There is an Evil God, irony of the God debate

[meltzerboy]

FYI, Rabbi Harold Kushner, of Conservative Judaism (not Orthodox or Reform), who wrote the rather well-known book “When Bad Things Happen to Good People” (not “Why”) faces the issue of a benevolent G-d in the presence of evil and suffering in the world, a world in which his own son died of progeria, a rare and fatal genetic disease, where children grow old prematurely and die before the age of 21, if not much sooner. He came to a conclusion which Judaism rejects, namely that G-d is benevolent, but He is not omnipotent, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. IOW, G-d is also bound by the laws of nature and physics, which He created. Although Judaism does not accept Rabbi Kushner’s conclusion, it may be an alternative argument to that of a malicious god in your system of belief, even if it is just as heretical.

The thing about faith is that there MUST be an element of mystery and doubt. Otherwise, it becomes certainty rather than a leap of faith, that is, if all the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle fit perfectly together. I don’t mean that one should place one’s trust in a belief system that is totally illogical, but, on the other hand, sure knowledge is not real faith either. In Judaism, we are asked to accept the existence of G-d even when our reason and emotions may tell us otherwise. Indeed we are asked to behave according to the tenets of the religion even when our faith may be lacking due to doubt. If faith were based solely on reason and common sense (the latter not a good guide for either religion or science), then we would not need to actually believe in G-d or the Law He established for us, since we would be able to figure out by means of our own rational mind and the law of nature in our own heart how to live a good life: IOW, humanism would suffice. Religion, however, demands of us to supersede our own human beliefs, and instead bow to the will and love of G-d. This may seem illogical, silly, stupid, at least superficially so; however, it teaches us that the human mind has limitations and makes us all less arrogant, more humble, and more appreciative of the wonder and mystery of life.

 

[samiam1611]

Why wouldn’t the deity have personlike qualities, though? Why is an unconscious creator or designer more likely than a conscious one? I will admit, demonstrating that the designer/creator/moral law giver is a conscious person is a daunting task which I’ve never seen one preform to my liking, but I don’t see why an unconscious deity would be preferred by you over a conscious one.
For what reason could you not accept that the deity is conscious or sentient?

I do not think it is possible for a thing or being to think (i.e. a personality and conscious thought) and interact with the physical world unless it too is physical. How can thoughts happen without a brain of some sort? Magical invisible molecules?

And why wouldn’t the creator have a personality? I don’t have any arguments that says he does, but just in the same I haven’t heard any arguments that he doesn’t. It seems on this point, as of yet, one should be agnostic. Now I personally have had religious experiences that I wont get into which do lead me to believe the creator is a person–but I admit that I can’t give any proofs for this.

I don’t have any special formulated argument either but I will tell you my thoughts on it.

There have been lots of different deities described. Zeus, Hagandes, Yemaja…the list goes on. Some are said to be good, some evil, some male, some feminine, some peaceful, some violent. You have now added another one to the list of contenders. We will call him mGod, unless you have a better name in mind. What is it about mGod that makes him stands out from the crowd? How come I shouldn’t put mGod in the pile of junk that is mythology?

I look forward to your answer and continuing discussion.

 

[sw85]

On a quick note, I do not know what you mean by metaphysical necessity. I’ve asked many people and have only gotten vague responses. Metaphysical necessity seems to be tied together with paradoxes of identity when we’re dealing with poorly defined concepts and appears only applicable to said cases. Until someone could explain this to me, though, I would reject the notion of metaphysical necessity outright.

I mean that such a being exists necessarily and that this can be demonstrated metaphysically.

Ahh I see that you responded to my DCT thread, lets get into the meat of the issue there. But I don’t see how this is a problem for me. In fact you seem to just be reinforcing the problem of evil which states; (1) God is by definition all good, yet he does evil (2) Therefore God does not exist.

This is an extremely reductive take of what I just posted.

If God was not by definition good, then the problem of evil would be a complete non-sequitar against Christian theism.

It is a non sequitur, anyway, because God’s omnibenevolence is a metaphysical fact, not an evidential one.

