The Ultimate Question

[Spock]

First of all, I think it is a mistake to assume we need Satan in order to commit evil. We humans have shown that we are more than capable to perform evil acts without his prodding. Your question has been debated for centuries by the greatest of thinkers and you have rejected the response of greater good/free will. I understand that because your unbelief in God does not allow you to accept that answer.

Not really. I reject them because they are logically incoherent. I would reject them even if I did believe in God.

For example, let’s say a terrible crime is committed in which innocent people are killed and untold pain and suffering is heaped on the victim’s family. A Christian will take solace in the fact that the innocent will be richly rewarded for their undeserved sacrifice and the families and even the public might learn valuable lessons from that evil. If you don’t believe in that reward or that we can learn from that pain and suffering and perhaps become better people, then of course this question will never be answered to your satisfaction. Make any sense?

Let me analyze your example. The “greater good” defense presumes that the “evil” part was logically necessary for the reward. Even if I accepted that the reward compensates for the suffering (which I don’t), I would have to reject the “greater good” defense, because there is no logical connection between the suffering and the reward. God could heap all sorts of rewards on the family, even if the atrocities never happened. Moreover, the “greater good” defense assumes that all the pain and suffering was necessary, and not one bit of it could have been omitted.

The other part of your argument is the “teaching” effect of the deed. It is a Catholic doctrine that humans have their dignity, and it is morally unacceptable to use humans as teaching tools. Also, you correctly used the word “perhaps” above. You cannot even be sure that such indignity and such an atrocity will certainly make changes in those who witness it. So how can a “perhaps” justify the atrocity?

You see, my objections have nothing to do with my lack of belief in God.

 

[Spock]

I think that’s all fair enough. The point of free will defenses however are to say that significant free will is such a great good that the creation of free agents who perform evil actions is justifiable, and thus compatible with omnibenevolence. So you still have yet to show the contradiction. The reason I distinguish between “defenses” and “theodicies” is because a theodicy attempts to explain “why?” I don’t think I can answer that question for everything.

Ok, let’s continue. First of all I do not accept that “free will” is so valuable that its existence justifies evil actions. But that is my personal opinion, so you can disregard it. We could explore this in a different thread, if you want to.

The problem is this: “free will can only explain the potentiality of evil, but not the actuality of evil”. It is true that “free will” logically and inevitably leads to the potentiality of evil. It cannot be shown (or proven) that the potentiality of evil will logically and necessarily lead to the actuality of evil, so this defense is logically faulty. Indeed, it is not logically contradictory, but it is still logically faulty. At this point we could go and explore the whole “transworld depravity”. To make it sweet and short, I can be prove (mathematically) that God can create a world with full free will, and no actuality of evil. Plantinga himself only says that “maybe” it is impossible to create such a world. He does not say that it is impossible, only that it may be impossible - which is not an argument. And he is wrong even in his weakened version.

Also, with the fourth one you seem to have a distaste for, I think it’s actually a fair reply, although I don’t like it as much myself. But God is not the type of agent which has obligations to creatures.

I disagree. Even if there is an incredible difference between God and us, we are both assumed to be moral agents (Catholic doctrine: we are created in the image of God). As such there are common obligations, despite the differences. What you say is the fallacy of special pleading.

BTW, there is an analogous argument by atheists, of the form “No, there’s so much evil in the world there could be no God! It’s impossible! But you’re all just blind to the truth and reason!!” I find this one to be the least compelling of course.

If you ever catch me saying that, please feel free to rub my nose into it. However, the amount of evil, and the lack of sufficiently logical theodicy makes the existence of a benevolent God impossible. It is still possible that God exists, but if he does, he cannot be called benevolent.

 

[awatkins69]

Ok, let’s continue. First of all I do not accept that “free will” is so valuable that its existence justifies evil actions. But that is my personal opinion, so you can disregard it. We could explore this in a different thread, if you want to.

The problem is this: “free will can only explain the potentiality of evil, but not to the actuality of evil”. It is true that “free will” logically and inevitably leads to the potentiality of evil. It cannot be shown (or proven) that the potentiality of evil will logically and necessarily lead to the actuality of evil, so this defense is logically faulty. Indeed, it is not logically contradictory, but it is still logically faulty. At this point we could go and explore the whole “transworld depravity”. To make it sweet and short, I can be prove (mathematically) that God can create a world with full free will, and no actuality of evil. Plantinga himself only says that “maybe” it is impossible to create such a world. He does not say that it is impossible, only that it may be impossible - which is not an argument. And he is wrong even in his weakened version.

