The so-called omnimax attributes

[Spock]

There are two key premises to your argument, Spock.

1. If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, you would be free not to do x.
2. An omniscient being is such that he would tell you to do x, being aware of all the facts in the case (including the fact that you would choose to be a contrarian).

You must be committed to #2, in order to prove what you’re saying. And yet, #2 cannot possibly be established.

Consider:

1. If Bob is always honest, and Bob says “This sentence is a lie”, then Bob is lying.
2. Bob is capable of saying such a sentence.

The conditional statement is true (although incompletely true), but #2 in this situation is obviously false. Significantly, this does not prove that Bob is not always honest.

All you’ve discovered is a paradox of omniscience, not a contradiction contained within it.

The proposition “this sentence is a lie” does **not have a true or false value **associated with it. You can either say that the quoted sentence is a paradox, or you can say that it is self-contradictory. A paradox **is **a contradiction. Now, I did not say that omniscience - in and by itself - is self-contradictory. Only that a revealed omniscient prediction is impossible. If the prediction is not revealed, then there in no problem - except that an unrevealed prediction is useless.

But my proposed scenario still stands. OG can make his prediction assuming (or knowing?) that I will act contrarian. That still does not allow to make a valid prediction. The point is that as soon as the prediction is revealed to me, the who-can-outwit-whom ends, and the ball is in my court.

Suppose that OG tells me: “I know that you would do X, if I did not reveal it. Now, since I did reveal it, you will not do X. But taking that into consideration, since I tell you that you will not do X, therefore you will do X…” etc… but the process cannot go to infinity, since it would not be a prediction. At one point OG must stop and either predict that I will do X, or that I will not do X. And then it is my turn to act - and guess, what I will do?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

The proposition “this sentence is a lie” does **not have a true or false value **associated with it. You can either say that the quoted sentence is a paradox, or you can say that it is self-contradictory. A paradox **is **a contradiction.

A paradoxical statement is a proposition that can neither be true or false (in other words, it entails its own incoherency). “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, you would be free not to do x” is paradoxical. It cannot be the case, and it cannot not be the case.

Now, I did not say that omniscience - in and by itself - is self-contradictory. Only that a revealed omniscient prediction is impossible. If the prediction is not revealed, then there in no problem - except that an unrevealed prediction is useless.

A revealed omniscient prediction is not impossible. I could prove the point to you, but I’ll just be chasing my tail unless you agree with the following proposition:

A1: It is not incoherent for an omniscient being to know the future of beings with free will.

If you disagree with A1 (which I believe you do), my answer will appear unsatisfactory to you. So we have to deal with A1 first.

To backtrack:

No, of course he is not. And the characters in the book have no free will, do they? So either your analogy is correct, and then we have no free will. Or, if we have free will, and then your analogy is incorrect. If the future is fixed and unchangable, then we may think that we have the power to influence it via our decisions, but that is just an illusion.

The proposition that God is outside time is ambiguous. Clearly God would be outside our time, but that does not give him any special access to the information about the affairs that have not happened yet.

Could a book be “written”, in a possible world, where the characters were given certain parameters and free will? This actually accords quite well with the phenomenal experiences of certain authors, who say that their characters chose their actions, within the context of the book. Of course, when an author says this it is (to some degree) a manner of speaking, but that does not preclude its possibility.

Suppose that OG tells me: “I know that you would do X, if I did not reveal it. Now, since I did reveal it, you will not do X. But taking that into consideration, since I tell you that you will not do X, therefore you will do X…” etc… but the process cannot go to infinity, since it would not be a prediction. At one point OG must stop and either predict that I will do X, or that I will not do X. And then it is my turn to act - and guess, what I will do?

Try this one: “Spock, you will eat before this conversation is over.” I’m guessing He would win. (Otherwise, He would have predicted that you would die before this conversation is over.)

 

[Spock]

A paradoxical statement is a proposition that can neither be true or false (in other words, it entails its own incoherency). “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, you would be free not to do x” is paradoxical. It cannot be the case, and it cannot not be the case.

There is an error in this reasoning. The proposition: “this sentence is false” stands on its own right, there is no conditional in it. Your proposition: “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, then you would be free not to do x” contains a conditional. Therefore it is easy to resolve the “paradox”: the OG can say “I predict that you will do X”, but my action will prove him wrong, therefore his omniscience is false.

A revealed omniscient prediction is not impossible. I could prove the point to you, but I’ll just be chasing my tail unless you agree with the following proposition:

A1: It is not incoherent for an omniscient being to know the future of beings with free will.

If you disagree with A1 (which I believe you do), my answer will appear unsatisfactory to you. So we have to deal with A1 first.

Correct, I disagree with A1. But that is not a problem, for the sake of this discussion I am willing to stipulate that A1 is true.

Try this one: “Spock, you will eat before this conversation is over.” I’m guessing He would win. (Otherwise, He would have predicted that you would die before this conversation is over.)

Who decides when is the conversation over? If I decide, then I just declare that the conversation is over, when my hunger becomes unendurable - and OG loses.

You see, it is easy to make vague predictions. I can predict that there will be someone who will not win a jackpot on Powerball at the next drawing. It is almost absolutely certain. In theory, it is possible that every one of all the millions of players will just happen to mark the winning numbers - that is true. But the chances against this are astronomical.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

There is an error in this reasoning. The proposition: “this sentence is false” stands on its own right, there is no conditional in it. Your proposition: “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, then you would be free not to do x” contains a conditional. Therefore it is easy to resolve the “paradox”: the OG can say “I predict that you will do X”, but my action will prove him wrong, therefore his omniscience is false.

