There is an Evil God, irony of the God debate

[Gorgias]

Interesting. Why do you think that the lack of intent lets God off the hook?

I’ll agree that one needs to consider this through the lens of faith, since otherwise, one becomes overly suspicious of God… but the answer is: because we believe that God allows an apparent evil to occur so that a greater good (which is visible to God and which may or may not be visible to us) may proceed. (There are a few caveats here: I’m am not saying that God is the author of the apparent evil; I am not saying that God passively participates in the evil; etc, etc…)

Whether God does something himself or merely allows it to happen, the outcome is the same.

Right, but I’m not certain that this is relevant…

If you are aware of a crime to be committed, and you have the power to prevent it, you are morally responsible for the act

Ask yourself why it is, that this is the case … that is, what is the moral principle at work in this assertion?

Even if no wrongdoing is planned, merely an accident is about to happen (you see a child about to fall into a crevasse) and you passively stay on the side and allow it to happen, you are still morally responsible for the event.

Counter-example: you are a military general, in a war (in which, for the sake of argument, is not immoral for you to participate). You not only allow the deaths of your soldiers and of others, but plan it and actively set the particular acts in motion. Are you committing evil by doing so?

Another counter-example: you are a doctor. Your patient really wishes to have a baby, but has an ectopic pregnancy. By saving her life, the baby will be killed. You neither intend nor desire to kill the baby, but by your actions, it will happen. Are you a murderer?

Since God respects free will, … God allows for evil in order that free will not be impinged.

Which is also unacceptable. Why does God (through inaction) value the “free will” of a criminal higher than the free will of the victim?

Again, we have to ask why it’s unacceptable: what standards apply, and why are they the standards in play?

Moreover, I’m not sure your response makes sense: in the case of an act of evil that one person might commit against an other, what’s the “free will of the victim” to which you’re appealing? You seem to be making a case about rights, not free will; yet, neither seem to fit, here. Can you elaborate a little, and help me understand what you mean by saying this?

 

[Serious]

I’ll agree that one needs to consider this through the lens of faith, since otherwise, one becomes overly suspicious of God… but the answer is: because we believe that God allows an apparent evil to occur so that a greater good (which is visible to God and which may or may not be visible to us) may proceed.

If you need “faith”, then you left the arena of rational discussion.

Ask yourself why it is, that this is the case … that is, what is the moral principle at work in this assertion?

The one and only principle anyone ever needs: “the principle of reciprocity”, which is expressed in the two forms of the “Golden Rule”.

Counter-example: you are a military general, in a war (in which, for the sake of argument, is not immoral for you to participate). You not only allow the deaths of your soldiers and of others, but plan it and actively set the particular acts in motion. Are you committing evil by doing so?

Another counter-example: you are a doctor. Your patient really wishes to have a baby, but has an ectopic pregnancy. By saving her life, the baby will be killed. You neither intend nor desire to kill the baby, but by your actions, it will happen. Are you a murderer?

I am not going to entertain 'counter-examples" until you have answered my point. I am sick and tired of such evasive tactics. Once you answered my point, I will be happy to answer yours. So far you have been evading, and instead of answering you asked “counter questions”. If you wish to answer, I will be glad to see your rationale. If you don’t, I will consider the conversation closed.

Again, we have to ask why it’s unacceptable: what standards apply, and why are they the standards in play?

The same as as above.

Moreover, I’m not sure your response makes sense: in the case of an act of evil that one person might commit against an other, what’s the “free will of the victim” to which you’re appealing? You seem to be making a case about rights, not free will; yet, neither seem to fit, here. Can you elaborate a little, and help me understand what you mean by saying this?

The “will” not to be victimized, or not to be raped. Her will cannot come to fruitition. Looks like that God is always on the side of the bullies, rapists, murderers, torturers - because he allows their “will” to conquer the will of the victims.

 

[JDaniel]

There is some irony in the god debate. Here we have theists arguing that there is a god, and we have atheists arguing that if there is a god, it’s not the god the theists conceive of.

Has no one ever considered that maybe both the atheists and theists are right? Maybe all the arguments for the existence of a deity are compelling enough to accept that there is one, and the atheological arguments that if there was a god, he would be evil, deceptive, and all around not nice are compelling as well. I am the hybrid that is born of both the atheistic and theistic position.

I am a maltheist, I accept both most of the popular theological and atheological arguments. I believe there is a creator/designer deity, and that this fellow goes through phases of being incredibly cruel and malicious to man kind. The way I see it, I am the most rational. I am willing to conceive to the stronger arguments from both sides, and this is where it has gotten me.

If you really think about it, the sort of deity I believe in best fits the arguments and the evidence everybody’s throwing around. I don’t get why no one else sees this, though. Maybe people just don’t want to believe in that sort of god, maybe it’s purely an emotional thing. Anyways are there other maltheists out there like me?

Relinquish:

Welcome to Catholic answers Forum. Now, to get to your assertion, I find non-theist positions to be, for the most part, affectacious, at best.

God bless,
jd

 

[englishredrose]

I haven’t read the many posts so don’t know if this has been said but

many atheists seem to become atheist after a period of believing in God. They have fallen out with God or the God they have been taught/perceived. Or fallen out with the church in some way.

Two weeks ago approximately now I was shown an example of the love and warmth of God. I was kind of taught that love and warmth of God. I came away - happy. I found if the love of God is that warm then who could not want that. If the love of God was that warm then who could not believe in God

I think many an atheist are atheist because of all the trappings we give each other and haven’t been able to experience The presence of God. His love and warmth just simply by being with him. We forget the basics of just simply being with God. “Be Still and Know That I am God”. But we need reminding of this in all our strife of trying to be a perfect Christian - whatever that is anyway. But we get caught up in it. God loves each one of us. His love is warm and pure. Why can’t we just be with him in return. No demands. Just enjoying his warmth and love. Even atheists would soon come around to God if they could just be still with God with no demands etc. God is so loving. We forget this at every turn. No wonder people walk away.

In order to be atheist it seems like they have had to heard of God in order to reject God. It not that they haven’t heard of God. Just for whatever reason that often seems to be a negative they reject God. If anyone can reject God after what I was shown two weeks ago, then… I don’t know. I do know its easy to reject God based on all the rules and regulations. But being with God - just simply with him pure Love. ANd I am building on that day by day because God is wonderful.

