The Theory of Knowledge

[greylorn]

I would like to know what the traditional understanding of epistemology within Catholic philosophy. According, to the rationalists, reason is the ultimate source of knowledge. Plato, for example, used to think that, the human being is born with ideas that are innate to him and that - like Socrates - the purpose of education was to bring those ideas out.
For the empiricists, all knowledge comes from experience and it is not possible for reason to be the final authority on reality. Reality, for many empiricists, however, was seen with skepticism and many were those - like David Hume - who doubted that we could apprehend reality in itself.

I, for myself, struggle with the notion of innate ideas. Is this true? Is this part of Catholic philosophy and theology? Also, I tend to think that all knowledge starts with the senses and that even mathematical truths would not exist if we did not have sense experience. Am I wrong?

I think you are wrong, but that does not make it so. I have often thought that I was wrong, but I turned out to be right, and vice versa. Right or wrong, you’ve put some thought into a worthy question. Here are my best answers.

You’ve put the cart before the horse. Your question is like standing alongside a wheeled buggy and asking how it moves. A better question would be, “what makes it move?” The Harry Potter stories featured this example at two levels, beginning with carriages which moved students from train to school without any form of locomotion— as if by magic.

The understanding of knowledge requires an understanding of mind, because mind may be the creator of knowledge, and is certainly a repository of sorts for it.

There is no agreement about the nature of mind, so we are free to invent one. I propose that humans have two mental mechanisms, brain, and the entity which religions call soul. Mine is a modernized version of classic Cartesian Dualism, with details about the properties of “soul” which are consistent with modern physics, and irrelevant to this discussion. It is enough to say that the brain handles some kinds of knowledge, like how to do arithmetic, drive a car, and pick your nose. The “soul” handles mostly conceptual knowledge, those things which we often understand without words.

The brain contains innate knowledge, sometimes referred to as instincts. Emotions come into this category. These can be modified or entirely recreated by forces outside the brain, including programming, electronics, and chemistry. Brain absorbs knowledge via direct sensory connections.

The “soul” originally appears without pre-programmed knowledge, but most folks with three-digit I.Q.'s have been here before. Yes, I know that reincarnation is not a popular concept among either atheists or Christians, but it is a common belief in much of the world, and there is considerable excellent modern evidence for it.

A reincarnated “soul” comes with two kinds of memory— residual memory from its previous life (short lived, usually manifesting only in young children), emotional memory from critical previous lives, and, most importantly, conceptual memory. The conceptual memory content provides the groundwork for genius and proclivities, among other things.

Mathematics is entirely different from ordinary knowledge. It is the only knowledge which can be obtained without sensory (name removed by moderator)ut.

You will notice that while ordinary knowledge has various degrees of validity and acceptance, mathematics does not. It exists independently of the universe, God, and any other minds capable of discovering it. Math is the one thing upon which all humans must agree. Our enemies may believe in a different God, or no God, but in order to build the bombs and delivery systems they want to use to convert us to their opinions, they use the same math.

 

[levinas12]

For all its success science is superficial because it doesn’t get to the very heart of things. Philosophy and theology take us further but not to the ultimate causes - which are manifestations of divine Love.

I like your reference to manifestations of divine love. And that science doesn’t get us to the very heart of things. Personal encounters, or what Martin Buber calls I-Thou relationships, gets us closer to that heart. By the way, a wonderful phenomenology of
I-Thou relationships is provided by a French philosopher, Levinas, whose focus was the Face. I don’t know if you have heard of him. I’ve taken my “handle” from him. In a way, Levinas transcends Aristotle who never addressed the issue of “person”.

 

[Betterave]

Quine was revealing the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism. …

In the passage you quoted?? Is that what you think?? Quine was giving his own view in that passage.

You claim that physical objects and the distinction between dreams and reality are ‘posited’…

By human beings in their thought processes.

but…

It is not a conscious inference.

