The so-called omnimax attributes

[Spock]

A potentially but not actually existing thing can very much have attributes. A pink elephant has attributes for example (for example, it has “pink” as its skin color).

It is just an imagined “thing”, which does not exist. I can say that I have two nonexistent apples on my desk and one of this is nice red and delicious, the other one is yet unripened and green. I could also say that I do not have apples on my desk. The second sentence is simple and coherent, the first one is “poetic”, “flowery” and nonsensical.

It depends what you mean by physical nonexistence. You could say a pink elephant would be a physical thing, but it doesn’t exist … thus it would have “physical nonexistence.” However, the word “physical” was originally used in philosophy to mean “actual existing” and was applied thus, by Catholic philosophers, even to immaterial things (such as angels). So, if you mean physical in that sense, then certainly there would not be “physical nonexistence” for it would be a contradiction in terms.

Physical existence is what is part of STEM. Hypothetical constructs (imagined, but not written books, the nonexistent car in my nonexistent garage, the dinner I did not eat yesterday, angels, leprechauns, the Tooth Fairy, married bachelors, the point to the north from the North Pole, etc…) do not exist in a physical manner. They can be imagined, but that is all.

There would definitely be no reason to accept the claim unless I were given some knowledge about the truth of your power. This does not necessarily have to come in the form of demonstrable proof, however. The knowledge could hypothetically be infused supernaturally into me, but perhaps in a small and not fully developed concept (this is what we mean by “faith”), but true enough to me that it would be unreasonable and unfounded to reject it. This kind of faith, I would say, would be the only good reason to accept a human being as omniscient who does not demonstrate it in any way.

Sorry, you should not include further hypotheticals into this conversation, especially something that cannot be demonstrated (like supernatural). Either omniscience is coherent on its own right, or not. Including new hypotheticals just compounds the problem.

However, in the case of God (not a human), omniscience is expected. This is because of many reasons (and perhaps not in line with the discussion? Maybe?). But in short, if something (an idea) is possible, then it actually exists in God (and I am defining God as that which has all possible being … which would include omniscience). If something is possible, then God has it. Otherwise, it’s not possible (and has some intrinsic contradiction about it). In short.

Maybe for you, but not for me. I emphasized before that I am not interested in God, only in a coherent definition of omniscience. To “drag” God into the conversation only adds further unknowns.

This could make you, I would say, very unreasonable. For example, if God (or a thing claiming to be God) starts predicting some amazing things … like, “A huge, volcanic explosion is going to happen five miles from where you are” or “a giant planet is going to pop into existence right next to the earth in about 3 seconds” or “the football teams to win the next 10 years of superbowls are …” or “the outcome of the next 50 flips of your coin will be this …” etc., and the predictions all turn out to be right … you would still say “Nay, this is no proof.”

Again, it depends on how omniscience is defined. My definition is “to know everything that can be known” - and from there we can try to figure out “what can be known”. That resonates with the usual definition of omnipotence, which is defined “to be able to do everyhing that can be done”. In both cases there is the qualifier “that can be known, or can be done”.

Now your examples can be split into two categories: 1) predictions that rely on deterministic processes and 2) predictions that include free decisions of conscious agents. This second category can be subdivided into two cases: 2a) the agent is not aware of the prediciton before he makes the selection, and 2b) the agent is aware of the prediciton before he makes the selection. If omniscience as defined “to know everything”, then it should include all of these categories.

The predictions under 1) are of course very amazing, but that is not what omniscience means. Predictions under 2a) are even more amazing, but that is not what omniscience is all about. However, predictions under 2b) will result in contradictions. Therefore if omniscience includes all these categories, it leads to logical impossibilities.

 

[Spock]

So what if OG makes a detailed prediction of a series of actual decay events in some radioactive decay process? Or are such events deterministic in your view?

As far as we know, they are not determinisitic.

But that’s just so obviously false. ‘Can act against it’ does not imply ‘will act against it’. Here’s another scenario: the prediction is that Spock will freely believe in the conceptual intelligibility of (divine) omniscience. Spock reads and understands the prediction, his heart opens a tiny crack and in rushes divine grace and – voila! – he believes, as per the prediction! It turns out you were wrong about the unshakeableness of your own stubborn will-to-not-believe! (If you say, “No, I wouldn’t do that!”, guess what? You’re not omniscient, OG is! (ex hypothesi!) – Think about it!)

I don’t know what is to think about. You do not talk about a decision making process here. To believe or not to believe is not subject to volitional control. I do not believe something I find unreasonable. If I am given new information, which explains something, then I will believe it - and no volitional action is involved. We are talking about something different here. And “can act against it” will result in “will act against it” - in my case, unless I am totally brainwashed - which is cheating.

Anyway, I think you keep losing track of your original goalposts. You want to say that the very concept of omniscience is unintelligible some of the time; when that doesn’t work you say that omniscience is not empirically provable, which is true in only a trivial sense (i.e., it’s not provable to a sceptic - but nothing is provable to a sceptic). The rest of the time you make the silly claim that it is empirically disprovable, because for some reason you maintain that either OG ought to be dumb enough to make a false prediction or if he’s smart enough (imagine that!) to avoid your little trap, omniscient enough to not make a false prediction (duh!), then he can’t be omniscient and/or the notion of (or belief in) omniscience is therefore unreasonable. But I was sure your original goalposts were about the intrinsic intelligibility of the concept. Has that changed?

As I said in the last paragraphs of my previous post, it all depends how omniscience is defined. Please read it above.

 

[Areopagite]

Correct, but subjective experiences do not count as evidence for anything.

I’m not sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you have to define what you mean by “subjective.”

If you mean we can’t count as evidence what is reported to us by someone who saw something (which we did not see) … then it seems the study of history is foolish. History primarily relies on historical records, which consist of people writing down what they witnessed. That is the essence of history (archeology is secondary, which is what every historian would claim). Historical records of an event is definitely considered evidence that the event took place.

Also, if you see something, it definitely is evidence to you (at least) that the thing you saw exists. Likewise, if other people see something, it becomes evidence to others (even to those who did not see it) that it was something that existed (not irrefutable evidence but evidence all the same).

So, what do you mean by “evidence” and what do you mean by “subjective.” And how does this show that faith is non-rational (which, I assume, correct me if I’m wrong, means anti-rational … but I may be misreading you)?

See above. What you consider “truth” is not relevant for me, unless you can substantiate it. Otherwise it is just a personal belief.

And there goes the study of history.

Makes no sense at all. Another example: I live in an apartment, and the house has no garage. I also do not have a car. Now hypothetically it is possible that the house would have a garage, and also hypothetically it is also possible that I would have a car, if I wanted to. Do you really say that God can “know” what kind of a nonexistent car I own and keep in the nonexistent garage?

You seem to indicate that all hypotheticals have only one definite conclusion. But, in fact, there could be many possibilities. You could own a Toyota, Chevy, or Lexus. It’s not that you’re necessarily going to have a particular car if you end up having a car.

God cannot know something as actually the case if it is never actualized, for that would be like knowing something is pink even if it’s not pink. That is not knowledge at all because it is contradictory, and thus false, and therefore not knowledge (knowledge is only true, otherwise it’s error, even if you think it’s knowledge).

Likewise, God can know every possible kind of car that you could have owned, but he would never know the particular car you would have definitely owned if “you had owned a car” (for that hypothetical does not limit the choice to one possibility).