 

[Gorgias]

Serious,

You’ve raised a number of interesting points. I’ve addressed all of them; but, due to scope and the length of the responses, I’ve broken things up into two posts.

Blessings,

G.

If you need “faith”, then you left the arena of rational discussion.

I disagree. Faith and hope speak to a certain movement of the human heart to transcend that which may be strictly proven. Those who dig in their heels on the side of ‘science’ and ‘rationality’ also have a certain affinity to ‘faith’ and ‘hope’, even if they don’t recognize or admit to it. A case in point: this past week, Richard Dawkins appeared on the Australian program “Q and A” along with Cardinal Pell, and they discussed a number of topics. (Please do a Google search to find a wealth of links on this debate.) In his review of science, Dawkins expressed a surprising assertion: science will find a solution to the question of the nature of creation, and this solution will be both elegant and simple – more simple, he asserts, then the notion of a Creator God.

Now, I ask you – how can Professor Dawkins make this claim? After all, science and the scientific method doesn’t promise answers, let alone guarantee “simple” or elegant answers. What is it that makes Dawkins claim that such a breakthrough is on the horizon? Simply stated, Dawkins is a man of faith: he has placed his faith in the ability of science to reach such a goal. After all, he has no proof that this will occur, does he? Of course not! (Mind you – he does have the record of the history of science to fall back upon; but this isn’t proof per se. “Past performance does not guarantee future results”, and all that…)

Nevertheless, Dawkins is appealing to a particular set of grounds upon which his faith and hope in science is based. In this case, it is the track record of the the field of science over the past few hundred years. Given that it has been increasing (not monotonically, of course), one might hope that its end point coincides with some measure of ultimate truth. However, that is not a necessary conclusion: it might be possible that science can only asymptotically approach “ultimate truth”, and at some point, it will have reached the limits of its competency. There’s no assertion out there – to the best of my knowledge – that demonstrates that this is not the case, let alone proves that is isn’t so. As a result, we see that “faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth”, for both believers and non-believers alike. (I’ll leave it to you to look up the citation… )

The one and only principle anyone ever needs: “the principle of reciprocity”, which is expressed in the two forms of the “Golden Rule”.

That’s very nice, but it’s insufficient. It fails to recognize the difference between the creator and his creations. The principle of reciprocity works, explicitly, between creatures; it does not attempt to address the relationship between a creator and creature, nor the responsibilities that a creator has to his creation (or vice versa). I would assert that your statement, while well intentioned, is deficient in this respect.

I am not going to entertain 'counter-examples" until you have answered my point. I am sick and tired of such evasive tactics.

Umm… a counter-example is an answer to an assertion – it shows the weaknesses of the assertion, and compels the person making the assertion to demonstrate how the counter-example fails to address the point the person was attempting to make. If you choose to refuse to refute such a response by calling it ‘evasive’, I’ll respect your right to withdraw from the discussion, but please do not mislead yourself into thinking that your assertions are not being met thoughtfully and with respect …

If you wish to answer, I will be glad to see your rationale. If you don’t, I will consider the conversation closed.

I have provided an example in which the premises that you proposed are unable to sufficiently respond. Perhaps you can harmonize my examples with your assertion, and demonstrate that my examples do fit your way of thinking? After all, if you’re presenting an assertion, it needs to hold for all examples, right? One merely has to provide a counter-example to show that the assertion doesn’t hold… (well, unless you want to tear down the whole edifice of philosophy and logic…)

Again, we have to ask why it’s unacceptable: what standards apply, and why are they the standards in play?

The same as as above.

Actually, no. I’ve raised the issue of the distinction between ‘creator’ and ‘creature’; my question, then, is how the notion of standards, in this respect, is different than in the consideration of creature-to-creature standards of acceptability. Perhaps you can assert what standards apply in this case? Or, if you claim that they are the same as the standards that apply creature-to-creature, you might provide an argument why the standards should be the same, and should not necessarily reflect the difference of the creator-creature relationship?

 

[Gorgias]

Serious:

Gorgias:

in the case of an act of evil that one person might commit against an other, what’s the “free will of the victim” to which you’re appealing? You seem to be making a case about rights, not free will; yet, neither seem to fit, here.

The “will” not to be victimized, or not to be raped. Her will cannot come to fruitition. Looks like that God is always on the side of the bullies, rapists, murderers, torturers - because he allows their “will” to conquer the will of the victims.

Respectfully, I think you’re abusing the notion of “free will”; or, at the very least, misunderstanding it. Perhaps it would be helpful if you give your definition of what “free will” entails?

After all, people are engaged in the act of willing various things in each of the moments of their lives. These acts of will frequently come in conflict. In these situations, a limited number of results ensue: one rational actor will defer, and allow the will of the other to take preference to his will; or, both actors will defer, and the conflict will disappear; or, one actor will assert his will, over the will of the other; or some third party will provide a standard which describes who should yield (of course, the decision to assent to the standard in general comes into question, as well as the particular question as to how the parties react in the particular situation). However, in those cases in which one party asserts a dominant position over another, and thwarts the action of the other party, it’s not the free will of the other that is conquered – it’s the actualization of the expression of the free will. That’s a completely different thing.

Let me use an example: does a prisoner, whose civil / physical liberties have been taken away, lose free will? Of course not: they continue to have the faculty of free will, and continue to have the opportunity to make decisions freely. However, having made decisions made in free will, the prisoner finds that they are unable to act in order to actualize these decisions. The free will remains; the ability to actualize is thwarted.

In other words, the will of the victim to remain unvictimized is not harmed; rather, the harm is in the ability to actualize this expression of the will.

To call the notion of free will a notion of “bullies, rapists, murderers, (and) torturers” is to confuse the notion of ‘free will’ with that of the notion of ‘actions chosen through the exercise of free will’. In other words, “bullies, rapists, murderers, and torturers” have the right to exercise their free will (and society has the right to stop them from actualizing certain acts that they conceive in their exercise of free will); likewise, there are those whom “bullies, rapists, murderers, and torturers” will victimize, in contravention of their desires – but that doesn’t represent an affront to their free will (but rather, to their rights as human persons to the integrity of their lives and their persons).

