Theism and Morality

[EnterTheBowser]

I want to stress that though this thread is a response to questions about atheism and morality, we should not spend our time addressing whether atheism entails nihilism or relativism or whatever. That question is besides the point for the moment - we can resolve the issues I’ve brought up without discussing atheism and morality. That’s why the thread is called "Theism and Morality," after all.

Twice in your introduction you made this point. Evidently you want the rules of the game to be entirely in your favor. You want to attack Thesism and Morality without allowing the Theist to address the alternative to Theism and Morality … the absurd spectacle of Atheistic Relativism.

I made the point twice because I expected people to bring it up and I wanted to be very clear what this discussion is about. “Atheistic Relativism” is a distraction in this case. We can discuss theism and morality regardless of what we think of it - the truth or falsity of “Atheistic Relativism” does not bear on the discussion.

The point I am really trying to make in this discussion is this: regardless of whether atheism entails nihilism, relativism, or egoism, theism doesn’t get us anywhere we can’t go with atheism.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Gilbert Keith:

BOWSER

Is it good simply because it is the morality grounded by God, or is there some other reason why this morality is good?

Anything grounded in God is good. It needs no other justification.

…

In that case - is it possible that the morality grounded in God held that incestual rape was, in fact, obligatory?

 

[abcdefg]

EnterTheBowser:

In that case - is it possible that the morality grounded in God held that incestual rape was, in fact, obligatory?

If God taught us incestual rape is obligatory, then it is obligatory. but God knows good and evil so that scenery never come true. That’s why you should worship God not Satan nor the majority of people.

 

[Declaration]

abcdefg:

If God taught us incestual rape is obligatory, then it is obligatory.

In your dreams.

 

[abcdefg]

Declaration:

In your dreams.

please read my post as a whole. instead of just the first sentence.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

abcdefg:

If God taught us incestual rape is obligatory, then it is obligatory. but God knows good and evil so that scenery never come true.

…

This seems a strange post, in that you first admit that if God said rape was morally obligatory, rape would be morally obligatory, but also say that God would not say this, because rape is wrong. In other words, it seems to me that this has happened:

EnterTheBowser: “Are the things God commands good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good?”

abcdefg: “Yes.”

This seems problematic, since I doubt that both sides of the dilemma can be true.

 

[Tantum_ergo]

There’s nothing wrong with a good discussion, the sort where a person makes a statement, and another person states why he agrees or disagrees, the first responds, etc.

However, if a person makes a statement, another person states why he agrees or disagrees, and the first does not respond to that but rather tries to start another topic, or dismisses what the person said as ‘irrelevant’, or insists on his or her POV or definition as being the ONLY thing to consider if even another person’s POV or definition is the point under discussion to begin with. . .or a whole HOST of other scenarios, you get the picture. . .

Then we do not have discussion. We have one person attempting to run the whole show, to make the statement, the counterstatement as he THINKS the other person responds with, and a further rebuttal of that “counterstatement” ad infinitum.

A win-win situation for that person. He makes the statements, he introduces only what responses he will allow (support) or can totally deny any responses he does not feel support him. . .

As I said, discussion is great. So let’s discuss. Let’s not attempt to set artificial limits, or to “change horses in the middle of the stream”, or attempt to dominate a topic by eliminating anything that doesn’t “agree with us”.

 

[abcdefg]

EnterTheBowser:

This seems a strange post, in that you first admit that if God said rape was morally obligatory, rape would be morally obligatory, but also say that God would not say this, because rape is wrong. In other words, it seems to me that this has happened:

EnterTheBowser: “Are the things God commands good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good?”

abcdefg: “Yes.”

This seems problematic, since I doubt that both sides of the dilemma can be true.

To put it simply, we trust God only can teach the good. our own sence of good and evil mustn’t contradict God’s sence

If God commands any moral, it’s because God feels it’s good. not because humans feel it’s good

 

[Gottle_of_Geer]

EnterTheBowser:

This thread is, in a sense, a response to the frequent charge that atheism entails nihilism, relativism, egoism, or something like that. At the same time this thread is not about that particular entailment. Let’s just put that question on hold and ask ourselves: what does theism have to offer with regards to justifying morality?