You see? Or does this just make no sense?

Or suppose that I did not eat breakfast today. Can God “know” what was the breakfast that I did not eat today? Such propositions are totally nonsensical. And yet that is what the Molinist middle knowledge (the “knowing” of hypotheticals) entails.

The answer to the question “What was the breakfast that I did not eat today” is “all possible breakfasts.” There is not just one answer. It is true that you didn’t eat “eggs” but it’s also true that you didn’t eat “cereal.” And God would know all the other things you didn’t eat as well. There isn’t just one particular breakfast you didn’t eat.

What does the “knowledge” mean in this case? The only sensible definition of knowledge is to have information about something.

I would say that knowledge (particularly, intellectual knowledge, opposed to memory, which is the mere storage of past mental images) is when the intellect possesses truth. Now, there are two ways to talk about truth, that I am aware of. The first is simply possessing a concept of a thing, without making any judgment about it. For example, thinking of “Animal” or Dog" or “brown” or even “Unicorn.” But this is not the more common usage of the term true. The more common usage of the term “truth” is regarding true judgments. This is when you relate two concepts together, like “Dog” and “Animal” in the form of the proposition: “A dog is an animal.” If the concepts can be related in such a proposition then it is a true judgment. Also, propositions can be phrased hypothetically and still be a proposition (that is, it can still relate concepts together). Thus hypothetical propositions are judgments as well, and can be said to be either true or false.

Thus, knowledge consists in possessing the truth, which involves possessing concepts and true judgments (and judgments can and often are expressed as hypotheticals).

This is something that I didn’t make up, but something I’ve learned in every book of logic I’ve ever read.

What does not exist does not have any attributes, therefore it cannot be known.

I still don’t know what you mean by this. It can be said that a pink elephant would have the attribute of being pink, even if the elephant doesn’t exist.

 

[Areopagite]

The word “knowledge” cannot and should not be applied to hypotheticals.

You must renounce the way of the logician then. Hypotheticals are legitimate kinds of propositions, and propositions are the expressions of judgments, and judgments can have a truth or false value, and knowledge is possessing the truth in one’s intellect (or “possessing information about something” as you say).

It is perfectly reasonable to say that “I know that if I light this gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion.” This is legitimate knowledge and it is expressed in the form of a hypothetical. It is definitely good information to know about fire and gasoline. If you deny that hypotheticals cannot be included in knowledge, then it is incorrect to say, “I know that if I light this gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion” because that is knowing something hypothetical (which you say is impossible).

One can imagine hypotheticals, but that is all.

Incorrect, unless you are using a different definition of imagination than what has been used for most of time. ** Imagination** has usually been understood as the brain’s faculty to form mental images. Hypotheticals, though they may be expressed and represented in some sensate form in the mind, are completely* logical constructions*. They are a being of reason because they are an expression of judgment. Now, if you expand the definition of imagination to include the intellectual ability to form concepts and judgments, then hypotheticals would fall under imagination, but they would certainly be included under intellectual knowledge.

It is just an imagined “thing”, which does not exist. I can say that I have two nonexistent apples on my desk and one of this is nice red and delicious, the other one is yet unripened and green. I could also say that I do not have apples on my desk. The second sentence is simple and coherent, the first one is “poetic”, “flowery” and nonsensical.

When you put “thing” in quotation marks, are you saying that it’s technically not a thing? You see, it’s been a common theme throughout philosophy that “things” can either actually exist or potentially exist. Until that distinction was made, philosophy looked pretty grim (in fact, you could say, starting with the Pre-Socratics, philosophy was born trying to figure out that question … and until Aristotle articulated the difference between “act and potency,” things looked pretty grim, namely, Parmenides had argued everything was an illusion because nothing made any sense).

Thus, you could say that apple does have attributes of being delicious or unripened etc., but not in actuality. The apple potentially exists, and potentially has those attributes. So in that sense, you cannot say non-existent things have no attributes in an absolute and total sense. Certainly, in the realm of possibility it does have those attributes, and it is the realm of possibility that omniscience has much to say about.

Physical existence is what is part of STEM. Hypothetical constructs (imagined, but not written books, the nonexistent car in my nonexistent garage, the dinner I did not eat yesterday, angels, leprechauns, the Tooth Fairy, married bachelors, the point to the north from the North Pole, etc…) do not exist in a physical manner. They can be imagined, but that is all.

Like I said, you can definitely know hypotheticals and you can know concepts too. You can know “What an angel is” and “What the Tooth Fairy” is (as in, you can know the definition … the concept) however if you were to make the judgment that they exist, you would be incorrect (probably). As for “married bachelors” and “the point to the north from the North Pole” … these concepts have contradictory essences, and cannot be completely conceived of (“dual concepts” sometimes called) and thus in themselves can be considered false.

Again, it depends on how omniscience is defined. My definition is “to know everything that can be known” - and from there we can try to figure out “what can be known”

I think I can agree to that.

Now your examples can be split into two categories: 1) predictions that rely on deterministic processes and 2) predictions that include free decisions of conscious agents. This second category can be subdivided into two cases: 2a) the agent is not aware of the prediciton before he makes the selection, and 2b) the agent is aware of the prediciton before he makes the selection. If omniscience as defined “to know everything”, then it should include all of these categories.

I’m confused about 2a and 2b. Who’s the “agent?” Sorry, I’m tired.

The predictions under 1) are of course very amazing, but that is not what omniscience means. Predictions under 2a) are even more amazing, but that is not what omniscience is all about. However, predictions under 2b) will result in contradictions. Therefore if omniscience includes all these categories, it leads to logical impossibilities.

I don’t understand what you’re saying here, but the little I think I understand, is this … I see this problem. You said omniscience is “knowing everything that can be known.” And you said that 2b should be included under omniscience, but then you said knowing 2b would lead to logical impossibilities. So, thus, you’re saying 2b can’t be known, and thus, by your own definition, 2b should not be included under omniscience. Now, I’m quite sure I may have misread you, and for that I apologize.

 

[Spock]

I’m not sure what you mean by this. Perhaps you have to define what you mean by “subjective.”

In this case I used it as a synonym for personal. Personal experience does not count for a whole lot.

If you mean we can’t count as evidence what is reported to us by someone who saw something (which we did not see) … then it seems the study of history is foolish. History primarily relies on historical records, which consist of people writing down what they witnessed.

History deals with the past, not with the present. The avaliable epistemological tools are different. Moreover, the picture emerging from those records is sketchy at best, and usually distorted - the official history is written by the victors. And what does history tell us about the details? Not a thing. What did Napoleon wear in bed before the battle of Waterloo? History, or testimonials can never give all the details of an event and their value is dubious at best.

So, what do you mean by “evidence” and what do you mean by “subjective.” And how does this show that faith is non-rational (which, I assume, correct me if I’m wrong, means anti-rational … but I may be misreading you)?

We could and probably should talk about evidence, preferably in another thread. Also, I did not say that faith is always unreasonable. I merely said that a specific article of faith, which is proven to be false if attempted to be verified - is irrational.

You seem to indicate that all hypotheticals have only one definite conclusion. But, in fact, there could be many possibilities. You could own a Toyota, Chevy, or Lexus. It’s not that you’re necessarily going to have a particular car if you end up having a car.

