The so-called omnimax attributes

[Spock]

And I’m still not quite sure why such information can’t expressed in the form of a hypothetical. For example I can have the information that “If I drop my pen, it will fall.” That’s legit information, and it’s a hypothetical.

But this is not true “knowledge”, it is an extremely likely educated guess. Unlikely it may be, but it is possible that dropping your pen will not result in your pen hitting the floor. For example, someone catches it in mid-air (possible), or someone else built a strong electro-magnet into the ceiling, which will cause your pen float upwards.

But generally speaking we can say that the known laws of nature and the assumed uniformity of nature gives one a very high confidence that a prediction like that will be borne out by the facts - once the experiment is concluded. And that is the point when the very likely educated guess will turn into ironclad knowledge. Now, you may say that I am splitting hairs here, but I don’t think so.

Yet … it is knowledge? Or not? I’m confused about what you exactly mean by tentative knowledge.

Educated guess.

Is this not also true about knowledge of physical things? Sometimes, we turn out to be wrong about physical things as well.

Of course. But what does that have to do with anything?

So, here you are saying that knowledge can pertain to concepts that are never gain physicality. I’m confused what you’re position is now. It seems like you said that knowledge can only be about physical things (that seemed to be your thesis statement in the larger part of this discussion … unless I’ve been misunderstanding you the whole time … which, I admit, is possible). But now you don’t seem to say that anymore.

I differentiate between knowledge about physical reality (inductive systems) and abstract sciences (deductive systems). In the latter, once the axioms are agreed upon, we can gain knowledge about anything that is the corollary of the axioms.

However, when things go out of actual existence, they can only exist conceptually. But we can nonetheless know them, despite their lack of physical existence. This definitely seems to contradict what you said previously. If not, you have to show how it doesn’t contradict the idea that “One can only truly know physical things.” (if indeed that was your point … and perhaps it wasn’t … and if not, I’m confused what you’re arguing now)

Don’t be. If something existed phyisically before, and we collected the information about it, then the cessation of the existence will not wipe out our information - therefore the knowledge persists. What I am arguing is that if something never existed and does not exist now, then there is no information to be gathered about it, therefore there is no knowledge. There can be an idea, there can be educated guesses, but none of those qualifies as knowledge. I hope this clarifies my position.

 

[Areopagite]

But this is not true “knowledge”, it is an extremely likely educated guess. Unlikely it may be, but it is possible that dropping your pen will not result in your pen hitting the floor. For example, someone catches it in mid-air (possible), or someone else built a strong electro-magnet into the ceiling, which will cause your pen float upwards.

I’ll go ahead and agree that we’re not sure that the pen will drop. I will also say that we know that’s it’s a possibility though.

You claim that an electro-magnet or mid-air catch is possible. But do you know this? I assume that you do. We know that such things are possible. And hence possibility is an object of knowledge. If we don’t know this, your claim that “it’s possible that such and such could happen” isn’t necessarily true. But you sure seemed to state it was true. Hence, I assume you think this is knowledge.

But generally speaking we can say that the known laws of nature and the assumed uniformity of nature gives one a very high confidence that a prediction like that will be borne out by the facts - once the experiment is concluded. And that is the point when the very likely educated guess will turn into ironclad knowledge. Now, you may say that I am splitting hairs here, but I don’t think so.

I don’t mind splitting hairs, but I don’t think you have correctly split any here.

Do we really have knowledge about the laws of nature in your view? Seeing something behave a certain way doesn’t mean it’s going to act that way again (as you seemed to say). We may know that an apple falls to the ground in that instance (and various other observed instances), but how do we know it’s going to act that way again? All scientific knowledge about how the laws of physics (always) work seems dubious now. The only way to state it in the way it makes sense is, “It’s possible that things will act in this way but they may not.” I would nonetheless call this knowledge … scientific knowledge.

Is this not also true about knowledge of physical things? Sometimes, we turn out to be wrong about physical things as well.

I brought this up to debunk your claim that knowledge about hypothetical things is not true knowledge because such “knowledge” could turn out to be inaccurate. By that logic, I said, we can’t have knowledge about physical things because sometimes that knowledge turns out to be inaccurate as well. Therefore, the premise that “if an assertion claiming to be a kind of knowledge turns out to be inaccurate, then that kind of alleged knowledge that it was claimed to pertain to isn’t a kind of ‘knowledge’ at all.”

