The Thomistic Cosmological Argument

[Spock]

Pardon me for butting in…do you think there is a ‘one’ constituent particle, or otherwise.

You are most welcome “butting in”. I am not talking about “one” anything. Space, time, energy, matter exist. Since they exist, and cannot be created or destroyed, they fulfill the role of “necessary entity”. That is all.

As far as trivial, Descartes has made some hay of it…

We made a few steps in cosmology since his time. He was a very smart fellow, but his views cannot be separated from the general knowledge when he lived.

 

[Just_Lurking]

1. Every dependent being relies on another for its existence.

Few of us will doubt this. We observe that human persons, for instance, are dependent on their bodily organs functioning properly, the air they breathe, the food they eat, etc.

Okay, I am dependent on the sandwich I just made, and the sandwich I just made is dependent on me, because it wouldn’t exist unless I made it.

2. The series of dependent beings either proceeds to infinity, or is grounded in a self-existent being.

Me and my sandwich form a finite (cardinality = 2) series of dependent beings that is not grounded in a self-existent being.

 

[punkforchrist]

Spock:

No, not exactly. It is STEM itself that does exist necessarily. Matter, energy, space and time cannot be created nor destroyed, therefore since they exist, they cannot not-exist. The truth is that the argument you proposed is very true, but trivial. It can be summed up as: “since something exists, something must exist.”

We can envisage the corruption of a molecule into smaller particles. Would you agree that such an object, given its corruptibility, does not exist necessarily?

I think there are additional arguments against the self-existence of STEM, e.g. Big Bang cosmology, but I don’t think appealing to them is necessary. You said that the argument I presented is true, so do you agree that a first cause exists?*

*Albeit you believe that the first cause is not God, but STEM.

 

[punkforchrist]

Just Lurking:

Me and my sandwich form a finite (cardinality = 2) series of dependent beings that is not grounded in a self-existent being.

I love food analogies.

You’re not actually dependent on the sandwich per se, but rather on the food that you made the sandwich with. Besides, there are other things you and the sandwich are dependent on, like air, gravity, and so forth.

 

[punkforchrist]

James S Saint:

In that case, you must begin with “the void” of absolute nothingness as your premise and from that demonstrate the logic of how something MUST exist.

That is the “First Cause”.

How could nothingness be a cause?

 

[Spock]

We can envisage the corruption of a molecule into smaller particles. Would you agree that such an object, given its corruptibility, does not exist necessarily?

The “form” STEM assumes is variable. STEM itself is invariant. Matter and energy (the two faces of physical existence) can assume many shapes.

I think there are additional arguments against the self-existence of STEM, e.g. Big Bang cosmology, but I don’t think appealing to them is necessary. You said that the argument I presented is true, so do you agree that a first cause exists?*

The proposition entailing “first” cause is as yet undefined. Just like space and time cannot be defined outside STEM or for STEM, causation cannot be defined either. The Big Bang cosmology says nothing about “causes” and “beginnings” - in general - it merely says that the current form of STEM seems to have been originated about 13 billion years ago - for the observable part of STEM.

 

[Just_Lurking]

I love food analogies.

You’re not actually dependent on the sandwich per se, but rather on the food that you made the sandwich with. Besides, there are other things you and the sandwich are dependent on, like air, gravity, and so forth.

Can you write down an axiom system for the notions that you use in your proof, such as dependence?

 

[punkforchrist]

Just Lurking:

Can you write down an axiom system for the notions that you use in your proof, such as dependence?

Well, as Godel has shown, it is difficult to formulate any complete axiom system. However, I can define any terms you’d like clarified. I’ve decided not to use the term “dependence”, at least for now. The proof currently under consideration is this (I’ll put it in terms of Thomas’ first way):

Prove A: A first mover exists.
Assume ~A: A first mover does not exist.
~A → B: If a first mover does not exist, then there are no intermediate movers.
~B: There are intermediate movers.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: A first mover exists.
Q.E.D.

The “first mover” is, of course, synonymous with Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. The support for (~A → B) can be found in an earlier post. A house without a foundation will collapse, and a watch without a spring will not move (even if there are infinitely-many gears).