What kind of a “knowledge” is that? I said that “omniscience cannot include the knowledge of a negative statement, like the make and model of a nonexistent car, which is not stored in my nonexistent garage”. The rattling off all the possible makes and models which I “could own” (but still cannot store in a nonexistent garage) does not constitute “knowledge”. Jokingly, I used to say (and it is perfectly true) that I know all the phone numbers of the world. After a short pause I add: “of course I have no idea which one belongs to whom”. That kind of “knowledge” is not knowledge, of course.

God cannot know something as actually the case if it is never actualized, for that would be like knowing something is pink even if it’s not pink. That is not knowledge at all because it is contradictory, and thus false, and therefore not knowledge (knowledge is only true, otherwise it’s error, even if you think it’s knowledge).

Looks like we might be getting somewhere. Knowing some hypotheticals does not constitute “knowledge”. After all some hypothetically possible cars could be far too expensive, and others could be way too large to fit into a garage…

The answer to the question “What was the breakfast that I did not eat today” is “all possible breakfasts.” There is not just one answer. It is true that you didn’t eat “eggs” but it’s also true that you didn’t eat “cereal.” And God would know all the other things you didn’t eat as well. There isn’t just one particular breakfast you didn’t eat.

Which is not an answer.

I would say that knowledge (particularly, intellectual knowledge, opposed to memory, which is the mere storage of past mental images) is when the intellect possesses truth. Now, there are two ways to talk about truth, that I am aware of. The first is simply possessing a concept of a thing, without making any judgment about it. For example, thinking of “Animal” or Dog" or “brown” or even “Unicorn.” But this is not the more common usage of the term true. The more common usage of the term “truth” is regarding true judgments. This is when you relate two concepts together, like “Dog” and “Animal” in the form of the proposition: “A dog is an animal.” If the concepts can be related in such a proposition then it is a true judgment.

I agree that knowledge is expressed via a “true” statement. A “true” statement can be the corollary of some axioms in a deductive system. Or it can reflect a correct relationship between a mental image and reality - in the natural world.

Also, propositions can be phrased hypothetically and still be a proposition (that is, it can still relate concepts together). Thus hypothetical propositions are judgments as well, and can be said to be either true or false.

Hypotheticals do not reflect reality, they pertain to what can be reality. But they can also be “pure” hypotheticals, without any reference to reality. If we go too far from reality, then the evaluation of true / false becomes impossible, and we are in a never-never land where nonexistent three-horned unicorns can play guitar with their flexible, eleven-fingered hoofs…

It is impossible to assign a true or false value to a proposition like: “the weather will be nice the same day next year”. Maybe it will be true, maybe it will be false, but today it is neither.

I still don’t know what you mean by this. It can be said that a pink elephant would have the attribute of being pink, even if the elephant doesn’t exist.

How do you distinguish between a nonexistent “green elephant” and a nonexistent “yellow-purple checkered elephant”? Is there a color to nonexistence?

You can ask me: “do you have an apple on your desk”? I can answer: “No, I do not have an apple on my desk”. (Presently it is the case). But the answer: “I have a nonexistent red apple on my desk” would be nonsensical, even though syntactically could be said to be a loose equivalent to the other reply.

If you insist that nonexistent entities can have attributes, then you must accept the validity of a statement like: “the color of the taste of the sound middle-C is soft”. Before you dismiss this as preposterous, slow down for a second, and contemplate. If a nonexistent elephant can have an attribute of being “yellow-pink-purple checkered”, then why cannot have a hypothetical sound have an attribute which is taste? And why can’t this hypothetical “taste” have colors? And why can’t the hypothetical color be “soft”?

If you go into the world of hypotheticals, then all bets are off. That hypothetical elephant can have 6 legs, can it not? And it can sing a rich contralto voice, too? Where does this end? Nowhere… We must deal with knowledge about reality.

 

[Spock]

You must renounce the way of the logician then. Hypotheticals are legitimate kinds of propositions, and propositions are the expressions of judgments, and judgments can have a truth or false value, and knowledge is possessing the truth in one’s intellect (or “possessing information about something” as you say).

It is perfectly reasonable to say that “I know that if I light this gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion.” This is legitimate knowledge and it is expressed in the form of a hypothetical. It is definitely good information to know about fire and gasoline. If you deny that hypotheticals cannot be included in knowledge, then it is incorrect to say, “I know that if I light this gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion” because that is knowing something hypothetical (which you say is impossible).

Yes, in this particular instance it is fine. Read my previous post, where does it lead, if we depart into the world of hypotheticals.

Incorrect, unless you are using a different definition of imagination than what has been used for most of time. ** Imagination** has usually been understood as the brain’s faculty to form mental images. Hypotheticals, though they may be expressed and represented in some sensate form in the mind, are completely* logical constructions*.

They can be… but not necessarily so. And the only way to distinguish between the two, is actual (not hypothetical) reference to existing reality. Hamlet is a fictional, hypothetical charater. Did he have measles when he was a child? Can this be known to an omniscient being?

They are a being of reason because they are an expression of judgment. Now, if you expand the definition of imagination to include the intellectual ability to form concepts and judgments, then hypotheticals would fall under imagination, but they would certainly be included under intellectual knowledge.

Only can be.

Thus, you could say that apple does have attributes of being delicious or unripened etc., but not in actuality. The apple potentially exists, and potentially has those attributes. So in that sense, you cannot say non-existent things have no attributes in an absolute and total sense. Certainly, in the realm of possibility it does have those attributes, and it is the realm of possibility that omniscience has much to say about.

What does omniscience say about the color of the middle-C? Is is raw or soft?

Like I said, you can definitely know hypotheticals and you can know concepts too. You can know “What an angel is” and “What the Tooth Fairy” is (as in, you can know the definition … the concept) however if you were to make the judgment that they exist, you would be incorrect (probably). As for “married bachelors” and “the point to the north from the North Pole” … these concepts have contradictory essences, and cannot be completely conceived of (“dual concepts” sometimes called) and thus in themselves can be considered false.

Only in this reality. It is easy to concoct a hypothetical reality, where people can be both married and still stay bachelors at the same time. It is merely a proper choice of some axioms in that particular hypothetical world.

I think I can agree to that.

I am glad to hear this! Now we can get into the details. If knowledge is properly defined as a correspondence between a mental image and reality, then we have an excellent staring point of agreement. Not in this post, however… it is getting rather late.

I don’t understand what you’re saying here, but the little I think I understand, is this … I see this problem. You said omniscience is “knowing everything that can be known.” And you said that 2b should be included under omniscience, but then you said knowing 2b would lead to logical impossibilities. So, thus, you’re saying 2b can’t be known, and thus, by your own definition, 2b should not be included under omniscience. Now, I’m quite sure I may have misread you, and for that I apologize.

No, you understood me just fine. A revealed prediction would lead to a contradiction. As such, omnisicnece cannot entail the foreknowledge of what a free agents will do, if the predicted action is revealed. We can get into the other details.

 

[Areopagite]

In this case I used it as a synonym for personal. Personal experience does not count for a whole lot.

Doesn’t count for a whole lot regarding what?

History deals with the past, not with the present. The avaliable epistemological tools are different. Moreover, the picture emerging from those records is sketchy at best, and usually distorted - the official history is written by the victors. And what does history tell us about the details? Not a thing. What did Napoleon wear in bed before the battle of Waterloo? History, or testimonials can never give all the details of an event and their value is dubious at best.