 

[Serious]

I disagree. Faith and hope speak to a certain movement of the human heart to transcend that which may be strictly proven.

The word “faith” has many meanings. We need to clarify to start from a common point, otherwise we shall talk past each other. The word covers a whole spectrum of possibilities all the way from “blind faith” to “reasonable expectation”. To put all of those possibilities under the same umbrella of “faith” is very misleading and disingenuous.

That’s very nice, but it’s insufficient. It fails to recognize the difference between the creator and his creations. The principle of reciprocity works, explicitly, between creatures; it does not attempt to address the relationship between a creator and creature, nor the responsibilities that a creator has to his creation (or vice versa). I would assert that your statement, while well intentioned, is deficient in this respect.

The starting point was that non-interference in the case of planned “misdeeed” reflects on the one, who 1) knew about this plan, 2) has the power to interfere, but 3) fails to do so. The creator is simply irrelevant here. If you say that the “creator” has special “rights”, then you commit the fallacy of “special pleading”. I am saying that if it is wrong for a human not to stop a planned “misdeed”, then it is equally wrong for God not to stop the same misdeed.

Umm… a counter-example is an answer to an assertion – it shows the weaknesses of the assertion, and compels the person making the assertion to demonstrate how the counter-example fails to address the point the person was attempting to make. If you choose to refuse to refute such a response by calling it ‘evasive’, I’ll respect your right to withdraw from the discussion, but please do not mislead yourself into thinking that your assertions are not being met thoughtfully and with respect …

Not true, since I do not intend to put down “absolute rules”. The question I positioned and the questions you asked have nothing in common.

Respectfully, I think you’re abusing the notion of “free will”; or, at the very least, misunderstanding it. Perhaps it would be helpful if you give your definition of what “free will” entails?

That is a legitimate question. Our “pure” will, wish, desire is always “unlimited”, or to be more precise is only limited by our imagination. It is completely irrelevant. The only thing that matters is the ability to carry out our “will, wish or desire”. It happened a long time ago that I had a conversation with someone about this very topic. He said that the “free will” of the victim of a rape was in no way impaired, since she could “will” whatever she wanted, only her ability to carry out her “will” (not to be raped) was limited. Since that was the first time I encountered such idiocy, I was almost left speechless.

 

[Gorgias]

The word “faith” has many meanings. We need to clarify to start from a common point, otherwise we shall talk past each other. The word covers a whole spectrum of possibilities all the way from “blind faith” to “reasonable expectation”. To put all of those possibilities under the same umbrella of “faith” is very misleading and disingenuous.

Yep, that makes sense. What understanding of ‘faith’ do you have in mind, such that an appeal to faith invalidates reason? The claim you made was that my appeal to ‘faith’ stands in the way of ‘reason’. How do you define my appeal to faith in that way, such that you believe our discussion is hindered?

The starting point was that non-interference in the case of planned “misdeeed” reflects on the one, who 1) knew about this plan, 2) has the power to interfere, but 3) fails to do so.

The creator is simply irrelevant here. If you say that the “creator” has special “rights”, then you commit the fallacy of “special pleading”.

The fallacy of special pleading doesn’t invalidate the case in which a special case, in fact, applies; rather, it only applies in cases in which there is no justification. I’ll presume that your response alleges that there is no justification to claim that there is a difference between the relationship of creator to creature and the relationship of creature to creature. Fair enough?

OK, then; presuming that this is your case, I think you’re mistaken. You assert that persons have the moral obligation to act in cases in which other persons’ rights as humans are being impinged. I agree. However, I’ve asked you to reflect upon this obligation, so that we might understand those principles from which it proceeds; you seem to have elected not to do so. Well… let me offer an observation, which substantiates my claim (and, in my opinion, negates your claim of “special pleading”); perhaps it will help advance our discussion.

As a creature – not created of my own volition, but dependent upon a creator for my existence – I recognize my life as a gift. Likewise, the lives of all those around me are gifts of the same creator. Therefore, inasmuch as I, myself, am indebted to the creator for my life (and therefore, do not have the right to act in ways contrary to my creator’s intentions with respect to my life), I have certain obligations: first, I don’t have the right to harm my own life or the life of another creature; second, I have the obligation to help prevent the harm that proceeds when a creature attempts to harm the life of another creature.

So, the creature-to-creature relationship is characterized by our common obligation to our creator. The creator-to-creature relationship, however, isn’t bound by this obligation. Now, let’s be fair: this doesn’t mean that God can do something unjust to us, and we just have to suck it up. Instead, it means that we still posit God to be just, and so we have faith that God’s actions will be just, in all the ways that they apply to us (even if they are difficult for us).

So, I would assert that I have substantiated that there is a difference between the creator-creature relationship and the creature-creature relationship; in other words, “special pleading” doesn’t apply in this case.

I am saying that if it is wrong for a human not to stop a planned “misdeed”, then it is equally wrong for God not to stop the same misdeed.

I believe that I have demonstrated that your assertion of equivalency here is mistaken. Let’s take up the discussion once we have resolved this notion, ok?

Umm… a counter-example is an answer to an assertion – it shows the weaknesses of the assertion, and compels the person making the assertion to demonstrate how the counter-example fails to address the point the person was attempting to make.

Not true, since I do not intend to put down “absolute rules”.

Hmm… interesting. I’m not sure what to make of your assertion of ‘non-absolute rules’. I’ll defer comment for now, other than noting that I’m now uncertain of what you’re trying to assert, and the value of these assertions, vis-a-vis any sort of argumentation…

The question I positioned and the questions you asked have nothing in common.

My examples, I believe, cover all the salient points, as you’ve set up the requirements: a situation in which there is the appearance of evil acts. You presume intent, and I have demonstrated that there is no such intent to commit evil, even though there is the appearance of evil. I would argue that your question and my counter-examples completely coincide; the fact that there is no intended evil demonstrates that your premise is faulty, not that my examples fail to address your assertions…

 

[Gorgias]

Continuing our discussion…

Serious:

That is a legitimate question. Our “pure” will, wish, desire is always “unlimited”, or to be more precise is only limited by our imagination. It is completely irrelevant. The only thing that matters is the ability to carry out our “will, wish or desire”.