Alternatively, we can weaken the premises:

1. There possibly exists an Unmoved Mover.
2. Whatever is possible is either contingent or necessary.
3. Whatever is contingent can be actualized.
4. An Unmoved Mover cannot be actualized.
5. Therefore, an Unmoved Mover exists necessarily.

In modal logic: Let x = entity; y = Unmoved Mover; and z = actualized.

1. ◊ y (x)
2. ◊ (x) → (◊ x & ~ □ x) ^ (□ x)
3. ◊ z (◊ x & ~ □ x)
4. ~ ◊ z
5. .: □ y
   Q.E.D.

Are these terms clear?

 

[punkforchrist]

Spock:

The “form” STEM assumes is variable. STEM itself is invariant. Matter and energy (the two faces of physical existence) can assume many shapes.

Okay, but it doesn’t necessarily assume any particular shape (form)?

The proposition entailing “first” cause is as yet undefined. Just like space and time cannot be defined outside STEM or for STEM, causation cannot be defined either. The Big Bang cosmology says nothing about “causes” and “beginnings” - in general - it merely says that the current form of STEM seems to have been originated about 13 billion years ago - for the observable part of STEM.

The KCA aside, I’m not arguing that there must be a first cause in the sense of a first entity in time. Imagine watch that exists from all eternity. The spring causally precedes the gears, even though the former doesn’t temporally precede the latter. So, even if the universe is eternal, or temporally necessary, it is still dependent on the first cause.

What I’m getting at is this. If the first cause (or, first mover, per Thomas’ “first way”) possesses certain attributes that the physical universe does not, then the two cannot be identical. I would argue that the first cause/first mover must possess divine attributes (I apologize for the length).

First of all, the first mover must be eternal. For, if the first mover ever came into being or ceased to exist, it would be changed from potentiality to actuality, or from non-being to being, or vice-versa. Since the first mover is changeless, then, it must exist at all times, and is therefore eternal.

Secondly, the first mover must be one. If there were more than one first mover, then there would be distinctions between them. But, distinctions entail limitations, and limitations entail potentiality. For example, if A is distinct from B, it can only be because A lacks something B has, or else B lacks something A has. This implies that if one lacks something, it can have something added to it. However, any addition would result in a change, and we have seen that the first mover is changeless. As a result, there can be only one first mover, and not many.

Finally, the first mover must be omnipotent and omniscient. Beings composed of potentiality and actuality, like human beings, are said to be partly actual. We have some power and some knowledge. From this we may infer that a purely actual being would possess all power and all knowledge, e.g., the first mover is all-powerful (omnipotent) and all-knowing (omniscient). This confirms our intuition that effects have a certain, even if not exact, likeness to their cause. In order for intermediate movers to be powerful and knowledgeable, their first mover, or source of motion, must itself possess these qualities.

So, we have a changeless, eternal, unitary, omnipotent and omniscient first mover. As St. Thomas puts it, “this everyone understands to be God.”

 

[Just_Lurking]

Prove A: A first mover exists.
Assume ~A: A first mover does not exist.
~A → B: If a first mover does not exist, then there are no intermediate movers.
~B: There are intermediate movers.
Hence, ~~A: by modus tollens.
Therefore, A: A first mover exists.
Q.E.D.

Okay, I see two predicates:

• FirstMover(x) = x is a first mover
• IntermediateMover(x) = x is an intermediate mover

And two axioms:

• Exists x s.t. IntermediateMover(x)
• (Not Exists x s.t. FirstMover(x)) ==> (Not Exists x s.t. IntermediateMover(x))

s.t. == such that

 

[Just_Lurking]

Are these terms clear?

What does “actualized” mean? Is it from modal logic or from metaphysics?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

What does “actualized” mean? Is it from modal logic or from metaphysics?

it refers to the transition from potential to actual, from possible to existent. its source seems modal, though to be frank the way everyone uses it seems to vary by their worldview, for a mathematician i suspect that a most rigourous use would be the norm while for the metaphysician, it may be less so, and thereby relegated to an adjective descriptive of solely a transition.

 

[Just_Lurking]

If there were more than one first mover, then there would be distinctions between them.

