with catholicism at first but not at all when fully nderstood , but evil is nothingness and does not and cannot exist , i’ll explain my own theory later dear friends …

 

[danserr]

No, an atheist would not have to argue that. An atheist just has to argue that things exist which Christianity considers evil, and they exist to a gratuitous degree.

Would you lay out an argument for how this would work? Your claim has some plausibility, but I can’t figure a way to lay out the argument so that it works, so I currently don’t think what you are suggesting is possible.

In short, any claim that the existence of evil disproves God, would have to entail that evil exist, which leaves one vulnerable to the OP’s point.

 

[danserr]

To be precise, evil is “intentional causation - or passive allowance - of unnecessary harm”. There is no problem if a “caused or allowed” harm brings along some greater good, which justifies the suffering (though it might run afoul of the good secular and also catholic doctrine that the end does not justifies the means). But the assertion that any and all of the observed sufferings fall into this category cannot be sustained.

The only logically correct argument (made by a theist) I have ever seen was produced by Rabbi Kushner in his book: “When bad things happen to good people” - and he understood that one of God’s supposed attributes (omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence) must “go”. He chose omnipotence.

First, consider the underlined portion. Remember, that problem evil is an attack that skeptics make on Christian theism. They typically argue that the existence of gratuitous suffering disproves the existence of God. This means that the *burden is on the skeptic *to prove that gratuitous evil exists. It is not enough to challenge the Christian with some instance of evil and say “explain that!” I do not profess to be able to explain the existence of every case of suffering in the universe, but I do not have to. I simply deny that such suffering constitutes a reason to doubt the God of classical Christian theism. If they atheist wishes to dispute this based on the existence of evil, then the burden is on him to try to show that gratuitous evil really does exist. But that is a substantial burden I don’t think an atheist could bear.

Second, I do not think denying God’s omnipotence helps much. It is not enough to make God less powerful; one would have to make him so much less powerful that he could not stop an instance of a person dying of cancer, which does not seem plausible. Especially since Christianity supposes he was powerful enough to create and design the universe. So I do not think limiting God’s power helps much.

Let’s review the Tale of the twelve officers…

Those are simply unhelpful caricatures. You really need to get your info from a better place than those silly infidel.org et. al. websites. Obviously a person who tries to prevent a crime does not interfere with free will, but a person is not God. If God prevented every instance of a crime (as your argument essentially demands), then this would quickly render free will meaningless. Every criminal who willed to do evil would be prevented. He would know that he would be prevented, which would mean that he would have no real choice in the matter. His free will would be meaningless. On the other hand, another man interfering to stop a crime hardly has this effect.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

I disagree. “Evil behavior” or “evil actions” are very much reality, not just an asbtraction.

In your opinion, are they subjective or objective?

Very much debated. Abstractions are not “realities” they are an image of reality. When you look into a mirror, you see a reflection of reality, not the reality itself.

Although, abstractions exist without acquired knowledge of them, simply knowing they exist did not bring them into reality at that point. Be it that what is reflected is not the reality itself and that the reflection cannot be without an existing reality to reflect, the act of reflecting exists unto itself.

Not accepteble. Evil is a term which is only appicable to conscious beings, who actively cause harm or passively allow harm - while knowing what they do.

But Spock, what if someone were to disagree, perhaps an atheistic communist that believes forcefully depopulating the world of “undesirable” people is morally right for the progress of the species? Who are either of you to tell the other what is right or wrong when there is no concept of moral law?

There is nothing wrong with a drought or a tsunami or an earthquake in a godless universe. They are natural catastrophies, and no malice is involved. They become problematic only if a benevolent and powerful god is assumed. That is when the contradiction arises.

You just said they’re natural, why would God’s existence become a problem? Because of what Aquinas said? “God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works.”?

 

[anEvilAtheist]

Would you lay out an argument for how this would work? Your claim has some plausibility, but I can’t figure a way to lay out the argument so that it works, so I currently don’t think what you are suggesting is possible.