I differentiate between knowledge about physical reality (inductive systems) and abstract sciences (deductive systems). In the latter, once the axioms are agreed upon, we can gain knowledge about anything that is the corollary of the axioms.

So, abstract systems can be the object of knowledge. And they are, as you claim, “knowledge about concepts,” right? Hence, your claim that “knowledge about concepts isn’t really knowledge” is false, right?

If something existed phyisically before, and we collected the information about it, then the cessation of the existence will not wipe out our information - therefore the knowledge persists.

I would agree.

What I am arguing is that if something never existed and does not exist now, then there is no information to be gathered about it, therefore there is no knowledge.

And thus, deductive systems are out the window. You are contradicting yourself.

There can be an idea, there can be educated guesses, but none of those qualifies as knowledge. I hope this clarifies my position.

Well … I might be the one responsible for not understanding you still. Perhaps it will help if you state your argument in a clear, one-sentence statement. I’m still not quite sure what you’re saying because I see inconsistencies between your various claims.

And another thing you didn’t address is that we know things (even physical things) because we have ideas about them. It is having ideas that constitute knowledge. Sometimes we can have bad judgments about those ideas, but it’s ideas that constitute the essence of knowledge. I mean, surely, if we know about some physical thing, that means we have an idea about it. It’s not like ideas only come into play if we’re thinking about something that only exists potentially.

Also, I think it’s absurd to say this, for example: a person who makes computers only knows how to make the individual computers he’s already made (because they physically exist). I would say, however, it would also make sense that he would have knowledge how to make computers that haven’t been made yet. A customer may come in and ask for a specific kind of computer with certain specs (but a combination the computer-maker’s never put together before). Nonetheless, I would say that he would know how to make such a hypothetical computer (provided that, of course, it involves all the kinds of things he used to putting into a computer … even if the particular combo isn’t something he’s done before). If you disagree, the computer maker has to say “I don’t have any knowledge about how to make that computer” because it’s never been done (or at least, he’s never done it … and you said if an action’s never been done before … it can’t be an object of knowledge).

Does this make any sense?

 

[Betterave]

As far as we know, they are not determinisitic.

So we have a winner? Or will you just adjust your other beliefs so as to continue to exclude what you most *want *to exclude?

I don’t know what is to think about. You do not talk about a decision making process here. To believe or not to believe is not subject to volitional control. I do not believe something I find unreasonable. If I am given new information, which explains something, then I will believe it - and no volitional action is involved. We are talking about something different here. And “can act against it” will result in “will act against it” - in my case, unless I am totally brainwashed - which is cheating.

Ever read William James (a delightful writer)? I’m thinking of his very popular “The Will to Believe”. The general point here: it is ridiculously implausible to think that your believing is not at all (ever) a function of your willing. Please tell me you don’t really mean that!

(That nonsense about brainwashing is nothing but question-begging.)

 

[Spock]

So we have a winner? Or will you just adjust your other beliefs so as to continue to exclude what you most *want *to exclude?

No, I don’t. If some supposedly OG will come and predict the result of a radioactive decay, then he has either proven his omniscience, or gives doubt that the decay is not actually random - contrary to what we thought. We don’t actually know that radioactive decay is truly random, but insofar that is the hypothesis. The true measure of omniscience is still the prediciton of a volitional act - revealed. Which will be proven impossible - as long as I am free to act in a contrarian fashion.

Ever read William James (a delightful writer)? I’m thinking of his very popular “The Will to Believe”. The general point here: it is ridiculously implausible to think that your believing is not at all (ever) a function of your willing. Please tell me you don’t really mean that!

Well, suppose that the probability of an event is close to 50%. In that case we can decide whether to accept the claim or not. But if the probability is very low, such a decision is impossible. Test it on yourself: imagine that you want to believe in the existence of the Tooth Fairy, and see how successful your attempt will be.

