The Summa on sin: Are all sins equal?

[st_felicity]

Summa Theologica:

newadvent.org/summa/2073.htm#article2
Article 2. Whether all sins are equal?

Objection 1. It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

Objection 2. Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.

Objection 3. Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): “He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,” and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.

I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in “being” corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in “becoming” corrupted rather than in “being” corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.

Reply to Objection 1. To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.

Reply to Objection 2. This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.

Reply to Objection 3. Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (66, A1,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.

So I understand that the culpability of sin is relative to the circumstances of the individual who commits the transgression, and I understand that the degree and matter of the transgression contributes to the seriousness of the sin…

What I’m confused about is Objection #2 and the answer.

Is not all sin contrary to the Divine Order and by that equal in its nature as sin?
To me, it’s like saying you’re a little pregnant–no, either you are pregnant, or you are not.

Can any Thomist scholars help me understand the distinction being made here in #2?

 

[Barbkw]

I’ve never studied the Summa however…

It seems that he is taking the perspective, rather like how science classifies animals:

Kingdom, division or phylum, class, order, family, genus, and species.

or

Superfamily, family, subfamily, tribe, subtribe, genus, subgenus, species, subspecies.

On a “cellular” level, yes all sin is equal. However, when applied, it is not.

 

[davidv]

So I understand that the culpability of sin is relative to the circumstances of the individual who commits the transgression, and I understand that the degree and matter of the transgression contributes to the seriousness of the sin…

What I’m confused about is Objection #2 and the answer.

Is not all sin contrary to the Divine Order and by that equal in its nature as sin?
To me, it’s like saying you’re a little pregnant–no, either you are pregnant, or you are not.

Can any Thomist scholars help me understand the distinction being made here in #2?

I’m not a Thomist scholar, but here are my thoughts anyway.

Is this a sin? is a question that has a binary answer, yes or no?
What kind of sin is it? is not a binary question.

For example take the question Is it alive? Considering the african violet plant in my sun room, the squiral running around in my front yard and myself, the answer in all three cases is yes. Therefore we are the same. Really? Only in the case of this particular question. To see the more clearly, the question What kind of life is it? is required.

So, for all sins, the first answer is yes and allows them to exist in the category “sin”.

To learn more, we must ask the next question, What kind? This question requires that answer be allowed along some continuum.

 

[AdriannaJean]

So I understand that the culpability of sin is relative to the circumstances of the individual who commits the transgression, and I understand that the degree and matter of the transgression contributes to the seriousness of the sin…

What I’m confused about is Objection #2 and the answer.

Is not all sin contrary to the Divine Order and by that equal in its nature as sin?
To me, it’s like saying you’re a little pregnant–no, either you are pregnant, or you are not.

Can any Thomist scholars help me understand the distinction being made here in #2?

Thomist Scholar in Training here

What has been said by the other posters seem to make sense. All sin fits under the genus of sin but not every sin is equal, just like not every sickness is equal. Both the common cold and cancer are sicknesses, but one is much worse than the other. Both fit equally into the genus of sickness, but one deprives someone of health in a much larger way.

When St. Thomas replies to the objection, saying that to assume all sins are equal is to assume that sins work as a “pure privation”, like death rather than sickness. All sins are sin and equally fit the definition, that does not mean that all sins are equal in gravity.

 

[st_felicity]

Thomist Scholar in Training here

What has been said by the other posters seem to make sense. All sin fits under the genus of sin but not every sin is equal, just like not every sickness is equal. Both the common cold and cancer are sicknesses, but one is much worse than the other. Both fit equally into the genus of sickness, but one deprives someone of health in a much larger way.

When St. Thomas replies to the objection, saying that to assume all sins are equal is to assume that sins work as a “pure privation”, like death rather than sickness. All sins are sin and equally fit the definition, that does not mean that all sins are equal in gravity.

Ah…so it is a nuance of the idea that though sin is the same in that it is all contrary to the Divine Good, sin cannot be assumed all equal in its commission or the circumstances as a result of that.

I think my trouble was with what Aquinas meant by “pure privation.” By the “pure” part, I think he means “in and of itself” --and sin cannot be looked at that way because circumstances and intention will always affect culpability and degree of offensiveness against God.

Does that sound right?

Hey–thanks to all who responded!

 

[Ghosty]

Pure privation means purely a privation, as in you don’t have something. If two people lack a necklace, they equally lack the necklace. In short, a pure privation is an either/or, yes or no kind of thing.

Looking at sin simply as “transgressing the Divine Will” is looking at it as a pure privation: something is either with the Divine Will or it isn’t. There are degrees of going against God, however, both in the actions themselves and the degree of malice intended by the actions. The further something departs from the Divine Will, the more sinful it is. A bodily comparison would be sickness: a person with a cold and a person with the plague both lack health, so if health is considered a matter of pure privation then we would say they are equally sick. The fact is, however, that we can depart from health by degrees, and the person with the plague is much sicker than the person with the cold.

Peace and God bless!

 

[JDaniel]

Ah…so it is a nuance of the idea that though sin is the same in that it is all contrary to the Divine Good, sin cannot be assumed all equal in its commission or the circumstances as a result of that.

I think my trouble was with what Aquinas meant by “pure privation.” By the “pure” part, I think he means “in and of itself” --and sin cannot be looked at that way because circumstances and intention will always affect culpability and degree of offensiveness against God.

Does that sound right?

Hey–thanks to all who responded!

St_felicity:

Remember the “rule of reason,” St. Thomas mentioned? It is like a line in the sand, so to speak. Crossed over, one is now in privation of the prior (good) side. Now, think of being on the bad side, but, remaining close to the line as opposed to being farther from it. The further from the line, the greater the privation, although both are purely privations. Thus, privation ≠ privation necessarily.

God bless,
jd