Theism and Morality

[Sherlock]

EnterTheBowser:

I think you misunderstand what exactly a “possible world” is. Even God would not have the power to affect things in another possible world - that follows from the very meaning of “possible world.”

??? God is infinite. To say that “Even God would not have the power to affect things in another possible world” creates a boundary for God—in which case He isn’t infinite and thus isn’t God. You do not understand what God necessarily is, then. And I’ll assume that when you say “world” here you mean, “universe”. And that means, “all that is”. God is the creator of all that is. To say that outside “all that is” is another set of “all that is” is to distort the meaning of “all that is”. It isn’t logical.

EnterTheBowser:

But anyways, disregarding that point, would you say that there’s a strict dichotomy between atheism and the existence of the Christian God - that these are the only two possibilities? Or is it similarly logically impossible for there to a universe without a God?

Yes, those are the possibilities.

 

[Sherlock]

Tantum ergo:

Please let’s stick to the God we have. If you want to discuss what gods might exist elsewhere, start another thread. We don’t have “sally” or “q” or sonic the hedgehog as our God, we have a well defined Judeo-Christian God and that God is what we are discussing, thanks.

Yes, thank you for posting this! Reality, please, not make-believe.

 

[Sherlock]

EnterTheBowser:

I am only concerned with showing Sally to be a possible God because the argument I made regarding theism, atheism, and moral justification (in post #46 I believe) depends on only that: the possibility of such a God.
.

You haven’t shown that it’s possible.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Tantum ergo:

A “possible world” that God could NOT have power to affect?

No such thing. God having the nature of God, His power is infinite. There can be no “possible world” without God.

I think I see what you’re trying to get to, but the fact is, you can’t really say, “suppose there really wasn’t a God, or that there was, but he is different from what you think is God”.

First, that’s really changing this thread. . .we aren’t arguing really over whether God is God, are we? We are, I believe, attempting to discuss theism and morality. So we can’t say, “well, let’s set aside the THEISTIC view, because after all, there COULD be other places with OTHER gods”.

Please let’s stick to the God we have. If you want to discuss what gods might exist elsewhere, start another thread. We don’t have “sally” or “q” or sonic the hedgehog as our God, we have a well defined Judeo-Christian God and that God is what we are discussing, thanks.

The very nature of possible worlds is such that nothing in one possible world can ever affect something in another possible world. World is also construed broadly to mean more than “all physical existence,” for example, but rather to mean everything that exists. In fact, I probably seemed to assert something that I probably should not have - that possible worlds are in some sense real. Whether they are or not is really immaterial. As a matter of fact, I probably shouldn’t even have said the words “possible world.”

Now, this question (could there be some other sort of God, or even no God at all?) is actually mildly important, because I used a “yes” answer in my argument, and this answer was then challenged. In other words, it does in fact bear on the question of theism and morality because it formed part of an argument I made which concerned theism and morality.

Now, I want to say this: it’s definitely true that if the Christian God exists, the Christian God is the only God and there are no other Gods. That’s great. But this is not enough to say that the Christian God - or any God - is the only logically possible God. As in my analogy… the following deduction is not valid:

1: If there is an apple in my basket, there is no orange in my basket
2: There is an apple in my basket
3: It is impossible for there to be an orange in my basket.

You’ve made an exactly analogous argument:

1: If a (the Christian) God exists, no other Gods exist
2: A (the Christian) God exists
3: Therefore there is only one possible God (the Christian one)

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Sherlock:

…

Yes, those [atheism and Christian theism] are the possibilities.

Given that, the argument I made in post #46 still runs fairly well, I imagine. The argument runs on the possibility that the moral rules established by God might not have been established.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Sherlock:

You haven’t shown that it’s possible.

Is there any logical contradiction in such a God? If the Christian God is logically possible, then this one certainly is as well, given the fact that they are so very similar - they don’t really differ in a respect that would be significant with regards to logical possibility.

 

[Sherlock]

EnterTheBowser:

The very nature of possible worlds is such that nothing in one possible world can ever affect something in another possible world. World is also construed broadly to mean more than “all physical existence,” for example, but rather to mean everything that exists.

If “world” equals “all that is”, then how can there be more than “all that is”? This is illogical. You can’t have a multiplicity of “all there is”.