So, let’s imagine that God has commanded moral system X. The question: is X moral because God commanded it, or did God command X because it is moral? Did God have some moral justification for commanding X, or is God’s command the moral justification for X?

Now, the second view has God as a sort of master philosopher, examining the universe and in ver infinite wisdom handing out the best possible sort of morality. On this view, theism might be useful, since it would be good to know what the right moral system is, but an atheistic universe would have just as much to offer with regards to justification. Whatever reasons God looked to in commanding X would exist without God - that’s the essential nature of this view. So here, theism has nothing special to offer with regards to moral justification.

This debate is a very old one.​

Theism doesn’t matter a rap - it is God Who matters, not systems of philosophy about God. So it’s of no consequence which is more interesting.

As to the model adopted, it is wretchedly inadequate, because that is not what God is like, since God is Infinite in every perfection; is, in reality, identical with His Perfections, since they are mental concepts, not realities; the only Reality is the One God. So God does not in fact cast about in His mind, wondering how He is to govern the universe: that is to view God anthropomorphically - which, unfortunately, is unavoidable.

ISTM that the divide you mention is also a convention - like the division of the simplicity of the One God into many perfections; IOW, I doubt that this division is real for anyone but men - for us, it is, I suspect, a division of things which are in reality one thing.

There’s far too much splitting of things into opposed fragments. ##

The first view is a little more interesting. Ex hypothesi God had no moral justification for whatever moral system God commanded. But what other sort of reason could God have for giving these commands? Note that any sort of reason given cannot justify this particular command; it just explains it (for example, if I make a command, a non-justificatory explanation might be a psychoanalytic one). But I don’t think any such explanation will be forthcoming - feel free to correct me and provide some sort of non-justificatory explanation if you think you’ve got one.

That seems to mean that God did not actually have any reason for commanding the moral system God commanded.

Wanting God to do so is no different from wanting God to explain Himself to man - it’s an inane idea, since God is God, and man is not. For God to explain Himself to man, would need (I suspect) an infinite revelation of Himself - and only God can receive such a thing.​

God could just have easily commanded anything - God could command us to murder our neighbors, rape our sons, worship Satan, anything. And if that’s the case, can we really say that the system God commanded is a moral system? Doesn’t it seem awfully arbitrary, in a way that an “objective” morality can’t be? So again, theism doesn’t seem to offer us any special way to ground a moral system.

A possible response might run something like this: “It is in the essential nature of God to command moral system X.”

That takes away God’s Liberty, so it is untenable. Another point - God is not the guarantor of any moral system. To think He is any such thing, is to confuse His Creativity & Faithfulness (which are real) with His being the lap-dog of religious or moral or political systems (which is a myth, and a form of idolatry.) Relative to us, God has no purpose - He is not for our use, but we are for His Glory. After all, we do not exist for the convenience of birds or trees; and neither does God exist for our convenience. And just in case we are stupid enough to think we have God sussed, the Incarnation and its results are a corrective; and fill in some of the detail of what God is​

But I think that puts us right back into the previous view. Now God has reasons for this particular moral code, and if these reasons can justify God’s commanding it, then it could equally justify X in the absence of God.

I want to stress that though this thread is a response to questions about atheism and morality, we should not spend our time addressing whether atheism entails nihilism or relativism or whatever. That question is besides the point for the moment - we can resolve the issues I’ve brought up without discussing atheism and morality. That’s why the thread is called “Theism and Morality,” after all.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Tantum ergo:

There’s nothing wrong with a good discussion, the sort where a person makes a statement, and another person states why he agrees or disagrees, the first responds, etc.

However, if a person makes a statement, another person states why he agrees or disagrees, and the first does not respond to that but rather tries to start another topic, or dismisses what the person said as ‘irrelevant’, or insists on his or her POV or definition as being the ONLY thing to consider if even another person’s POV or definition is the point under discussion to begin with. . .or a whole HOST of other scenarios, you get the picture. . .

