From what I understand, beings possess the potential to act, but don’t actually act without being caused to act by another being in act. Unless we posit an infinite regression of beings in act causing other beings to move from potency to act, there would need to be a being that possessed no potency but is always in act (it wasn’t caused to act by another being).
You have everything correct, according to St. Thomas, until the sentence beginning “unless.” Even if we posit an infinite regression, we do not escape absurdity, because there would be an infinitely insufficient chain of causal agents. The nature, so to speak, of the chain would be “to pass into act after being acted on” or “to be moved by another.” An infinitely long paintbrush, for example, does not give us a painter.
son:
In other words, if a being moves from potency to act on its own, it would be absurd because such a move would be an uncaused act.
Correct.
son:
If God has positively determined every good or permitted every evil, does that leave room for a being to freely choose between good and evil?
At this point it is necessary to flesh out the idea of “free will.” What do most people think it means? It obviously cannot mean a spontaneous, uncaused act. Such an act would be
without reason. Far from preserving the freedom of the individual, this would posit an absurdity.
Now, what is not repugnant to freedom is that there are motivations for the free act. Again, how could this not be? If there were no motives, there would be an irresolvable indeterminence. The being would be frozen, as it were, with no reason to choose A over B. So, obviously, freedom does not imply that there is nothing at all which moves the will.
Second, it must be observed that the object of the will is goodness as such; not this this or that good, but Good-ness. Now, Good-ness is the same thing as God. The two are convertible. As such, goodness “as it is” or goodness as such exists transcendentally. We only see things which have been dipped, as it were, in its transcendental liquid. We will this good object - this good apple, or whatever, but we do not see the essence of goodness.
So, since we do not see goodness’ essence, the object of our will is, so to speak, always just beyond our grasp. If we were to behold it (as the Faith teaches we shall in the beatific vision), we would be completely satiated, and unable to turn away (since goodness as such is desirable under every aspect.) From this it follows that, since we do not behold goodness as such, and since it is always just beyond our grasp, all the objects we perceive can be viewed as good under a certain respect. Pizza tastes good, for instance, but it is bad for one’s health.
Now, this infinite distance between goodness as such, and goodness as it appears under a certain aspect in an object is why the will is “free.” By “free” is meant there is no necessity in the will to this or that object, since, as said above, prior to the beatific vision, no object can satisfy the will, since no object is goodness as such, but only good under this aspect, and bad under that aspect.
son:
rather my concern is with the implications of omniscience when it concerns the future…
Excellent question.
The classic Thomistic idea is this. God’s knowledge is predicated on his will. God cannot see, for instance, what he has not willed to occur. This is the case if we are talking of future (implying time, obviously) contingencies (which implies more than time - i.e. ontological inferiority.) In terms of contingencies, it must be admitted that all creatures are contingent, or not-necessary, and have their reason for being in God himself. Were God to cease willing their being, they would cease to be. Were God cease thinking about them, their identity would cease to be as well.
Now, what this means is that there is no creature which can determine God’s knowledge. Indeed, how could it? No being can act, unless moved, ultimately, by God. No creature can exist unless he holds it in existence. Consider these two things very seriously. It follows from them that, the way creatures act - if they perform good - is determined by God, as gift through grace, or permitted through wisdom. Unless this is so, we must posit the creatures “acting on their own” or being, in a sense, their own “God’s.” They would be existing in a sort of Platonic state, outside of God’s influence. Creatures would then be able to determine God’s knowledge, for he would look “at” them and gain information “by” them. When we know a thing, we take it in, and it affects our minds. It, so to speak, *determines *our knowledge, whether we like it or not. This cannot be the case with God.
From this it follows that what God knows, he knows because he has determinately willed to know: either by postive or permissive decree. How, for instance, could God know that it was Peter who was approaching, unless God had willed for Peter to do this, and consequently for God to know it? Indeed, if he had not willed to know it, how could Peter be approaching (moving on his own causation)? How could Peter’s contingency of walking be
true? What would *ground *it?
The key to understanding God’s knowledge is to stop thinking in terms of eternity and time, and start thinking of necessity verse contingency. Many think that to posit God in eternity solves the problem, because then they say that God just “sees” future contingencies. Yet, if this was the whole story, God’s knowledge would be like our own. It would “take in” and he would be “determined by” what he saw. In a sense, God would be ignorant, and, ontologically speaking, would be determined by the very contingent beings he created in wisdom and perfect, infallible foresight and decree - which would of course be impossible.
Great questions.