Well I laid out the basic argument earlier:

An atheist does not need to prove what evil is and that it exists. She could merely grant the Christian definition for the sake of argument and show that it leads to a logical contradiction. For example, she could argue that it would be possible to have a world with less evil and more good (using Christian definitions of good and evil). She could then argue that an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God would. If the premises of this argument are true, then Christianity is internally inconsistent and therefore false. Whether morality actually exists is irrelevant.

This argument does not try to show that evil exists, merely that Christianity is inherently contradictory. I don’t feel like laying it out in more detail, since I’m not fully convinced by the argument. There’s a vast literature on the problem of evil, and I’ve just read a fraction of it. Based on what I’ve read so far, I tend to think that the logical argument from evil does not work, but the evidential argument from evil does. So I think the problem of evil likely provides evidence against Christianity, but not an ironclad disproof of it. I haven’t finished it yet, but I am especially intrigued by Christian philosopher Nick Trakakis’ arguments in The God Beyond Belief. His arguments are at a pretty high level and he engages with the top thinkers on the problem of evil. His conclusion is that the problem of evil provides evidence against the existence of God, but he is a Christian because he thinks there are even stronger arguments for the existence of God.

In short, any claim that the existence of evil disproves God, would have to entail that evil exist, which leaves one vulnerable to the OP’s point.

Yes, to claim that evil exists entails that evil exists. But it does not entail that evil exists to claim that Christianity is contradictory because God is supposedly all good, but needlessly permits things which Christianity says are evil.

 

[Spock]

First, consider the underlined portion. Remember, that problem evil is an attack that skeptics make on Christian theism. They typically argue that the existence of gratuitous suffering disproves the existence of God. This means that the *burden is on the skeptic *to prove that gratuitous evil exists. It is not enough to challenge the Christian with some instance of evil and say “explain that!” I do not profess to be able to explain the existence of every case of suffering in the universe, but I do not have to. I simply deny that such suffering constitutes a reason to doubt the God of classical Christian theism. If they atheist wishes to dispute this based on the existence of evil, then the burden is on him to try to show that gratuitous evil really does exist. But that is a substantial burden I don’t think an atheist could bear.

Ok. Let’s take it from here. In a sense we have two opposing views. The atheist says that there are obviously unnecessary (or gratuitious) events of suffering. But you say that these events are not obvious, and you demand an argument why should they be considered “unnecessary”. There seems to be an impasse here.

However, the atheist has a trump card: “the duck principle”. In every other case you and your fellow believers accept the “duck principle”… which says: “if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, looks like a duck and tastes like a duck … then it is unreasonable to assume that it is an elephant and not a duck”. Now we must be ready to explore the possibility that we are mistaken, and despite all the appearances it is really an elephant and not a duck. That is fine. But to say that it is “possible that we are mistaken” is insufficient. There needs to be a very strong argument to show that all the appearances are false, and the “seemingly” duck entity is really an “elephant”. So the ball is in the believer’s court. You must be able to substantiate your position.

But, you can dig your heels in, and demand that the atheist goes even further, and substantiate or “prove” that the “duck is really a duck”. It can be done, and it is rather easy. The catholic (or christian) dogma is that only humans have an immortal souls, animals do not. As such when animals die, that is “it”. No more “next life”, where some unspecified reward will compensate them for the unnecessary suffering endured here. (Of course, even in the case of humans, that purported reward cannot retroactively justify the suffering here - since the suffering must be a logical prerequisite to be able to justify its existence. To say that there is an otherwise unjustified suffering, but God will reimburse the sufferer with eternal bliss - is not acceptable.) But there is no such argument for animals. They also experience pain and they get no “reward”. As such their suffering cannot be justified.