And in the previous hypothetical scenario, yes, it is possible that one will go along with the prediction, if that prediction is something one favors. But it is also possible that one will not do so. And just one such act will disprove omniscience. We have an identical scenario here that we encounter in the hypothesis testing of any scientific theory. A billion successful experiments will not prove, rather will substantiate the hypothesis. One unsuccessful experiment will disprove the hypothesis.

 

[Spock]

I’ll go ahead and agree that we’re not sure that the pen will drop. I will also say that we know that’s it’s a possibility though.

Yes, indeed. But this is still conceptual knowledge, not factual knowledge.

Do we really have knowledge about the laws of nature in your view? Seeing something behave a certain way doesn’t mean it’s going to act that way again (as you seemed to say). We may know that an apple falls to the ground in that instance (and various other observed instances), but how do we know it’s going to act that way again? All scientific knowledge about how the laws of physics (always) work seems dubious now. The only way to state it in the way it makes sense is, “It’s possible that things will act in this way but they may not.” I would nonetheless call this knowledge … scientific knowledge.

Yes, but here you still speak of abstract, conceptual knowledge, which is a whole different ballgame. We have well-founded theories about the laws of nature. These theories are always provisional, subject to review, if the need arises. Yes, we can call this true knowledge - abstact knowledge.

And thus, deductive systems are out the window. You are contradicting yourself.

Why would I? The object of knowledge can be either the result of a deductive system, which is not the same as knowledge about objective reality. I have stated this many times so far.

Well … I might be the one responsible for not understanding you still. Perhaps it will help if you state your argument in a clear, one-sentence statement. I’m still not quite sure what you’re saying because I see inconsistencies between your various claims.

OK. I will do it at the end of this post.

Also, I think it’s absurd to say this, for example: a person who makes computers only knows how to make the individual computers he’s already made (because they physically exist). I would say, however, it would also make sense that he would have knowledge how to make computers that haven’t been made yet. A customer may come in and ask for a specific kind of computer with certain specs (but a combination the computer-maker’s never put together before). Nonetheless, I would say that he would know how to make such a hypothetical computer (provided that, of course, it involves all the kinds of things he used to putting into a computer … even if the particular combo isn’t something he’s done before). If you disagree, the computer maker has to say “I don’t have any knowledge about how to make that computer” because it’s never been done (or at least, he’s never done it … and you said if an action’s never been done before … it can’t be an object of knowledge).

A good example to illustrate our differences. The computer guy has performed the task many times. He accumulated knowledge on how to do it. This is the know-how - the theoretical knowledge. He can extrapolate from his previous experience and predict how the next computer should perform. However, he cannot know (with absolute certainty) that the parts are all without defect, that the parts will be compatible with each other - until he actually boots up the new computer and tests it. Yes, he can have very good assurance that the computer will perform correctly, but until he actually tries it, he cannot know that it will be so or not.

A summary: knowledge in a deductive system is fundamentally different in nature from knowledge about objective, physical reality. I am not interested in the deductive type of knowledge at all. It presents no problems.

Knowledge about physical reality is a different matter. Foreknowledge about reality is always tentative. Our previous experience and the accumulated abstract knowlegde gives us good assurance that our predictions will be accurate. However, due to uncertainty inherent in nature we cannot actually know how the event will turn out - until we actually test it.

Omniscience is supposed to be “knowledge of everything that can be known”. If the system is fully deterministic, and the starting condictions are known, and the rules (laws) are also known, then a correct prediction is possible. If the system is inherently random (chaotic) then the prediction cannot be 100% accurate. If the system contains elements which exhibit freedom, the prediciton cannot be accurate. That is all.

The funny thing is that omnipotence used to be “power to do anything and everything” - which is the literal meaning of the word. This has been abandoned a long time ago, moreover theists assert that there are many things we can do, but God cannot do - which is highly ironic - especially since they also assert that this fact does not diminish God’s “omnipotence”. To this I say: hogwash! If there are things we can do, but the omnipotent guy cannot do, then omnipotence is truly and completely meaningless.

 

[Areopagite]

Yes, indeed. But this is still conceptual knowledge, not factual knowledge.

Conceptual knowledge is knowledge though, right? If so, then we agree.

You had said that knowledge of possibilities (which you said is a kind of conceptual knowledge) was problematic … and perhaps not actually knowledge at all. Am I misrepresenting you? Perhaps I am.