Then we do not have discussion. We have one person attempting to run the whole show, to make the statement, the counterstatement as he THINKS the other person responds with, and a further rebuttal of that “counterstatement” ad infinitum.

A win-win situation for that person. He makes the statements, he introduces only what responses he will allow (support) or can totally deny any responses he does not feel support him. . .

As I said, discussion is great. So let’s discuss. Let’s not attempt to set artificial limits, or to “change horses in the middle of the stream”, or attempt to dominate a topic by eliminating anything that doesn’t “agree with us”.

I think you are right: I should not have asked that “Atheistic Relativism” not be discussed. This probably would be a good thread to discuss it in. The issue is related to the topic I proposed, and like you said, discussion is great. (As a matter of fact, make the argument - I think I might enjoy discussing it).

However, I will retain something of what I’ve said before: most of the points I’m going to make in this thread probably cannot be refuted by arguing that atheism entails relativism.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

abcdefg:

To put it simply, we trust God only can teach the good. our own sence of good and evil mustn’t contradict God’s sence

If God commands any moral, it’s because God feels it’s good. not because humans feel it’s good

Alright, so God has reasons for commanding the things he does, but fallible humans should just trust the command and not look for the reasons themselves. And in the case of atheism we would have no certainty with regards to these reasons, and so we would have a sort of relativism due to epistemic rather than metaphysical reasons.

In that case, I think that we’ve got a similar problem under theism - we have no more certainty regarding God’s word than we can regarding human moral reasoning. Now, it might be countered that God provides direct knowledge of his moral code to humans and circumvents the problem in that way, but I don’t think this works. I’ll admit that a genuine revelation from God would seem like a genuine revelation from God - but a fallible human could certainly mistake a false revelation for a true one. So on this view, epistemic uncertainty regarding morality remains in a theistic or an atheistic universe, just as morality exists equally in both.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Gottle of Geer:

…

]## Wanting God to do so is no different from wanting God to explain Himself to man - it’s an inane idea, since God is God, and man is not. For God to explain Himself to man, would need (I suspect) an infinite revelation of Himself - and only God can receive such a thing. ##

Is your view as follows:

God had a moral justification for “commanding” whatever moral system God commanded, but these reasons are incomprehensible to humans. So in an atheistic universe, moral truths exist but are epistemically inaccessible to humans.

That takes away God’s Liberty, so it is untenable. Another point - God is not the guarantor of any moral system. To think He is any such thing, is to confuse His Creativity & Faithfulness (which are real) with His being the lap-dog of religious or moral or political systems (which is a myth, and a form of idolatry.) Relative to us, God has no purpose - He is not for our use, but we are for His Glory. After all, we do not exist for the convenience of birds or trees; and neither does God exist for our convenience. And just in case we are stupid enough to think we have God sussed, the Incarnation and its results are a corrective; and fill in some of the detail of what God is​

Is your view:

Humans should follow God’s commands because God is the most perfect being; we ought to bring glory to the most glorious being; or something like that.

I’d just like to know what you’ve said before I try to say something about it.

 

[Maranatha]

EnterTheBowser:

In that case - is it possible that the morality grounded in God held that incestual rape was, in fact, obligatory?

Your asking can God have defined an evil act as good. That’s like asking can God define a square to be a circle. It’s a logical fallacy.

By definition what God creates is good. For example, God created you and since creation is better then never coming in to existence, by definition, your creation is good.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Maranatha:

Your asking can God have defined an evil act as good. That’s like asking can God define a square to be a circle. It’s a logical fallacy.

By definition what God creates is good. For example, God created you and since creation is better then never coming in to existence, by definition, your creation is good.

Somehow I think there’s a problem with what you’ve said, at least on the face of it. First, you say that God can’t command us to do something that’s evil, and then say that anything that God commands is good. The only way out of this (it seems to me) is to contend that: there are reasons independent of God why things are good or bad, and God is a being so composed that God could never command a person to do something evil.

Is that what you meant, or is there something else going on?