Conditionals can be true or false. “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, then you would be free not to do x” is either true or false. Let’s consider what would happen if the conditions were or were not satisfied:

If conditions not met: then the conditional would remain true.

If conditions were met: then “you would be free not to do x”. You could, in other words, do not-x. And yet, one of the conditions *fully entails *that you will do x. This leads to the conclusion of “x & not-x”, a reductio ad absurdum, which entitles me to toss out whatever assumptions led to its existence. You can either toss out the assumption that “you have free will” or the assumption that “an omniscient being said that you would do x”. The two conditions, if both satisfied, lead to the conclusion that the two conditions cannot coexist.

But this is all that has been proven: that the conditions cannot both be met. In other words, since you (Spock) *do *have free will, God will never tell you what you’re about to do. This does not make the conditional false, but rather trivial. “If the moon is made of green cheese, then I will drive a Porsche” is perfectly true (logically speaking), but trivial.

Now, please excuse me while I throw out the reasoning in the above paragraphs.

Above, I was assuming what you assume: i.e. that God’s foreknowledge is bound by time, that He simply can predict all outcomes from a time-limited standpoint. Now I will tell you my real opinion: that God is not bound by time.

Example: Jesus told Peter that “before the cock crows, you will deny me three times”. Now, Peter had *absolutely no intention *of fulfilling that prophecy. He was in full possession of his faculties, and meant to contradict Jesus’ words with his own actions. But Jesus would not have made such a prediction if it was in Peter’s power – *ultimately *-- to not deny Jesus. He who knows the future is not capable of entering into contradiction with the future.

Thus, we have a complete reversal in our friendly old conditional: “If you would be free not to do x, then an omniscient being will not say that you will do x.” Here, the word “free” takes on a radicalized meaning: “pertaining to that which does not correspond to this universe”. It does not mean “possessing free will”.

Who decides when is the conversation over? If I decide, then I just declare that the conversation is over, when my hunger becomes unendurable - and OG loses.

Spock: Alright already! Conversation over – pass me those tacos.
God: You may defy my “prediction” by eating as soon as the conversation has ceased.
Spock: The conversation’s over, so I’m not responding. Gee, I hope we have some sour cream.
God: Yes, there’s some in the fridge.
Spock: Hey, that’s cheating! You read my thoughts.
God: With me, you see, the conversation never ends. Bon appetit!

 

[James_S_Saint]

Spock: Alright already! Conversation over – pass me those tacos.
God: You may defy my “prediction” by eating as soon as the conversation has ceased.
Spock: The conversation’s over, so I’m not responding. Gee, I hope we have some sour cream.
God: Yes, there’s some in the fridge.
Spock: Hey, that’s cheating! You read my thoughts.
God: With me, you see, the conversation never ends. Bon appetit!

 

[Spock]

Conditionals can be true or false. “If an omniscient being said that you would do x, and you have free will, then you would be free not to do x” is either true or false. Let’s consider what would happen if the conditions were or were not satisfied:

If conditions not met: then the conditional would remain true.

If conditions were met: then “you would be free not to do x”. You could, in other words, do not-x. And yet, one of the conditions *fully entails *that you will do x. This leads to the conclusion of “x & not-x”, a reductio ad absurdum, which entitles me to toss out whatever assumptions led to its existence. You can either toss out the assumption that “you have free will” or the assumption that “an omniscient being said that you would do x”. The two conditions, if both satisfied, lead to the conclusion that the two conditions cannot coexist.

But this is all that has been proven: that the conditions cannot both be met. In other words, since you (Spock) *do *have free will, God will never tell you what you’re about to do. This does not make the conditional false, but rather trivial. “If the moon is made of green cheese, then I will drive a Porsche” is perfectly true (logically speaking), but trivial.

That is precisely what I suggested many pages ago. The assumption of omniscience is based on faith - but this particular faith is especially unreasonable. Observe, some articles of faith cannot be proven, in principle. No matter what kind of verification process we would invent, the process would not support or refute the article of faith - it would be inconclusive. This one, however is a different ballgame. As soon as it would be subjected to rational proof, it would be found false.

Now, please excuse me while I throw out the reasoning in the above paragraphs.

Above, I was assuming what you assume: i.e. that God’s foreknowledge is bound by time, that He simply can predict all outcomes from a time-limited standpoint. Now I will tell you my real opinion: that God is not bound by time.

Example: Jesus told Peter that “before the cock crows, you will deny me three times”. Now, Peter had *absolutely no intention *of fulfilling that prophecy. He was in full possession of his faculties, and meant to contradict Jesus’ words with his own actions. But Jesus would not have made such a prediction if it was in Peter’s power – *ultimately *-- to not deny Jesus. He who knows the future is not capable of entering into contradiction with the future.

Thus, we have a complete reversal in our friendly old conditional: “If you would be free not to do x, then an omniscient being will not say that you will do x.” Here, the word “free” takes on a radicalized meaning: “pertaining to that which does not correspond to this universe”. It does not mean “possessing free will”.

