The real problem with pain

[TS_Aquinas]

Is that the argument is contingent on qualia (for association of pain is necessary to assert the “problem”), of which is not reducible to matter. The Cartesian denies this even being a problem for the real person is not being harmed at all. The materialist is a eliminativist, if he/she is intellectually honest, and denies qualia and thus forfeits the argument. One must go beyond strict physicalism to assert the argument and give way to meta-physical aspects of the human mind but still require it is the actual person experiencing pain, a perfect recipe for hylomorphism. To logically assert pain as a problem can only be done by way of assent to Aristotelian metaphysics which can be easily answered by that same metaphysical system. Regardless of such the real problem here is realizing qualia, doing this requires an assent to meta and abandonment of materialism. At best, the only person qualified to pose this problem is an agnostic.

 

[GEddie]

Dear TS:

I could wade through all of that philosophical jargon, but see no point in it.

Since physical pain is a given for all human beings, it seems that everybody, nonphilosophers included, could contribute to the exchange you want to start, except that hardly anybody will understand your statements.

Methinks it doth behoove you to translate your statement into plain English, or wait to begin this conversation until the Mayan Calendar runs out

Nonphilosopher and proud of it,

ICXC NIKA

 

[Theophorus]

Nonphilosopher and proud of it,

ICXC NIKA

why ya hanging around the philosophy forum then?

Is that the argument is contingent on qualia (for association of pain is necessary to assert the “problem”), of which is not reducible to matter. The Cartesian denies this even being a problem for the real person is not being harmed at all. The materialist is a eliminativist, if he/she is intellectually honest, and denies qualia and thus forfeits the argument. One must go beyond strict physicalism to assert the argument and give way to meta-physical aspects of the human mind but still require it is the actual person experiencing pain, a perfect recipe for hylomorphism. To logically assert pain as a problem can only be done by way of assent to Aristotelian metaphysics which can be easily answered by that same metaphysical system. Regardless of such the real problem here is realizing qualia, doing this requires an assent to meta and abandonment of materialism. At best, the only person qualified to pose this problem is an agnostic.

Is there a question burred here, or is it a theory of bodily pain, as opposed to why do we suffer?

On my view the Aristotelian/Thomistic view of human nature is the most logical one to use in the explination of the sensation of pain

 

[CHRISTINE77]

Is that the argument is contingent on qualia (for association of pain is necessary to assert the “problem”), of which is not reducible to matter. The Cartesian denies this even being a problem for the real person is not being harmed at all. The materialist is a eliminativist, if he/she is intellectually honest, and denies qualia and thus forfeits the argument. One must go beyond strict physicalism to assert the argument and give way to meta-physical aspects of the human mind but still require it is the actual person experiencing pain, a perfect recipe for hylomorphism. To logically assert pain as a problem can only be done by way of assent to Aristotelian metaphysics which can be easily answered by that same metaphysical system. Regardless of such the real problem here is realizing qualia, doing this requires an assent to meta and abandonment of materialism. At best, the only person qualified to pose this problem is an agnostic.

Say what???

 

[GEddie]

Say what???

It seems that those who do not speak the jargon are not wanted in these conversations…

ICXC NIKA.

 

[CHRISTINE77]

It seems that those who do not speak the jargon are not wanted in these conversations…

ICXC NIKA.

I haven’t seen much of a conversation yet.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Is there a question burred here, or is it a theory of bodily pain, as opposed to why do we suffer?

On my view the Aristotelian/Thomistic view of human nature is the most logical one to use in the explination of the sensation of pain

It is a refutation to the mindless argument posed by emotional and irrational atheists that assert the existence of pain and suffering is a problem with theism. Simply demonstrating that to allow pain as a premise is to allow qualia, something that is contra-materialistic and an assent to Aristotelian thought.

 

[CHRISTINE77]

It is a refutation to the mindless argument posed by emotional and irrational atheists that assert the existence of pain and suffering is a problem with theism. Simply demonstrating that to allow pain as a premise is to allow qualia, something that is contra-materialistic and an assent to Aristotelian thought.

What is qualia?

 

[GEddie]

Originally Posted by GEddie

Nonphilosopher and proud of it,

ICXC NIKA

why ya hanging around the philosophy forum then?

Because I am a student of the human body and life, and it’s mysteries. But I don’t use words like “qualia” regularly, and prefer to see questions stated as questions, rather than soaked in philosophical jargon. Something that is common to human life can and should be expressed in words all humans use.

God Bless,
ICXC NIKA.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Because I am a student of the human body and life, and it’s mysteries. But I don’t use words like “qualia” regularly, and prefer to see questions stated as questions, rather than soaked in philosophical jargon. Something that is common to human life can and should be expressed in words all humans use.

God Bless,
ICXC NIKA.

Do you do this to MDs who speak medical language amongst themselves?

 

[GEddie]

Do you do this to MDs who speak medical language amongst themselves?

If I were in a conversation with one, I’d certainly ask him to translate any terms I was unfamiliar with.

Human body terms, however, are more generally known than philosophical ones.