Interesting: ‘free will’ is irrelevant; only ‘will to power’ matters. So… Nietzsche much, do ya?

I disagree – and, in fact, Schopenhauer, who wrote about what you’re talking about (the ‘will to live’) is exactly what Nietzsche was attempting to contradict: the ‘will to power’ as it attempts to overcome the ‘will to live’. Now, Nietzsche isn’t attempting to discuss free will; he’s trying to describe human behavior, and he asserts that the ‘will to power’ is more useful in this endeavor than appeals to the ‘will to live’.

Nevertheless, neither the ‘will to live’ nor the ‘will to power’ is in play in our current discussion; rather, the notion of free will (which is sometimes exhibited in the ‘will to live’ or the ‘will to power’, but isn’t defined purely by these two) is what we’re talking about.

In other words, I’m not trying to leave you speechless. Rather, I’m hoping to point out that you’re talking about certain things but inaccurately labelling them ‘free will’. Are the essential human rights of a rape victim violated by rape? Of course!!! Does the notion of ‘free will’ come into play in this situation? No – rather, it’s a situation in which the ‘will to live’ has been usurped unjustly by another’s ‘will to power’. No need to claim idiocy which leaves you speechless…

 

[Serious]

Yep, that makes sense. What understanding of ‘faith’ do you have in mind, such that an appeal to faith invalidates reason? The claim you made was that my appeal to ‘faith’ stands in the way of ‘reason’. How do you define my appeal to faith in that way, such that you believe our discussion is hindered?

Very well, this is important. The biblical definition is in Hebrews 11:1 (New International Version), which says: “Now faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.” In other words it is simply wishful thinking without sufficient rational support. For example to say that “believing that your car will start tomorrow” is based upon faith, and the belief that Jesus walked on water is also based upon faith is a horrible way to spreading confusion. I suggest that “faith” is to be preserved for those beliefs for which there is little or no evidence, sometimes the evidence points in the other direction, and use “reasonable assumption” for those instances where the evidence is overwhelming. There is a lot in-between, they are more-or-less substantiated assumptions.

The fallacy of special pleading doesn’t invalidate the case in which a special case, in fact, applies; rather, it only applies in cases in which there is no justification. I’ll presume that your response alleges that there is no justification to claim that there is a difference between the relationship of creator to creature and the relationship of creature to creature. Fair enough?

Not precise. There are obviously differences. But both the creator and the createe are moral agents, moreover it is asserted that we (the created ones) are made in the “image” of God. Despite the differences we are the same as God in that particular respect. Also it is asserted that there is only one moral code to cover the whole shebang. So, differences aside, if something is immoral for us, then it is immoral for God. If you say that there is a moral code for humans, and a totally different one for God, then you deny the existence of absolute morality, and attempt to carve out a speciel consideration for God. Not acceptable.

As a creature – not created of my own volition, but dependent upon a creator for my existence – I recognize my life as a gift.

I don’t. Besides, it is not a “gift” for you either. A “gift” presumes that the recipient assumes full dominion over the gift. That is not the case. This “gift” is merely a “loan”. You are simply in charge of the maintenance, but have no “rights” over it. You are not supposed to have the right to give it “back”, and say, “thanks, but no thanks”. So your idea of a “gift” is logically flawed.

I see it completely differently. The creator owes the created one. The created one did not wish to be created. The created one needs to be compensated for being “dragged out” from nonexistence.

Interesting: ‘free will’ is irrelevant; only ‘will to power’ matters. So… Nietzsche much, do ya?

No, not at all. I am simply not interested in the musings of philosophers. The phrase “will to power” means nothing. I am saying that if you are not in the position to act out what you “will / want / desire”, then it is an empty phenomenon. I can “will” to move freely about the solar system unharmed and at will, but that “will” is nothing but “wishful thinking”.

The definition of free will is very simple. It rests on two legs:

1. The person must have at least two options to choose from (and he must be able to carry them out). Also called the principle of alternate possibilities.
2. The locus of decision rests with the person.

If a mafioso takes your family as hostage and threatens to kill them unless you carry out his orders, then - technically - you are still the one who either complies or not, but no sane person would say that you acted on your own volition, and would hold you responsible for your action.

In other words, I’m not trying to leave you speechless. Rather, I’m hoping to point out that you’re talking about certain things but inaccurately labelling them ‘free will’. Are the essential human rights of a rape victim violated by rape? Of course!!! Does the notion of ‘free will’ come into play in this situation? No – rather, it’s a situation in which the ‘will to live’ has been usurped unjustly by another’s ‘will to power’. No need to claim idiocy which leaves you speechless…

In the case the person being raped has one desire: “to escape”. If one wishes to be cynical about it, she also has an option of “lay back and enjoy”. But no one would consider it a viable “option”. As such she does not have the #1 requirement, she has no alternate possibilities.

To say that her “free will” is intact is a logical absurdity. But, let’s say for a second, that her free will is still intact. If that would be the case then God could prevent all the atrocities committed by the criminals, by preventing their ability to carry out their “desires”. You cannot have both ways.

 

[Gorgias]

Very well, this is important. The biblical definition is in Hebrews 11:1 (New International Version), which says: “Now faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see.” In other words it is simply wishful thinking without sufficient rational support.

“Wishful thinking without sufficient rational support” is a poor conclusion based on the Scriptural citation you provided – unless your understanding of that verse is deficient. Let me ask you – there’s a myriad of scientific assertions to which you ascribe, I’m sure. How do you describe your assent, if it doesn’t include the notion of belief? You surely can’t be saying that you have rationally validated all the bases upon which you operate, right? (Of course, you could claim that they are, in fact, all verifiable… but until you embark on that project, you’re still relying on a notion of faith that the project will turn out well for you, right? I would suspect you’d call that kind of faith a “reasonable assumption”, but again, it’s only what you’ve read and what others have told you that shores up that faith: and that looks a lot like what we believers in God say. The only difference is that the basis for our faith is the experience of God and the nature of God qua God, and your basis is the experience of science and the nature of the scientific method.)

For example to say that “believing that your car will start tomorrow” is based upon faith, and the belief that Jesus walked on water is also based upon faith is a horrible way to spreading confusion.