Well, this type of “free will” is definitely not one I agree with. You merely say that we do not have libertarian free will. Of course the lack of libertarian free will makes personal responsibility null and void. Tough choice!

Spock: Alright already! Conversation over – pass me those tacos.
God: You may defy my “prediction” by eating as soon as the conversation has ceased.
Spock: The conversation’s over, so I’m not responding. Gee, I hope we have some sour cream.
God: Yes, there’s some in the fridge.
Spock: Hey, that’s cheating! You read my thoughts.
God: With me, you see, the conversation never ends. Bon appetit!

There are two ways to view this snippet of a conversation. The “prediction” that I will eat before the conversation ends, is just trivial, if the conversation cannot end. And that earns a big “duh” from me. The other possibility - which I prefer - is to tell God, that the previous conversation is over, so my eating will invalidate his prediciton, and we are now participating in a fresh conversation.

 

[Spock]

Spock: Alright already! Conversation over – pass me those tacos.
God: You may defy my “prediction” by eating as soon as the conversation has ceased.
Spock: The conversation’s over, so I’m not responding. Gee, I hope we have some sour cream.
God: Yes, there’s some in the fridge.
Spock: Hey, that’s cheating! You read my thoughts.
God: With me, you see, the conversation never ends. Bon appetit!

Two more remarks here. First, the conversation never even started - and it is not my fault. The challenge stands, and I am ready. Second, if there is only one kind of food presented, then the prediction that I will “eat that particular food” is trivial and obvious. Let’s see if God can predict which one of two or more equally nutritious and mouth-watering dishes will I choose. But again, he cannot - he must stay silent, lest his own words will betray his lack of ability. So much for omniscience.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

and still the mere fact that time doesnt exist and therefore what is chosen and what is known are simultaneous answers the question. even better, it agrees with general ideas of physics.

discovermagazine.com/2007/jun/in-no-time

 

[Spock]

and still the mere fact that time doesnt exist and therefore what is chosen and what is known are simultaneous answers the question. even better, it agrees with general ideas of physics.

discovermagazine.com/2007/jun/in-no-time

Time as we understand it may work quite differently on the quantum level, but so does causation. Strangely enough I don’t see you vehemetly attacking the “first cause” type of arguments based upon the quantum level of causality. I wonder why?

On the macro level, however, so far the best approach is to consider time as a valid concept and so is causation (outside libertarian free will). The whole langauge distinguishes today, yesterday and tomorrow. To say that our “future self” exists simultaneously with our yesteday’s self and today’s self is preposterous. What was done yesterday cannot be undone today. What will be done tomorrow does not exist today. You keep bringing up the same stuff… don’t you realize that no one cares?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Time as we understand it may work quite differently on the quantum level, but so does causation. Strangely enough I don’t see you vehemetly attacking the “first cause” type of arguments based upon the quantum level of causality. I wonder why?

its not that time works differently on the quantum level, its that it doesnt exist at any level other than as our subjective measurement of change, it simply becomes obvious in quantifiable terms at that level.

im not vehemently attacking “first cause” arguments in relation to quantum causality because they dont have anything to do with one another. all QM phenomenon are contingent on a universe already existing. i.e. VP are contingent on the lagrangian ranges of a vacuum already existing.

not exacly a threat to first cause.

On the macro level, however, so far the best approach is to consider time as a valid concept and so is causation (outside libertarian free will).

so we should just accept the existence of time, even though its lack destroys your argument? and we should accept a quid pro quo for causation, except when it defeats your ideas of free will?

isnt that a little self serving?

The whole langauge distinguishes today, yesterday and tomorrow. To say that our “future self” exists simultaneously with our yesteday’s self and today’s self is preposterous. What was done yesterday cannot be undone today. What will be done tomorrow does not exist today.

what does language have to do with the bare fact that time doesnt exist? inserting temporal language into the order of change

You keep bringing up the same stuff

because you keep dodging, as is your pattern, when your backed into a corner, you ignore an argument rather than deal with it. you dont really want to know the truth, you want the truth to be what you hope it is. cognitive dissonance.

… don’t you realize that no one cares?

no, a number of people care. some may be uncomfortable with metaphysics, physics, and the gneral sciences. but many care. we have a whole forum of people who do.

but i notice that your only real response to time being non-existent is that we should just accept it. thats hardly a response worthy of a rational man, if something doesnt exist, why should we treat it as though it does? if there is no evidence of it, then i think its a relative matter of faith to believe in it no? i mean i believe in G-d based on the evidence i see. on the testimony of thousands over millenia, on the existence of the universe, and in the witness of the Church. you seem to be asking us to accept that time exists, “just because.”

no, im afraid that wont cut it.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

That is precisely what I suggested many pages ago. The assumption of omniscience is based on faith - but this particular faith is especially unreasonable. Observe, some articles of faith cannot be proven, in principle. No matter what kind of verification process we would invent, the process would not support or refute the article of faith - it would be inconclusive. This one, however is a different ballgame. As soon as it would be subjected to rational proof, it would be found false.

The scientific method has gaps. The location and speed of electrons is not subject to rational proof either; shall we say that idea of electrons having both location and speed is incoherent, too?

Technically, you could never verify omniscience until God had told you every fact contained within the universe, including the fact that He had told you every fact (and thus and infinite regress). But even then you couldn’t be sure. You act as if all the universe must be capable of being fully comprehended by the human brain.