ICXC NIKA

 

[Qoeleth]

Is that the argument is contingent on qualia (for association of pain is necessary to assert the “problem”), of which is not reducible to matter. The Cartesian denies this even being a problem for the real person is not being harmed at all. The materialist is a eliminativist, if he/she is intellectually honest, and denies qualia and thus forfeits the argument. One must go beyond strict physicalism to assert the argument and give way to meta-physical aspects of the human mind but still require it is the actual person experiencing pain, a perfect recipe for hylomorphism. To logically assert pain as a problem can only be done by way of assent to Aristotelian metaphysics which can be easily answered by that same metaphysical system. Regardless of such the real problem here is realizing qualia, doing this requires an assent to meta and abandonment of materialism. At best, the only person qualified to pose this problem is an agnostic.

Yes, that is true. To a strict materialist pain would not be philosophical ‘problem’ at all. I wonder if such a strict materialist could ever exist- an absolute Stoic of materialism? saying, “Yes, I feel a nervous called ‘pain’, but it is merely a series of electro-chemical reaction, and therefore not a problem at all.”

I can think of a similar example where pain is regarded as no problem. In Buddhist Scripture, one of the Buddhas has abandoned the error of believing the self (soul) exists. Therefore, when he is tortured and torn apart, he shows no concern at all. Strictly speaking, this is more nihilism that materialism, because the reality of matter, as well as the reality of the self, is also denied.

The evasion of the non-problem of pain for an absolute materialist could be perhaps found in this way.
“A knife has entered my flesh. No problem.
As an electro-chemical reaction, there is movement in my nerves called ‘pain’. No problem.
As a result of this reaction in my nerves, due to another reaction in my brain, my mouth will no scream in agony. No problem.”

 

[fhansen]

Yes, that is true. To a strict materialist pain would not be philosophical ‘problem’ at all. I wonder if such a strict materialist could ever exist- an absolute Stoic of materialism? saying, “Yes, I feel a nervous called ‘pain’, but it is merely a series of electro-chemical reaction, and therefore not a problem at all.”

I can think of a similar example where pain is regarded as no problem. In Buddhist Scripture, one of the Buddhas has abandoned the error of believing the self (soul) exists. Therefore, when he is tortured and torn apart, he shows no concern at all. Strictly speaking, this is more nihilism that materialism, because the reality of matter, as well as the reality of the self, is also denied.

The evasion of the non-problem of pain for an absolute materialist could be perhaps found in this way.
“A knife has entered my flesh. No problem.
As an electro-chemical reaction, there is movement in my nerves called ‘pain’. No problem.
As a result of this reaction in my nerves, due to another reaction in my brain, my mouth will no scream in agony. No problem.”

Wasn’t 100% sure there if you meant to say ‘not scream in agony’ or ‘now scream in agony’ but either way seems workable enough I guess; he either denies the pain or denies being concerned with it. Still sounds like denial either way, tho

 

[Hypatia]

Is that the argument is contingent on qualia (for association of pain is necessary to assert the “problem”), of which is not reducible to matter. The Cartesian denies this even being a problem for the real person is not being harmed at all. The materialist is a eliminativist, if he/she is intellectually honest, and denies qualia and thus forfeits the argument. One must go beyond strict physicalism to assert the argument and give way to meta-physical aspects of the human mind but still require it is the actual person experiencing pain, a perfect recipe for hylomorphism. To logically assert pain as a problem can only be done by way of assent to Aristotelian metaphysics which can be easily answered by that same metaphysical system. Regardless of such the real problem here is realizing qualia, doing this requires an assent to meta and abandonment of materialism. At best, the only person qualified to pose this problem is an agnostic.

Since all experience belongs to the ego, for Decartes, including the experience of pain, whatever its source, I’m not sure what it means to say that “the real person is not being harmed”. On the other hand if you are trying to refute some sort of atheism, then Decartes still seems like an odd target, since he affirms the existence of God (and even a personal, creating God, which is more than one can say for Aristotle).

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Since all experience belongs to the ego, for Decartes, including the experience of pain, whatever its source, I’m not sure what it means to say that “the real person is not being harmed”. On the other hand if you are trying to refute some sort of atheism, then Decartes still seems like an odd target, since he affirms the existence of God (and even a personal, creating God, which is more than one can say for Aristotle).

Pain experienced physically is a separate substance being affected altogather for the Cartesian dualist as the person is a phantasm connected, per accidens, to corporeality. If the person is nothing more then a ghost in the machine, whatever happens to the machine means little to this dualist, and the argument of suffering/pain is also of no consequence. I was simply involving the three usual positions of philosophy of mind, but brings to light the interaction problem, yet again, for the Cartesian dualist but that’s another thread.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Yes, that is true. To a strict materialist pain would not be philosophical ‘problem’ at all. I wonder if such a strict materialist could ever exist- an absolute Stoic of materialism? saying, “Yes, I feel a nervous called ‘pain’, but it is merely a series of electro-chemical reaction, and therefore not a problem at all.”

I can think of a similar example where pain is regarded as no problem. In Buddhist Scripture, one of the Buddhas has abandoned the error of believing the self (soul) exists. Therefore, when he is tortured and torn apart, he shows no concern at all. Strictly speaking, this is more nihilism that materialism, because the reality of matter, as well as the reality of the self, is also denied.