I have seen the following counter-arguments to this problem: 1) animals don’t “really” suffer (when they exhibit a pain response to being burned to death, they do not really “suffer”). And 2) “who cares”? Animals do not count. Whatever they feel is irrelevant.

Second, I do not think denying God’s omnipotence helps much. It is not enough to make God less powerful; one would have to make him so much less powerful that he could not stop an instance of a person dying of cancer, which does not seem plausible. Especially since Christianity supposes he was powerful enough to create and design the universe. So I do not think limiting God’s power helps much.

Why not? Even we, with our measly powers can prevent the suffering - morphine comes to mind. If God is assumed to be powerful enough to create a whole universe, then to stop a pain from cancer should be “child’s play for him”.

Those are simply unhelpful caricatures.

I wish you did not say that. They are the distilled versions of the usual “rebuttals” and not “caricatures” at all.

Obviously a person who tries to prevent a crime does not interfere with free will, but a person is not God.

Of course he is trying to “interfere” with the free will of the perpetrator. Maybe you made a typo?

If God prevented every instance of a crime (as your argument essentially demands), then this would quickly render free will meaningless. Every criminal who willed to do evil would be prevented. He would know that he would be prevented, which would mean that he would have no real choice in the matter. His free will would be meaningless. On the other hand, another man interfering to stop a crime hardly has this effect.

A serious disagreement here. We are already “limited” in what we can do by the physical constraints imposed upon us. Look at the second officer’s reply: “Would you rather the world were nothing but love, peace, and roses?”. My answer is “definitely”.

 

[Spock]

In your opinion, are they subjective or objective?

Objective, of course. The nerve endings which report “pain” are there whether we accept it or not.

But Spock, what if someone were to disagree, perhaps an atheistic communist that believes forcefully depopulating the world of “undesirable” people is morally right for the progress of the species? Who are either of you to tell the other what is right or wrong when there is no concept of moral law?

If that hypothetical person could give a persuasive argument for his case, there would be no problem. Of course it is impossible, since the diversity of people is a much better strategy than even the best, but unidirectional “selection” of human traits.

\You just said they’re natural, why would God’s existence become a problem? Because of what Aquinas said? “God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works.”?

If there s a God, then there is no such thing as “natural”.

 

[danserr]

Ok. Let’s take it from here. In a sense we have two opposing views. The atheist says that there are obviously unnecessary (or gratuitious) events of suffering. But you say that these events are not obvious, and you demand an argument why should they be considered “unnecessary”. There seems to be an impasse here.

I’m going to focus on this part of the argument here, since this is the main issue. In short the skeptic says:

1. Gratuitous evil exists
2. Because gratuitous evil exists, God does not exist.

Now the theist might object by denying either that gratuitous evil exists (as I am inclined to), or claim that gratuitous evil is compatible with the existence of God (as the Christian philosopher John Van Engen does).

Since the skeptic is the one claiming that 1. gratuitous evil exists, and 2. this is incompatible with the existence of God, then the burden is on him to prove both things (or at least demonstrate both to be probable).

You seem to agree and try to offer the argument “if it looks like a duck… etc.” If I interpret you correctly you are saying that it appears that no greater good or morally sufficient reason exists for instances of evil a,b, and c, therefore we are rationally justified in believing there is not one.

This is essentially a **non-seeum **argument.

• For example, it is like arguing: “I don’t see an elephant in my living room, therefore there isn’t one.” You don’t see it, so it ain’t there. This would be a good non-seeum argument. But there are also bad non-seum arguments. For example:
• I don’t see bacteria in the living room, so there are not any. This would be a bad non-seum argument.

The reason the second argument fails is that it is not clear that we should expect to be able to see bacteria if there were any. We are simply not well placed to make that assessment.

The non-seum argument from evil then, seems to me to be of the latter kind. We are simply not well placed to assess if it is likely that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of suffering. Consider these two further analogies:
1). If aliens existed, they would visit us. They have not visited us, therefore, aliens do not exist.