I disagree. The only way that confusion creeps in is if we do a lot of hand-waving and obfuscating on the bases of faith. My example above speaks to that perspective.

I suggest that “faith” is to be preserved for those beliefs for which there is little or no evidence, sometimes the evidence points in the other direction, and use “reasonable assumption” for those instances where the evidence is overwhelming.

So, let me make sure I’m understanding your stance: you want me to agree to a definition of ‘faith’ that says that faith applies to matters of poor foundation, and reason applies to matters of certainty? Nice try; no dice!

I would assert that your definition is overly biased in the direction of empirically verifiable events. It’s unreasonable to hold that standard in a discussion of a supreme being who exists outside of the realm of physicality; in other words, your definition requires us to preclude any hope of demonstrating rationality. However, there is a certain rationality that applies to faith; posit the existence of such a God, and rationality holds perfectly well. Faith, then, is that set of grounds which permits human rationality to properly function when considering the transcendent.

Let’s take another example: I would hope that there has been at least one person in your life whom you’ve loved or whom you would consider has loved you. What’s the empirical foundation that allows for a rational conclusion of ‘love’? Sure, there are certain behaviors and actions that might be cited, but none that lead to the conclusion of ‘love’. Are you asserting that the kind of faith that goes hand in hand with the belief in love is, itself, irrational – that ‘love’ cannot be proven to exist?

But both the creator and the createe are moral agents, moreover it is asserted that we (the created ones) are made in the “image” of God. Despite the differences we are the same as God in that particular respect.

In what respect? That we are moral agents?

Also it is asserted that there is only one moral code to cover the whole shebang.

But the responsibilities incumbent on us as creatures are different than those on God – in particular, our lack of complete perspective means that, necessarily, there will be things that we lack the scope to see fully. So, by definition, what might appear a violation of the moral code, might well appear not to be so from the perspective of God.

If you say that there is a moral code for humans, and a totally different one for God, then you deny the existence of absolute morality, and attempt to carve out a speciel consideration for God. Not acceptable.

No, it isn’t. And, I have a counter-example to demonstrate that there is the possibility of differences in the way that the moral code applies, based on inter-personal relationships (after all, we’re talking about the creator-creature relationship here). I suscribe to the Decalogue, which provides a framework for moral behavior. In the fourth commandment, we see the injunction to “honor your mother and father”. In other words, based on a particular relationship, there’s a distinct and different set of moral responsibilities that applies over-and-above other relationships. By extension, then, we see that what might not be a moral responsibility from me to you would in fact, be a responsibility from me to my folks. In other words, this is not the fallacy of ‘special pleading’ – there is a reasonable, substantial special case here.

 

[Gorgias]

I don’t. Besides, it is not a “gift” for you either. A “gift” presumes that the recipient assumes full dominion over the gift. That is not the case. This “gift” is merely a “loan”.

I disagree. Life is not a “loan”; there is no “giving back” of our life to God, according to our theology. Once given, it is the possession of the individual, eternally.

You are simply in charge of the maintenance, but have no “rights” over it. You are not supposed to have the right to give it “back”, and say, “thanks, but no thanks”.

Excellent point: we are not the owners of our life, but rather, the stewards of it. It is a gift, but not under the restrictive terms that you have attempted to frame up.

So your idea of a “gift” is logically flawed.

I disagree. Consider the following example: on her 16th birthday, you buy your daughter a car. As you hand the keys to her, you explain the ground rules with respect to the gift: no driving after midnight, no more than three passengers, and when she’s in college, the car stays at your house.

Now, by your definition, no gift has been given. However, that flies in the face of reality. Not all gifts are given unconditionally, and the presence of conditions do not negate the reality of a gift. Your assertions are “logically flawed”…

I see it completely differently. The creator owes the created one. The created one did not wish to be created. The created one needs to be compensated for being “dragged out” from nonexistence.

LOL … the world owes you a living, eh? A grasshopper tried that argument on an ant, in lore, to no good effect…

No, not at all. I am simply not interested in the musings of philosophers. The phrase “will to power” means nothing.

LOL… ironically, though, your musings line up perfectly with theirs; your tropes are theirs; and “will to power” means what you describe.

I am saying that if you are not in the position to act out what you “will / want / desire”, then it is an empty phenomenon. I can “will” to move freely about the solar system unharmed and at will, but that “will” is nothing but “wishful thinking”.

You’re confusing “freedom of action” with “freedom of will”, then. Freedom of action is contradicted by force contrary to action; freedom of will is contradicted by determinism.

You’re arguing that there is no free will where there is no corresponding free action? So, then, where there is any hindrance to action, there is a corresponding lack of will? You would do well to study some philosophy; you’re sounding foolish here, I’m afraid…

If a mafioso takes your family as hostage and threatens to kill them unless you carry out his orders, then - technically - you are still the one who either complies or not, but no sane person would say that you acted on your own volition, and would hold you responsible for your action.

See?!? You’re admitting it yourself! The concession that’s being made is that the action was coerced!

To say that her “free will” is intact is a logical absurdity.

So, according to your standard, ‘free will’ is something that’s situationally conditioned? Not all have it, or in equal measure? Therefore, by your definition, free will isn’t something that’s predicated upon our human nature, but rather, by our circumstances.

If you want to discuss “freedom of action”, I’m willing to do that. However, you’re not talking about free will, so you’re not going to be able to make any headway with your case, here…

But, let’s say for a second, that her free will is still intact. If that would be the case then God could prevent all the atrocities committed by the criminals, by preventing their ability to carry out their “desires”. You cannot have both ways.

Wow… maybe you should flesh out the steps you’ve taken here – otherwise, this is just a wicked non sequitur. On one hand, you’re talking about free will; on the other, you’re talking about God’s activity. Right in the middle, you’ve slipped back from free will to freedom of action (on the part of the criminals’ desires). You’re not making sense here. Would you mind trying again?

 

[Serious]

You’re confusing “freedom of action” with “freedom of will”, then.

Looks like you did not wish to reflect of the definiton of “free will”. Why is that?