Would you say that Napoleon did exist, though, right? There has to be some history that you regard as true, no? And if so, it is only because of the reports of people’s experiences.

I did not say that faith is always unreasonable. I merely said that a specific article of faith, which is proven to be false if attempted to be verified - is irrational.

Ah. Well, I agree. Good man.

I said that “omniscience cannot include the knowledge of a negative statement, like the make and model of a nonexistent car, which is not stored in my nonexistent garage”.

The rattling off all the possible makes and models which I “could own” (but still cannot store in a nonexistent garage) does not constitute “knowledge”.

First of all, I would disagree that omniscient (or even non-omniscient) knowledge cannot include negative statements. For example, I know that “there are no unicorns in my basement.” I know that “2 plus 2 does not equal 5.” I know that “Square circles do not exist.”

Once again, I don’t know how else to say this:

• It is true that God cannot know the actual make and model of a car that does not actually exist (because that would be a contradiction)
• However, God can know the potential make and model of a car that potentially exists … which potentially may be in a potential garage.

Now, God’s knowledge of the possible models of your car can be quite meaningful … because even though a human can know that it could be “any model,” God knows all the models in infinite detail, conceptualizing each possibility in infinite depth and breadth, whereas a human does not possess this intricate knowledge of any possibility.

Jokingly, I used to say (and it is perfectly true) that I know all the phone numbers of the world. After a short pause I add: “of course I have no idea which one belongs to whom”. That kind of “knowledge” is not knowledge, of course.

Technically, you would have some knowledge, because there are some people who don’t know what a phone number even is.

Looks like we might be getting somewhere. Knowing some hypotheticals does not constitute “knowledge”. After all some hypothetically possible cars could be far too expensive, and others could be way too large to fit into a garage…

I’m not sure what you’re saying here. I don’t see how knowing hypotheticals wouldn’t constitute knowledge in that example.

Which is not an answer.

Yes it is. It’s the correct answer too. The answer to the question “What was the breakfast that I did not eat today” is “all possible breakfasts.”

Now, maybe it’s not an answer you find very informative to you, but it’s no less an answer. And I find no rational reason to disregard this technicality.

Now, we can ask a slightly different question that entails a more useful answer, like, “What was the breakfast that I did not eat today that would have had so many grams of fat?” Then, I think, the answer here might appear more useful to you. No?

I agree that knowledge is expressed via a “true” statement. A “true” statement can be the corollary of some axioms in a deductive system. Or it can reflect a correct relationship between a mental image and reality - in the natural world.

Okay. Just out of curiosity, what about science? It’s not a deductive system and not simply a collection of mental images relating to realities. What about laws?

Hypotheticals do not reflect reality, they pertain to what can be reality.

I don’t think so. The statement “If you light gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion” is a hypothetical that definitely reflects reality. “If you jump off a very tall building, you’ll probably die” is definitely something realistic. “If you get decapitated, you will die” is a statement that reflects reality. No?

Once again, there are two kinds of “real being” … and they are “actual being” and “possible being.” Things that are not possible are not in reality at all (e.g. square circle). Things that are possible are in reality, but not actually in reality. I would say (as Aristotle did) that actual things have fuller reality than potential things, but potential things are nonetheless in a legitimate sense part of reality. If you dispense with the idea of possibility, you’ll get into trouble real fast.

But they can also be “pure” hypotheticals, without any reference to reality.

I suppose an example of this would be “If a square circle is married bachelor, then it’s a rock that’s so heavy not even God can move.” Here, all three terms (“square circle,” “married bachelor” and “a rock so heavy not even God can move”) are all non-real things, neither actual nor possible. However, if hypotheticals contains terms that are real things (actual or possible) then it most definitely reflects reality.

If we go too far from reality, then the evaluation of true / false becomes impossible, and we are in a never-never land where nonexistent three-horned unicorns can play guitar with their flexible, eleven-fingered hoofs…

I suppose you mean here that if we ONLY talk about what’s possible (and not actual) then we may end up talking about possible but not actually existing things that aren’t very important. Sure. However, if we deny the validity of potentiality (as being an object of knowledge) then we can’t evaluate the true / false statement of “If you light gasoline on fire, there will be an explosion.”

I’m not advocating we ONLY talk about possibility to the rejection of actuality. But nor should one ONLY accept actuality to the rejection of potentiality. I advocate one accept both concepts, and accept both as objects of knowledge.

 

[Areopagite]

It is impossible to assign a true or false value to a proposition like: “the weather will be nice the same day next year”. Maybe it will be true, maybe it will be false, but today it is neither.

I agree that the knowledge of future contingents is not possible for one who exists prior to the event and has not received an insight by a being outside of time. However, as I’ve said in other places, we can know (some) past events with certainty. And for God, it is as if all time has already passed, and thus He can know all events in time with certainty. It is not like He only exists at a particular point in time and can only know things relative to the time.

How do you distinguish between a nonexistent “green elephant” and a nonexistent “yellow-purple checkered elephant”? Is there a color to nonexistence?

The difference would be that one would be green and one would be yellow-purple. It’s not that nonexistence has color, it’s that a nonexistent thing could have color. And, given the hypothetical possibility of the two things, what would be the difference between them. It’s perfectly reasonable.

You can ask me: “do you have an apple on your desk”? I can answer: “No, I do not have an apple on my desk”. (Presently it is the case). But the answer: “I have a nonexistent red apple on my desk” would be nonsensical, even though syntactically could be said to be a loose equivalent to the other reply.

I would say that in order to actually “have something on your desk” the thing would have to exist in actuality. So, yes, it would indeed be nonsensical. This is because (correct me if I’m wrong) you can only actually have things that actually exist. You can also potentially have things that potentially exist. And you can potentially have things that actually exist. But, once again, you can’t actually have things that only potentially exist. Does that make sense?

If you insist that nonexistent entities can have attributes, then you must accept the validity of a statement like: “the color of the taste of the sound middle-C is soft”. Before you dismiss this as preposterous, slow down for a second, and contemplate. If a nonexistent elephant can have an attribute of being “yellow-pink-purple checkered”, then why cannot have a hypothetical sound have an attribute which is taste? And why can’t this hypothetical “taste” have colors? And why can’t the hypothetical color be “soft”?

It’s a good question. However, just because I said that nonexistent things could have attributes, I didn’t mean that any nonexistent thing could have any attribute. If the attribute leads to a contradiction with a certain thing, then it could not have that attribute. For example, a square could not have circularity.

Now, to answer your question, one of the first things to ask is “Could the sound of middle-C be tasted?” If not (because the nature of sound and the nature of taste cannot be joined in this way), then the statement is false because the term has a contradictory essence (it is neither possible nor actual). Likewise, “Can color have taste?” If not (due to the impossibility of color having taste, based on what color is and what taste is), then the statement is false for the same reason. It’s like the equivalent idea of a “square circle” which has no potentiality in reality because of its contradictory essence.

However, it may be a question of science whether taste can have color and sound can have taste. It seems to be more of a biological issue to be determined by experimentation. Perhaps they are not contradictory. I had a friend who did LSD (he stopped though thankfully) but he said that he could hear color and see sound. Other people on LSD claim to have done this. Perhaps LSD causes the senses to be heightened in that way. So perhaps it’s not necessarily that absurd.