While I used to think that Plantinga was right in saying it is metaphysically impossible for God to create a world with no evil, after discussing this on the forums with someone else I changed my mind. So I admit it is possible for God to create a world with no evils.

Still, after thinking about it, I think there is another way to make the free will defense work. But first, I want to understand the problem. Is this a correct understanding of your view? I don’t want to straw-man you, so let me know if I’m off the mark. Let’s call this the No Evils Principle (NEP):

(NEP) There is some moral principle in the nature of God which prohibits him from creating a creature who does something immoral.

Is that fair enough? If I get that straight, I can explain.

I disagree. Even if there is an incredible difference between God and us, we are both assumed to be moral agents (Catholic doctrine: we are created in the image of God). As such there are common obligations, despite the differences. What you say is the fallacy of special pleading.

No special pleading my friend. We are created in the image of God insofar as we have intellect and will. But we are not identical. If we understand God according to at least the classical theistic way, and we understand meta-ethics in a perfectionist/ethical naturalist way, then just a simple application of general meta-ethical principles shows us that God doesn’t have obligations to creatures. But I won’t go on about that, since your thread deals with free will and such. We must save that for another day.

 

[awatkins69]

BTW, I don’t want to derail your thread. I did read your original post earlier, and I know you’re looking more for an answer to the “why” than a free will defense. So if you want to discuss it more, if you’d like, we can make another thread. All up to you though…

 

[Spock]

While I used to think that Plantinga was right in saying it is metaphysically impossible for God to create a world with no evil, after discussing this on the forums with someone else I changed my mind. So I admit it is possible for God to create a world with no evils.

Still, after thinking about it, I think there is another way to make the free will defense work. But first, I want to understand the problem. Is this a correct understanding of your view? I don’t want to straw-man you, so let me know if I’m off the mark. Let’s call this the No Evils Principle (NEP):

(NEP) There is some moral principle in the nature of God which prohibits him from creating a creature who does something immoral.

Is that fair enough? If I get that straight, I can explain.

Yes, let’s use your principle as a starting point. It is a good principle.

Just to be safe, let me define “immoral” as “actively committing or passively allowing an act which causes harm and which harm cannot be justified”. A harm can be justified if there is some “greater good” to compensate for it. A few pages ago I gave a detailed set of requirements, and I will repeat them here:

1. The recipient of the “greater good” must be the same who endured the harm. It is unacceptable to inflict some harm on person “A”, so that person “B” will reap some benefits. Unless, of course person “A” volunteers for it, and is aware of the consequences.
2. The “greater good” must really outweigh the harm in the eyes of the sufferer. And if the sufferer is mature and lucid, he must be asked first, if he wants the harm. A doctor is obligated to ask, as long as the patient is in the position to make the decision.
3. The harm cannot be lessened without losing the benefit.
4. The harm must be a logical prerequisite to the benefit. If the same benefit can be reached without the harm, the harm cannot be justified.
   I just mentioned these to clear of the “underbrush” before we start to work on the tree.

No special pleading my friend. We are created in the image of God insofar as we have intellect and will. But we are not identical. If we understand God according to at least the classical theistic way, and we understand meta-ethics in a perfectionist/ethical naturalist way, then just a simple application of general meta-ethical principles shows us that God doesn’t have obligations to creatures. But I won’t go on about that, since your thread deals with free will and such. We must save that for another day.

Ok, let’s postpone it. Truly irrelevant for the topic at hand.

 

[awatkins69]

Good. I just wanted to make sure I wasn’t straw-manning you. I’m going to restate (NEP) just for convenience:

-(NEP) There is some moral principle in the nature of God which prohibits him from creating a creature who does something immoral.

Now, this is my general form of argument. Like I said, we assume that significant free will is a great good. Now, I want you to understand what I mean by this phrase. Someone performs an action significantly freely just in case he freely refrains from a duty or freely refrains from doing something immoral. Let’s call this the Significant Freedom Principle (SFP).

-(SFP) It is not the case that God’s nature contains a moral principle that would make it impossible for him to create a significantly free person.

What I argue for is the conditional C: (NEP) implies not-(SFP). Our free will defense says that (SEP) since we assume the great value of significant freedom. Thus, not-(NEP).

Here’s how I argue for that conditional. First I need this highly plausible principle:

-If it is logically impossible for someone to do something immoral, then he lacks significant freedom.