• this is a bad argument because, we are simply not well placed to say if aliens would visit us or not if they existed. Similarly, we are finite, sinful, fallible beings of very limited knowledge. We are simply not well placed to assess whether or not God, a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. Therefore, the skeptic is unwarranted in his premise that “gratuitous evil exists,” he simply lacks the ability to asses God’s possible justifying reasons for allowing the existence of evil. But since the burden is on him to show that God lacks a morally sufficient reason for allowing such evil and he cannot do this, then he cannot say that the existence of gratuitous evil is a reason to doubt the Christian God.
• (2) It would be like someone drawing a complex mathematical problem on a board, and a child (or me ) looking at it and saying, “I don’t see an answer to that problem, so there must not be one.” Obviously, I am not well-placed to know the answer to such a problem. Likewise with God. We finite, fallible creatures are not well placed to assess the possible justifying reasons of an omnipotent omniscient, morally perfect God. Therefore, evil does not provide a reason for doubting the God of classical theism.

Similarly with animal evil. I cannot explain it, but I also maintain we are not well placed to assess whether or not God has a justifying reason that would explain the existence of animal evil. So animal suffering does not provide a reason to doubt God either.

 

[danserr]

Originally Posted by danserr View Post
Second, I do not think denying God’s omnipotence helps much. It is not enough to make God less powerful; one would have to make him so much less powerful that he could not stop an instance of a person dying of cancer, which does not seem plausible. Especially since Christianity supposes he was powerful enough to create and design the universe. So I do not think limiting God’s power helps much.

Why not? Even we, with our measly powers can prevent the suffering - morphine comes to mind. If God is assumed to be powerful enough to create a whole universe, then to stop a pain from cancer should be “child’s play for him”.

I think you misunderstood me. I agree with you. I do not think limiting God’s power (making him not omnipotent) helps to solve the problem of evil.

Originally Posted by danserr View Post
Those are simply unhelpful caricatures.

I wish you did not say that. They are the distilled versions of the usual “rebuttals” and not “caricatures” at all.

Most are straw men. You need to read the arguments are they are actually made, not as someone briefly constructs them for purposes of ridicule.

Your answer to my reply to the officer dilemma is essentially to say that it would be better to not have free will. I deny this, but am not going to try to convince you of it at the moment. We’ve bitten off enough. I simply take it as obvious that the free will that allows us to choose God and be eternally united with him in heaven where all the evils of this world will be righted is a morally sufficient reason for allowing free will. I deny that our free will is meaningfully constrained by our physical constraints. Actually, the natural laws theodicy shows that those laws of nature that limit us may also be necessary for allowing free will.

 

[danserr]

Well I laid out the basic argument earlier:

This argument does not try to show that evil exists, merely that Christianity is inherently contradictory.** I don’t feel like laying it out in more detail, since I’m not fully convinced by the argument**. There’s a vast literature on the problem of evil, and I’ve just read a fraction of it. Based on what I’ve read so far, I tend to think that the logical argument from evil does not work, but the evidential argument from evil does. So I think the problem of evil likely provides evidence against Christianity, but not an ironclad disproof of it. I haven’t finished it yet, but I am especially intrigued by Christian philosopher Nick Trakakis’ arguments in The God Beyond Belief. His arguments are at a pretty high level and he engages with the top thinkers on the problem of evil. His conclusion is that the problem of evil provides evidence against the existence of God, but he is a Christian because he thinks there are even stronger arguments for the existence of God.

Yes, to claim that evil exists entails that evil exists. But it does not entail that evil exists to claim that Christianity is contradictory because God is supposedly all good, but needlessly permits things which Christianity says are evil.

If you won’t lay out the argument as a syllogism, then I can’t accept it as reasonable, because as stated it is an assertion, but not sufficiently supported. The reason I ask you to lay it out is that I don’t think it is possible to launch an argument from evil based on it that is sound.