 

[Areopagite]

If you go into the world of hypotheticals, then all bets are off. That hypothetical elephant can have 6 legs, can it not? And it can sing a rich contralto voice, too? Where does this end? Nowhere…

I suppose a deformed elephant could be born with six legs. Could it sing in a rich contralto voice? That’s a question for zoologists, I suppose. I don’t know. I can’t see a necessary contradiction with an elephant’s nature, but maybe I’m wrong. It is perhaps a worthless question, but just because it’s a worthless hypothetical doesn’t mean all hypotheticals are worthless.

Hamlet is a fictional, hypothetical charater. Did he have measles when he was a child? Can this be known to an omniscient being?

The only way to answer questions regarding fictional characters would be to look at what is said about the character in the work he or she appears in. If it doesn’t mention something either way nor necessitates something either way about a character than it hasn’t been actualized. Thus, you could say that Hamlet could have had measles, but that event was never actualized in the expressed concept of the character. God would not know whether he actually had it or not, but God could know that he could have had it.

Only in this reality. It is easy to concoct a hypothetical reality, where people can be both married and still stay bachelors at the same time. It is merely a proper choice of some axioms in that particular hypothetical world.

So, you’re saying that our axioms can be false? I need to ask you what you mean by this. Would you say that hypothetically 2+2=5? Because I wouldn’t. I would say it’s impossible that it could be true, and thus is not hypothetically possible either.

And the only way I could see bachelors being married was if you change the definition of “bachelor” and/or “married.” Otherwise, it would be a logical contradiction, and thus not possible. This is because a “bachelor” is an “unmarried man” and being married would certainly contradict that. No?

If knowledge is properly defined as a correspondence between a mental image and reality, then we have an excellent staring point of agreement.

The correspondence between a mental image and reality is just one kind of knowledge. There is also the more important kind of knowledge, namely, intellectual knowledge (opposed to sense knowledge … memory, imagination, etc.). Math, for example, is intellectual knowledge, because it isn’t just merely mental images corresponding to something actually in reality. Right?

No, you understood me just fine. A revealed prediction would lead to a contradiction.

You mean, specifically, a revealed prediction to a free agent about what he will do but who is planning to do the opposite of the prediction.

As such, omnisicnece cannot entail the foreknowledge of what a free agents will do, if the predicted action is revealed.

Not necessarily. The prediction could be about the actions of other free agents besides the one to whom the prediction is told.

Also, even if the prediction was about the future action of the one to whom the prediction is told, it could still be possible either because: 1) the agent ends up doing the predicted action willfully (deciding not to be a contrarian), or 2) the agent ends up doing the predicted action accidentally.

Have you read Oedipus Rex? There the characters are told prophecies of what they will do, but they take actions to prevent them … but those very actions end up fulfilling the prophecy. It’s a tragedy.

 

[Spock]

Sorry, been away for a while. Let’s get down to basics. I recall that you enumerated different types of “beings”. I don’t like this nomenclature, since the word “being” has a connotation of something that is not just an inanimate object. But apart from that, the subdivision of beings into the suggested categories is not informative. Here is my suggestion for a more useful categorization:

1. Physically existing objects. No mystery there. Something that objectively exists or existed.
2. Concepts and ideas. These are mental constructs, which refer to “something”.

The concepts can be subdivided into other categories:

2a) Concepts pertaining to physical objects.
2b) Concepts pertaining to other “things”, even other concepts.

Knowledge in general can be attributed to objects in category 1). Again, the knowledge about physical objects presents no problem.

Knowledge about the category 2a) is also non-problematic. The problem comes in category 2b). It is fine to say that one can know about the concepts themselves. I can know that some people have a concept of “demons” for example. However, it makes no sense to speak of knowledge about the referents of these concepts.

One example of this second kind is the concepts about nonexisting objects. Stuff that simply does not exist. In this case we are out in never-never land. It simply makes no sense to speak of “information” vis-a-vis nonexistence.

Going back to some previous examples. I say that it makes no sense of speaking about two nonexistent apples on my desk, and adding that one is red, the other one is green. If you still say that this is sensible, then answer this: which one is on the right side? Just as you cannot sensibly “know” about the color of nonexistent apples, you cannot know about their position either.

This brings us to the fundamental problem of “future” events and objects. God’s position outside time (which is also just an assertion) does not help here. Our past is distinguishable for our present and both can be known. The future is a completely different matter. Future does not exist in any physical form. Future is nothing but a conglomerate of possibilities, some of which may come true and some may not.

To speak about the true-false value of an event which has not happened yet is impossible. A true-false value cannot be attributed to the proposition “Next year the New York Giants wins the Super Bowl”. And the assumption that for God this is already “past” is nonsensical.** Something cannot be both future and past**, depending on the observer.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

and yet there is no evidence time exists, this thread has become just so much hot air in the face of that.

if your going to just assume things, then why not just assume G-d and be done with it? surely you all arent just talking to hear yourselves type?

 

[Areopagite]

Let’s get down to basics. I recall that you enumerated different types of “beings”. I don’t like this nomenclature, since the word “being” has a connotation of something that is not just an inanimate object.

It may have certain connotations in certain cultural contexts, but I was referring to how it has been used for hundreds of years in philosophy (not just in Scholastic philosophy). Once again, when I say being, I mean, “That which can exist.” Now, this may not hold all the connotations that some people may carry with this term, but that doesn’t necessarily give grounds to reject it in a specialized discussion, just like one should not dismiss the term “atom” in a physics discussion just because it may have a connotation of being “indivisible” (which would be its etymological definition) against what physicists are referring to.

But whatever.

But apart from that, the subdivision of beings into the suggested categories is not informative. Here is my suggestion for a more useful categorization:

1. Physically existing objects. No mystery there. Something that objectively exists or existed.
2. Concepts and ideas. These are mental constructs, which refer to “something”.

The concepts can be subdivided into other categories:

2a) Concepts pertaining to physical objects.
2b) Concepts pertaining to other “things”, even other concepts.

I like this categorization. Indeed, being can be divided many different ways, and this is a pretty good one. It also has much resemblance to the Aristotelian and Scholastic division.

• “Physical existing objects” could correspond to “Real Actual Being” (or more simply, “Actual Being”)
• “Concepts and ideas” could correspond to “Ideal Being”
• “Concepts pertaining to physical objects” could correspond to … you’ll see …
• “Concepts pertaining to other things” could correspond to either Ideal Objective Being or Logical Being (depending on what kind of concept you’re talking about)

(as a reminder, “Ideal Objective Being” refers to things in the mind that could take actual existence … e.g. unicorns … whereas “Logical Being” refers to concepts that can only exist in the mind … e.g. nonsense things like square circles … or reasonable things like negation of being, or logical relations such as the relation we give to symbols and their meanings … I could clear this up if you want … but perhaps it’s not necessary)

Knowledge in general can be attributed to objects in category 1). Again, the knowledge about physical objects presents no problem.

Knowledge about the category 2a) is also non-problematic. The problem comes in category 2b). It is fine to say that one can know about the concepts themselves. I can know that some people have a concept of “demons” for example. However, it makes no sense to speak of knowledge about the referents of these concepts.

One example of this second kind is the concepts about nonexisting objects. Stuff that simply does not exist. In this case we are out in never-never land. It simply makes no sense to speak of “information” vis-a-vis nonexistence.

I disagree. And I must disagree, because if not, all science is in peril.