Then you ask me to justify my statements? Isn’t it obvious that “you posit such inferences as a convenient myth that is supposed to make your worldview make sense - but such positing is arbitrary and groundless”?

Please justify your statements and provide an alternative epistemology - not a worldview if you wish to be accurate.

And what would be more accurate about “epistemology” as opposed to “worldview” in the context here? Can you explain this?

 

[Betterave]

How precisely is the disclosure effected? There must be some (presumably physical) mechanism at work.

Why “presumably”? What does “physical” mean?

We can never get to an object in the sense that we know it as it really is.

What does “object” mean? Are propositions objects? - e.g., “The closest we can get to [an object] is conceptually, i.e. by formulating the laws of nature and the ways in which it corresponds to those laws. The success of science is due to our ability to predict **how **objects behave, not what they are.” - is that an ‘object’?

 

[tonyrey]

Quine was revealing the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism. …

Can you explain why empiricism is a complete account of our knowledge of reality?

You claim that physical objects and the distinction between dreams and reality are ‘posited’…

Once again you are misrepresenting my views. Where did I make that claim?

We posit the existence of physical objects but we distinguish them from dreams by their intelligibility, coherence, consistency, fertility, verifiability and predictability.

Then you ask me to justify my statements? Isn’t it obvious that “you posit such inferences as a convenient myth that is supposed to make your worldview make sense - but such positing is arbitrary and groundless”?

Then you must believe we have direct knowledge of physical objects. Can you explain precisely how that is possible?

Please justify your statements and provide an alternative epistemology - not a worldview if you wish to be accurate.

And what would be more accurate about “epistemology” as opposed to “worldview” in the context here? Can you explain this?

Epistemology is a theory of knowledge. A worldview in this context is ontological, i.e. a theory of reality. Can you provide an alternative epistemology?

 

[tonyrey]

How precisely is the disclosure effected? There must be some (presumably physical) mechanism at work.

.
What does “object” mean?In this context a physical object perceptible by the senses. Do you believe we can know it as it really is?

Are propositions objects? - e.g., "The closest we can get to [an object] is conceptually, i.e. by formulating the laws of nature and the ways in which it corresponds to those laws. The success of science is due to our ability to predict **how **

objects behave, not what they are." - is that an ‘object’? Propositions are not perceptible objects but mental constructs.

[/QUOTE]

 

[In_Spiration]

I like this - with your emphasis on “same form that’s in reality”, We are directly aware of the form of the extramental object. We do not have to infer. We do not have to posit. We do not have to make a mental construct. We do not have to make a consistency check.

However, “same form but different matter” could be misunderstood and lead to an epistemological problem. In Aristotle, the matter is what individuates the form. But what about perceiving individuals as individuals? For example, perceiving that apple over there on the table? And this problem becomes acute when we perceive persons. There is no Aristotelian form of a person - e.g., John Doe is not an instantiation of a Form of John Doe, as if there could be other instantiations of John Doe. A person is a singularity that cannot be captured by species/genus. This is why a person is a who, not a what. I think the medievals alluded to this by talking about “incommunicability”.

Well I say “matter” loosely. And maybe we can’t know “individuals as individuals”, at least not in their primary individuality. Wouldn’t that individuality imply that one couldn’t even divide their form from their matter while preserving the same individuality? So we get their secondary individuality maybe, viz., our own intentional individuation of them or their form, which we do by giving them our own “matter”. This new individuation would persist in intellectual action.

Re: forms of persons, I’m inclined to disagree. Persons have a substantial form which, considered in isolation, is in potency, not act. The substantial form is the soul, the form (active potency) of a substance (passive potency). The individual, essential substance is the (act of) unity of body and soul (matter & form), i.e., unity between active and passive potencies in an act. The unity of substance with God must be spirituality, the category of existence that Aristotle left out which is more fundamental than substance, I suppose.