Yes, some Christians admit that evil can be a reason to doubt God, but that there are even better reasons to believe in him. I think this is true, but as I say to spock, I think there are reasons that we are not justified in saying that evil provides a reason to doubt the existence, power, or goodness or God.

 

[anEvilAtheist]

Now the theist might object by denying either that gratuitous evil exists (as I am inclined to), or claim that gratuitous evil is compatible with the existence of God (as the Christian philosopher John Van Engen does).

By the kind of skeptical theism you embrace, you would end up accepting that God is all good even if the world was the most profoundly evil place imaginable. I don’t think that’s reasonable. But I think Erik Wielenberg’s paper titled Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies raises more serious problem with your skeptical theist position. Below is a discussion I had previously posted which shows some of the problems with your position:

In his paper, Wielenberg argues that people who try to get around the problem of evil by saying that just because we can’t think of a justification for a particular evil doesn’t mean that there isn’t one must also accept that just because we can’t think of a justification for God lying to us doesn’t mean that there isn’t one. Although this would not disprove God, it would show that we have no good reason for thinking that God is telling us the truth. Of course a believer could instead reject skeptical theism, but that would make it very difficult to respond to the problem of evil.

Calling God’s honesty into question would cause serious problems for Christianity. Wielenberg quotes Nicholas Wolterstorff’s observation that “deep in the traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, is the attribution of speech to God. To excise those attributions from those religions would be to have only shards left.” Wolterstorff also noted that the “traditional principles guiding biblical interpretation in the Christian tradition” is the principle “that God never speaks falsehood.” Wielenberg then quotes Richard Swinburne discussing how mankind needs God to reveal things like the atonement and heaven and hell. If Christians can’t rely on God to be honest, then how can Christians possibly know anything about God or the afterlife? The self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit that apologist William Lane Craig loves to talk about might not be so self-authenticating after all.

But it would also be problematic to reject skeptical theism, as it seems to be the only half-decent answer to the problem of evil. Many non-believers argue that if there is an evil act that seems completely irreconcilable with an omnibenevolent God, then it probably is. At the very least, the great number of seemingly unjustifiable evils provides evidence against the existence of God. A skeptical theist would respond by saying that our knowledge is extremely limited and just because we can’t think of a justification doesn’t mean that God doesn’t have one. Given how little we actually know, this seems like a somewhat reasonable response, though in cases like the Holocaust, it seems implausible that the good could outweigh the bad without the word good losing all meaning. But at least the skeptical theist response is logically coherent.

Wielenberg explains that one problem with accepting skeptical theism is that God could have a justification for anything. A Christian might believe that they don’t have to worry about global warming or a nuclear holocaust because God will protect them. But under skeptical theism, this would be irrational. God might have some justification for killing everyone on earth in the most painful way imaginable. He could even have some justification for then sending everyone on Earth to an eternity in hell. We have no reason to take God at his word, for he could have an unknown reason for lying to us.

Wielenberg’s core argument is essentially this:
Premise 1: If skeptical theism is true, we have no reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about.
Premise 2: If we have no reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about, then we do not know any proposition based solely on God’s word.
Therefore: Skeptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition based solely on God’s word.

So a skeptical theist must accept that they cannot know even core tenants of Christianity like the claim that Christians can get eternal life. Of course it’s hard to imagine how God could be justified in lying to us about something like that. But as skeptical theists say, just because we can’t think of a justification doesn’t mean there isn’t one. Maybe there’s some justification for the Holocaust that we can’t even begin to understand, and maybe there’s some justification for God deluding us into thinking we will live forever when instead we will rot in the ground.

I was glad to see that Wielenberg addressed what I see as a likely response from Christians: “So what?” Why is it so horrible if God does lie occasionally?