Well, this type of “free will” is definitely not one I agree with. You merely say that we do not have libertarian free will. Of course the lack of libertarian free will makes personal responsibility null and void. Tough choice!

As a libertarian, I’m quite shocked to be called a compatibilist.

As I’ve said before, my idea is that somehow God is capable of creating within certain parameters, without “thinking of” the outcome to the individual persons. At any rate, the idea of God sitting back and “choosing” to create this particular universe – thereby determining all its outcomes – is (in my eyes, at least) clearly wrong.

There are two ways to view this snippet of a conversation. The “prediction” that I will eat before the conversation ends, is just trivial, if the conversation cannot end. And that earns a big “duh” from me.

That’s why it was a joke.

The other possibility - which I prefer - is to tell God, that the previous conversation is over, so my eating will invalidate his prediciton, and we are now participating in a fresh conversation.

Sounds like nominalism to me…

Second, if there is only one kind of food presented, then the prediction that I will “eat that particular food” is trivial and obvious. Let’s see if God can predict which one of two or more equally nutritious and mouth-watering dishes will I choose. But again, he cannot - he must stay silent, lest his own words will betray his lack of ability. So much for omniscience.

• 1 The LORD said to Job:

2 “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him?
Let him who accuses God answer him!”

3 Then Job answered the LORD :

4 "I am unworthy—how can I reply to you?
I put my hand over my mouth.

5 I spoke once, but I have no answer—
twice, but I will say no more."

6 Then the LORD spoke to Job out of the storm:

7 "Brace yourself like a man;
I will question you,
and you shall answer me.

8 "Would you discredit my justice?
Would you condemn me to justify yourself?

9 Do you have an arm like God’s,
and can your voice thunder like his?

10 Then adorn yourself with glory and splendor,
and clothe yourself in honor and majesty. …

1 Then Job replied to the LORD :

2 "I know that you can do all things;
no plan of yours can be thwarted.

3 You asked, ‘Who is this that obscures my counsel without knowledge?’
Surely I spoke of things I did not understand,
things too wonderful for me to know.

4 "You said, ‘Listen now, and I will speak;
I will question you,
and you shall answer me.’

5 My ears had heard of you
but now my eyes have seen you.

6 Therefore I despise myself
and repent in dust and ashes."*

If you don’t think that the above verses are your answer, then so be it. Just consider what the response would be if you demanded President Obama appear before you, and multiply it a thousandfold.

 

[Spock]

The scientific method has gaps. The location and speed of electrons is not subject to rational proof either; shall we say that idea of electrons having both location and speed is incoherent, too?

In a sense it is. However this only demonstrates that our “picture” of the quantum world cannot be readily translated into concepts which describe the macro-world. In the time when Niels Bohr proposed his model for the hydrogen atom, the “model” was akin to miniature solar system. Today we consider the model obsolete. We readily accept that the quantum world is not like a miniature macro world. But that is not a problem. The mathematical equations cannot be visualized, that is all. This is not a “gap” in science, it is the realization that the quantum world is not like the macro world.

This is not the case with the proposition of omniscience.

Technically, you could never verify omniscience until God had told you every fact contained within the universe, including the fact that He had told you every fact (and thus and infinite regress). But even then you couldn’t be sure. You act as if all the universe must be capable of being fully comprehended by the human brain.

I am not asking for that. The example I brought up actually proves that a rational demonstration of omniscience is logically impossible.

As a libertarian, I’m quite shocked to be called a compatibilist.

Well, as a fellow libertarian I am glad to hear that you are also one. Of course I will never understand how can a libertarian stance (which is the ultimate rejection of authoritarian rule) be compatible with the penultimate authoritarian system of Catholicism. But there are so many things that I don’t understand…

As I’ve said before, my idea is that somehow God is capable of creating within certain parameters, without “thinking of” the outcome to the individual persons. At any rate, the idea of God sitting back and “choosing” to create this particular universe – thereby determining all its outcomes – is (in my eyes, at least) clearly wrong.

So what else is there? If we are co-creators of the universe, that is all well and good. We have the freedom to choose X or non-X. We cannot choose both, that is obvious. There can only one actual future, depending on our selection. We have not made the decision yet. Nevertheless you say that God already knows which one we shall choose - since according to his point of view the selection is already done. If this is not a logical contradiction, I don’t know what is. An event both exists and does not exist depending on the point of view of the observer. The actual future makes our selection between X and non-X illusiory, since we cannot chose the one we did not choose. Therefore the free will which we allegedly enjoy is just an illusion. These are the only logical corollaries of omniscience: 1) a logical contradiction and 2) the denial of actual free will. And no appeal to God’s timeless existence (which is just another nonsensical proposition) can resolve this dilemma.

• 1 The LORD said to Job:

2 “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him?
Let him who accuses God answer him!”

3 Then Job answered the LORD :

4 "I am unworthy—how can I reply to you?
I put my hand over my mouth.

5 I spoke once, but I have no answer—
twice, but I will say no more."

6 Then the LORD spoke to Job out of the storm:

7 "Brace yourself like a man;
I will question you,
and you shall answer me.

8 "Would you discredit my justice?
Would you condemn me to justify yourself?

9 Do you have an arm like God’s,
and can your voice thunder like his?

10 Then adorn yourself with glory and splendor,
and clothe yourself in honor and majesty. …

1 Then Job replied to the LORD :

2 "I know that you can do all things;
no plan of yours can be thwarted.