In my estimation, the substance of myself is what persists throughout a vast range of material instantiations. My individuality is linked essentially to a sort of general material/accidental mode, but not any one particular material/accidental form. Isn’t it the case that my soul has a particular form right now, which informs my body in such a fashion temporarily, but which in 5 years will be a different form?

When we say ‘Socrates exists,’ do we speak the truth, even though he’s dead? If so, what’s the true subject of that proposition? Or, if it’s not true, to what does the subject refer? (Now it sounds like we only know the ‘who’ of a person by analogy, or perhaps only if we come in direct, personal contact.)

You may be right, though. I’ll have to think more about species/genus re: a man, as well as look into “incommunicability”.

 

[Betterave]

Can you explain why empiricism is a complete account of our knowledge of reality?

Uh… no… How is this an intelligent response to my comment??

Once again you are misrepresenting my views. Where did I make that claim?

You claimed that the distinction is based on an inference that we are not aware of making. That inference is something that you posit, surely? If not, where did it come from??

We posit the existence of physical objects but we distinguish them from dreams by their intelligibility, coherence, consistency, fertility, verifiability and predictability.

You’re simply repeating your assertion while begging the question.

Then you must believe we have direct knowledge of physical objects. Can you explain precisely how that is possible?

How does that follow from what I said? Can you explain the chain of inference from:

Isn’t it obvious that “you posit such inferences as a convenient myth that is supposed to make your worldview make sense - but such positing is arbitrary and groundless”?

to

Then you must believe we have direct knowledge of physical objects.

Epistemology is a theory of knowledge. A worldview in this context is ontological, i.e. a theory of reality. Can you provide an alternative epistemology?

How does that answer my question? You really think that your epistemological view isn’t also an ontological view??

 

[tonyrey]

Can you explain why empiricism is a complete account of our knowledge of reality?

You contested my statement that Quine was revealing the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism. This implies that you accept them. The weakness of your view is that you have presented no alternative whatsoever.

Quine was giving his own view in that passage…

The onus is on you to show why he was mistaken.

You claimed that the distinction is based on an inference that we are not aware of making. That inference is something that you posit, surely?

Not initially. As a small child one does not consciously posit anything.

If not, where did it come from??

As a result of the learning process.

We posit the existence of physical objects but we distinguish them from dreams by their intelligibility, coherence, consistency, fertility, verifiability and predictability.

You’re simply repeating your assertion while begging the question.

I am replying to your argument that we don’t posit the existence of physical objects and your implication that we don’t need to distinguish them from dreams.

You are supposing that we actually distinguish between dreams and reality by means of an inference from “consistency and regularity of stimuli.” Problem is, no such inference actually occurs when we make these distinctions.

Never? In that case how and why does anyone **ever **distinguish between dreams and reality?

Then you must believe we have direct knowledge of physical objects. Can you explain precisely how that is possible?

How does that follow from what I said? Can you explain the chain of inference from:

Isn’t it obvious that “you posit such inferences as a convenient myth that is supposed to make your worldview make sense - but such positing is arbitrary and groundless”?

You imply that you have a superior form of knowledge which is not arbitrary and groundless! What else can that be but through direct knowledge of physical objects.

Can you explain precisely how that is possible? Otherwise why criticise my statement?

Epistemology is a theory of knowledge. A worldview in this context is ontological, i.e. a theory of reality. Can you provide an alternative epistemology?

How does that answer my question? You really think that your epistemological view isn’t also an ontological view??

Not all epistemological views are necessarily ontological. For example, I could deny the reality of physical objects in addition to positing them. On the other hand I could deny immaterial reality.

 

[Betterave]

Let’s take one point at a time here, Tony:

You contested my statement that Quine was revealing the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism. This implies that you accept them.

That is a gross non sequitur. And what is “them” supposed to refer to?

Do you or do you not understand that Quine was ***not ***intending to “reveal the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism” in the passage you cited?

**If **he nonetheless *was *doing that, he was doing so in spite of himself, in which case you need to explain how he was in fact doing so.

