So… as I have been saying, call them what they are, subjective experiences.
I gave several definite questions which can be answered, and they will lead to others. That’s how we progress. Unlike debating games, which might flatter egos but lead nowhere.
The question again is: “is the difference significant?”. There can be two different scenarios about a proposition: 1) we do not know right now if the proposition is true or not, but we can investigate and find out – eventually; and 2) it cannot be known in principle if the proposition is true or not. The first kind merits attention, and while the investigation is underway the label we “stick” on that proposition is neither true, nor false rather “undecided”. The second kind does not merit attention, even though it may not be syntactically “meaningless”.
We need
Ah, but the semantic content is not something that exists in an objective manner. Between the two of us, we can create an artificial language, which is perfectly meaningful for us, and sounds like a meaningless (or even misleading) gobbledygook for everyone else. There is no “abstract, objective” meaning to words and propositions. The meaning gets established in a communication channel between two entities, who “agree” on the meaning. I cannot emphasize enough that the “meaning” is the result of agreement.
Ok. But this is just a side track. The “torturing” aspect was only a convenient example to highlight the central problem: namely the question of emulation vs. the real thing.
I cannot answer for inocente, only for myself. But you do not read the “appearances” correctly. I definitely deny that the “verification principle” is applicable to ALL propositions (which was the assertion of the logical positivists). This principle is not applicable to the propositions in an abstract, axiomatic system (one cannot “verify” the axioms of mathematics and all the non-axiomatic propositions are true if and only if they are logical corollary of the axioms). It is also not applicable to the subjective propositions like “I prefer chocolate ice cream over the vanilla flavored one”. However, it is applicable to the statements pertaining the external, objective reality. If a proposition reflects the external reality, it is “true” proposition, otherwise it is not.
That wasn’t quite the point I was making. I was trying to think of how a race of intelligent machines would determine whether humans can think. I can’t help feeling that they could use your logic to prove that they think and we can’t, just as you use it to prove we think and they can’t.
There’s an interesting case before the courts at the moment, a writ of habeas corpus for a chimpanzee. Don’t know what their chances are, but it’s part of a continuing trend. Who knows what people in 100 years time will think.
I realize. I responded about us encountering another race since that has been brought up previously and that was the situation you seemed to be modified. To clarify, I have not claimed that alien races “can’t” think (I also admit that if we encountered one, we would probably have to assume that they do, though we could be wrong). The point I’m making is that the Turing test is not sufficient to show the presence of many of the fundamental subjective qualities akin to those of our own thoughts, not that it proves that machines don’t think. I’m noting that Turing’s argument fails (if it is construed as showing that machines could think as we think), not saying that Turing’s argument, by failing, proves the opposite of what he wanted to prove (that would be much too strong of a claim).
Not exactly. A substantial part of my argument is that science does not disclose the types of facts that would lend themselves to resolving your disparity. Modern science was developed by stipulating that the subjective aspects of reality are “secondary qualities,” which do not exist in the same objective way that “primary qualities” (ie. mass, electron charge, etc.) do. It is rather straightforward that, by doing so, it is intrinsically limited to resolving questions of mind, and some overhaul is needed if it is to succeed. That does not mean that it cannot tell us a lot about the brain and even about the mind, just that it has self-imposed limitations that prevent it from admitting an explanation of subjectivity. These difficulties will face science no matter how much it learns. It seems like a complete neuroscience, carried out under current methodological assumptions, will simply not offer a full explanation of our thought processes. That might lead some naturalists to deny the existence of our thoughts, but others might realize that their method was just limited.
You’ll see you said “intelligence” originally, not “thinking”, and I replied to say that intelligence is not subjective. There are IQ tests and so on, it can be observed and measured.
You know as well as me that many philosophers reject the term, it’s simply an unnecessary and misleading hypothesis.
I would agree that it does not merit scientific attention if science is restricted by its method to verification by physical evidence, but that is not the same as claiming the statements are meaningless, unless one has a prior metaphysical commitment to eliminative materialism or some form of scientism. Propositions may be meaningful in ways that cannot be carried by or embodied in physical media. To insist that meaning must be embodied in physical events in order to be meaningful requires its own proof, which I doubt can be demonstrably shown to be true as a proposition by any “objective” physical means.
This is another example of thinking going off the rails.
Why deny the verification principle has applicability to subjective propositions except under the presumption that subjects capable of subjective experiences actually do exist? If subjects do exist, then why can’t these same subjects be capable of other meaningful propositions that are inter-subjectively meaningful, though not objectively verifiable? I.e., the propositions are not objectively verifiable but still meaningful between two subjects qua subjects? We would then have “meaning” even under your definition because we have agreement on a subjective (though not objective) level between two subjects.
Again, logic goes astray.