3 You asked, ‘Who is this that obscures my counsel without knowledge?’
Surely I spoke of things I did not understand,
things too wonderful for me to know.

4 "You said, ‘Listen now, and I will speak;
I will question you,
and you shall answer me.’

5 My ears had heard of you
but now my eyes have seen you.

6 Therefore I despise myself
and repent in dust and ashes."*

If you don’t think that the above verses are your answer, then so be it. Just consider what the response would be if you demanded President Obama appear before you, and multiply it a thousandfold.

Sorry, all I see that the powerful God demands silence and submission from the powerless Job. And he does not do it in the proper way of explaining things, rather just refers to his overwhelming power. Might makes right? Besides, I am not “demanding” anything… I merely “ask” a question or two. And by the way, Obama is responsible for his actions. We, the people elected him.

Since you created a playful conversation between God and me, I will take the liberty of creating one myself:

Spock: Do you foresee my free decison which will happen sometime in the future?
God: Yes, of course. I am omniscient.
Spock: Can you demonstrate it by telling me what the decison will be?
God: No, I cannot, since if I revealed it to you, you would act contrarian, and thus would disprove my omniscience.
Spock: So I must accept it on faith only?
God: Indeed. A rational demostration cannot be done.
Spock: In this particular case reason and faith cannot be reconciled?
God: Correct.
Spock: But this is not what the Catholic Church says.
God: Ho-hum.
**God smiles… **
Spock grins… and waves a cheerful goodbye.

 

[Areopagite]

A paradox **is **a contradiction.

No it’s not. That’s not the definition used by the Catholic Church at least (and most other people that I know). A paradox is an apparent contradiction. However, it’s not actually a contradiction. Just the other day, I was watching a documentary on medieval weaponry, and a guy was demonstrating the flail, and said that “Paradoxically, if you swing it around faster, it’s easier to control.” This does seem like a contradiction many times, but it’s not. In fact, it makes sense if you consider it hard enough. There are many paradoxes in physics too. A lot of stuff with how the micro and macro world interact with each other. Speed of light and relativity, all that stuff. However, there are actually no contradictions there, but there sure as heck seem like there are sometimes. That’s what I’ve heard scientists say at least. They have used the word “paradox” in many circumstances.

And indeed, some paradoxes can be proven (that is, it can be clearly demonstrated why he two seemingly irreconcilable things go together). But not necessarily all of them. There are paradoxes in Christianity that cannot be proven (and these are also called “Mysteries”), but nonetheless it is held that these mysteries are not contradictions, even though they may seemingly be contradictions. If they are contradictions, then they would be false and we are obligated as human beings not to believe them. Much of theology, particularly apologetics, is to show that the truths of the faith are not contradictions, even if they might be unprovable truths.

Now, I did not say that omniscience - in and by itself - is self-contradictory. Only that a revealed omniscient prediction is impossible.

So, you’re saying that omniscience is NOT self-contradictory, then, right?

But my proposed scenario still stands. OG can make his prediction assuming (or knowing?) that I will act contrarian. That still does not allow to make a valid prediction. The point is that as soon as the prediction is revealed to me, the who-can-outwit-whom ends, and the ball is in my court.

Indeed, if you will be a contrarian here, God would not give any prediction, since that prediction one then turn out to be false. He would only give true predictions. There’s nothing unreasonable about that.

The example I brought up actually proves that a rational demonstration of omniscience is logically impossible.

This assumes that your example is the only kind of rational demonstration that could be tried for demonstrating omniscience. God could demonstrate omniscience in other ways by predicting other people’s actions to you or actions of nature.

Also, it may be the case that you might not decide to be a contrarian after God’s issues a prediction of your actions. It’s not inconceivable or impossible, even if you first intended that you would be a contrarian. God would know if you would be a contrarian or not, and act accordingly by either predicting your willed action (if you decided not to be a contrarian) or not predicting it (if you did decide to be one) since by doing so He would predict wrongly. I don’t see how this is unreasonable.

Nevertheless you say that God already knows which one we shall choose - since according to his point of view the selection is already done. If this is not a logical contradiction, I don’t know what is. An event both exists and does not exist depending on the point of view of the observer.

Assuming that free will exists, it is unreasonable to look into the past and say “Since I have chosen those certain actions in my past, I had no free will not to choose them.” This is the kind of argument you’re using. Just because what we have chosen in the past is forever fixed now, doesn’t mean we didn’t have free will to choose differently.

God’s omniscience and timelessness is seeing all temporal existence as if it has already happened … as if it’s all in the past to Him. There is no logical step that results in there being no free will.

Spock: Do you foresee my free decison which will happen sometime in the future?
God: Yes, of course. I am omniscient.
Spock: Can you demonstrate it by telling me what the decison will be?
God: No, I cannot, since if I revealed it to you, you would act contrarian, and thus would disprove my omniscience.
Spock: So I must accept it on faith only?
God: Indeed. A rational demostration cannot be done.
Spock: In this particular case reason and faith cannot be reconciled?
God: Correct.
Spock: But this is not what the Catholic Church says.
God: Ho-hum.
**God smiles… **
Spock grins… and waves a cheerful goodbye.