 

[tonyrey]

Do you or do you not understand that Quine was ***not ***intending to “reveal the weakness of the dogmas of empiricism” in the passage you cited?

**If **he nonetheless *was *doing that, he was doing so in spite of himself, in which case you need to explain how he was in fact doing so.

Why then did he refer to “dogmas”?

“But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.”

Unlike most empiricists Quine accepted the fact that physical objects are cultural posits of which we do not have direct knowledge. Do you reject that interpretation of his view? If so why?

BTW To commence a question with “Do you or do you not understand that…” gives the impression that you regard yourself as a lecturer with superior knowledge!

 

[levinas12]

Re: forms of persons, I’m inclined to disagree. Persons have a substantial form which, considered in isolation, is in potency, not act. The substantial form is the soul, the form (active potency) of a substance (passive potency). … the category of existence that Aristotle left out which is more fundamental than substance, I suppose.

In my estimation, the substance of myself is what persists throughout a vast range of material instantiations. …

When we say ‘Socrates exists,’ do we speak the truth, even though he’s dead? If so, what’s the true subject of that proposition? Or, if it’s not true, to what does the subject refer? (Now it sounds like we only know the ‘who’ of a person by analogy, or perhaps only if we come in direct, personal contact.)

You may be right, though. I’ll have to think more about species/genus re: a man, as well as look into “incommunicability”.

The philosophical concepts of essence and matter in Aristotle cannot account for the being of a person … essence is nature …essence is a what but not a who … and matter cannot be the basis for the person because matter can’t be a who … a person can have a nature … but as such, person is a singularity because it can’t be defined in terms of species/genus (at least as traditionally understood in Greek philosophy). For more on this, see Robert Sokolowski’s The Phenomenology of the Human Person. Also, Robert Spaemann has a nice book, I think it’s called Persons.

 

[Betterave]

So yes or no… (No? You don’t understand that? Or yes, you do?) Please just give a straight answer.

Why then did he refer to “dogmas”?
[What are you referring to? ]

“But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.”
[That’s Quine’s view. Not a dogma that he’s criticizing. And not a criticism of a dogma. Do you understand that or not?]

Unlike most empiricists Quine accepted the fact that physical objects are cultural posits of which we do not have direct knowledge. Do you reject that interpretation of his view? If so why?
[No I don’t reject that ‘interpretation.’]

BTW To commence a question with “Do you or do you not understand that…” gives the impression that you regard yourself as a lecturer with superior knowledge!
*[Does it? Not if you DO understand, surely? Only if you don’t understand would it be the case that my knowledge is superior on the point in question. Do you understand that?]

 

[Betterave]

The onus is on you to show why he was mistaken.

Have done. It’s called a reductio ad absurdum.

Not initially. As a small child one does not consciously posit anything.

Then when? When one embraces the myth of empiricism?

As a result of the learning process.

Oh right, “the learning process”… what is that again? (another cultural posit?)

I am replying to your argument that we don’t posit the existence of physical objects and your implication that we don’t need to distinguish them from dreams.

Well you got my argument wrong, but in any case: You’re (still!) simply repeating your assertion while begging the question with your ‘reply.’

Never? In that case how and why does anyone **ever **distinguish between dreams and reality?

If you ask yourself this question, do you really not know?

You imply that you have a superior form of knowledge which is not arbitrary and groundless! What else can that be but through direct knowledge of physical objects.

Can you explain precisely how that is possible? Otherwise why criticise my statement?

Sometimes it’s good to clean the site before you start to build. Think Socrates; it’s pretty basic.

Not all epistemological views are necessarily ontological. For example, I could deny the reality of physical objects in addition to positing them. On the other hand I could deny immaterial reality.

But your example is thoroughly ontological! So really not a good example.

 

[tonyrey]

The onus is on you to show why he was mistaken.

Have done. It’s called a reductio ad absurdum.