First of all, I would say the knowledge about what a thing is (i.e. knowledge about an essence) is distinct from the knowledge about whether such a thing exists (i.e. knowledge about whether there is an actual thing with that essence). Both are knowledge. If we could only know essences that actually exist, things would get very absurd. For example…

Let’s say a scientist is an expert on particle accelerators. He knows what they do and how they can do the things they do. He’s worked with them a lot. Since he knows what a particle accelerator is he by definition knows the essence of a particle accelerator (and of course, since he knows them in great detail, he knows the essence of them in great detail). However, let’s say, for one disastrous reason or another, all the particle accelerators are destroyed. Does the scientist no longer have knowledge about particle accelerators? Or, does he still have knowledge about particle accelerators, despite their current lack of actual existence? Now, of course, he could be on vacation, and they could be sabotaged without his knowledge … in which case, he would perhaps wrongly assume they still exist … but that doesn’t mean he no longer has legitimate knowledge about how they work. When someone asks him about particle accelerators, would he say, “Hold on. I need to check if any of them are still in existence, because if not, then the answer is no.” So, he would have to call up one of the labs and ask if there’s still one still in existence, and if so, he would say, “Okay, good. Well, then, yes, I know how they work.” But if not, “Sorry, none of them exist anymore. I have no knowledge about them at all. I am an ignoramus on the subject.” The person he’s talking to might say, “Well … maybe they can build a new one … and maybe you could help!” The scientists responds, “No, I don’t have any knowledge about particle accelerators because they don’t exist, how can I have knowledge of how to build one if I don’t have knowledge about them. Because, come on! They don’t exist!” At that point, the person he’s talking to slowly and cautiously walks away.

I hope you enjoyed that.

 

[Areopagite]

So, I say that the idea that you can only know physically existing things is absurd. The whole idea of invention goes out the window, certainly, for you first need to know about the thing you intend to bring into physical existence (unless all invention is pure accident). And even though it doesn’t exist, you still have knowledge about the object (even if it doesn’t have physical existence).

This idea about the distinction between essence and existence, and that something can still be known (i.e. an essence can still be known) even if it doesn’t have actual existence coupled with it … is an idea that even Plato understood. Before that, the only philosopher who made the most sense (even though he didn’t make *any *sense) was Parmenides, who said everything either actually exists or nothing actually exists. There is no middle ground. Plato and especially Aristotle disagreed and came up with the common sense position that essence and existence (i.e. actual existence) can be distinguished, and both are objects of knowledge, even if they are separate at certain points in time.

Aristotle even said that essence is primarily what is known. Every concept is an essence of a thing as it exists in the mind. Now, sometimes those essences are concretized in physical reality. When we are aware that something physical has a certain essence, then we logically predicate existence of that essence (that is, we make the judgment: “That essence has physical existence” … e.g. “The particle accelerator exists”), however if the existence is separated from the essence, we still have the essence in our mind, and thus we still now what it is … we still know* what a particle accelerator* is, whether existence is favorable to it or not.

I don’t blame you for not seeing what exactly I’m saying. Hopefully, something what I said is clearer than before. But … perhaps not.

Going back to some previous examples. I say that it makes no sense of speaking about two nonexistent apples on my desk, and adding that one is red, the other one is green. If you still say that this is sensible, then answer this: which one is on the right side? Just as you cannot sensibly “know” about the color of nonexistent apples, you cannot know about their position either.

If you re-read my response to the non-existent apple example, you shall see that I agreed that it didn’t make sense. But that doesn’t show that knowledge of possibility isn’t knowledge.

This is not to say that all possible existing things are important (i.e. unicorns … maybe), but all existing things aren’t that important either. Some purely possible things can be more important than actually existing things. If someone conceptualizes what the cure for cancer is, that non-existent cure can be said to be more important than an actually existing grain of sand in a random desert. Right?

This brings us to the fundamental problem of “future” events and objects. God’s position outside time (which is also just an assertion) does not help here. Our past is distinguishable for our present and both can be known. The future is a completely different matter. Future does not exist in any physical form. Future is nothing but a conglomerate of possibilities, some of which may come true and some may not.

You’re still using “future” without the correct application to God’s position as outside of time. Future is a relative term. It only applies to things in time.

Also, let’s say Jim lives in 1962. He doesn’t know what going to happen in 2009 because it’s the future to him. However, for Fred living in 2010, he knows a lot of what happened in 2009. To Fred, 2009 is not the future. But to Jim in 1962, it is the future. Since God is outside of time, everything in time is as if everything has already happened. He knows the future, not insofar as He knows His future (because relative to God, there is no future, due to His timelessness), but He knows, for example, the future relative to Jim, similar to how John in 2010 knows what happens after 1962. I don’t know how else to explain it. But maybe I’ll think of a way.

To speak about the true-false value of an event which has not happened yet is impossible. A true-false value cannot be attributed to the proposition “Next year the New York Giants wins the Super Bowl”.

If you know the future relative to something in the past you can speak this way. For example, if you are narrating the past events of the New York giants and using the present tense (which happens all the time with telling stories), and saying something like, “The team doesn’t even make it to the play-offs that year, but little do they know, that next year they will win the Super Bowl.” Perfectly legitimate way to talk. And making such future statements relative to things in the past can have a true-false value.

And the assumption that for God this is already “past” is nonsensical.** Something cannot be both future and past**, depending on the observer.

Well, relative to God, it’s not both future and past, it’s simply past. When we say “God knows the future,” we are simply saying that God knows the events that will chronologically happens after this current point in time that we are experiencing this very moment.

You have to specify what you mean by “something cannot be both future and past.” You could say that certain unchangeable things are both in the past and in the future … like the laws of physics, the nature of existence, the principle of non-contradiction, or even matter (if you think matter is indestructible). I’m not sure what you’re talking about here.

 

[Areopagite]

and yet there is no evidence time exists, this thread has become just so much hot air in the face of that.

if your going to just assume things, then why not just assume G-d and be done with it? surely you all arent just talking to hear yourselves type?

The evidence that time exists is that we observe change.

And if you think this thread has become full of hot air, please tell us where exactly we have gone wrong. If you think everything I’ve typed has been hot air, then Aristotle and Aquinas and the Scholastics and even some Church Councils are full of hot air too, in your opinion, because I’ve been referring to concepts they have used.

One reason why one may assume time exists but God does not is that the existence of time is more obvious (even self-evident perhaps) whereas God’s existence is less so (and definitely not self-evident … at least according to Aquinas … if you care about that at all … not that you have to … I’d ask you not to arrogantly dismiss Aquinas offhand unless you can demonstrate that he’s wrong about this).

I know it may appear that all this is vain. But it’s better than telling someone, “Just stop talking and believe us.” That would be an insult to a person’s intelligence. I personally believe Spock is honest, and he’s not just causing trouble for the pleasure of it.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The evidence that time exists is that we observe change.

actually change is evidence that change exists. physicists call it the problem of time.

And if you think this thread has become full of hot air, please tell us where exactly we have gone wrong.

ignoring the implications of the problem of time.

If you think everything I’ve typed has been hot air, then Aristotle and Aquinas and the Scholastics and even some Church Councils are full of hot air too, in your opinion, because I’ve been referring to concepts they have used.

ummm. yes, i know. im refering to ignoring the problem of time and how it relates to omniscience. the event and the knowledge are concurrent. we sort change by that subjective measuring stick called time, that doesnt need be the case for an omniscient, omnipotent G-d.