Whoa. You’re implying here that all truths reconcilable with reason can be rationally demonstrated. I hope you don’t mean that. Otherwise, all those first principles and axioms are out the window … and, thus, all rationality is out the window.

 

[James_S_Saint]

A paradox is an apparent contradiction. However, it’s not actually a contradiction.

**Hear! Hear!! **

An “Actual paradox”, being one of not mere appearance, does not exist. Thus for the word to have any real meaning, it must refer merely to appearances of contradiction.

Main Entry: par·a·dox
Pronunciation: \ˈper-ə-ˌdäks, ˈpa-rə-
Function: noun
Etymology: Latin paradoxum, from Greek paradoxon, from neuter of paradoxos contrary to expectation, from para- + dokein to think, seem — more at decent
Date: 1540

1 : a tenet contrary to received opinion
2 a : a statement that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet is perhaps true b : a self-contradictory statement that at first seems true c : an argument that apparently derives self-contradictory conclusions by valid deduction from acceptable premises
3 : one (as a person, situation, or action) having seemingly contradictory qualities or phases

 

[Spock]

And indeed, some paradoxes can be proven (that is, it can be clearly demonstrated why he two seemingly irreconcilable things go together). But not necessarily all of them. There are paradoxes in Christianity that cannot be proven (and these are also called “Mysteries”), but nonetheless it is held that these mysteries are not contradictions, even though they may seemingly be contradictions. If they are contradictions, then they would be false and we are obligated as human beings not to believe them. Much of theology, particularly apologetics, is to show that the truths of the faith are not contradictions, even if they might be unprovable truths.

An unprovable truth is either an axiom (in abstract sciences) or a basic principle (in natural sciences). The “truths” based upon faith are neither.

So, you’re saying that omniscience is NOT self-contradictory, then, right?

Correct. The concept of omniscience can be a valid idea, if properly defined. However, if defined as “knowing everything, past, present and future” which includes the Molinist “middle knowledge” (the “knowledge” of how everyone would behave in any hypothetical scenario) leads to the nonsensical proposition that God can “know” the contents of a book, which was never written by a person who was never born - after all the person could have been born, and could have written a book.

The reason this is pure nonsense should be obvious. Knowledge is defined as information about something. However, there is no (and there cannot be) information about nonexistence. A nonexistent book which was not written by Balzac cannot be told apart from a nonexistent book, which was not written by Tolstoy or a nonexistent book which was never writen by a never born writer - moreover it cannot be told apart from a nonexistent car, which was never manufactured by a never created car-company. They are all the same: nonexistent.

There is no physical nonexistence. A non-existent object does not have attributes. Therefore nonexistent “things” cannot be known in any coherent sense of the word. And that is precisely what is claimed by theism in their definition of omniscience.

Indeed, if you will be a contrarian here, God would not give any prediction, since that prediction one then turn out to be false. He would only give true predictions. There’s nothing unreasonable about that.

Not unreasonable. I can claim that I have omniscience, and when asked to demonstrate it - to your satisfaction - then I simply refuse. What would be unreasonable to accept such a claim without demonstration.

This assumes that your example is the only kind of rational demonstration that could be tried for demonstrating omniscience. God could demonstrate omniscience in other ways by predicting other people’s actions to you or actions of nature.

This has been covered before. Such demonstration would not be conclusive. Being a very skeptical person, I would be suspicious that there is some trickery involved. The scenario I proposed excludes the possibility of any “sleight of hand”.

Also, it may be the case that you might not decide to be a contrarian after God’s issues a prediction of your actions. It’s not inconceivable or impossible, even if you first intended that you would be a contrarian. God would know if you would be a contrarian or not, and act accordingly by either predicting your willed action (if you decided not to be a contrarian) or not predicting it (if you did decide to be one) since by doing so He would predict wrongly. I don’t see how this is unreasonable.

Answered above.

Assuming that free will exists, it is unreasonable to look into the past and say “Since I have chosen those certain actions in my past, I had no free will not to choose them.” This is the kind of argument you’re using. Just because what we have chosen in the past is forever fixed now, doesn’t mean we didn’t have free will to choose differently.

This is the crux of the matter. If the decisions would have been made differently, then the current state of affairs would not have been realized. Yes, the past decisions could have been different, but** not in this existing reality**. In this reality the past decisions could not have been made differently from the way they had been made. And that is the reason that there “is” no free will in the past - even though there “was” - as long as the present did not exist as an actual reality, only as a yet-unrealized conglomerate of possibilities.

God’s omniscience and timelessness is seeing all temporal existence as if it has already happened … as if it’s all in the past to Him. There is no logical step that results in there being no free will.

If our unrealized future is “not really unrealized”, if God has positive knowledge about it - and that means that the future states of affairs is already reality in some fashion, then our current decisions are already made, and we have no freedom to make them differently. God’s timeless existence does not help here. The future either exists or it does not. If exists, it can be known. If it does not exist, but the wolrd is totally deterministic, it can be known as well - by extrapolating from the current reality by applying the deterministic laws of nature. (It is a different matter that some laws of nature are not deterministic, but we don’t have to go there.) If, however the future does not exist yet, and we have the freedom in our decision making process, then the outcome cannot be known - though it may be guessed.

Whoa. You’re implying here that all truths reconcilable with reason can be rationally demonstrated. I hope you don’t mean that. Otherwise, all those first principles and axioms are out the window … and, thus, all rationality is out the window.