I will repeat it for you:

The definition of free will is very simple. It rests on two legs:

1. The person must have at least two options to choose from (and he must be able to carry them out). Also called the principle of alternate possibilities.
2. The locus of decision rests with the person.

If you do not have at least two options which you can carry out, and if you are not in the position to make a choice about it, then you have no free will.

You’re arguing that there is no free will where there is no corresponding free action? So, then, where there is any hindrance to action, there is a corresponding lack of will?

Oh, the “will” is there, it is merely futile. If you are in a locked room, and a fire starts, you can “will” not to be burned, but that “will” is irrelevant since you lack the means to escape.

Wow… maybe you should flesh out the steps you’ve taken here – otherwise, this is just a wicked non sequitur.

It is so very simple. You stipulated that it is not necessary that the “will” could be carried out. As long as you have the “will” it is enough. Therefore if God interferes and prevents a rapist to carry out his intent, then his free will is not curtailed. Not sure what your problem was.

 

[Gorgias]

Looks like you did not wish to reflect of the definiton of “free will”. Why is that?

Sorry; perhaps I need to be more direct. I did not reflect upon your definition of free will, because I reject it as a definition of free will (as such); instead, I noted that you are talking about “freedom of action”, not “freedom of will”.

I will repeat it for you:

And I will continue to reject it. The opposite of free will is determinism: if I have no free will, then there is no matter about which I may make a choice – everything is pre-determined. However, where there are choices that I may make (whether or not I have the power to bring them about), then there is free will.

The opposite of freedom of action is force: once I’ve used my free will to make a choice, I then must go about actualizing my will. If there is something that stands in the way, then that force is thwarting my action, not my will.

if you are not in the position to make a choice about it, then you have no free will.

See this extra condition you’re adding here? This is where you’re having problems; the added condition moves you away from ‘will’ and toward ‘act’.

Oh, the “will” is there, it is merely futile. If you are in a locked room, and a fire starts, you can “will” not to be burned, but that “will” is irrelevant since you lack the means to escape.

Will is never irrelevant – because of our rationality, it is what makes us human. It may lead to unobtainable goals, but that’s a whole 'nother issue…

It is so very simple. You stipulated that it is not necessary that the “will” could be carried out. As long as you have the “will” it is enough. Therefore if God interferes and prevents a rapist to carry out his intent, then his free will is not curtailed. Not sure what your problem was.

Aah… now I see what you’re trying to demonstrate: a God who thwarted the actions of criminals would therefore not be impinging upon their will, but upon their ability to act upon their will. I get it. However, it does not demonstrate anything interesting – this is not the way in which God acts, nor does it provide illumination into God’s nature. (Moreover, it is a self-defeating setup: picture yourself living in a world where God allows you to act if you freely choose the things that God wills, but in which God prevents you from acting if you freely choose to do things that God does not will. In that world, you quickly are conditioned to choose those things which God wills, since you realize that you won’t be able to do anything else, anyway. In that world, God would have created humans who are nothing more than lab rats, conditioned by their maker and merely parroting that conditioning. No, that’s not the way God works…)

So, I do want it both ways, since both of your examples fail to reflect the goodness of God – we are neither in possession of free will only when we are able to act, nor are we in possession of free will only when we act in the way that God wants us to. Rather, we are always able to choose freely (even when we do so immorally, such that we impinge on others’ ability to act morally).

 

[Serious]

Sorry; perhaps I need to be more direct. I did not reflect upon your definition of free will, because I reject it as a definition of free will (as such); instead, I noted that you are talking about “freedom of action”, not “freedom of will”.

Strangely that is the definition of free will. Read it here: plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

And I will continue to reject it.

Then why don’t you provide your own definiton? It is not enough to say that “this is not the definition”; you need to say what the defintion is. And you cannot define something be stipulating what that phenomenon is “not”.

Will is never irrelevant – because of our rationality, it is what makes us human. It may lead to unobtainable goals, but that’s a whole 'nother issue…

If you cannot do what you “want / will / desire” to do, then your will counts for nothing. If you have no course of action which reflects your will, then what good is it?

Aah… now I see what you’re trying to demonstrate: a God who thwarted the actions of criminals would therefore not be impinging upon their will, but upon their ability to act upon their will. I get it. However, it does not demonstrate anything interesting – this is not the way in which God acts, nor does it provide illumination into God’s nature.

Come on. If the existence of mere “will” is what is pertinent, and thwarting the accompanying action is irrelevant (and this is what you say), then the so called evil actions could all be thwarted without limiting the free will of the perpetrator. You just invalidated the so called “free will defense” (which says: "the free will of the agents is so important and valuable that God must put up with the evil actions, since preventing the actions God would invalidate the free will of the evil people). And the fact that God “does not operate like this” is the question: “why?”. You cannot say: “well this is a mystery, God’s nature is inscrutable”. Contrary to what you say: “it gives a tremendious insight into God’s nature” and the insight is not “pretty”.

So, I do want it both ways, since both of your examples fail to reflect the goodness of God.

Wow, no kidding. Looks like we shall have the same problem as always: “You wish to establish God’s ‘goodness’ as an axiom, and when my reasoning invalidates that assumption, then my reasoning is incorrect”. That is not the way a rational discourse works.

When contemplating the “problem of evil”, the only “features” of God we take into account (as premises) are: “omniscience” (God knows about the actions), “omnipotence” (God has the power prevent the actions) - and of course the undeniable fact that “evil” actions and “harmful events” DO occur. The alleged “benevolence” is just a hypothesis, which you need to establish in the course of the discussion. You are not allowed to present it as a premise for the discussion. This is the point when the theist invariably starts to complain: “you wish to control the discussion, you wish to take away my freedom to resort to theology, the catechism, etc…”. What they actually should say (if they were intellectually honest) is: “In order to show God’s benevolence I need to present it as an axiom. Then I can say that evidence to the contrary is discarded since it contradicts the axiom. Thus finally I could establish God’s benevolence” Do you actually understand why this line of “reasoning is not admissible”??

 

[Gorgias]

Strangely that is the definition of free will. Read it here: plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Oddly enough, the opening sentence there is “'Free Will is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.” Note that this definition speaks to the “capacity … to choose”, not a ‘capacity to act’.