One reason why one may assume time exists but God does not is that the existence of time is more obvious (even self-evident perhaps) whereas God’s existence is less so (and definitely not self-evident … at least according to Aquinas … if you care about that at all … not that you have to … I’d ask you not to arrogantly dismiss Aquinas offhand unless you can demonstrate that he’s wrong about this).

i wouldnt dismiss Aquinas at all. but there are more ways to approach a problem then what the venerable Philosopher suggests.

I know it may appear that all this is vain. But it’s better than telling someone, “Just stop talking and believe us.” That would be an insult to a person’s intelligence.

not in vain at all.

I personally believe Spock is honest, and he’s not just causing trouble for the pleasure of it.

youre quite charitable.

…at this point you may have realized that you jumped the gun, a poor metaphysician i may be, but a metaphysician i am.

 

[Spock]

Once again, when I say being, I mean, “That which can exist.”

The trouble with this proposition is that it is vague. There are two different types of existence, physical existence (STEM) and the existence of concepts. These two types are radically different, and it is unfortunate that the laguage is imprecise and uses the same term: “existence” for both of them. I suggested before the distinction of P-existence and C-existence. One fundamental difference is that P-existence is acitve, while C-existence is “inert”. A concept cannot “do” anything. The concept of a stinky cheese does not smell bad.

I disagree. And I must disagree, because if not, all science is in peril.

First of all, I would say the knowledge about what a thing is (i.e. knowledge about an essence) is distinct from the knowledge about whether such a thing exists (i.e. knowledge about whether there is an actual thing with that essence). Both are knowledge. If we could only know essences that actually exist, things would get very absurd. For example…

There is one trouble here, too. In your example you posited that particle accelarators used to exist, and their disappearance does not invalidate the knowledge about them. Of course, I agree. The point is that this pertains to knowledge about the past, which is not problematic.

However, suppose I hypothesize about the ultimate humane weapon (invented by Larry Niven) which does not do any harm, rather it invokes intense pleasure and happiness. Can we say that we have “knowledge” about such a device? Hardly. We can hypothesize about pretty mich anything, but that does not constitute “knowledge”.

The old saying of “nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu” has a good sound to it, yet it is not entirely precise. We can imagine all sorts of things, and we can say that we have knowledge about the ideas themselves. But I am not willing to say that we have “knowledge” about the “stuff” which would be result if those hypothesized ideas would come into reality. Knowledge must be differentiated from imagined ideas and hypotheses. Just because we can imagine a very complex set of ideas (say, about a book we are contemplating to write) that imagination should not be confused with the actual knowledge when the book is finally written. I suggest that this differentiation is fundamentally important.

Sure enough, scientists hypothesize all the time. They come up with brand new ideas, and attempt to verify them. If they succeed, the hypothesis is “upgraded” into the realm of knowledge. So sicence is not in “peril” at all with the distinction I propose. I would say that this distinction is essential to science. Scientists always differentiate between a proposed new concept (hypothesis) and the verified version of it (knowledge).

Now, about the “essence”. From the previous paragraphs it follows that “essence” is a C-existing idea about something that has or had P-existence. It makes no sense to talk about the “essence” of that proposed hypothetical humane weapon. P-existence always preceeds C-existence. Even the most farfected ideas have some basis in prior reality. That is what the quoted “nihil est in intellectu…” says, and there is no reason to deny it…

… will continue later.

 

[Areopagite]

The trouble with this proposition is that it is vague. There are two different types of existence, physical existence (STEM) and the existence of concepts. These two types are radically different, and it is unfortunate that the laguage is imprecise and uses the same term: “existence” for both of them. I suggested before the distinction of P-existence and C-existence. One fundamental difference is that P-existence is acitve, while C-existence is “inert”. A concept cannot “do” anything. The concept of a stinky cheese does not smell bad.

I would not call the term “existence” (or “being”) vague but merely very general. And, like you said, there are different kinds of existence, in which case we merely specify what kind of existence we’re talking about. That is why, traditionally, existence (or being) has been specified into real existence, ideal existence, logical existence, and even subdivided from there. You have done the same exact thing with your c-existence and p-existence. They both are kinds of existence. But different kinds.

I would agree, though, that if a particle accelerator (for example) physically exists, that it has a fuller or more complete existence or being than if it only possibly existed or only conceptually existed. That is why, as Aristotle said, that actual being (a subdivision of real being) has a fuller existence than possible being (the other subdivision of real being). Hence, it is often implied that if a thing exists, we are talking about actual existence (or p-existence as you say). But this is an imprecise way of talking and can lead to confusion sometimes because “existence” is a broad term (not a vague term necessarily … but I guess you could call it that).

There is one trouble here, too. In your example you posited that particle accelarators used to exist, and their disappearance does not invalidate the knowledge about them. Of course, I agree. The point is that this pertains to knowledge about the past, which is not problematic.

I’m glad you agree. However, this seems to contradict what you said before:

The concepts can be subdivided into other categories:

2a) Concepts pertaining to physical objects.
2b) Concepts pertaining to other “things”, even other concepts.

Knowledge about the category 2a) is also non-problematic. The problem comes in category 2b). It is fine to say that one can know about the concepts themselves. I can know that some people have a concept of “demons” for example. However, it makes no sense to speak of knowledge about the referents of these concepts.

One example of this second kind is the concepts about nonexisting objects. Stuff that simply does not exist. In this case we are out in never-never land. It simply makes no sense to speak of “information” vis-a-vis nonexistence.

Here you said that the only non-problematic knowledge is knowledge of physically existing things. Now, once particle accelerators are gone, one can ask the question, “Do particle accelerators (physically) exist?” to which the correct answer would be, “No.”

And hence, by your definition, knowledge about particle accelerators is now problematic (and not knowledge then?)

If you want to say, true knowledge is only about “things that physically existed at one point, even if it’s not now” then you have to acknowledge one can nonetheless know things that do not have physical existence. But they are things nonetheless, even if they are not physical.

However, suppose I hypothesize about the ultimate humane weapon (invented by Larry Niven) which does not do any harm, rather it invokes intense pleasure and happiness. Can we say that we have “knowledge” about such a device? Hardly. We can hypothesize about pretty much anything, but that does not constitute “knowledge”.

It depends what knowledge about this thing you’re talking about.

Are you saying that one can know about something that “invokes intense pleasure”? Then, yes, I’d call that knowledge. There are plenty of things I know that invoke pleasure.

Are you saying that one can know about something that is both a weapon and a thing that is not meant to harm (but give pleasure)? Then, I would say no, because that would be a contradiction (because weapon by definition is a thing that causes harm … unless of course you’re using another definition).

Are you saying that one can know how to make something that causes pleasure? Well, then yes, I think someone could have knowledge of that (but why would one call it a weapon?).

So it depends what you’re talking about.

 

[Areopagite]

We can imagine all sorts of things, and we can say that we have knowledge about the ideas themselves. But I am not willing to say that we have “knowledge” about the “stuff” which would be result if those hypothesized ideas would come into reality. Knowledge must be differentiated from imagined ideas and hypotheses. Just because we can imagine a very complex set of ideas (say, about a book we are contemplating to write) that imagination should not be confused with the actual knowledge when the book is finally written.