Classical theists usually understand God to be a necessary being, i.e. one which exists in all possible worlds (as we talked about a while back). That means that necessarily, any contingent being is a creature of God. So if (NEP) is correct, and if it is logically necessary that every contingent being is a creature of God, then it is logically impossible that a contingent being does anything immoral. Thus, it is logically impossible that any person does anything immoral. Hence, it is impossible that any person have significant freedom. This implies that (SFP) is false, and thus C is true. Modus tollens then, (NEP) is false.

 

[Spock]

Good. I just wanted to make sure I wasn’t straw-manning you. I’m going to restate (NEP) just for convenience:

-(NEP) There is some moral principle in the nature of God which prohibits him from creating a creature who does something immoral.

Now, this is my general form of argument. Like I said, we assume that significant free will is a great good. Now, I want you to understand what I mean by this phrase. Someone performs an action significantly freely just in case he freely refrains from a duty or freely refrains from doing something immoral. Let’s call this the Significant Freedom Principle (SFP).

-(SFP) It is not the case that God’s nature contains a moral principle that would make it impossible for him to create a significantly free person.

What I argue for is the conditional C: (NEP) implies not-(SFP). Our free will defense says that (SEP) since we assume the great value of significant freedom. Thus, not-(NEP).

Here’s how I argue for that conditional. First I need this highly plausible principle:

-If it is logically impossible for someone to do something immoral, then he lacks significant freedom.

Classical theists usually understand God to be a necessary being, i.e. one which exists in all possible worlds (as we talked about a while back). That means that necessarily, any contingent being is a creature of God. So if (NEP) is correct, and if it is logically necessary that every contingent being is a creature of God, then it is logically impossible that a contingent being does anything immoral. Thus, it is logically impossible that any person does anything immoral. Hence, it is impossible that any person have significant freedom. This implies that (SFP) is false, and thus C is true. Modus tollens then, (NEP) is false.

Well, you sure said a whole lot in such a short post. But I have a question. I will concentrate on your highlighted principle. What does it mean that for someone it would be “logically impossible” to commit anything immoral? I simply don’t understand this concept. I do understand physically impossible, or psychologically impossible.

Let me clarify: for me it is physically impossible to “will” that every bad person would be turned into a good person. Likewise, it is physically impossible for me to “will” that every bad person would cease to exist. I have no “freedom” to achieve something “very good” (first example) or to achieve something “very bad” (second example) - by simply “willing it”. Does that mean that I have no significant freedom?

Or another example, more realistic than the previous one. It is physically possible for me to grab a knife and kill my wife. However, it is phychologically impossible for me to perform this act. It is even phychologically impossible for me to take extra cash in the grocery store, if the clerk would happen to make a mistake in my favor. It happened before, and I even contemplated it for a split of a second, and I found it impossible to take the cash. There is an urge to take it, and it is immediately overridden by my “programming”. Does that mean that I lack significant freedom?

So, just what does “logically impossible” mean?

 

[Gregory_I]

It is impossible because it is illogical.

 

[EricFilmer]

Justice means that the reward/punishment be commensurate to the deed. Mercy means that the punishment be less than deserved. (There is no word for overly great, undeserved reward). Therefore a sentence cannot be both commensurate to and less than what the deed deserved. Hence the contradiction. A sentence can be either just or merciful, but can never be both.

The problem with your definition of justice (based on what you stated above and earlier in this thread) is that you are saying that justice cannot be truly satisfied unless all the consequences of a crime are completely undone. Obviously it is impossible for humans to practice this type of justice, because we lack the ability to erase the past. Furthermore, from a theological perspective, God does not do this either because (if for no other reason) it would involve the violation of freewill. So, in essence, you are discussing aspects of justice with a definition that no one believes in (from either a secular or theological perspective).

Because crimes are practiced in a temporal realm, justice has its limitations (i.e., it cannot erase the crime and make it so it never happened). Rather, justice seeks restitution to the extent that is possible. If restitution is to the fullest extent of what is truly possible then we tend to use the expression, “Justice is satisfied”. What is possible for God is far more than what is possible for the human legal system, but only God knows the details of how he renders justice. As a Catholic I am to trust that God will take care of it, and that justice will be satisfied.

In light of all this, justice and mercy are not contradictory. The satisfaction of justice can be tempered by mercy, as I have stated before. This happens all the time in our civil legal system, and God says that he does it also for those who want his mercy. God, because of his very nature, is obligated to mete out justice. Mercy, however, is a gift.