The second paragraph says “Philosophers who distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will do so because our success in carrying out our ends depends in part on factors wholly beyond our control. Furthermore, there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake. As the presence or absence of these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility, it is plausible that the central loci of our responsibility are our choices, or ‘willings.’”

Thank you for helping illustrate my point.

Then why don’t you provide your own definiton?

Let’s work with the definition from the link you provided: the ability of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives; this ability speaks to ‘freedom of will’ and not ‘freedom of action’.

If you cannot do what you “want / will / desire” to do, then your will counts for nothing. If you have no course of action which reflects your will, then what good is it?

If I have no ability to act out my will, then there is still great importance to my being able to make decisions: in the context in which some agent is attempting to thwart my ability to act, the only act of defiance that I may be able to make is to retain my right to make moral choices; in doing so, I affirm my humanity, even in the face of injustice.

Come on. If the existence of mere “will” is what is pertinent, and thwarting the accompanying action is irrelevant (and this is what you say), then the so called evil actions could all be thwarted without limiting the free will of the perpetrator.

Yes, but you see the implication, don’t you? If we have a God who is a ‘traffic cop’, then people do not act out of a desire to love God in their actions – they act because they know that Big Brother is everywhere, waiting to pounce on them. Ask yourself: do we obey traffic law because we choose to do so, making free will decisions… or isn’t more the case that we do so because we fear being caught?

Contrary to what you say: “it gives a tremendious insight into God’s nature” and the insight is not “pretty”.

And I see it precisely differently: God allows us not only to make free will decisions, but God also gives us (relative) freedom to act – in this way, we aren’t ‘forced’ by God to do anything, but rather, we have the free will to come to God of our own volition. Kind of a “if you love something, set it free; if it comes back to you, it’s yours forever. If not, it never was” dynamic…

Wow, no kidding.

Not really, though: in this particular example, it seems that you have set up a situation in which the salient features aren’t diametrically opposed. It’s not the case that God must either be evil because free action may be abused OR God must be evil because God doesn’t thwart evil free actions. The alternative is that God allows free will, does not interfere with free action, AND has the perspective to see how goodness flows from this ‘design choice’.

Looks like we shall have the same problem as always: “You wish to establish God’s ‘goodness’ as an axiom, and when my reasoning invalidates that assumption, then my reasoning is incorrect”.

Your reasoning does not “invalidate that assumption”, it just merely fails to demonstrate what you’d hoped. It’s not that I’m simply saying “no no no” – I’ve been providing counter-examples left and right. And that, my friend, is how rational discourse works…!

 

[Gorgias]

When contemplating the “problem of evil”, the only “features” of God we take into account (as premises) are: “omniscience” (God knows about the actions), “omnipotence” (God has the power prevent the actions) - and of course the undeniable fact that “evil” actions and “harmful events” DO occur.

And my counter to your set of premises is that ‘omnipotence’ is the ability to do all things (your negative formulation as ‘prevention’ already sets you in the wrong direction); in addition, you need to substantiate ‘evil actions’ and ‘harmful events’ in the context of the whole of history. If God allows something that appears evil to occur, such that God’s plan of Salvation obtains, then your assertion of ‘harmful’ fails to obtain.

Note two things: your assertion claims for yourself some sort of omniscient perspective which you don’t have – this assertion invalidly enables you to speak of evil on some absolute scale. I’m claiming that this is not the case. Note also that this is a distinct position from the moral tenet that “evil may not be done in order that good proceed”; in this case, God is neither doing nor willing evil – rather, God is simply allowing it to occur. This is a far different case than your assertion of God’s active involvement and responsibility for the evil you purport.

An example: when I learned to ride a bicycle, I was taught by my parents. In the course of learning, I fell a few times. These falls were ‘harmful’ and would, seemingly, fall under the notion of ‘evil’ you’ve outlined. My parents allowed these falls; they knew that they would occur; and they didn’t prevent them. However, they neither caused them nor willed them. Rather, knowing that they were part of the process of me reaching the goal of learning to ride a bike, they allowed them, in the greater context of enabling me to reach that goal.

What they actually should say (if they were intellectually honest) is: “In order to show God’s benevolence I need to present it as an axiom. Then I can say that evidence to the contrary is discarded since it contradicts the axiom. Thus finally I could establish God’s benevolence” Do you actually understand why this line of “reasoning is not admissible”??

I’m not claiming that your points are inadmissible because “they contradict the axiom”; I’m claiming that they do not stand scrutiny on their own merits. (They just also happen to contradict the claim of God’s omnibenevolence, too… )

 

[Serious]

Oddly enough, the opening sentence there is “'Free Will is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.” Note that this definition speaks to the “capacity … to choose”, not a ‘capacity to act’.

You failed to read the “small print”. The point is that the phrase to “to choose a course of action from among various alternatives” implies that all the alternatives can be carried out. Without the abilitiy to carry our the chosen line of action, it is meaningless to speak of the choice. And that is what you fail to realize. Why, I don’t know. It is simply obvious.

I will illustrate your error with an example. You are locked in a room on the 100th floor of a building. There is a fire in the room. You wish / want / desire / will to escape. But the door is locked and you have no key. The door is too strong to break it down. However, you can break the window. Now you have two “options”, you can stay in the room and burn to death, or you can jump and fall to your death.

Do you really assert that you have “free will” in this situation?

Yes, but you see the implication, don’t you?

Yes, and no but.

If we have a God who is a ‘traffic cop’, then people do not act out of a desire to love God in their actions – they act because they know that Big Brother is everywhere, waiting to pounce on them.

Irrelevant. None of my actions are performed out of desire to love God. If the “free will” of the would be perpetrator is not contingent upon the ability to carry out those actions, then God can safely interfere and prevent them. You cannot have it both ways. Either the ability to carry out the “willed” action is important, and then your definition is nonsense, or the ability to carry out is not important, and then God can interfere and the “free will” is not limited. You cannot have your cake and eat it, too.

And I see it precisely differently: God allows us not only to make free will decisions, but God also gives us (relative) freedom to act – in this way, we aren’t ‘forced’ by God to do anything, but rather, we have the free will to come to God of our own volition.