Then when?
Most people are never aware they are positing material objects - just as they are never aware of other philosophical facts.

As a result of the learning process.

Oh right, “the learning process”… what is that again? (another cultural posit?)
It seems you posit nothing whatsoever!

I am replying to your argument that we don’t posit the existence of physical objects and your implication that we don’t need to distinguish them from dreams.

Well you got my argument wrong, but in any case: You’re (still!) simply repeating your assertion while begging the question with your ‘reply.’

**How ** exactly did I get it wrong?

In that case how and why does anyone ever distinguish between dreams and reality?

If you ask yourself this question, do you really not know?
If you persist in evading the question there is no point in pursuing this “discussion”.

You imply that you have a superior form of knowledge which is not arbitrary and groundless! What else can that be but through direct knowledge of physical objects.

No reply!

Can you explain precisely how that is possible? Otherwise why criticise my statement?

Sometimes it’s good to clean the site before you start to build. Think Socrates; it’s pretty basic.
If you persist in evading the question there is no point in pursuing this “discussion”.

Not all epistemological views are necessarily ontological. For example, I could deny the reality of physical objects in addition to positing them. On the other hand I could deny immaterial reality.

But your example is thoroughly ontological!
Do you deny that not all epistemological views are necessarily ontological?

The upshot of this dialogue is that you have not offered any explanation of our knowledge of physical objects.

[/QUOTE]

 

[Betterave]

what is it

?

The reduction of all concepts to cultural posits, i.e., myths, implies that this reduction itself is a myth; it also implies that any normative status (i.e., ‘truth’) it claims for itself is likewise mythical; but that is a contradiction: a culturally posited myth, as such, cannot really have any objective normative status, but only a de facto acceptance, which is *philosophically *(normatively, in the interest of truth) simply not of interest.

Most people are never aware they are positing material objects - just as they are never aware of other philosophical facts.

LOL? So…when then? (I didn’t ask “when NOT?”) Is it indeed when one embraces the myth of empiricism?

It seems you posit nothing whatsoever!

It seems you don’t like to answer questions.

**How ** exactly did I get it wrong?

I did not say what you attributed to me.

If you persist in evading the question there is no point in pursuing this “discussion”.

Why is that? Because if I don’t give you my answer, then your answer must be right, and it is pointless for you to listen to my criticisms of it? LOL! You’re joking, right? It’s fine to be combative, I don’t mind, but try to remain minimally rational. Do you understand the Socrates reference? If you have a problem with it, go ahead and present it. If you don’t understand, ask for an explanation. In any case, drop the irrational bluster.

No reply!

Wrong! See above! That is a reply! I’ve called you on your false premise!

If you persist in evading the question there is no point in pursuing this “discussion”.

If you persist in evading the inappropriateness of your question there is no point in pursuing this “discussion”.

Do you deny that not all epistemological views are necessarily ontological?

I do assert that all epistemological view are necessarily ontological (as illustrated by your failed counter-example).

The upshot of this dialogue is that you have not offered any explanation of our knowledge of physical objects.

No, the upshot is that you seem think that your view must be true and that you can dismiss criticisms of it, as long as I have not offered an alternate view… which is very irrational on your part.

 

[tonyrey]

The reduction of all concepts to cultural posits, i.e., myths, implies that this reduction itself is a myth.

At last a positive statement - which is false! There is one irreducible concept (or whatever you like to call it) - the positer, the person who is reasoning and interpreting reality. It is not necessary to swallow Quine’s view lock, stock and barrel to recognise the fact that we are all in the egocentric predicament. His empiricism may overlook the primacy of our stream of consciousness as** the sole source of direct knowledge** but his analysis of knowledge is sound. We start with nothing but our thoughts, feelings, perceptions and decisions from which we infer everything else.

it also implies that any normative status (i.e., ‘truth’) it claims for itself is likewise mythical; but that is a contradiction: a culturally posited myth, as such, cannot really have any objective normative status, but only a de facto acceptance, which is *philosophically *(normatively, in the interest of truth) simply not of interest.