 

[abcdefg]

EnterTheBowser:

In that case, I think that we’ve got a similar problem under theism - we have no more certainty regarding God’s word than we can regarding human moral reasoning. Now, it might be countered that God provides direct knowledge of his moral code to humans and circumvents the problem in that way, but I don’t think this works. I’ll admit that a genuine revelation from God would seem like a genuine revelation from God - but a fallible human could certainly mistake a false revelation for a true one. So on this view, epistemic uncertainty regarding morality remains in a theistic or an atheistic universe, just as morality exists equally in both.

1. There’re theists who take God’s commands “symbolically” or not at all. Catharism(?) is an example which includes the belief fornication is more justifiable than marriage. that’s why a crusade is directed against it.
2. Church decides which relevation is genuine and binding to all. That’s why one need organized churches. while I’m not familar with other churches, I can say Catholics believe the Catholic Church is found by God(Jesus Christ). and protected by God.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

1) There’re theists who take God’s commands “symbolically” or not at all. Catharism(?) is an example which includes the belief fornication is more justifiable than marriage. that’s why a crusade is directed against it.
2) Church decides which relevation is genuine and binding to all. That’s why one need organized churches. while I’m not familar with other churches, I can say Catholics believe the Catholic Church is found by God(Jesus Christ). and protected by God.

My point is that the humans who make up the Church remain fallible in the same way that an atheist ethicist is fallible.

 

[abcdefg]

EnterTheBowser:

My point is that the humans who make up the Church remain fallible in the same way that an atheist ethicist is fallible.

Pope is infallible unless declared as a heretic (Honorius I) For Honorius I’s case it’s not that hard to decide what he is.

Protected by Holy Ghost, current popes can’t teach evolution is right or Catholics can accept evolution without damaging faith(at least no document explicitly shows this so old teachings stand).

 

[Contarini]

EnterTheBowser:

So there’s some characteristic of God which is a moral justification for the moral system God approves of? Could you be a little more specific as to what this characteristic is?

No, there is no specific “characteristic” (except goodness–but that’s obviously not very specific). And what do you mean by a “moral justification”? A “justification” implies appeal to some other standard. God is goodness. Goodness is God. The point is that the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t apply. God commands things because they are good, but that standard of goodness to which God’s commands conform is internal to God, not separate from God.

I hope I’m not misrepresenting you, but did you argue that:
-Humans are made in God’s image
-Humans become happy when they imitate God
-Ethical behavior is imitating God in the ways that make us happy

Ethical behavior is imitating God in the ways that correspond with our nature, yes. (Rocks and tigers and stars and angels all imitate God in ways that would not be appropriate for us, and vice versa.) And acting according to our nature makes us happy.

By “our nature” I mean “the way God intends us to be,” which in Christian belief is not entirely the same as the way we currently are (though not entirely different either).

I do think that you made an unfair stipulation at the beginning, as you seem to realize now. It makes no sense to argue that theism puts us in no “better position” than atheists with regard to morality if we can’t compare theism with atheism.

Part of the problem is that both theism and atheism can mean a lot of things. Most of us here will probably not be interested in defending some abstract “theism.” And for your part, it would help to clarify what you see as the ultimate reality in the universe. I would freely grant that certain kinds of non-theists (at least, nonbelievers in the kind of God Christians believe in), such as Buddhists, Jains, Stoics, Neo-Platonists, etc., have a philosophically coherent basis for ethics. But “atheist” in our society usually translates into “materialist”–someone who thinks that matter in motion is the ultimate reality of the universe. I don’t think that someone coming from such a position can formulate a philosophically coherent basis for ethics, no. Materialist ethics is necessarily going to be utilitarian, based on what is conducive to human survival or to the order of society or something of that sort. Or it’s going to be radically subjective, amounting to no more than a personal preference that has no basis outside itself.