Uh-oh. This is getting a but fuzzy. Using your theft example, does a restitution happen if the thief gave back one dollar of the 1000 he stole?

Obviously it is a partial restitution (1/1000th of a part to be exact). But is justice satisfied? No, because in this case it is certainly within the realm of possibility for the entire $1000 to be restored.

And, of course, just what kind of a restitution can happen in a rape/murder/torture case? And how can justice be satisfied by “partially” undoing the crime?

Once again, the idea of “undoing crime” is yours. Neither civic justice nor divine justice undoes crime. Justice, civic and divine, satisfies justice by other means. The specifics of how God ultimately takes care of the victims of brutal crime is unknown to me. Hence my belief in the justice of God is founded upon faith and trust.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

Yes, I am familiar with the story. The question is “why was it necessary?”. If you say that justice means restitution. what was “restored” by this sacrifice? If God is “mercfiful”, why was that sacrifice logically necessary?

I already answered this question in Post #119 (which you chose not to respond to). I will cut & paste the relevant information from Post #119 here:

God is Life Itself. Sin is the rejection of God and therefore the rejection of life. The only realistic consequence of the rejection of life is death, which is why the Bible teaches that the wages of sin is death. Jesus paid this wage on behalf of all humanity by dying on the cross for our sins.

In dying on the cross, Jesus accepted the deadly consequences of all sin and in turn allowed fallen humanity to be reconciled with God. What was restored was our relationship with God (and therefore Life) which was disrupted by sin (which rejects God and life).

I am trying to keep the conversation on a platform which can be accepted by both of us. And it is very difficult to do. I ask you not to use the types of arguments like “God will deal with it at the end of times”, because you know full well that such arguments are meaningless for atheists. Also I ask you not to say something like “God’s notion of mercy and justice”. It is your notion (your notion as a believer) not God’s.

Objectively speaking, if an eternal divine being exists who is omniscient and omnipotent then it is impossible for a mortal human like me to fully understand how he wields such power. Divine revelation tells me that he does certain things but not always how it is done. You are asking me to come up with philosophical arguments for how God wields his power without basing my responses on his revelation. Well, maybe someone else feels capable of such a task, but personally I have to ground my responses in this thread with divine revelation. Statements such as “God will deal with it at the end of time” are true, even if they are not meaningful to you. Of course, I understand that such responses will not be satisfactory to you, so I will not have an issue with you for dismissing them in the context of this discussion.

And if it is different from mine, then we are unable to create a common platform, and thus no meaningful conversation can take place. At that point we can try to reconcile the differences. As an example, right now I have no idea how do you define “restitution”? And what level of restitution will “satisfy” justice? These are fully “secular” questions, not theological.

See what I stated above.

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

Well, that is the crucial point. How is it possible to “love” someone whose very existence is in doubt?

I agree that this is a crucial point, but not necessarily part of this discussion. Plus, I doubt if you will find my answer “meaningful.” To love a person one has to experience that person, and there are certain ways by which we experience God. They not only involve faith, but also the “leap of faith.” It involves participating in spiritual practices, such as prayer. But if you want to continue this conversation then it would be best to start a new thread discussion with this question. It is, after all, getting off-topic to this discussion, and you would also get a wider range of (name removed by moderator)ut in a separate thread. I doubt if I would participate in that thread, though, because it all comes down to the idea of convincing an atheist to pray, which, in my personal experience, can be a highly futile endeavor.

Since I violated the first commandment, I am already in the state of mortal sin. And I was “free” to do it. That is what separates the goats from the sheep. Why is there a need for “additional” freedom?

Actually, what separates the sheep from the goats (according to its origins in the Gospel of Matthew) is acting charitable or not acting charitable (to those in need). But to answer your question, because you have additional freedom, the possibility is still open for you to make choices that would put you in a state of grace before time runs out for you.

Originally posted by EricFilmer:
If God limits the freedom we have to commit atrocities then he likewise limits our ability to do great acts of love. After all, if I have the freedom to do a great sin, but I refrain from the temptation out of the love I have for God and my neighbor, then that is a great expression of love. The greater the temptation and the greater our capacity to do sin, the greater the exercise of virtue which overcomes it.