A believer could still say that at the very least if God tells them something, they can know that God wants them to believe it. So divine revelation is not God revealing the truth, but God revealing what he wants us to believe. However, even this is uncertain. If we do not know God’s purpose for telling us something, we do not know how God wants us to respond. For all we know, he could want us to respond by being angry at God, for maybe this will lead to the most good in the end. So God telling us something gives us no basis for believing it or even for acting as if we believe it.

Continued…

 

[anEvilAtheist]

…Continued from above post

Another possible response Wielenberg addresses is that this argument does not show that God is morally imperfect, so at least everything will end up fine in the end. But since under skeptical theism there may be moral goods that God is trying to achieve which are beyond our understanding, we cannot know anything about our fate. For all we know, there is some overriding good that could be achieved by torturing all believers eternally and letting only atheists into heaven.

So while skeptical theism may enable Christians to escape the problem of evil, it ends up destroying mainstream Christianity. If Isaiah 55:9 and Ecclesiastes 8:17 really do indicate that God may have unknowable reasons for his actions, and Stephen Wykstra is right that skeptical theism “is not an additional postulate: it was implicit in theism (taken with a little realism about our cognitive powers) all along,” then Christianity itself is incoherent.

 

[anEvilAtheist]

If you won’t lay out the argument as a syllogism, then I can’t accept it as reasonable, because as stated it is an assertion, but not sufficiently supported. The reason I ask you to lay it out is that I don’t think it is possible to launch an argument from evil based on it that is sound.

Yes, some Christians admit that evil can be a reason to doubt God, but that there are even better reasons to believe in him. I think this is true, but as I say to spock, I think there are reasons that we are not justified in saying that evil provides a reason to doubt the existence, power, or goodness or God.

If I’m not convinced by an argument, why would I try to convince you of it. This thread makes the false claim that in order to make an argument from evil, you have to prove that evil exists. I commented on the thread to show that there are versions of the argument which need no such assumption. Whether any versions of the argument from evil are sound is a separate issue.

 

[Hmgbrd]

Bravo danserr! Go for it!

 

[tonyrey]

The problem with those who bring up the problem of evil is that they have a one-sided view of reality. They completely overlook the problem of goodness. How can one exist without the other? In a Godless universe there would be no reason to believe in either because nothing would exist for any reason or purpose…

 

[Spock]

I’m going to focus on this part of the argument here, since this is the main issue. In short the skeptic says:

1. Gratuitous evil exists
2. Because gratuitous evil exists, God does not exist.

Or “3. God is not benevolent”.

Since the skeptic is the one claiming that 1. gratuitous evil exists, and 2. this is incompatible with the existence of God, then the burden is on him to prove both things (or at least demonstrate both to be probable).

You seem to agree and try to offer the argument “if it looks like a duck… etc.” If I interpret you correctly you are saying that it appears that no greater good or morally sufficient reason exists for instances of evil a,b, and c, therefore we are rationally justified in believing there is not one.

Exactly. If you drop an object a few million times, and it always drops “down”, and never floats “up”, it is rational to assume the existence of gravity.

This is essentially a **non-seeum **argument.

• For example, it is like arguing: “I don’t see an elephant in my living room, therefore there isn’t one.” You don’t see it, so it ain’t there. This would be a good non-seeum argument. But there are also bad non-seum arguments. For example:
• I don’t see bacteria in the living room, so there are not any. This would be a bad non-seum argument.

Not quite. One does not have to rely on raw sensory (name removed by moderator)ut only. If you use all the possible methods and none of them indicates an error in your assumption, it is reasonable to assume that there was no error. Let’s use a realistic example. We walk in a desert, and we see some “water looking object” in the distance. The “regular” skeptic would say: “it might be a mirage, because…” and explains the physics behind it. The “super skeptic” (“universal skeptic”) would say: “we are imperfect, fallible beings, therefore we might be mistaken”. Now they keep on going, and indeed find something that really looks like a lake, moreover, when they get there, and they take a dip, it feels like water, when they drink some, it tastes like water… At that moment the “regular” skeptic will say: “well, it might have been a mirage, but it turned out to be a real lake”. Whereupon the “universal” skeptic will repeat: “we are imperfect, fallible beings, therefore we STILL might be mistaken”. Is there any reason for this doubt? Nope.