And I was not giving the logical problem of evil, I recognize that there is no explicit contradiction in the theistic concept of god. I have read Plantinga’s book God, Freedom, and Evil, and I agree for the most part with his free will defense. My argument is an argument to best explanation, that my maltheistic beliefs explain and predict the evidence better than the theists beliefs do (if the theists do at all).

Theistic beliefs about God’s goodness are not evidential, is what I’m saying. They are metaphysical. Therefore no amount of evidential arguing can contradict it without attacking the underlying metaphysical basis for God’s goodness.

As I said, it is only necessary, to defeat the “problem of evil,” to demonstrate that it is not, in principle, impossible to reconcile God’s goodness with the fact of evil in the world. Theodicy demonstrates that such arguments are not, in principle, impossible to make.

Yes, to the logical problem of evil. Not to the evidential problem of evil. A defense cannot combat the evidential problem of evil.

No, again, God is believed to be good because such a being cannot not be evil, not because of evidential problems.

I recognize that sophisticated theists believe God is omnibenevolant because they’ve defined him as such, and not because of anyting he’s actually done. This doesn’t help your case, though, but just switches the question from “Is God evil?” to “Does God exist?” as being not evil is part of the definition of God.

No, this is false. God’s features have been revealed through Scholastic dialectic. He has not been “defined” arbitrarily as anything; rather the definition of Him has been informed by that dialectic. This is why the end of Aquinas’ proofs generally goes, “And this, we call God.”

The relevant issues here concern (a) God’s identification as actus purus and (b) the identification, in Scholastic philosophy, of goodness with being. If God is actus purus (i.e., pure being), and being is the standard by which goodness is measured, then it follows that God is the highest standard by which goodness is measured. Thus he is simultaneously all-good and not a moral agent.

This is a foundational issue in apologetics, and I’m very surprised that, as you admitted in the other thread, you aren’t aware of it. This is very strange. In general you should be cautious about accepting or rejecting something you aren’t fully informed about. Again, I recommend Edward Feser’s Aquinas.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I have never seen the inductive problem of evil or problem of divine hiddenness refuted. If you’d like you may take a swing at them;

(1) X is an intending cause for all states of affairs
(2) Occurrences of great suffering obtain
(3) X intends occurrences of great suffering (from 1 and 2)

Not sure what (2) is supposed to mean: occurrences of great suffering obtain? Obtain what?
In any event: the logic of the problem of evil, generally speaking when written properly, is valid. However, the ‘proof’ assumes that God is completely incompatible with suffering & evil. This needs to be proven before you can assert that your proof is true.

Intending suffering for others is, by definition, maliciousness. My deity is at times very malicious while yours is by definition omnibenevolant, so clearly this argument supports my deity and not yours. You could offer a theodicy in an attempt to explain how your deity might intend malice, and yet still be benevolent but this theodicy would be ad hoc. My maltheistic beliefs, on the other hand, are not very easily explain this conclusion but predict this conclusion.

I do not see how theodicy is ad hoc as compared to your maltheism. Your approach to the problem is doing the same thing: arranging something for a particular purpose (the definition of ad hoc). Your maltheistic deity seems more like a schizophrenic deity who ought not to be even worshiped or discussed for fear of the consequences of his wrath.

So as you can see, my maltheistic beliefs have both explanatory power and predictive power where as your Christian theistic beliefs have neither and must be rather ad hoc if they’re going to survive the argument.

You could, of course, object to the argument by demonstrating that one of the premises are false or showing the structure to be invalid. I encourage you to try that.

Your maltheistic beliefs have no explanatory power outside of “My god can change his mind on a whim, so this explains all the evil and good in the world.” Your beliefs have zero predictive power on anything either, but then again, no one’s beliefs have such power.

I already demonstrated the problem with your problem of evil: it assumes that God is completely incompatible with evil, which needs to be proven.

Why? Are all atheists irrational for thinking the problem of evil holds any weight? If atheists are not completely irrational, and the problem of evil is a hefty beast, then you yourself would be irrational for not being a maltheist. Of course it would be incredibly ignorant to think that all atheists are irrational. I don’t see how you could treat this very controversial issue so trivially–surely the problem of evil is worth some consideration if it’s one of the strongest atheological arguments?