No, there are exceptions, the axioms and basic principles, which are not accepted on faith, they must be accepted since their denial would lead to nonsense. But the assertions about God’s nature are not included in those categories.

 

[Areopagite]

An unprovable truth is either an axiom (in abstract sciences) or a basic principle (in natural sciences).

This is a blind assertion without any basis. There are plenty of historical truths that cannot be proven but can be truths nonetheless. Or, I could undergo an experience, and know it happened, but sometimes I cannot prove that I had the experience to someone else. There are many unprovable truths besides axioms and basic principles.

The “truths” based upon faith are neither (axioms or basic principles).

True, but my point was that you cannot say that faith is unreasonable using the premise that unprovable truths are unreasonable. It is a false universal negative (because there ARE some truths that are reasonable that cannot be proven). You have to show some other reason why faith is unreasonable or else also condemn axioms and basic principles.

The axioms and basic principles, which are not accepted on faith, they must be accepted since their denial would lead to nonsense.

So thus, not all unprovable truths are unreasonable. Thus the premise must be demoted to a particular negative, “Some unprovable truths are unreasonable,” but of course there is no assurance that faith is one of those unreasonable, unprovable truths … unless there is a separate argument to prove that (which has yet to be brought forth).

Also, it can be argued that axioms and basic principles are matters of faith. Many modern philosophers deny the that the intuitions of elementary truths as those can be known with certainty. They are correct insofar as they point out that they cannot be proven. Nonetheless, our mind can see that it is true, yet cannot demonstrate it.

Faith (i.e. theological virtue of faith) is the same thing in that regard. It is partial knowledge of divine realities (infused supernaturally by God) but not a complete nor demonstrable knowledge of it.

If (omnipotence is) defined as “knowing everything, past, present and future” which includes the Molinist “middle knowledge” (the “knowledge” of how everyone would behave in any hypothetical scenario) leads to the nonsensical proposition that God can “know” the contents of a book, which was never written by a person who was never born - after all the person could have been born, and could have written a book.

Omniscience (as it includes knowing both actual and potential realities) would know every possible outcome of hypothetical scenarios, but it would not know the one actual outcome (obviously, since this regards the potential and not actual existing realm). Thus, God would know all the possible contents that a book could ever have, even if never actually existing, written by a person who would never actually be born.

The reason this is pure nonsense should be obvious. Knowledge is defined as information about something. However, there is no (and there cannot be) information about nonexistence. A nonexistent book which was not written by Balzac cannot be told apart from a nonexistent book, which was not written by Tolstoy or a nonexistent book which was never writen by a never born writer - moreover it cannot be told apart from a nonexistent car, which was never manufactured by a never created car-company. They are all the same: nonexistent.

Once again, there can be knowledge of potentially existing things as well as actually existing things. Omnipotence can know every possible thing Balzac and Tolstoy could have written. Since they never actually wrote it, God would not know the actual thing they would end up writing (since it would never be actual but only potential).

Continued on next post…

 

[Areopagite]

There is no physical nonexistence. A non-existent object does not have attributes. Therefore nonexistent “things” cannot be known in any coherent sense of the word. And that is precisely what is claimed by theism in their definition of omniscience.

A potentially but not actually existing thing can very much have attributes. A pink elephant has attributes for example (for example, it has “pink” as its skin color).

It depends what you mean by physical nonexistence. You could say a pink elephant would be a physical thing, but it doesn’t exist … thus it would have “physical nonexistence.” However, the word “physical” was originally used in philosophy to mean “actual existing” and was applied thus, by Catholic philosophers, even to immaterial things (such as angels). So, if you mean physical in that sense, then certainly there would not be “physical nonexistence” for it would be a contradiction in terms.

Not unreasonable. I can claim that I have omniscience, and when asked to demonstrate it - to your satisfaction - then I simply refuse. What would be unreasonable to accept such a claim without demonstration.

There would definitely be no reason to accept the claim unless I were given some knowledge about the truth of your power. This does not necessarily have to come in the form of demonstrable proof, however. The knowledge could hypothetically be infused supernaturally into me, but perhaps in a small and not fully developed concept (this is what we mean by “faith”), but true enough to me that it would be unreasonable and unfounded to reject it. This kind of faith, I would say, would be the only good reason to accept a human being as omniscient who does not demonstrate it in any way.

However, in the case of God (not a human), omniscience is expected. This is because of many reasons (and perhaps not in line with the discussion? Maybe?). But in short, if something (an idea) is possible, then it actually exists in God (and I am defining God as that which has all possible being … which would include omniscience). If something is possible, then God has it. Otherwise, it’s not possible (and has some intrinsic contradiction about it). In short.

This has been covered before. Such demonstration would not be conclusive. Being a very skeptical person, I would be suspicious that there is some trickery involved. The scenario I proposed excludes the possibility of any “sleight of hand”.

This could make you, I would say, very unreasonable. For example, if God (or a thing claiming to be God) starts predicting some amazing things … like, “A huge, volcanic explosion is going to happen five miles from where you are” or “a giant planet is going to pop into existence right next to the earth in about 3 seconds” or “the football teams to win the next 10 years of superbowls are …” or “the outcome of the next 50 flips of your coin will be this …” etc., and the predictions all turn out to be right … you would still say “Nay, this is no proof.” I suppose it’s just as reasonable to say gravity (or any law of physics) could not be proven either. Sure there are consistent phenomena of “gravitational pull” but it could be all coincidence. What’s to say that an apple might disobey the “law of gravity” and start flying like a bird just because it feels like it.

