Two thoughts here: first, if you create people who might sin, then it will become obvious what the game is, if God is going to prevent the actualization of immoral acts. It wouldn’t take a person long to realize that their actions are being thwarted; don’t you agree?
But they are not thwarted, and that is the point. They can sin, there is no barrier, except that they do not want to sin.
Second, though: the thought that God might “only create people who do not want to perform such acts” is tantamount to determinism, isn’t it?
Not at all. No one forces them to behave as they do. They see the alternatives, they could do any of the alternatives, but they do not desire to do it. Their free will and their free actions are not curtailed by external forces and determinations. Of course they are limited by their own decisions, but that does not mean determination.
I will have to elaborate: as I said before, I am perfectly free to kill someone, but I do not want to do it. In a very good sense I limit myself. However, free will would only disappear if some extenal factor would impose ITS will upon mine. We need to consider the difference between “determined” and “very heavily influenced”. Due to my upringing I find it (almost) impossible to stay seated when an older person stands next to me on the bus or the metro. Not fully impossible, but the difference is so small that it is next to zilch. Now, the question is: “am I determined by my upbringing to give my seat away?” No, I am not determined. If I really wanted to, I could override my deeply ingrained habit, and stay seated (especially since I am already 66 years old

). But I will not do it, because I do not want to do it. The freedom is there, however.
How would you distinguish between a world in which there is free will but no free will choices that intend immoral acts, and a world in which there is only determinism of the sort that prevents immoral acts? It seems to me that there is no distinction here!
But there is. Not externally, but internally. The outside human observer cannot tell the difference, but God is supposed to know. Of course, in a very good sense it
does not matter. If you would be in a traffic accident, and a doctor would come to treat your injuries, it would not matter to you, if he does it out of free compassion, or if he does it due to taking the Hyppocratic oath very seriously. Or suppose that there is an extremely advanced robot, who (not what) is programmed to help you, and has absolutely no choice in the matter, it would not matter to you. As Asimov wrote in “I Robot”: “the truth is that we cannot tell the difference between a robot, and an extremely good, loving, caring and compassionate human”. (The quote is not verbatim, but the gist is there.)
Hmm… how could we argue for free will if we positively exclude a certain sub-class of willings? I’m sorry, but that seems to violate free will…
That is an error. Free will, just like freedom of action is never “absolute”. By taking out some “sub-class” you limit the freedom, but do not destroy it. This is again the usual “black-and-white” approach of theists. Everything, or nothing! No grey areas. Either good or evil.
You make the assertion that a God who allows free moral agents to make choices (regardless of the moral content of those choices) is not benevolent; implicitly, you’re saying that free will is less important than freedom of action.
I don’t say it just implictly, I say it explicitly. Freedom to will something is irrelevant if you cannot carry out your will.
Can you make a case for this assertion? That is, is it better to have free will, or is it better to have no sin?
Since it is possible to reconcile the two, I do not need to choose.
But, if you are interested, I will give a short reply. When a goal orinted designer / constructor plans and creates a system, he has certain results in mind. He wishes the system to perform according to his desires or specifications. There are three possible courses of creating that system:
- fully deterministic. Everything works as planned, there is no discrepancy, there are no errors, no unforeseen and unplanned events. This is how a good and conscientious constructor works.
- partially deterministic. Not everything is pre-determined, but there are built in limits of tolerance. Within those tolerance limits there is freedom in the system. But the fluctuations are never too wide to create an unwanted and unplanned action or event. This is how a decent, but somewhat lazy constructor operates.
- undeterministic. There is a lot of freedom built into the system, so much so, that actions and events can happen that the designer definitely does not want. He could fix them, but only after they happened, but usually too lazy to do it. Instead of doing a thorough job of putting tolerance limits, he issues “commandments” which try to influence the free agents to stay within the desired parameters. The result is a disaster. The agents do not perform as desired. Seeing this, the creator fabricates a reward / penal system, but then messes that one up as well. Instead of giving rewards or meting out punishments when the agents could learn from them, he does it when there is no chance to learn any more. As such there is no correction built into the punishment, it becomes sheer revenge.
To add insult to injury, he even demands worship and adoration from his ill-designed and lousily executed, flawed creation. Needless to say this is how an incompetent, lazy and tyrannical designer works.
If you see a parallel between this mini-essay and christianity, it is not a coincidence. Seriously.