I think that one who accepts the problem of evil as a proof of God’s non-existence is irrational. Since most every atheist I have ever met has used this argument, it follows that atheists are irrational because of this argument.
I also disagree that it is a strong atheological (is that even a word?) argument. It’s terribly poor and horridly ineffective. I think asking for scientific proof that God exists is a slightly better argument than using the problem of evil.

 

[Relinquish]

I mean that such a being exists necessarily and that this can be demonstrated metaphysically.

Okay.

This is an extremely reductive take of what I just posted.

I don’t know what a reductive take is.

It is a non sequitur, anyway, because God’s omnibenevolence is a metaphysical fact, not an evidential one.

I don’t know what the difference is between a metaphysical and an evidential fact, please explain the difference.

No, again, God is believed to be good because such a being cannot not be evil, not because of evidential problems.

So instead of proving God to be evil, the evidential problem of evil proves God doesn’t exist. I really don’t get what your hangup on this is.

No, this is false. God’s features have been revealed through Scholastic dialectic. He has not been “defined” arbitrarily as anything; rather the definition of Him has been informed by that dialectic. This is why the end of Aquinas’ proofs generally goes, “And this, we call God.”

Yeah… I’m not seeing any meaningful distinction here.

The relevant issues here concern (a) God’s identification as actus purus and (b) the identification, in Scholastic philosophy, of goodness with being. If God is actus purus (i.e., pure being), and being is the standard by which goodness is measured, then it follows that God is the highest standard by which goodness is measured. Thus he is simultaneously all-good and not a moral agent.

I really just don’t see any sense to be made in this.

This is a foundational issue in apologetics, and I’m very surprised that, as you admitted in the other thread, you aren’t aware of it. This is very strange. In general you should be cautious about accepting or rejecting something you aren’t fully informed about. Again, I recommend Edward Feser’s Aquinas.

I have not studied any of Aquinas’ work, but from how it’s been described to me I don’t think reading it would be a very good use of my time.

 

[Relinquish]

Of course not! Although I realize you’re attempting to be clever, I hope this isn’t the depth of your distinction. Lack of intentionality doesn’t imply lack of knowledge. It’s possible to foresee that action may lead both to an intended and an unintended consequence.

I never said anything about knowledge, I’m not sure where you’re getting that. Please tell me do you deny one of the premises, or that the argument is invalid? If so explain why you believe as you do.
If not, then you must accept the conclusion.

Sorry… I don’t understand this response. One can be “all good”, yet allow for suffering to advance the cause of good. Perhaps you can rephrase your respose?

I agree. There is no logical inconsistency with the existence of evil and the existence of the theistic god. That has nothing to do with my argument, though.

My argument is that the maltheistic hypothesis is better supported than the theistic hypothesis by the phenomenon of evil. The theistic hypothesis does not predict evil, and to explain evil you have to give ad hoc theodicies. The maltheistic hypothesis does predict evil, on the other hand, and there is no ad hoc-ness to using maltheism to explain evil.

Therefore maltheism has greater predictive power and explanatory power than theism with respect to evil, and therefore given evil maltheism is greatly more likely than theism.

And I’m asserting that this conclusion does not follow. If your supreme being doesn’t intend malice, and if good obtains, then it doesn’t follow that malicious intentions were in play. Yes, suffering might be an intermediate result, but you would have to demonstrate malice in order to make this claim.

I originally put the argument in a confusing form where maybe it wasn’t obvious that it was valid.

(1) For all things X; if X exists, then Y intentionally caused X
(2) Suffering exists
(3) Y intentionally caused Suffering

Now this argument is valid. If you’re going to find issue with it, you have to reject a premise. If you reject premise (1) that means there are things in which Y did not intentionally cause, yet come into existence anyway. Y could be anything, I know you consider it to be your god, while I consider it to be my god.

And this shows… exactly what, again? You asserted that we were claiming that your arguments were irrational. Showing “fair support” for your arguments may be both rational (since that’s a judgment, ultimately of you) and wrong (since that’s an objective judgment).

The point is that I believe both the theistic arguments for the existence of a deity, and the problem of evil are compelling. They are not mutually exclusive, so why not accept both as they’re both well evidenced?

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

(1) For all things X; if X exists, then Y intentionally caused X
(2) Suffering exists
(3) Y intentionally caused Suffering

Can you show that if X exists, Y necessarily intentionally caused it?