The evasion of the non-problem of pain for an absolute materialist could be perhaps found in this way.
“A knife has entered my flesh. No problem.
As an electro-chemical reaction, there is movement in my nerves called ‘pain’. No problem.
As a result of this reaction in my nerves, due to another reaction in my brain, my mouth will no scream in agony. No problem.”

A good demonstration of how even materialism can lead to skepticism, almost as bad as indirect realism.

 

[Theophorus]

It is a refutation to the mindless argument posed by emotional and irrational atheists that assert the existence of pain and suffering is a problem with theism. Simply demonstrating that to allow pain as a premise is to allow qualia, something that is contra-materialistic and an assent to Aristotelian thought.

Not everyone on this forum has the same level of philosophical education, indeed I would say that many on this philosophy forum have no formal training in philosophy at all, but they still have very good questions and arguments. Can I suggest simpler argumentation forms and at least explain the technical terms you use, so as to engage people in a good philosophical argument and so that you can convince them that you make a valid point. There is no use throwing around terms like ‘efficent cause’ or ‘hylomorphic compound’ if people don’t understand them. Remember the point of the perennial philosophy is to explain rationally the reality of things not to baffle people. Rememer what it was like when you first read Aristotle esp the like of De Anima.

 

[Perplexity]

First, I would love to hear why the materialist should be an eliminativist (as I’m sure the philosophical community would too, if your claim is worth its salt, this needs to be published in nous! )

Second, atheists can be substance dualists

Finally, the evidential problem of suffering just says that suffering is more to be expected given atheism than theism, not given materialism than dualism lol. Almost all theists (philosophers, at least) concede that suffering is evidence for atheism, their only escape being ‘it’s not that strong of evidence though.’ (Given your description of the problem of pain, it doesn’t sound like you’re even familiar with the evidential problem of suffering)

I wasn’t even gonna touch this one till I saw how you described atheists, then I figured it’s time to bake some humble pie

 

[Sair]

First, I would love to hear why the materialist should be an eliminativist (as I’m sure the philosophical community would too, if your claim is worth its salt, this needs to be published in nous! )

Second, atheists can be substance dualists

Finally, the evidential problem of suffering just says that suffering is more to be expected given atheism than theism, not given materialism than dualism lol. Almost all theists (philosophers, at least) concede that suffering is evidence for atheism, their only escape being ‘it’s not that strong of evidence though.’ (Given your description of the problem of pain, it doesn’t sound like you’re even familiar with the evidential problem of suffering)

I wasn’t even gonna touch this one till I saw how you described atheists, then I figured it’s time to bake some humble pie

I felt exactly the same way, but you were quicker on the draw

No, atheism doesn’t logically entail materialism. Many are materialists, but certainly not all.

And it’s worth pointing out, again, that the problem of evil/pain/suffering is only actually a philosophical problem for those who do believe in an all-good, all-powerful deity. Without that belief, pain and suffering are just things that happen - a practical problem, to be sure, but we who believe the universe is devoid of a personal, benevolent deity do not have to confront the possibility that said deity, despite its purported qualities, intentionally created suffering.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

First, I would love to hear why the materialist should be an eliminativist (as I’m sure the philosophical community would too, if your claim is worth its salt, this needs to be published in nous! )

Don’t take my word for it, John Searle and Edward Feser have already written works that demonstrates all forms of materialism denies the existence of the mind, intentional or not. Let’s face it, it’s the logical end to materialism; a desperate last resort option on hold hoping the present problems can be explained via monism and when reality finally settles in, the opt out awaits. Some, like the Churchlands, have put their money where their mouth is, the rest will follow sooner or later. If the last century has shown us anything concerning philosophy of mind and materialism, it has been a systematic movement towards abandoning the existence of the mind when theory after theory has been defeated and abandoned.

Second, atheists can be substance dualists

An atheist would say the mind is a complete substance void of matter and exists apart from matter? Interesting… All dualists I know of, of this school of thought explains the gap between causal relation of mind and body by presenting a god of the gaps argument. What is the atheist response to this interaction problem?

Finally, the evidential problem of suffering just says that suffering is more to be expected given atheism than theism, not given materialism than dualism lol.

And with materialism there is no pain experienced and any association with concepts of suffering or evil with pain is absurd. With Cartesian dualism, whatever is experienced by the body really doesn’t matter, since the real and thinking person is elsewhere and non-contingent of the body.

Almost all theists (philosophers, at least) concede that suffering is evidence for atheism, their only escape being ‘it’s not that strong of evidence though.’ (Given your description of the problem of pain, it doesn’t sound like you’re even familiar with the evidential problem of suffering)

I understand the muddleheaded argument and I’m not impressed by the emotional tears behind it. Since when was the boundaries of strict rational argumentation expanded for a single worthless argument? And whoever says it’s “evidence for atheism” is an idiot, as the argument aims at attributes of God rather than His existence.

I wasn’t even gonna touch this one till I saw how you described atheists, then I figured it’s time to bake some humble pie

No need for you eat that pie, yet