The duck principle is more precise then to say: “if it looks like a duck, it is probably a duck”. It offers all the possible tests, and if that “duck-looking thing” passes all the tests, then it becomes irrational to doubt any more. It is much deeper than just a simple “non-seeum”.

The point is that to doubt one needs an actual reason to doubt. If one becomes a “universal skeptic”, doubting everything, then he must doubt his own doubt, too, thus leading to a self-contradictory position. On the other hand, if he chooses to accept certain things, without doubting, then there must be a rational reason to decide where to draw the line.

Likewise with God. We finite, fallible creatures are not well placed to assess the possible justifying reasons of an omnipotent omniscient, morally perfect God. Therefore, evil does not provide a reason for doubting the God of classical theism.

Don’t sell yourself short. You either have a rational reason to think that “all seemingly evil events are just measurement errors”, and then you have a real argument. Or you are a universal skeptic, who only says: “we might be in error due to our imperfections and fallen nature”. Suppose that for some “seemingly evil instances” we could devise a rational argument, and see why our assessment of “seemingly evil” was wrong. In that case it might be more acceptable to consider the “measurement error”. But there is none, not even one explainable event.

Remember the 2 criteria:

1. the seemingly evil act must bring along a logical corollary, which more than outweighs the suffering of the event.
2. the amount of suffering cannot be lessened without losing that benefit.

Both criteria are of utmost importance. If the same “benefit” could be achieved without the suffering, then the reward or benefit cannot be used to “retroactively justify” the sufferning, no matter how small the suffering might be, and no matter how great the reward might turn out.

Similarly with animal evil. I cannot explain it, but I also maintain we are not well placed to assess whether or not God has a justifying reason that would explain the existence of animal evil. So animal suffering does not provide a reason to doubt God either.

Actually it does. Here is the argument:

1. the death of an animal in a wildfire does not benefit the animal itself. That cannot be denied.
2. the fiery death does not benefit anyone else, either. Even if the death would carry some benefit (maybe weeding out some “surplus”), the method of fire does not add anything to it.
3. since animals do not have an immortal soul, they cannot get a “reward” in the afterlife.

Therefore there is no point of the fiety death of animals, and as such it was gratuitous, unnecessary. Since God allowed it to happen, God cannot be benevolent, or does not exist. The only argument against this would be a universal skeptic’s argument - and that is irrational, since it is self-contradictory.

 

[Spock]

Your answer to my reply to the officer dilemma is essentially to say that it would be better to not have free will.

No, I did not say that. I maintain that the amount of freedom we enjoy is partially too much - when it comes to administer pain and misery; and partially too small, when it comes to alleviate the pain and misery, either caused by humans, or natural events. The freedom could be “less” when it comes to causing harm, and it could be “more” when it comes to counteracting harm.

There is no need to be “free” to cause harm at all.

When it comes to freedom, it really should not be more than to choose God, or not to choose God. That is the only significant choice we make - according to the believers. It is not necessary to make this “choice” in a “roundabout way”. The Bible said something along these lines: “the way you treat others, is the way you treat me”. No need for that. We can directly choose or reject God and there is no reason to do it “indirectly”.

 

[someguy14]

Does God exist!

Matishyahu Jerusalem

Matisyahu King Without A Crown

 

[danserr]

By the kind of skeptical theism you embrace, you would end up accepting that God is all good even if the world was the most profoundly evil place imaginable. I don’t think that’s reasonable. But I think Erik Wielenberg’s paper titled Skeptical Theism and Divine Lies raises more serious problem with your skeptical theist position. Below is a discussion I had previously posted which shows some of the problems with your position:

…

Wielenberg explains that one problem with accepting skeptical theism is that God could have a justification for anything. A Christian might believe that they don’t have to worry about global warming or a nuclear holocaust because God will protect them. But under skeptical theism, this would be irrational. God might have some justification for killing everyone on earth in the most painful way imaginable. He could even have some justification for then sending everyone on Earth to an eternity in hell. We have no reason to take God at his word, for he could have an unknown reason for lying to us.