 

[Relinquish]

Not sure what (2) is supposed to mean: occurrences of great suffering obtain? Obtain what?
In any event: the logic of the problem of evil, generally speaking when written properly, is valid. However, the ‘proof’ assumes that God is completely incompatible with suffering & evil. This needs to be proven before you can assert that your proof is true.

This is starting to become frustrating. I’ve said time and time again to people that I am not giving the logical problem of evil, I don’t remember ever saying I was. I thought it was obvious from the argument that it was an inductive argument to the best explanation—but maybe not.

My argument is that the maltheistic hypothesis is better supported than the theistic hypothesis by the phenomenon of evil. The theistic hypothesis does not predict evil, and to explain evil you have to give ad hoc theodicies. The maltheistic hypothesis does predict evil, on the other hand, and there is no ad hoc-ness to using maltheism to explain evil.

Therefore maltheism has greater predictive power and explanatory power than theism with respect to evil, and therefore given evil maltheism is greatly more likely than theism.

And occurrences of great suffering obtain is a long winded way of saying people suffer greatly sometimes.

I do not see how theodicy is ad hoc as compared to your maltheism. Your approach to the problem is doing the same thing: arranging something for a particular purpose (the definition of ad hoc). Your maltheistic deity seems more like a schizophrenic deity who ought not to be even worshiped or discussed for fear of the consequences of his wrath.

How are my beliefs arranged for a particular purpose? I am a maltheist because maltheism best explains the evidence. On the other hand theism doesn’t best explain or predict the evidence and you have to come up with ad hoc explanations to make it fit. And maybe he is schizophrenic (though I’m not sure why you would say that). And yes you should fear him.

Your maltheistic beliefs have no explanatory power outside of “My god can change his mind on a whim, so this explains all the evil and good in the world.” Your beliefs have zero predictive power on anything either, but then again, no one’s beliefs have such power.

I’m not saying maltheism is necessarily a good explanation, but that it’s a better explanation than theism. And yes maltheism does have some predictive power. If maltheism were true you would expect to see the kind of world we live in; a world in which holy wars are fought in the name of the creator because he takes pleasure in watching religious brutality. Maltheism predicts child prostitution and child soldiers. It predicts that human history would go through cycles of incredible suffering and bloodshed. Theism does not predict anything of the sort.

I think that one who accepts the problem of evil as a proof of God’s non-existence is irrational. Since most every atheist I have ever met has used this argument, it follows that atheists are irrational because of this argument.
I also disagree that it is a strong atheological (is that even a word?) argument. It’s terribly poor and horridly ineffective. I think asking for scientific proof that God exists is a slightly better argument than using the problem of evil.

You have not yet refuted it, so that speaks volumes about yourself.

 

[Relinquish]

Thought_Officer:

The problem of evil doesn’t speak to the possibility of a malicious God since, like arguments for God’s goodness, the maliciousness is deferentially applied. But it might be argued that God’s malice is contained in his differential treatment.

Yes I don’t hold to the deity being omnimalicious. Just plain old malicious.

The issue of God’s existence isn’t resolved on the grounds that maybe he’s just a jerk. There have to be other compelling reasons for belief, Relinquish.

I agree. I think there are some compelling arguments for the existence of a deity. If you want to get into them we can.

 

[Relinquish]

Your argument simply prove that the Devil is the god of this World. And we knew that already, although many in the Church do not like to talk about it. That is why the ways of the world are NOT the ways of God. That is why “whoever is a friend of the world is an enemy of God.”

I guess the Christian god doesn’t exist then…?

God created Paradise. Sin, introduced through the Devil and His angels, ‘created’ this universe- or, more precisely messed up totally what God had created- but effectively made what this valley of tears that we we live in today. That is why now, “all things are vanity and vexation of spirit”.

So God is not sovereign?

Now, yes, the idea that Satan -]created /-]the world is not really orthodox, I know. But the term ‘created’ is used only metaphorically, crossed out, as -]created/-], since the current universe, the Devil’s dominion, is simply smoke and shadows, passing vanities and vexation, verily less than a dream which endures not.

Again, is not God sovereign?