Not so fast. If you want our discussion to be “meaningful” and “reasonable” then, likewise, if you are going to attempt to refute my position you will need to do so within the parameters I set. Focusing on one part of my position while ignoring the rest is not going to cut it. Kindly keep that in mind the next time you feel compelled to denounce something I’ve posted as being “nonsense.”

Here is specifically what I am talking about. Notice how you chose to address my position. I stated (and I will bold some words for emphasis), “…if I have the freedom to do a great sin, but I refrain from the temptation out of love for God and my neighbor, then that is a great expression of love.” In your attempted rebuttal, you came up with an example that only addressed the concept of freedom, but not the concept of temptation. After all, you clearly admitted that you have the freedom to “raise a shovel and hit (your child)” but you also clearly stated that there is no temptation involved here (i.e. “…which I don’t want to perform in the first place”). So if you are going to use your personal experience with your child to refute my position, you need to address times when you exercised the freedom to do virtuous things (nurture, caress, etc.) in the midst of temptation to do opposing sinful things. And that is only the first step. Next, you would need to explain why the choice to practice virtue and resist the temptation to sin did not make you a better (and therefore more loving) parent.

Also keep in mind what Gregory I stated in Post #131 (which you have not yet addressed):
“Provide an example of freedom to love that does not involve freedom to harm.”

(Continued in my next post)

 

[EricFilmer]

(Continued…)

Is this another “numbers-game”?

I’m not sure what you mean by “numbers –game”. You are also implying that I have done this in the past. Please define what a “numbers-game” is and then provide a quote from me that demonstrates me playing it.

You don’t have the freedom to wipe out your neighborhood by simply “willing” it. You are not “free to do this”. Is now your love toward your neighbor is somehow less meaningful because you are unable to curse him to smithereens? If you had that power, would your “love” increase?

Throughout this discussion you have been trying to present a very limited definition of restraint. More specifically, you propose a possible action (either realistically or theoretically) and then draw conclusions based on whether or not the action was performed. What you have been avoiding is addressing the reason why it was or was not performed. When we speak of love as a virtue, whether it increases or decreases depends on how it was exercised in the context of certain types of temptation to do otherwise.

To address your specific question, let us say that I had the power for committing an atrocity greater than what I have now, such as disintegrating my neighbor. And let us say that there was some situation that tempted me to do so to satisfy some sensation of hate, but I chose not to. Does this result in an increase of love? Maybe, maybe not. The question is, why did I not disintegrate him? If I was afraid of going to prison or being executed as a result of wielding this power, then my restraint was based more on “love of self” rather than “love of neighbor”, and love of self is narcissism, so it is not the virtuous love that we are discussing. But if my restraint is based upon my desire to be reconciled with my neighbor, to work to overcome the hatred which tempts me, then by exercising the virtues of love of neighbor, peace and patience I likewise grow stronger in them. It seems to me that this is especially true because dealing with my neighbor in a virtuous way is harder (in terms of time, energy, emotional commitment, etc.) than simply blasting him out of existence so I can’t be bothered by him anymore.

To address the other aspect of your question, is my current love for my neighbor “less meaningful” because of the human limitations I have, and therefore unable to either love or hate him in a greater capacity? I don’t really think “less meaningful” is the best term to use here. But naturally God can love others in a greater capacity than me, and Satan can hate others in a greater capacity than me. If this makes my capacity for love “less meaningful” than God’s then that seems pretty obvious. If this makes my capacity for hate less meaningful than Satan’s then I guess that seems very natural. But I am only responsible for the bar that is realistically set for me. My capacity to do evil, although lesser than Satan’s, still can result in me being a great horrific sinner, so I guess we can say that it is “meaningful enough.” Moreover, my capacity to love can result in me being a great saint, a true champion of virtue. In this sense, my love of neighbor is incredibly meaningful in the context of human accomplishments, but still less meaningful than divine love.

 

[awatkins69]

Hi Spock. I use my modal terms in the same way most people do. Something is logically impossible just in case there is no possible world where it obtains. So the phrase “it is logically impossible for someone to do something immoral” is equivalent to saying “there is no possible world where someone does something immoral.” Clear enough?

We can contrast this with physical possibility for example. It is physically impossible for me to hop four hundred feet in the air, but it is not logically impossible. As for “psychological” impossibility, that’s a completely different thing. In that scenario where you wouldn’t take the extra money (which I am very happy to know you didn’t, as many people these days look for hand outs) you were quite free in your actions in my opinion. Of course this gets into decision theory and ideas about compatibilism, libertarianism, etc. And these are irrelevant to my argument.

