I guess, we are cooking now with gas.

I will try and reflect on the several different point that have been brought up.
Exodus said:
I don’t see what’s so irrational about creating a being who tests the hearts of his creation. God could have created a world without any evil, without even the possibility of evil. Any time a creature would be about to sin, he could simply hold their thoughts at bay and turn them to something good, but it seems to me such a world would involve less good, not more.
There are several way to achieve this, without any “forceful” intrusion on God’s part. I would like to ask you: “why do you think that a world without actual evil is ‘less good’ than a world with actual evil?” I see no reason to assume that. To use an analogy: your assertion is something like: “it is better to be ill and then recover, than to be constantly healthy”. Such a state of affairs would “rob” us the happiness of “recovery”, for sure. But I consider the state of affairs of being constantly healthy much more preferable then the opposite.
EricFilmer says the same thing, with different wording.
CatHerder says something very different:
This is a faulty presupposition. God knows I could take a number of roads to get to work today. He knows each possibility and combination thereof. He knows what would happen to me as I travel each road. But He does NOT know which one I will actually take.
This is the Molinist “middle knowledge”, which has several problems of its own. Suppose I have a coin in my hand, which I am about to toss. I can say that the result is 1) it will be heads, or 2) it will be tails, or 3) the coin will land on its rim and will not flip over, or 4) someone snatches the coin in mid-air. In case 3) or 4) the result is undefined. That is not what “omniscience” is usually understood. If this were “omniscience”, we would all be “omniscient”. “Omniscience” is more than just knowing all the hypothetical possibilities, it also entails the actual outcome. Nevertheless, your scenario would let God off the hook, but it sacrifices “omniscience”.
Because an imperfect world can be redeemed and only a redeemed world is truly perfect.
I don’t accept this definition of “perfection”.
Pieman says the same thing as CatHerder. Molinist middle knowledge is not what “omniscience” is supposed to be.
JDaniel. Sorry, I still don’t see the answer to the “why”. I looked at your later post, too.
Simpst’s post is complicated. I can go into detail, but Plantinga is wrong.
Let me just present a very simple scenario: “Suppose that there is only one moral agent in the world. Suppose that this agent is confronted by only one moral dilemma”. The agent is free to choose which way to resolve the dilemma, but - natually - he cannot choose both ways, only one. Therefore there are only two possible worlds, one, in which the agent chooses the moral solution, and the other one, where the agent chooses the immoral solution.
God can instantiate either world. In the first one, the agent will freely choose morally, in the second one the agent will freely choose immorally.
It is the agent who makes the choice, not God. God merely provides the “freamework”, so to speak. By the fact that God chooses to intstantiate world #1, God does not “force” or “compel” the choice. The choice is free, and there is no immoral decision.
TimothyH I don’t accept that there is some “blanket” perfection. A perfect bullet can penetrate any armor. A perfect armor cannot be penetrated by any bullet. Perfection is always “perfect” in some respect.
Windfish says: “Screw you”.

What a delight to see this phrase on the board. I would have liked to say it several times, but I lacked the courage to use it, since I thought it was against the rules. I am happy to see that it is not.

Cheers, mate!