So, just re-label this cruddy maltheist god, “The Devil”, and treat him with the contempt he deserves. Then you will be on the right path…

Sure. I’m not willing to argue semantics, it seems you’re not a very good Christian if you believe the Devil is the one true god.

 

[Relinquish]

I do not think it is possible for a thing or being to think (i.e. a personality and conscious thought) and interact with the physical world unless it too is physical. How can thoughts happen without a brain of some sort? Magical invisible molecules?

Oh I see, well there could be very mechanical processes at work behind the scenes in the deity’s mind just like there are for us. Now I don’t think he’s made of molecules or anything, I don’t really know what sort of substance gods are made of.

I don’t have any special formulated argument either but I will tell you my thoughts on it.

There have been lots of different deities described. Zeus, Hagandes, Yemaja…the list goes on. Some are said to be good, some evil, some male, some feminine, some peaceful, some violent. You have now added another one to the list of contenders. We will call him mGod, unless you have a better name in mind. What is it about mGod that makes him stands out from the crowd? How come I shouldn’t put mGod in the pile of junk that is mythology?

I look forward to your answer and continuing discussion.

Well it’s true if I were to speak of a particular god I couldn’t offer very good reason to believe he existed. If I were to instead just argue for the maltheistic position, that there is a god as I’ve described him (but I don’t know particularly who he might be) then I would be much better supported. Christians do this too, they argue for a general theistic deity and then say they recognize that as their god. So maybe you can throw mGod in the pile of junk, but maltheism as a position still has strength.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

This is starting to become frustrating. I’ve said time and time again to people that I am not giving the logical problem of evil, I don’t remember ever saying I was. I thought it was obvious from the argument that it was an inductive argument to the best explanation—but maybe not.

You actually gave the logical problem of evil in Post #23. Do you not remember doing that? Perhaps it is because you are fighting 5 different arguments from 5 different people. But, rest assured, you gave the logic problem as I have zero reason to introduce an argument that you did not present yourself.

My argument is that the maltheistic hypothesis is better supported than the theistic hypothesis by the phenomenon of evil. The theistic hypothesis does not predict evil, and to explain evil you have to give ad hoc theodicies. The maltheistic hypothesis does predict evil, on the other hand, and there is no ad hoc-ness to using maltheism to explain evil.

No religious belief can predict evil, but they can allow for it as part of the belief system. Since the theistic hypothesis allows for evil, then it is certainly as good as your maltheism.

Therefore maltheism has greater predictive power and explanatory power than theism with respect to evil, and therefore given evil maltheism is greatly more likely than theism.

There is no predictive power of maltheism. There is some explanatory power, but I would not posit that it is greater than theism.

And occurrences of great suffering obtain is a long winded way of saying people suffer greatly sometimes.

It is not a long winded way of saying that. It is a half-sentence, it is not complete in anything. “Occurrences of great suffering” is your subject, “obtain” is your verb, but you have no predicate; it is completely incomplete. Fortunately, I was able to discern (though I did not indicate it) what you had intended.

How are my beliefs arranged for a particular purpose? I am a maltheist because maltheism best explains the evidence. On the other hand theism doesn’t best explain or predict the evidence and you have to come up with ad hoc explanations to make it fit. And maybe he is schizophrenic (though I’m not sure why you would say that). And yes you should fear him.

You created a supreme creator who is evil & good at alternating times, rather than a supreme creator who is only good but allows evil to exist. Your choice is as ad hoc as the more widely accepted good God.
I said your god is schizophrenic because he is both good and evil, but at alternating times. Schizophrenics have the stigma of having multiple personalities (despite the fact that schizophrenics do not actually suffer from that), I was going along that train of thought.

I’m not saying maltheism is necessarily a good explanation, but that it’s a better explanation than theism. And yes maltheism does have some predictive power. If maltheism were true you would expect to see the kind of world we live in; a world in which holy wars are fought in the name of the creator because he takes pleasure in watching religious brutality. Maltheism predicts child prostitution and child soldiers. It predicts that human history would go through cycles of incredible suffering and bloodshed. Theism does not predict anything of the sort.

Maltheism does not predict anything. Neither does theism, atheism, pantheism, or any other -ism. It can explain, to some degree, why things are the way they are, but it does not predict that this is the way things are.