So anyways, even a compatibilist then could accept this quite plausible claim. I’m not good with fancy names, so I’m just going to call it highlighted principle (HP):
(HP) If there is no possible world where someone does anything immoral, then he does not have significant free will.

It’s equivalent to what you highlighted, just it should hopefully be more clear to you now.

 

[NYTony]

You see, my objections have nothing to do with my lack of belief in God.

Why have any objections? As an unbeliever, I presume you already have an answer to the question based on human reason, observation, and life experience. I can only speculate that the answer would have to be that evil is committed through instinct, rejection of evolved social morays, mental disorder, or some other biological trait. Doesn’t the disbelief in God negate any need for philosophical or logical proofs? Why does it matter? Why ask us to posit proofs in order to defend Church teaching or some Thomist/Augustinian defense?

If one believes in a benevolent God, we know through faith that His Providence ultimately leads to victory and glory. No matter how ugly the trials; no matter how heartbreaking the pain; no matter how incomprehensible it is to the human mind, we know that if we can perservere, we can find eternal bliss and peace. No cross, no crown. We have had this prophesied to us, demonstrated to us through Christ Jesus, and taught to us by the Church for 2,000 years. I know it is not the answer you are looking for, but it is all I got brother.

 

[Spock]

Hi Spock. I use my modal terms in the same way most people do. Something is logically impossible just in case there is no possible world where it obtains. So the phrase “it is logically impossible for someone to do something immoral” is equivalent to saying “there is no possible world where someone does something immoral.” Clear enough?

Thank you, it is very clear. I would also like to add that the opposite is also true.

(HP-x) If there is no possible world where someone does anything moral, then he does not have significant free will.

Now, let’s go back to your argument.

-(NEP) There is some moral principle in the nature of God which prohibits him from creating a creature who does something immoral.

Now, this is my general form of argument. Like I said, we assume that significant free will is a great good. Now, I want you to understand what I mean by this phrase. Someone performs an action significantly freely just in case he freely refrains from a duty or freely refrains from doing something immoral. Let’s call this the Significant Freedom Principle (SFP).

-(SFP) It is not the case that God’s nature contains a moral principle that would make it impossible for him to create a significantly free person.

What I argue for is the conditional C: (NEP) implies not-(SFP). Our free will defense says that (SEP) since we assume the great value of significant freedom. Thus, not-(NEP).

Here’s how I argue for that conditional. First I need this highly plausible principle:

-If it is logically impossible for someone to do something immoral, then he lacks significant freedom.

Classical theists usually understand God to be a necessary being, i.e. one which exists in all possible worlds (as we talked about a while back). That means that necessarily, any contingent being is a creature of God. So if (NEP) is correct, and if it is logically necessary that every contingent being is a creature of God, then it is logically impossible that a contingent being does anything immoral. Thus, it is logically impossible that any person does anything immoral. Hence, it is impossible that any person have significant freedom. This implies that (SFP) is false, and thus C is true. Modus tollens then, (NEP) is false.

I agree with your argument. You presented it very well. You proved that there is no moral principle in God’s nature which will prevent him from creating a world where someone, somewhere makes an immoral decision.

We also agreed, that it is also possible for God to create a world where everyone, always makes a moral decison - and yet the beings also have significant freedom. Essentially this means that God has the freedom to create a world with evil or without evil - and still retain the “significant freedom” for the created creatures.

Now, from the fact that this world does contain evil, what can you say about the “moral nature” of God? If someone is free to do evil and free to do no evil, and chooses to do evil, what can you say about his nature? Let’s not forget that you do not use the “a-posteriori greater good” argument here. You do not say that the evil created / allowed by God can be justified by stipulating some corollary to it. Its existence is not necessary even if one stipulates that the existence of “significant freedom” is the “a-priori greater good” - since God can create a world with significant freedom and no evil in it. As such at least some of the evil God created is gratuitous, unnecessary. And whatever adjective you wish to use to describe God in this case, it cannot be “benevolent”.

 

[Spock]

The problem with your definition of justice (based on what you stated above and earlier in this thread) is that you are saying that justice cannot be truly satisfied unless all the consequences of a crime are completely undone.

Yes, this is what I would call perfect justice. As you correctly observed, this is impossible for humans.