Even though the laws of physics cannot be proven formally, it would be unreasonable to reject them. They are, what is called, “cogent” (opposed to “proven” in the proper sense). They are inductive demonstrations, opposed to deductive ones. Likewise, demonstrations of divine omniscience such as the ones I mentioned would be cogent reasons to accept the existence of omniscience.

Why would you choose to only accept a demonstration that God cannot perform due to a logical impossibility. God cannot go against logic. Every “thing” He can do are “real” things, and not logically absurdities. It’s a very convenient and ridiculous restriction you demand for a demonstration. Very convenient.

 

[Spirithound]

If, however the future does not exist yet, and we have the freedom in our decision making process, then the outcome cannot be known - though it may be guessed.

To what degree of accuracy?

 

[Betterave]

To predict something that is the result of a deterministic process is very spectacular, no question about that. But it is still not what omniscience is supposed to be, is it? We did agree that the present can be known by OG. We can agree that OG has a tremendous, all-encompassing knowledge of the laws of nature. All that can be presupposed as part of omniscience - and there is no problem with that. Therefore the prediciton of a deterministic process is just run-of-mill for OG. There is really nothing special about it for an OG.

So what if OG makes a detailed prediction of a series of actual decay events in some radioactive decay process? Or are such events deterministic in your view?

The true measure of omniscience is the prediction of a non-deterministic process, aka. free will. And that is what I am arguing against. So far neither you, nor anyone else could establish how could a revealed and understood prediction be accurate if the free agent can act against it. All that complexity of the hypothetical revealed prediction in a coded format is just an attempt to postpone the true situation when the agent knows the prediciton, the agent is free to follow it, or act against it. That is the crux of the matter.

But that’s just so obviously false. ‘Can act against it’ does not imply ‘will act against it’. Here’s another scenario: the prediction is that Spock will freely believe in the conceptual intelligibility of (divine) omniscience. Spock reads and understands the prediction, his heart opens a tiny crack and in rushes divine grace and – voila! – he believes, as per the prediction! It turns out you were wrong about the unshakeableness of your own stubborn will-to-not-believe! (If you say, “No, I wouldn’t do that!”, guess what? You’re not omniscient, OG is! (ex hypothesi!) – Think about it!)

Anyway, I think you keep losing track of your original goalposts. You want to say that the very concept of omniscience is unintelligible some of the time; when that doesn’t work you say that omniscience is not empirically provable, which is true in only a trivial sense (i.e., it’s not provable to a sceptic - but nothing is provable to a sceptic). The rest of the time you make the silly claim that it is empirically disprovable, because for some reason you maintain that either OG ought to be dumb enough to make a false prediction or if he’s smart enough (imagine that!) to avoid your little trap, omniscient enough to not make a false prediction (duh!), then he can’t be omniscient and/or the notion of (or belief in) omniscience is therefore unreasonable. But I was sure your original goalposts were about the intrinsic intelligibility of the concept. Has that changed?

 

[Spock]

This is a blind assertion without any basis. There are plenty of historical truths that cannot be proven but can be truths nonetheless. Or, I could undergo an experience, and know it happened, but sometimes I cannot prove that I had the experience to someone else. There are many unprovable truths besides axioms and basic principles.

Correct, but subjective experiences do not count as evidence for anything.

True, but my point was that you cannot say that faith is unreasonable using the premise that unprovable truths are unreasonable. It is a false universal negative (because there ARE some truths that are reasonable that cannot be proven). You have to show some other reason why faith is unreasonable or else also condemn axioms and basic principles.

See above. What you consider “truth” is not relevant for me, unless you can substantiate it. Otherwise it is just a personal belief.

Omniscience (as it includes knowing both actual and potential realities) would know every possible outcome of hypothetical scenarios, but it would not know the one actual outcome (obviously, since this regards the potential and not actual existing realm). Thus, God would know all the possible contents that a book could ever have, even if never actually existing, written by a person who would never actually be born.

Makes no sense at all. Another example: I live in an apartment, and the house has no garage. I also do not have a car. Now hypothetically it is possible that the house would have a garage, and also hypothetically it is also possible that I would have a car, if I wanted to. Do you really say that God can “know” what kind of a nonexistent car I own and keep in the nonexistent garage? Or suppose that I did not eat breakfast today. Can God “know” what was the breakfast that I did not eat today? Such propositions are totally nonsensical. And yet that is what the Molinist middle knowledge (the “knowing” of hypotheticals) entails.

Once again, there can be knowledge of potentially existing things as well as actually existing things. Omnipotence can know every possible thing Balzac and Tolstoy could have written. Since they never actually wrote it, God would not know the actual thing they would end up writing (since it would never be actual but only potential).

What does the “knowledge” mean in this case? The only sensible definition of knowledge is to have information about something. What does not exist does not have any attributes, therefore it cannot be known. The word “knowledge” cannot and should not be applied to hypotheticals. One can imagine hypotheticals, but that is all. We can even imagine faster than light travel, but that cannot be translated into reality. We can also imagine a sentence, which we intend to write down onto paper, and that can be converted into reality. To use “knowledge” and “imagination” interchangably only creates confusion.