EnterTheBowser:

In fact, I probably seemed to assert something that I probably should not have - that possible worlds are in some sense real. Whether they are or not is really immaterial. As a matter of fact, I probably shouldn’t even have said the words “possible world.”

Whether they are real or not is immaterial?? How can you say that after you’ve stated above that, “The very nature of possible worlds is such that nothing in one possible world can ever affect something in another possible world”. How can something have a “nature” if it doesn’t exist?? And if you’re not sure it does, then how is it that you can state something—anything—about it’s “nature” as if it were a fact established by observation??

 

[EnterTheBowser]

I think what I should have said is that possible worlds are conceptual tools used to describe notions of possibility and necessity. Sorry for being confusing - I was rambling and somewhat incoherent, I realize.

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Incidentally, regarding necessity:

There is no property P such that if x has P, then x necessarily exists. Proof: let’s consider the x such that x has P and A and ~A, where A is some property. It follows from P that x necessarily exists. Therefore it follows that there is a x which has A and ~A, which is a contradiction. Hence there is no such property P.

Rather, “necessity” is a sort of “metaproperty,” something which obtains when we consider the other properties of x. In that sense, “necessity” is “contingent” on the properties of x. ; )

I don’t know if this bears on anything one of y’all said, but I think it might, so I threw it out there.

 

[Sherlock]

EnterTheBowser:

Incidentally, regarding necessity:

There is no property P such that if x has P, then x necessarily exists. Proof: let’s consider the x such that x has P and A and ~A, where A is some property. It follows from P that x necessarily exists. Therefore it follows that there is a x which has A and ~A, which is a contradiction. Hence there is no such property P.

Rather, “necessity” is a sort of “metaproperty,” something which obtains when we consider the other properties of x. In that sense, “necessity” is “contingent” on the properties of x. ; )

I don’t know if this bears on anything one of y’all said, but I think it might, so I threw it out there.

This only obscures whatever point you’re trying to make even more, and I don’t think you’re using the term “necessary” as philosophers use it (in terms of causality). Try it again.

 

[Gilbert_Keith]

BOWSER

*Rather, “necessity” is a sort of “metaproperty,” something which obtains when we consider the other properties of x. In that sense, “necessity” is “contingent” on the properties of x. ; )
At this rate you’re going to lose your audience pronto!

 

[EnterTheBowser]

Regarding philosophical use of necessity: on occasion, analytic philosophers (generally this sort) go about listing the necessary and sufficient conditions for some statement or other. In this sense, a necessary condition of X is just the Y such that X implies Y (if X then Y). On the other hand, when philosophers talk about something that is necessarily true - which is true absolutely regardless, has no possibility of being false (or is true in every possible world), that is not exactly what they mean. This is the sense where necessary contrasts with contingent or possible (instead of being contrasted with sufficient). And it is this sense which I used in my argument.

I posted that rather esoteric post because I wanted to head off a possible claim that the Christian God is necessary just because of the very meaning of the Christian God - that it has the particular property of necessity. To say that something is necessarily true or necessarily exists requires an argument based on its various properties.

That aside, do you have responses to these less esoteric points:

EnterTheBowser:

Now, I want to say this: it’s definitely true that if the Christian God exists, the Christian God is the only God and there are no other Gods. That’s great. But this is not enough to say that the Christian God - or any God - is the only logically possible God. As in my analogy… the following deduction is not valid:

1: If there is an apple in my basket, there is no orange in my basket
2: There is an apple in my basket
3: It is impossible for there to be an orange in my basket.

You’ve made an exactly analogous argument:

1: If a (the Christian) God exists, no other Gods exist
2: A (the Christian) God exists
3: Therefore there is only one possible God (the Christian one)

EnterTheBowser:

Sherlock:

…

Yes, those [atheism and Christian theism] are the possibilities.

Given that, the argument I made in post #46 still runs fairly well, I imagine. The argument runs on the possibility that the moral rules established by God might not have been established.

EnterTheBowser:

Sherlock:

You haven’t shown that it’s [the existence of Sally] possible.

Is there any logical contradiction in such a God? If the Christian God is logically possible, then this one certainly is as well, given the fact that they are so very similar - they don’t really differ in a respect that would be significant with regards to logical possibility.