There is (a lot) more than one electron in the universe, but they are all indistinguishable. I don’t know how this physics concept relates to metaphysical “distinction”.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

i like the term “maximal state of being” trace the contingent argument far enough and eventually you come to pure existence, the state of pure actuality, or what Aquinas calls the being whose essence is existence. i think that nearly 80 years ago in the russell-Copleston debate, Copleston made the point that an infinite chain of contingent beings still requires a necessary being. something like an infinite pile of apples never makes an orchard. people have been arguing it for decades now, but nothing has changed. a contingent being is only potential until acted upon by a cause, so the only way that any chain of contingent beings can exist without a necessary being is if they all come into existence together as one self supporting unit,* with no cause*. but then that becomes the atheists own scarecrow, a POOF! theory. a violation of the PSR, something no right thinking, scientifically minded individual can really claim. though ive seen a few dissertations trying.

so the situation is that either there must be a necessary being, or the entire chain of contingent beings poofed into existence for no reason in a self supporting structure, violateing the PSR, and thereby nullifying the scientific method also. its a no win situation for the non-theists.

 

[Just_Lurking]

it refers to the transition from potential to actual, from possible to existent.

The concept of “transition” seems more metaphysical than modal. For example, at this moment, I am in the USA. This is contingent, because in an alternative world, I could instead be in Germany at this moment. But I can’t be in both places at the same time in this world.

More mathematically, if A is true in this world, yet false in another, so that A is contingent, it is still not possible for “A and (not A)” to be true in this world.

 

[punkforchrist]

Just Lurking:

What does “actualized” mean? Is it from modal logic or from metaphysics?

Pete is correct that actualization refers to a transition from potentiality to actuality. An acorn is merely an acorn in actuality, but it is an oak tree in potentiality. It is “actualized” in its process of becoming an oak tree, via water, soil, sunlight, etc.

There is (a lot) more than one electron in the universe, but they are all indistinguishable. I don’t know how this physics concept relates to metaphysical “distinction”.

Well, each electron could be distinguished by its location in space, or by its activity, e.g, two electrons repelling each other in one instance, and another electron existing in some other state elsewhere.

 

[punkforchrist]

warpspeedpetey:

i think that nearly 80 years ago in the russell-Copleston debate, Copleston made the point that an infinite chain of contingent beings still requires a necessary being. something like an infinite pile of apples never makes an orchard.

Yeah, I heard Copleston use the analogy: if we have infinitely-many chocolates, we don’t get a sheep.

 

[Just_Lurking]

Well, each electron could be distinguished by its location in space, or by its activity, e.g, two electrons repelling each other in one instance, and another electron existing in some other state elsewhere.

This would be true for indistinguishable objects in classical physics, but not in quantum physics. In quantum physics, indistinguishable particles don’t have an identity different from each other (see here). Mathematically, this is called a Fock space (see here).

As a simplified example, if you could somehow name two elections A and B, and you have two locations L1 and L2, then you can’t say that A is at L1 and B is at L2. It could just as easily be that B is at L1 and A is at L2. The two particles A and B exist in a quantum superposition, where they could each be at L1 or L2. In other words, if there is an electron at a location L, then all electrons are at location L in superposition. There is no property, whether location or anything else, that can be used to distinguish one electron from another. All the electrons in the universe are in all the locations that have electrons, simultaneously in quantum superposition.

They are truly indistinguishable, and there is more than one of them. Maybe this helps explain how the Trinity works?

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The concept of “transition” seems more metaphysical than modal. For example, at this moment, I am in the USA. This is contingent, because in an alternative world, I could instead be in Germany at this moment. But I can’t be in both places at the same time in this world.

More mathematically, if A is true in this world, yet false in another, so that A is contingent, it is still not possible for “A and (not A)” to be true in this world.

how are you drawing the conclusion “The concept of “transition” seems more metaphysical than modal.” from the examples given? im missing it here.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Yeah, I heard Copleston use the analogy: if we have infinitely-many chocolates, we don’t get a sheep.

yup! i went 850 posts with the moderators on an atheist board over the same contention, they just cant seem to get past the idea that if there be no necessary being then they are insisting on a POOF! theory, which, as you can imagine i joyfully batted them about the head and ears with for hundreds of posts