I have already indicated that your thoughts and your power of inference cannot be a culturally posited myth unless you contradict yourself. “I am only thinking that I am thinking!” Get rid of your thoughts and the rest is silence…

Like charity the truth begins at home - which is hardly surprising if one believes we are made in the image of God.

 

[Betterave]

At last a positive statement - which is false!

Oh, really?! Let us see…

There is one irreducible concept (or whatever you like to call it) - the positer, the person who is reasoning and interpreting reality.

What makes this an “irreducible concept”? (What constitutes an “irreducible concept” as such, and why is this an instance of one?)

It is not necessary to swallow Quine’s view lock, stock and barrel to recognise the fact that we are all in the egocentric predicament.

So what is necessary to recognize this??

His empiricism may overlook the primacy of our stream of consciousness as** the sole source of direct knowledge**…

I’m not sure what this means. Some questions:
What is ‘knowledge’?
What makes knowledge ‘direct’?
What is a ‘source of direct knowledge’?
How does our ‘stream of consciousness’ function as a ‘source of direct knowledge’?

but his analysis of knowledge is sound.

Is it really? How do you know this? You seem to just be asserting this.

We start with nothing but our thoughts, feelings, perceptions and decisions from which we infer everything else.

Do we really start with all that? In what sense of “start”?

I have already indicated that your thoughts and your power of inference cannot be a culturally posited myth unless you contradict yourself. “I am only thinking that I am thinking!”

How does “I am only thinking that I am thinking” constitute a contradiction of myself??

Get rid of your thoughts and the rest is silence…

The rest of what?

 

[tonyrey]

Oh, really?! Let us see… What makes this an “irreducible concept”? (What constitutes an “irreducible concept” as such, and why is this an instance of one?) So what is necessary to recognize this?? I’m not sure what this means. Some questions:
What is ‘knowledge’?
What makes knowledge ‘direct’?
What is a ‘source of direct knowledge’?
How does our ‘stream of consciousness’ function as a ‘source of direct knowledge’?
Is it really? How do you know this? You seem to just be asserting this. Do we really start with all that? In what sense of “start”?
How does “I am only thinking that I am thinking” constitute a contradiction of myself??
The rest of what?

You have not made one positive statement! This is a classic example of inability to refute the other person’s statements and attempting to conceal the fact by asking questions.

By way of contrast I have made my position clear:

1. There is one irreducible concept (or whatever you like to call it) - the positer, the **person **who is reasoning and interpreting reality.
2. It is not necessary to swallow Quine’s view lock, stock and barrel to recognise the fact that **we are all in the egocentric predicament.
   **
   3.The fact that we have direct knowledge solely of our thoughts.
3. We start with nothing but our thoughts, feelings, perceptions and decisions from which we infer everything else.
4. Your thoughts and your power of inference cannot be a culturally posited myth unless you contradict yourself. “I am only thinking that I am thinking!” leads to an infinite regress…

You have not produced any explanation whatsoever of our knowledge of physical objects. Until you do so I shall not waste any further time or energy in answering puerile questions.

 

[Betterave]

You have not made one positive statement! This is a classic example of inability to refute the other person’s statements and attempting to conceal the fact by asking questions.

By way of contrast I have made my position clear: …

LOL! The fact that you can repeatedly recite a bunch of abstract formulations does not show that you have made your position clear. The fact that you are unable to respond to questions about your abstract formulations suggests that your position is *not *clear, not to me, and not to you.

Socrates pointed out that the person who knows that he doesn’t know is at least better off than the person who claims to know but doesn’t, i.e., who doesn’t even know that he doesn’t know. (And people who thought they knew got upset with Socrates too…) Please just be honest here: if you have no answers, just admit it. (And you dismiss my questions by claiming that they are puerile?! You *really *don’t have very high rational standards, do you?)