It seems now, though, that you think conceptual knowledge is legit knowledge.

I still maintain though that knowledge of physical things is conceptual knowledge as well. You need concepts to understand facts.

Yes, but here you still speak of abstract, conceptual knowledge, which is a whole different ballgame. We have well-founded theories about the laws of nature. These theories are always provisional, subject to review, if the need arises. Yes, we can call this true knowledge - abstact knowledge.

… okay. Sounds good.

Why would I? The object of knowledge can be either the result of a deductive system, which is not the same as knowledge about objective reality. I have stated this many times so far.

You have indeed. I was just saying though that it contradicted your past claim that all non-problematic knowledge is knowledge of physical things. Obviously, you meant that in a qualified way … or something?

A good example to illustrate our differences. The computer guy has performed the task many times. He accumulated knowledge on how to do it. This is the know-how - the theoretical knowledge. He can extrapolate from his previous experience and predict how the next computer should perform. However, he cannot know (with absolute certainty) that the parts are all without defect, that the parts will be compatible with each other - until he actually boots up the new computer and tests it. Yes, he can have very good assurance that the computer will perform correctly, but until he actually tries it, he cannot know that it will be so or not.

Sounds good. I’ll agree. It is true that he does not have complete knowledge about how the possible computer will work (and so on), but that is also true about all knowledge … that is, all human knowledge is not complete. When we examine how physically existing things work … our knowledge about how they work (as we behold them working) might be off as well. But just because knowledge is a tad incomplete … I would still call it knowledge.

A summary: knowledge in a deductive system is fundamentally different in nature from knowledge about objective, physical reality. I am not interested in the deductive type of knowledge at all. It presents no problems.

I agree they’re very different. And my point was that your past statement that “all non-problematic knowledge is knowledge about physical things” seems to be false, considering that deductive systems like mathematics considers non-physical things. That was my point.

Knowledge about physical reality is a different matter. Foreknowledge about reality is always tentative. Our previous experience and the accumulated abstract knowlegde gives us good assurance that our predictions will be accurate. However, due to uncertainty inherent in nature we cannot actually know how the event will turn out - until we actually test it.

I guess … I could agree. But I would say that we can know how something can possibly turn out. Which is what I’ve been arguing and what you (at least sometimes) seem to be denying. But once again, perhaps you’re not saying this.

Also, when I asked for a simple, one sentence thesis statement about what you’re claiming about knowledge … I didn’t find it in your last post. Perhaps, I’m silly, and I glossed over it. It’s still important for me to have, since … I’m not sure what your arguing still.

 

[Areopagite]

Omniscience is supposed to be “knowledge of everything that can be known”. If the system is fully deterministic, and the starting condictions are known, and the rules (laws) are also known, then a correct prediction is possible. If the system is inherently random (chaotic) then the prediction cannot be 100% accurate. If the system contains elements which exhibit freedom, the prediciton cannot be accurate. That is all.

Unless, of course, one is looking at all these events as if they have already occurred … something that being outside of time can perhaps make possible. Hence, every prediction God makes known to a creature is not really a prediction to God (because the predicted event has already taken place from His perspective) but it would be a prediction to the creature (because the predicted event has not yet taken place relative to the creature).

The funny thing is that omnipotence used to be “power to do anything and everything” - which is the literal meaning of the word. This has been abandoned a long time ago, moreover theists assert that there are many things we can do, but God cannot do - which is highly ironic - especially since they also assert that this fact does not diminish God’s “omnipotence”. To this I say: hogwash! If there are things we can do, but the omnipotent guy cannot do, then omnipotence is truly and completely meaningless.

The definition of omnipotence being “the power to do anything and everything” has never been abandoned (have you read an authoritative source that has said otherwise?).