Because crimes are practiced in a temporal realm, justice has its limitations (i.e., it cannot erase the crime and make it so it never happened). Rather, justice seeks restitution to the extent that is possible. If restitution is to the fullest extent of what is truly possible then we tend to use the expression, “Justice is satisfied”. What is possible for God is far more than what is possible for the human legal system, but only God knows the details of how he renders justice. As a Catholic I am to trust that God will take care of it, and that justice will be satisfied.

Fine. This is your belief, based upon your faith. I only hope you understand that it is not something that is even remotely satisfactory for an atheist.

In light of all this, justice and mercy are not contradictory. The satisfaction of justice can be tempered by mercy, as I have stated before. This happens all the time in our civil legal system, and God says that he does it also for those who want his mercy. God, because of his very nature, is obligated to mete out justice. Mercy, however, is a gift.

This is not substantiated. If you say that God has the full picture (which is not available for us) and renders his judgment based upon that complete information, then his sentence will be just. This still leaves no place for “mercy”.

Obviously it is a partial restitution (1/1000th of a part to be exact). But is justice satisfied? No, because in this case it is certainly within the realm of possibility for the entire $1000 to be restored.

I agree.

Once again, the idea of “undoing crime” is yours. Neither civic justice nor divine justice undoes crime. Justice, civic and divine, satisfies justice by other means. The specifics of how God ultimately takes care of the victims of brutal crime is unknown to me. Hence my belief in the justice of God is founded upon faith and trust.

So we are off into la-la land again. You have your faith and trust and that is all. You do not have any specific arguments beyond that. Where does that leave us? Is there any need to continue?

 

[awatkins69]

I agree with your argument. You presented it very well. You proved that there is no moral principle in God’s nature which will prevent him from creating a world where someone, somewhere makes an immoral decision.

We also agreed, that it is also possible for God to create a world where everyone, always makes a moral decison - and yet the beings also have significant freedom. Essentially this means that God has the freedom to create a world with evil or without evil - and still retain the “significant freedom” for the created creatures.

Now, from the fact that this world does contain evil, what can you say about the “moral nature” of God? If someone is free to do evil and free to do no evil, and chooses to do evil, what can you say about his nature? Let’s not forget that you do not use the “a-posteriori greater good” argument here. You do not say that the evil created / allowed by God can be justified by stipulating some corollary to it. Its existence is not necessary even if one stipulates that the existence of “significant freedom” is the “a-priori greater good” - since God can create a world with significant freedom and no evil in it. As such at least some of the evil God created is gratuitous, unnecessary. And whatever adjective you wish to use to describe God in this case, it cannot be “benevolent”.

I’m glad you liked the argument. However, I’m very confused now. You admitted that there is no moral principle in the nature of God which prevents Him from creating a world where someone commits an evil action. Then you end up saying there is no way that God is omnibenevolent, because he created a world where people commit evil actions. Either my argument worked or it didn’t my friend. Please, if it wasn’t clear, understand that I consider the nature of God to contain attributes such as omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence. If you want, I can reformulate the argument to make it more clear that I’m dealing with an omnibenevolent God. Best.

 

[Spock]

I’m glad you liked the argument. However, I’m very confused now. You admitted that there is no moral principle in the nature of God which prevents Him from creating a world where someone commits an evil action. Then you end up saying there is no way that God is omnibenevolent, because he created a world where people commit evil actions. Either my argument worked or it didn’t my friend. Please, if it wasn’t clear, understand that I consider the nature of God to contain attributes such as omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotence. If you want, I can reformulate the argument to make it more clear that I’m dealing with an omnibenevolent God. Best.

The thing is that you did not specify God’s nature before. It was stated as a generic “God’s nature”. From the argument it follows that God can create any world with any number of evil actions, and none of them leads to a logical contradiction - from zero evil actions to “all” evil actions. Nowhere in your argument have you utilized that God must be benevolent.

Going back to the mini-example we used previously, let’s consider the world with only one morally charged dilemma. There are two possible worlds, W1, where the agent resolves the dilemma morally, and W2, where the agent resolves the dilemma immorally. The principle of significant freedom says that both W1 and W2 must be possible worlds. If only one of them would be possible, then the PSF would be violated.

Therefore God can freely choose to instantiate either W1 or W2. If he chooses to instantiate W1, there are no immoral decisions in the actual world (in other words: no evil exists). If he chooses W2, there will be no moral decisons (in other words: there will be evil). In W2 there is no justification for the evil. Therefore the evil is not necessary. Therefore God is not benevolent. Now, if you could show that God is not free to choose W1, if you could show that W1 somehow leads to a logical contradiction - which means that W1 is not a possible world - then God would be “off hook”, so to speak. But that would mean that the PSF is violated.