…

Continued…

That is an interesting argument; since it is relatively recent, I will be curious to see what the responses to it are, but the the meantime, the question seems to be, given skepticial theism (ST), are we warranted in acting as if God tells us the truth?

ST says that we are not well placed to assess if God has morally sufficient reasons (MSR) for allowing the existence of evil, so the existence of evil does not provide a reason to doubt the God of classical theism. Wielenberg suggests that by the same logic, the ST has no warrant for acting as if God tells the truth because God might have MSR for lying.

One potential problem is that ST is generally applied against the evidential argument from evil. God lying however may itself be contradictory or incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. God is a greatest conceivable being (GCB). If God could lie, then we could conceive of a greater being, one that could not lie, and that being would be God. So God cannot lie. If, then, it is not possible that God lie, then ST cannot applied to an evidential argument that maybe God lies in the same way that will lead to a greater good.

Second, there is another difference between the two arguments. ST responds to the problem of evil, which begins with the observation that there is evil in the universe. A comparable tu quoque argument would have to begin with the observation that God lies. The arguments seem dis-analogous then.

Now, I’m considering a couple arguments by Michael Rea and Bergmann on ST and moral skepticism. I’ll just try to apply them to here.

• Skeptical theists hold that cognitive considerations alone are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, which seems plausible.
  The question is then do the same cognitive considerations sufficiently undermine our other beliefs, that God tells the truth, that we should obey his moral commands etc?
• theism, however, does not exist in a vacuum. When deciding the impact of ST on other actions (such as choosing to believe God or follow his moral commands), we will take into account our background beliefs. This considered, God’s commands (revelation) thus provide us with reasons to act (from a modified divine commands theory of morality or direct revelation or religious experience) and thus to act in accord with his commands assuming He tells the truth.

-Possibly Weilenberg confuses the ST argument itself, with his assessment of how the premise of that argument bears on other beliefs that the ST holds. But I am not appealing to divine revelation to argue ST, but to show that the premises of the argument for ST do no force me to assume that God does not tell the truth.

• Even without these background beliefs, it is not entirely clear that Weilenberg’s argument is a good one. Suppose,
  a) we have reason to think God tells the truth
  b) we have no pro tanto reason to doubt it
  c) we have no reason to think we could find such a reason before we need to make a decision (to trust God or not)
  d). we ought then to assume God tells the truth.

Finally, I would suggest that while it might be true that we can’t know everything about all the possible goods there are, it doesn’t follow that we can’t know anything about them. We do not know enough to conclude that God can’t have morallly sufficient reasons for allowing evil, but I think we could say we do know enough to believe that God is telling the truth and would not, says, condemn everyone to hell.

Just my initial thoughts, but it’s an interesting article, I’ll keep paying attention for the responses to it.

 

[Spock]

God lying however may itself be contradictory or incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. God is a greatest conceivable being (GCB). If God could lie, then we could conceive of a greater being, one that could not lie, and that being would be God. So God cannot lie.

There are many problems with the concept of GCB. One is apparent here. You contend that a being who is unable to lie is “superior” or “greater” than another one who can lie, but chooses not to. (No one asserts that God is liar, the argument merely says that we cannot assume - coming from skepticism - that God will not lie.) That means that the being unable to lie has less freedom than the one who is not so constrained, and thus has more freedom. The whole concept of GCB deteriorates into a subjective “my GCB is greater than your GCB” type of childish argument. So, just based upon the GCB you cannot say that a possibly lying God is like a married bachelor.