You have not yet refuted it, so that speaks volumes about yourself.

I have refuted it: your proof is incomplete because you did not show that an all-good God is incompatible with suffering. Since you have not shown that, then your proof is invalid and, hence, refuted. The fact that you glossed over and ignored it speaks volumes about yourself.

 

[Relinquish]

Can you show that if X exists, Y necessarily intentionally caused it?

I cannot, this is an assumption.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

I cannot, this is an assumption.

I see. And you do not think this is a weak point?

 

[Relinquish]

You actually gave the logical problem of evil in Post #23. Do you not remember doing that? Perhaps it is because you are fighting 5 different arguments from 5 different people. But, rest assured, you gave the logic problem as I have zero reason to introduce an argument that you did not present yourself.

So you are right. Yes it is confusing arguing with so many people. I shall have to revise my argument some time to make it an argument to the best explanation.

No religious belief can predict evil, but they can allow for it as part of the belief system. Since the theistic hypothesis allows for evil, then it is certainly as good as your maltheism.

How does the hypothesis that there is a very powerful person in control that wants to cause suffering, not predict that suffering will happen?

There is no predictive power of maltheism. There is some explanatory power, but I would not posit that it is greater than theism.

Why is it not greater than theism?

It is not a long winded way of saying that. It is a half-sentence, it is not complete in anything. “Occurrences of great suffering” is your subject, “obtain” is your verb, but you have no predicate; it is completely incomplete. Fortunately, I was able to discern (though I did not indicate it) what you had intended.

Okay

You created a supreme creator who is evil & good at alternating times, rather than a supreme creator who is only good but allows evil to exist. Your choice is as ad hoc as the more widely accepted good God.
I said your god is schizophrenic because he is both good and evil, but at alternating times. Schizophrenics have the stigma of having multiple personalities (despite the fact that schizophrenics do not actually suffer from that), I was going along that train of thought.

Okay.

Maltheism does not predict anything. Neither does theism, atheism, pantheism, or any other -ism. It can explain, to some degree, why things are the way they are, but it does not predict that this is the way things are.

You would not expect suffering if maltheism were true?

I have refuted it: your proof is incomplete because you did not show that an all-good God is incompatible with suffering. Since you have not shown that, then your proof is invalid and, hence, refuted. The fact that you glossed over and ignored it speaks volumes about yourself.

I’m not trying to argue that an all-good god is incompatible with suffering. The proof is valid as the conclusion follows from the premises.

 

[Alberti_Devoveo]

How does the hypothesis that there is a very powerful person in control that wants to cause suffering, not predict that suffering will happen?

Prediction indicates knowing (with certainty) that a future event will occur. Since no one can actually predict the future, it stands that no belief system can predict suffering.

Why is it not greater than theism?

Because it is an ad hoc, back-door escape to the ‘problem’ of evil. You have no revelation outside of your own personal feelings; theism has its own revelation.

You would not expect suffering if maltheism were true?

I would expect suffering if maltheism were true. I also expect suffering if theism is true.

I’m not trying to argue that an all-good god is incompatible with suffering. The proof is valid as the conclusion follows from the premises.

I know you are not trying to argue the incompatibility between the theistic deity and suffering. But you need to because your premise and your conclusion requires it! There is no reason to suspect the incompatibility, unless you can provide one. Since you have not yet provided a reason for the incompatibility, your premise is actually false and the argument is invalid.

 

[Relinquish]

Seems clear to me. The Christian God, to you anyway, is not real. What is real is a completely different god. One that is usually evil - or evil from time to time. But, the problem that I end up having is - how does evil and good get defined? I have no idea in your theology. What your god wants is … not good. But, when your god is happy, it’s actually sad? When things are going well for your god - it’s bad - I think. I’ve confused myself too much already. Sorry.

I define good and evil in the most commonsensical way; by the collections of things which hold these qualities. This is the most intuitive way I know of.

And no good/evil have nothing to do with happiness or sadness. The standard of goodness is external to the deity.

 

[Qoeleth]

I guess the Christian god doesn’t exist then…?

So God is not sovereign?

Again, is not God sovereign?