You see, the sword cuts both ways. The PSF stipulates that the agent must be able to choose either morally or immoraly - in some possible world. Previously you said: “If there is no possible world where someone does anything immoral, then he does not have significant free will” - which is true, and I agree with it. But the reverse is also true as I pointed it out: “If there is no possible world where someone does anything moral, then he does not have significant free will”. Are we in synch now?

 

[awatkins69]

You see, the sword cuts both ways. The PSF stipulates that the agent must be able to choose either morally or immoraly - in some possible world. Previously you said: “If there is no possible world where someone does anything immoral, then he does not have significant free will” - which is true, and I agree with it. But the reverse is also true as I pointed it out: “If there is no possible world where someone does anything moral, then he does not have significant free will”. Are we in synch now?

Okay. That’s good then. So I should utilize the benevolence of God, right?

Also, just because we deny the principle NEP does not imply that it is impossible that anyone does anything moral. We don’t say that God must create some world where there is evil in my argument.

Anyways, just state the NEP and SFP’s these ways. Call them NEP* and SFP*.

(NEP*) The nature of an essentially omnibenevolent and omnipotent God contains a moral principle, which he necessarily acts on as he is omnibenevolent, that would prohibit Him from creating a person that does something immoral.

(SFP*) It is not the case that God’s omnibenevolent nature contains any moral principle that would make it logically impossible for God to create a significantly free person.

I don’t think I need to re-write the entire argument again. I still say that NEP* implies not-SFP* with the same line of reasoning. The argument is the same as before. And if you didn’t reject any premises or lines of reasoning before, it’s hard to see how the more clear definition changes much. But I’ll wait to see what you think.

And again, I don’t attempt to explain why God allows specific evil actions. This just shows that there is no logical contradiction.

 

[EricFilmer]

Originally Posted by EricFilmer

So justice demands that the impossible be done?
Where is the justice in that?
Based on your definition, justice is itself unjust.

Originally Posted by EricFilmer

Haven’t I already stated as much? From Post #147: “I understand that such responses will not be satisfactory to you, so I will not have an issue with you for dismissing them in the context of this discussion.”
But in the end of my next post I will say more on whether or not my entire statement has any objective philosophical merit.

This is not substantiated. If you say that God has the full picture (which is not available for us) and renders his judgment based upon that complete information, then his sentence will be just. This still leaves no place for “mercy”.

So you still believe that a sentence passed down by a judge (human or divine) can only be one of justice or one of mercy, but never have elements of both? As I stated before, justice can be tempered with mercy.

For example, let us say that a thief is caught and convicted. And let us say that what he stole was returned to its rightful owner. And moreover, let us say that the judge gives him the maximum prison sentence allowed by law. In this case, it seems that justice is satisfied (to the limited degree that humans can mete out justice). But time goes by and the thief becomes a model inmate and demonstrates to a parole board that he is no longer a threat to society. The parole board then shortens his sentence, which can be viewed as an act of mercy (i.e., he ended up getting less of a prison sentence than he deserved). Does this later act of mercy completely undo the satisfaction of justice? If the thief was sentenced to ten years in prison but only served seven, don’t those seven years still count as an application of justice? Based on my viewpoint, this is an example of justice tempered by mercy. Based on your view, this is an act of mercy that completely undoes the justice that was imposed.

And consider this as well. In this thread you have said that justice demands full restitution and anything less than that is an act of mercy for the criminal:

Post #136: “Justice means that the reward/punishment be commensurate to the deed. Mercy means that the punishment be less than deserved… Therefore a sentence cannot be both commensurate to and less than what the deed deserved. Hence the contradiction. A sentence can be either just or merciful, but can never be both."

Moreover, your concept of full restitution is to completely undo the crime, which we both agree is impossible:

Post #155: “Yes, this is what I would call perfect justice. As you correctly observed, this is impossible for humans.”

Therefore, every time judges pass sentences on criminals, they always fall short of what the criminals deserve, which is your definition of mercy. Hence, the ramification of your views is that our legal system (in reality) is set up to always provide mercy for criminals but never justice for victims and society. In the entire history of the judicial systems on this planet, no civil court ever passed down a sentence of justice, and no civil court ever will. How many judges and prosecuting attorneys do you think would agree with this view?

(Continued in my next post)