In other words, what I’m defending is the idea of a transcendent ground of morality that exists independently of physical evolution, of the biological characteristics of any species, or of the norms of any society. Theists of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition (and some others–many Hindus, for instance) see this ultimate reality as in some ways analogous to a human person. Hence, we speak of God commanding, acting, judging, forgiving, etc. And hence the possibility for a disjunction between divine commands and the divine nature. But such a disjunction is always a serious philosophical mistake.

Edwin

 

[EnterTheBowser]

abcdefg:

Pope is infallible unless declared as a heretic (Honorius I) For Honorius I’s case it’s not that hard to decide what he is.

Protected by Holy Ghost, current popes can’t teach evolution is right or Catholics can accept evolution without damaging faith(at least no document explicitly shows this so old teachings stand).

First: evolution???

Second, I’m well aware of the idea that the Pope is infallible. I’m trying to point out that this is not, in fact, true. How does the Pope distinguish genuine intervention by the Holy Ghost from a bad case of indigestion?

Moreover, even if the Pope were infallible, we’d retain the epistemic uncertainty - how do we know that we’re right in our interpretation of what the Pope says? Even if he is very clear about it, fallible humans might indeed misintepret the man.

No matter where you go, some uncertainty will remain.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Contarini:

No, there is no specific “characteristic” (except goodness–but that’s obviously not very specific). And what do you mean by a “moral justification”? A “justification” implies appeal to some other standard. God is goodness. Goodness is God. The point is that the Euthyphro dilemma doesn’t apply. God commands things because they are good, but that standard of goodness to which God’s commands conform is internal to God, not separate from God.

Given that, it rather seems to me that you have given the answer “Whatever God commands is good because God commands it.” God is the standard of goodness, as you put it.

That being said, I imagine that God’s goodness does lay down some precepts for moral behavior - eg to love one’s neighbor. In other words, God’s standard of goodness does in fact have some specifics to it. I ask: is there any reason why these specifics are as they are and not some other way? Is it concievable that God’s standard, in some other world, would include precepts that value incestuous rape (for example)?

…

I do think that you made an unfair stipulation at the beginning, as you seem to realize now. It makes no sense to argue that theism puts us in no “better position” than atheists with regard to morality if we can’t compare theism with atheism.

I think my stipulation was unfair in that it is reasonable for people to discuss atheism and morality in a thread about theism and morality. The point I want to make is that if atheism entails nihilism, egoism, relativism, whatever, theism doesn’t get us anywhere better.

Part of the problem is that both theism and atheism can mean a lot of things. Most of us here will probably not be interested in defending some abstract “theism.” And for your part, it would help to clarify what you see as the ultimate reality in the universe. I would freely grant that certain kinds of non-theists (at least, nonbelievers in the kind of God Christians believe in), such as Buddhists, Jains, Stoics, Neo-Platonists, etc., have a philosophically coherent basis for ethics. But “atheist” in our society usually translates into “materialist”–someone who thinks that matter in motion is the ultimate reality of the universe. I don’t think that someone coming from such a position can formulate a philosophically coherent basis for ethics, no. Materialist ethics is necessarily going to be utilitarian, based on what is conducive to human survival or to the order of society or something of that sort. Or it’s going to be radically subjective, amounting to no more than a personal preference that has no basis outside itself.

By “atheist” I mean that I believe there are good reasons for believing that there is no thing that can be reasonably called a God. Additionally, I will say that beliefs in the supernatural are most likely bunkum. Beyond that, my philosophical beliefs are, well, uncertain.

In other words, what I’m defending is the idea of a transcendent ground of morality that exists independently of physical evolution, of the biological characteristics of any species, or of the norms of any society. Theists of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition (and some others–many Hindus, for instance) see this ultimate reality as in some ways analogous to a human person. Hence, we speak of God commanding, acting, judging, forgiving, etc. And hence the possibility for a disjunction between divine commands and the divine nature. But such a disjunction is always a serious philosophical mistake.

Edwin

I want to note that I use “commands” in place of a variety of other possible words (such as “grounds”), so don’t get hung up on the idea of a command. The argument equally applies to a non-commanding God who in some way is a transcendent ground for morality. Why does this ground of morality ground a particular moral code as opposed to another?