I think I first heard about verificationism as Gödel’s victim. I like the engineering approach:
The problem is that “a duck” is, presumably, an objective and limited characterization to begin with. We don’t really comprehend what a duck actually is, metaphysically speaking.
Why…? Why should we prefer two longer words to one short that is also used by professional philosophers? I do not see a difference of meaning or connotation here. Thus, as far, as I understand, it is equivalent to insisting that one must say “rational animal” instead of “human”…
Well, if you have such a low opinion about Philosophy, what are you doing in the Philosophy subforum…?I gave several definite questions which can be answered, and they will lead to others. That’s how we progress. Unlike debating games, which might flatter egos but lead nowhere.
Well, let’s look at something similar. Let’s take a different directly undetectable quality with significant practical importance: “not being fake” of money. By itself, we cannot check if the given bank note has been issued by a legitimate institution with the right of money emission. Yet we have some indirect ways (“heuristics”, if you wish) to detect fake bank notes (for example, water marks).
I think we’re still talking at cross purposes.
Not sure why any sane person would deny the existence of their thoughts.
You do realize that the concept carries baggage and a lot of professional philosophers don’t accept it either? For starters, see: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Critics_of_qualia
I never said anything about philosophy, which I notice has acquired an SCC (Sudden Spontaneous Capitalization).Well, if you have such a low opinion about Philosophy, what are you doing in the Philosophy subforum…?
Uh…
In an episode of the Simpsons everyone in the town, including the TV stations, police and law court, sting Homer to teach him a lesson.Well, let’s look at something similar. Let’s take a different directly undetectable quality with significant practical importance: “not being fake” of money. By itself, we cannot check if the given bank note has been issued by a legitimate institution with the right of money emission. Yet we have some indirect ways (“heuristics”, if you wish) to detect fake bank notes (for example, water marks).
Now, let’s imagine an equivalent of Turing test for money. A group of experts would look at the bank note and try to find out if it is real or fake. The “weak” version of the “Turing test” would declare that, well, if they concluded that the bank note is real then they have concluded that it is real. That, of course is true (though trivial).
But the “strong” version of Turing test (criticised in the original post of this thread) claims that in such case we must believe that the bank note is real even after we find out that someone (not a Central bank) has been trying to make it to fool the experts. With explanations that “Maybe someone replaced that bank note with the real one when no one was looking!” (mostly equivalent to the Turing’s answer to the “theological objection”).
Now I think that accepting such explanations would not be reasonable. And that the “real” Turing test fails in a similar way: the machine that passes the Turing test is going to be specifically made to pass it, to fool the experts. Why should we ignore that piece of evidence…?
On the other hand, we wouldn’t have such a piece of evidence in case of an alien that looks like a machine. In such case it might be reasonable to conclude that it (or would that be “he”?) is rational and act accordingly. Then again, we would be rather unlikely to run a Turing test for such an alien… After all, the alien is not guaranteed to like the test…
Or, if you do not like the example with money, try a different one. In the “Popular culture” subforum we have a thread (forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?t=838850) where a claim that illusionists do “real” magic has been mentioned. The reasoning is similar: the “expert” has failed to find a difference, therefore, there is no difference. Do you think it is reasonable to conclude so and ignore the fact that they are called, well, “illusionists”…?
“If it looks like a duck” is a long way of saying induction. It says don’t expect absolute proofs if we want to make progress. Go with what we’ve got, get the job done. Less librarian, more marine. Oorah.
The essence need not be “beyond the stars,” but in reality itself. How would you know there is no objective essence without a presumption?
That might be your “foundation stone” of ethics, but it isn’t a sufficient one, precisely because “behaving” like a human leaves undefined exactly what “like a human” means. How can the behaviour of a human (trivially defined as the behaviour humans demonstrate) suffice as an ethical foundation? Humans kill, rape, steal, etc. These are all entailed under “behaves like a human” which means, according to your stipulation, that these are all ethically acceptable because they are human behaviours.Certainly no one would agree that a human must possess a specific genome. Who would decide the rules by which ethnic groups might be excluded and called sub-human? Who would accept that scientists get to judge us? No, the only ethical way is if she looks like a human and behaves like a human then she is human.
So it turns out that “If it looks like a duck” is a foundation stone of ethics.
Yet I do not see many recommendations to say “subjective experiences” instead of “qualia” there. I suspect that the ones who reject “qualia” will generally reject “subjective experiences” as well… Did I miss someone…?
Let’s see:
If “debating games” does not refer to Philosophy (as far, as I remember, the names of “subjects” tend to be capitalised in English - aren’t they?), what do those words refer to…?I gave several definite questions which can be answered, and they will lead to others. That’s how we progress. Unlike debating games, which might flatter egos but lead nowhere.