I don’t think so. A person can “know what to write.” He may not know all the details of what to write, but he can certainly know some, and so theoretically can know the whole hypothetical book. If we didn’t know what to write, it would be a perpetual and complete writer’s block.

Also, when someone is putting together a computer, if he’s experienced with making other computers in the past, he knows how to make it, even though this individual computer had never existed before. It may be a little different than any other computer (in insignificant ways) but he can nonetheless know that it’s going to work (unless he treads into territory of doing something he’s not familiar with).

I suggest that this differentiation is fundamentally important.

The distinction between actuality and possibility is very important. However, both can be objects of knowledge.

Sure enough, scientists hypothesize all the time. They come up with brand new ideas, and attempt to verify them. If they succeed, the hypothesis is “upgraded” into the realm of knowledge. So science is not in “peril” at all with the distinction I propose. I would say that this distinction is essential to science. Scientists always differentiate between a proposed new concept (hypothesis) and the verified version of it (knowledge).

Very reasonable.

However, it is imperative that the physical sciences operate in this manner because the laws of physics and the nature and behavior of matter cannot be logically deduced (the atheistic philosopher David Hume does a good job showing this). Learning and confirming truths about the nature of the physical universe can only be known with certainty by physically testing things (unlike the truths of math, for example). When one has a theory about whether the universe happens to behave in a certain way, if it is different enough than what previous experimentation has dealt with, then it is not known what will actually happen, since there is no deductive way to tell. However, once I do have sufficient familiarity with certain kinds of physical phenomena, I can say, for example, “I know that if I drop this pen, it will fall to the ground” even if that particular action never existed. I can know that. And that, my friend, is a hypothetical. Would you disagree? If so, what is the purpose of scientific experiments? It is to figure out how things act. And with that knowledge of how things act, we can then develop technology (for example) because we say “If this law of physics is this way, it will work in this way if I applying it like this.” etc. Does that make sense?

Also, there is the whole can of worms of things like math. Mathematical formulas don’t exist physically … nor have they ever physically existed … nor will they ever (Aristotle calls this Logical Being … concepts that cannot attain actual existence). Their expressions can (e.g. chalk on a chalk board), but the expressions are certainly not the formulas themselves. Yet, I believe one can know mathematical formulas. And if knowing math is a legit knowledge, then the object of knowledge does not necessary require physical existence at any point in time.

 

[Spock]

We are still not in synch. The term knowledge still means information about something. The concept means again two different things, depending on what we are are talking about. Knowledge about concepts is fundamentally different from knowledge about physical objects and actions.

Yes, one can imagine something that does not exist yet. However this kind of knowledge is tentative. It may or it may not turn out to be accurate. Maybe the imagined object or action will never come to pass, and the information we hold does not refer to anything. Certainly one can imagine a book one intends to write. The knowledge he holds is not about the final product, it is about the imagined version of it. And that is not problematic either.

One can even come up with a brand new abstract concept. The concept will never be translated into physical reality (like a mathematical point or a line). Yes, one can have full knowledge about such concepts. No problem there again.

Yes, it may be true that a physical object existed some point in the past. If one collected information about it (knowledge), that information still persists, even if the object does not. This also presents no problem. Knowledge is well defined.

Where the problem does exist is in the case of a physical object (or event) which has never existed, and which does not exist either. Maybe it will exist, maybe it will not. We can imagine the object (or event) maybe even in full detail. However this information is not about the actual object (since it never existed), it is about its imagined counterpart. It makes no sense to profess knowledge about an object to be created somethime in the future - or about any object that has never existed. That hypothetical “weapon” I proposed is a matter of fantasy. We can imagine such a gadget, and we can imagine its effect. That imagination is not about the proposed weapon, it is about what we think about it. It has nothing to do with the actual weapon - should it ever be created.

 

[Areopagite]

We are still not in synch. The term knowledge still means information about something.

And I’m still not quite sure why such information can’t expressed in the form of a hypothetical. For example I can have the information that “If I drop my pen, it will fall.” That’s legit information, and it’s a hypothetical.

The concept means again two different things, depending on what we are are talking about. Knowledge about concepts is fundamentally different from knowledge about physical objects and actions.

You would say, though, that knowing physical objects is only possible by having concepts about them, right? Concepts don’t just come into play if we’re talking about non-physical things. They are also essential in understanding physical things as well. So, I’m not sure what you’re saying here.

Yes, one can imagine something that does not exist yet. However this kind of knowledge is tentative.

Yet … it is knowledge? Or not? I’m confused about what you exactly mean by tentative knowledge.

It may or it may not turn out to be accurate.

Is this not also true about knowledge of physical things? Sometimes, we turn out to be wrong about physical things as well.

One can even come up with a brand new abstract concept. The concept will never be translated into physical reality (like a mathematical point or a line). Yes, one can have full knowledge about such concepts. No problem there again.

So, here you are saying that knowledge can pertain to concepts that are never gain physicality. I’m confused what you’re position is now. It seems like you said that knowledge can only be about physical things (that seemed to be your thesis statement in the larger part of this discussion … unless I’ve been misunderstanding you the whole time … which, I admit, is possible). But now you don’t seem to say that anymore.

Yes, it may be true that a physical object existed some point in the past. If one collected information about it (knowledge), that information still persists, even if the object does not. This also presents no problem. Knowledge is well defined.

However, when things go out of actual existence, they can only exist conceptually. But we can nonetheless know them, despite their lack of physical existence. This definitely seems to contradict what you said previously. If not, you have to show how it doesn’t contradict the idea that “One can only truly know physical things.” (if indeed that was your point … and perhaps it wasn’t … and if not, I’m confused what you’re arguing now)

Where the problem does exist is in the case of a physical object (or event) which has never existed, and which does not exist either.

Yet, you said mathematics is perfectly legitimate kind of knowledge. I don’t see how you can reconcile these statements.

Maybe it will exist, maybe it will not. We can imagine the object (or event) maybe even in full detail. However this information is not about the actual object (since it never existed), it is about its imagined counterpart. It makes no sense to profess knowledge about an object to be created somethime in the future - or about any object that has never existed.

I don’t think so. I could have knowledge about what a leopard-patterned iPod Touch would be like. Even if it never existed, I could potentially know how to make it, how it would work, how big it would be, etc.

Also, I could know what would happen if I dropped my favorite pen, even if no one has ever dropped it before.

That hypothetical “weapon” I proposed is a matter of fantasy. We can imagine such a gadget, and we can imagine its effect. That imagination is not about the proposed weapon, it is about what we think about it. It has nothing to do with the actual weapon - should it ever be created.

As I said before, I don’t think you could, for example, know how to build such a thing, provided that you are using the definition of weapon of “an instrument for causing harm” because it couldn’t be reconciled with “a thing designed to not create harm but create pleasure.” Hence, you can know that such a thing can’t even exist. That would be knowing something about this hypothetical “weapon.” Such a judgment is not a thing of imagination (for once again, imagination simply pertains to sense images) because calling something “possible” or “impossible” is only accomplished by the intellect (not mere mental sensory manipulation). I would also say that such a weapon cannot be imagined, due to its contradictory essence (just as a square circle cannot be imagined). Now, perhaps you are defining “weapon” differently, and if so, then how?

In short, I’m not quite sure what you’re arguing anymore. You seemed to say that knowledge only pertains to physical things, but, at least in your last post, you admitted that there some things that are non-physical that can be known. I apologize if I’ve missed some obvious points you were making.