Sure. I’m not willing to argue semantics, it seems you’re not a very good Christian if you believe the Devil is the one true god.

Maybe, I’m not a very good Christian, but let me explain further.

The God I follow is not sovereign over earthly things. No way. That ‘god’ would have to allow child abuse, rape and famine. Was JESUS sovereign over earthly things? No. “My Kingdom is not of this world. If it were, my armies would defend me.” He had no earthly power, wealth, status, and fell under the weight of tree.

I believe the Devil, the Ruler of this World, is a FALSE god, since this universe is a falsehood, an error, a deception. This seems to be in accordance with your premise.

The true God is love. He has no power other than love. Having power in itself would be an evil characteristic, and one that is incompatible with love.

What we need to do is to rebel against the metaphysical order of this universe, and the false god of this universe. And we can do this, by feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, loving them that hate you, etc., etc. Then, like Jesus, we may say:
“Now sentence is passed on this world,
Now the Lord of this World is overthrown.”

Maltheism and Christian understanding both agree that the ‘god’ of this World is rotten. The difference is, Christians reject and rebel against him, following the example of Jesus.

But maybe this is your position too. Or do you try to follow this evil ‘god’? If you think the Devil, the Ruler of this World, is evil, and renounce and reject him and his evil ways and vain temptations, maybe you are actually a Christian…

 

[Gorgias]

I never said anything about knowledge, I’m not sure where you’re getting that.

And unfortunately, that’s a weakness of your argument. You’re asserting ‘intention’ as if it’s the only game in town. There’s a middle ground: God knows of an event that causes suffering, but doesn’t intend it. Again, we’re talking primary and secondary causation. God is the primary cause of all creation. However, there are moral agents which are secondary causes of actions. The fact that these agents may be causes of suffering does not imply that God intended the suffering. Instead, God intended the results of God’s creation – which, according to Christian theology, is the salvation of all humanity. Since God respects free will, God allows for some to reject salvation; this also implies that God allows for evil in order that free will not be impinged.

Please tell me do you deny one of the premises, or that the argument is invalid? If so explain why you believe as you do.

I disagree with (1). God has knowledge of all states of affairs; this doesn’t imply that God intends them all.

My argument is that the maltheistic hypothesis is better supported than the theistic hypothesis by the phenomenon of evil.

Can you support your claim that “the theistic hypothesis does not predict evil”? I don’t think that a Christian would agree with that assertion.

to explain evil (the theistic hypothesis has) to give ad hoc theodicies.

Not true. To explain the presence of evil, one has only to posit free will in the context of human imperfection. It is not necessary to posit a theodicy – a justification of God in light of the presence of evil in the world – in order explain evil’s presence.

The maltheistic hypothesis does predict evil, on the other hand, and there is no ad hoc-ness to using maltheism to explain evil.

The maltheistic hypothesis requires evil. Big difference. Since its premise is evil, it has no force in explaining evil.

Therefore maltheism has greater predictive power and explanatory power than theism with respect to evil, and therefore given evil maltheism is greatly more likely than theism.

Your argument doesn’t hold. You’ve set up a tautology (Evil → evil), and are claiming that the tautology proves your system of belief. That dog just don’t hunt…

I originally put the argument in a confusing form where maybe it wasn’t obvious that it was valid.

LOL… and I would assert that your confusing form made it not obvious to you that it was invalid…!

 

[Serious]

There’s a middle ground: God knows of an event that causes suffering, but doesn’t intend it.

Interesting. Why do you think that the lack of intent lets God off the hook? Whether God does something himself or merely allows it to happen, the outcome is the same. If you are aware of a crime to be committed, and you have the power to prevent it, you are morally responsible for the act, whether you “actively intended” it to happen or “passively allowed” it to happen. Even if no wrongdoing is planned, merely an accident is about to happen (you see a child about to fall into a crevasse) and you passively stay on the side and allow it to happen, you are still morally responsible for the event. If I remember correctly, Pilate was just “washing his hands”, and no one accepted that as a valid defense.

Since God respects free will, God allows for some to reject salvation; this also implies that God allows for evil in order that free will not be impinged.

Which is also unacceptable. Why does God (through inaction) value the “free will” of a criminal higher than the free will of the victim?