The thing to be defined clearly in that definition is the word … “thing.” Surprisingly enough Aristotle and the Scholastics use it to mean any possible real being (this would be the formal philosophical use of the word. Although sometimes it’s used more broadly to include purely logical beings like “nothing” or even “square circle.” Technically (as the Scholastics have said) “nothing” is not a “thing” … and a “square circle” is not a “thing” … at least in the technical way they used it. All “things” are beings that have the intrinsic possibility of existence … that is, real beings that do not have a contradictory essence. Any being that does result in a contradiction would not be a “thing” and hence it cannot be accomplished by God. In this traditional use of the term “thing,” God’s omnipotence can be defined as “the power to do anything and everything” … but in the broader and less formal use of the term (such that “thing” includes absurd beings), then that definition of omnipotence does not work.

Now, depending what you mean, there are indeed some “things” humans do that God cannot. Humans can sin (and even though this is bad … it’s not a logical contradiction). But God cannot sin … for that would be contradicting Himself. There are other examples. But I’ll just mention that for now.

Just keep in mind that when omnipotence is defined as “power to do anything and everything” … the “-things” are referring to real possible being, excluding absurd being that leads to logical contradictions.

 

[Betterave]

… To this I say: hogwash! If there are things we can do, but the omnipotent guy cannot do, then omnipotence is truly and completely meaningless.

…and to this I in return say: hogwash!

 

[Betterave]

No, I don’t. If some supposedly OG will come and predict the result of a radioactive decay, then he has either proven his omniscience, or gives doubt that the decay is not actually random - contrary to what we thought. We don’t actually know that radioactive decay is truly random, but insofar that is the hypothesis. The true measure of omniscience is still the prediciton of a volitional act - revealed. Which will be proven impossible - as long as I am free to act in a contrarian fashion.

NO NO NO Spock. Not as long “as you are free to act in a contrarian fashion”; rather “as long as you do actually freely act in a contrarian fashion”. But of course you’re begging the question when you make such affirmations, that you will, without a doubt, act freely in a contrarian fashion. You contradict yourself saying this: i.e., you claim that it is determinately true that you will freely act in a particular way. If you, with your relatively puny intellect and field of comprehension, can make such a claim and get away with it, a fortiori OG can!!! Of course OG’s claim will be correct, while yours will not. Your free will is situated; it is not omni-free! (See also below.)

Well, suppose that the probability of an event ****** is close to 50%. In that case we can decide whether to accept the claim or not. But if the probability is very low, such a decision is impossible. Test it on yourself: imagine that you want to believe in the existence of the Tooth Fairy, and see how successful your attempt will be.
Heard of Buridan’s ass (yo CAF, this is not a bad word!)? 50% does not mean we can decide. Buridan’s donkey starves.
How is Tooth Fairy relevant? Leave her out of this, she’s a nice lady - used to give me money under my pillow. Those were the days. (But seriously, not relevant - we’re not talking about anything like the Tooth Fairy here).

And in the previous hypothetical scenario, yes, it is possible that one will go along with the prediction, if that prediction is something one favors. But it is also possible that one will not do so.

But OG knows, ex hypothesi, all about the conditions that go into something being favored and believed. He’s like a super-mom who just has a knack for knowing when her child is ready to stop wearing diapers, and to start wearing big-boy underwear (that’s what we call them in my house).

And just one such act will disprove omniscience. We have an identical scenario here that we encounter in the hypothesis testing of any scientific theory. A billion successful experiments will not prove

, rather will substantiate the hypothesis. One unsuccessful experiment will disprove the hypothesis.

You don’t really believe this do you? If you do, I recommend a remedial Phil of Science class for you.

 

[david_friol_1]

I have serious problems with the so called “omnimax” attributes. These are omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omnipresence, and they are not well defined. I have yet to see a coherent and rigorous definition of these terms. Take, whichever you want, and present a definition, so we can review it. Forget that these attributes are supposed to pertain to God. Let’s not drag God and his other alleged attributes into the discussion. I would prefer to examine these attributes on their own merit, and see if they make any sense. If the concepts themselves make sense, then (and only then) it can be examined if they can be properly attributed to God. If the concepts themselves are incoherent, they will not make sense, even if they are God’s attributes.

Hey Spock
Rather than give a definition to something that you already must know the definition to or at least you must have access to some kind of dictionary, I’ll just say one thing. God “knows” what you are trying to do, by his almighty “power” he allows you to continue doing it, in his supreme “goodness” he still smiles down on you and he is always right there “with” you until the end.
God help you see where you are in reality