Completely irrelevant. We are talking about the fully secular question of “free will”. If we have two neckties to choose from, one is red, the other is blue, and no one forces us to choose the red, then we already have free will. Nevertheless I will entertain your idea that the only “relevant free will” is the ability to choose to love God or not. If the only pertinent choice is whether to love God or not, then God can REALLY take away all of our other freedoms. It is not necessary to have the “extra” freedom of also being able to torture someone.

Not really, though: in this particular example, it seems that you have set up a situation in which the salient features aren’t diametrically opposed. It’s not the case that God must either be evil because free action may be abused OR God must be evil because God doesn’t thwart evil free actions. The alternative is that God allows free will, does not interfere with free action, AND has the perspective to see how goodness flows from this ‘design choice’.

Nice try. You now switched from the “free will defense” to the “greater good defense”. Do you see that?

The basic “free will defense” says that the “free will” is so valuable, that God must put up with the existence of unnecessary, gratuitous evil. It says that evil is a logical consequence of giving free will. Of course, it is a vessel of stinking fertilizer, since the existence of free will only leads logically to the possibility of evil, but not to the actuality of it.

The “greater good defense” says the exact opposite. It say that there are no unnecessay, gratuitous evil acts and events, all those seemingly unnecessary acts are actually the best course of action, if only God woul explain it to us. It stipulates that the (seemingly) evil acts are logical prerequisites to the ensuing “greater good”.

The two are logically opposed to each other.

But I see the apologists to jump from one to the other when they realize that the first one does not work - just like you did now. (Then, when the second one does not work either, they usually jump to the third one, and start to say that pain and suffering have a “redemptive” value, or they say that pain and suffering are the gratest gift from God… and then - finally - they start to scream: “but you are you, you miserable piece of dirt to question God!!!” When shall we reach that stange?)

 

[Gorgias]

You failed to read the “small print”. The point is that the phrase to “to choose a course of action from among various alternatives” implies that all the alternatives can be carried out.

Before I address the meat of your response, it would seem that it would be helpful to resolve this continuing sticking-point. Can you show me where, in the article, it speaks to this ‘small print’ of “alternatives that can be carried out”? After all, I quoted you the second paragraph, where it specifically speaks to the difference between ‘choice’ and ‘action’, and falling squarely on the side of ‘choice’ in this discussion. The notion of “alternatives that can be carried out” is specifically what the article disregards, since “there are always external constraints on the range of options we can meaningfully try to undertake” and therefore “these conditions and constraints are not (usually) our responsibility”.

You complain that I fail to recognize your point: I don’t – I see what you’re saying, but I reject it as being out of scope in this discussion. You seem to be oblivious to what I’ve been saying, to the extent that when you point to an article that makes my point, you think it’s trying to demonstrate your point…!

Do you really assert that you have “free will” in this situation?

Yes – clearly, I have the ability to choose; however, I do not have the ability to actualize my choice. Nevertheless, the choice is there, and the external constraints thwart only action, not choice.

 

[Gorgias]

Irrelevant. None of my actions are performed out of desire to love God.

Say it however you wish: a desire to love God, a desire to act morally, a desire to properly exercise free will. In each case, they point to God and God’s providence (whether or not you explicitly recognize it). Recall that we are taking as a premise God’s existence, so from this perspective, your knowledge or admission of God is irrelevant here.

If the “free will” of the would be perpetrator is not contingent upon the ability to carry out those actions, then God can safely interfere and prevent them.

God can, but is not required to. Nor does it follow that deferring to act is evil; we’ve discussed the notion of apparent evil in the face of an omniscient God’s greater perspective.

You cannot have it both ways.

I’m not attempting to: I’m asserting that you’re making a false dichotomy.

Either the ability to carry out the “willed” action is important

which I reject…

or the ability to carry out is not important, and then God can interfere and the “free will” is not limited.

in which case your example isn’t about ‘free will’; it’s now about justice, vis-a-vis God. We can talk about the justice of God who allows a variety of actions on the part of rational created agents, but this is a discussion that’s distinct from the notion of free will. We can have that discussion, but let’s admit that we’re changing course…

Completely irrelevant. We are talking about the fully secular question of “free will”. If we have two neckties to choose from, one is red, the other is blue, and no one forces us to choose the red, then we already have free will.

You’re still tied up in notions of actualizing the choice: it’s not that anyone forces you to pick up the red, it’s whether your choice of the red is pre-determined!

Nice try. You now switched from the “free will defense” to the “greater good defense”. Do you see that?

That’s because you digressed from a discussion of ‘free will’ to a discussion of God’s justice. Do you see that?

The basic “free will defense” says that the “free will” is so valuable, that God must put up with the existence of unnecessary, gratuitous evil.

No. Free will opens up the possibility of acts contrary to God’s nature on the part of his creations, but it does not require that this evil is ‘unnecessary’ or ‘gratutious’. Can you substantiate this claim, or do you expect it to stand as a pure assertion?

It says that evil is a logical consequence of giving free will. Of course, it is a vessel of stinking fertilizer, since the existence of free will only leads logically to the possibility of evil, but not to the actuality of it.

It says that evil is a possible consequence of free will, not a necessary one. We agree on that point; why do you assert the necessity as a logical consequence?

The “greater good defense” says the exact opposite. It say that there are no unnecessay, gratuitous evil acts and events, all those seemingly unnecessary acts are actually the best course of action, if only God woul explain it to us. It stipulates that the (seemingly) evil acts are logical prerequisites to the ensuing “greater good”.

Note that ‘greater good’ answers a different question – a question you weren’t asking. If you want to concede that you’re not making headway with the notion of free will, we can turn to the question of God’s justice (which, by the way, you’ve reached conclusions about by making a ton of assumptions without substantiation!)…

But I see the apologists to jump from one to the other when they realize that the first one does not work - just like you did now.

I’m just following your lead, brother. When you talk about free will, I respond to your assertions. When you shift to the notion of divine justice, I engage you on that front. It’s unfair of you to say that I’m moving from one topic to another, without recognizing that you’re a partner in that particular dance!

and then - finally - they start to scream: “but you are you, you miserable piece of dirt to question God??!!!” When shall we reach that stange?)

Well, it’s good to see that you approach this discussion with an open mind and a rational view. I’m the one who is about to fling insults? Pot, meet kettle…