Alois:
I understand exactly what your point is, I was just hoping you wouldn’t attempt to carry this in to solipsism, which has been considered an intellectually bankrupt philosophy for over a thousand years now. Just what do you propose with this philosophy? You can dream up an infinite amount of 'or’s, and I challenge you to do so if you really believe in it. To assume that we’re in a vat is nothing. You can neither prove or disprove it. It’s irrelevant until we see a “glitch” in this vat.
i’m afraid you’re still not getting the point.
this has got nothing to do with solipsism, but rather with the idea that the only beliefs that can have warrant are those that are capable of being demonstrated, or “proven”…
some of our foundational beliefs aren’t capable of deductive proof, whether that be logical
or empirical. now, either those beliefs are nonetheless warranted, or they are not; if they are, then why should any
other belief have deductive provability as a necessary condition for reasonable belief? if they are
not warranted, then neither is anything else we believe.
i am not “assuming” that we’re in a vat - i am merely pointing out that the
possibility is consistent with
everything we know. that is, none of us believes that we’re in a vat, but none of us can
prove that we’re not; therefore “proof” of this sort isn’t necessary for reasonable belief.
Alois:
It’s fun to play around with in your mind, but worthless as a philosophy. Stating that “evidence can be wrong” as the reason for believing that evidence is wrong is circular logic.
but i’m not saying this. i’m saying that the fact it’s always possible that our evidence can be wrong entails that we do not need certainty that our evidence must be right in order to have rational beliefs.
and the objection that i consistently hear levelled against theistic arguments is that we can’t be certain about the evidence marshalled in support of them…
Alois:
They are observable. If you think observable means something that can be seen through the human eye, then you are mistaken. We cannot see quarks, but we can observe them by monitoring their impact on matter that we can see, and then using physics to assess them. This is connected with my final paragraph.
exactly: they’re
indirectly observable - observable through their
effects. god is observable in the same way.
Alois:
If you state that you believe in God, and you have no evidence to support it, that belief is unreasonable.
well, i don’t state this; i state that one doesn’t require unassailable evidence in order to believe in god. one doesn’t even need to be able to formulate arguments any more than one needs to be able to formulate arguments to support her belief in the real world or the reliability of her senses. such arguments may, in fact, be available, but they’re not
needed.
personally, my belief in the existence of god is basic - i am just aware of some more than human source of meaning and value; but i have also subsequently recognized the soundness of some of the arguments for god’s existence.
Alois:
If you state that evidence isn’t needed, then you admit that reason and logic are not needed. We can’t debate without reason and logic.
no. i state that what you’re calling “observable” evidence isn’t needed.
Alois:
Undetectable evidence is irrelevant to us until we do detect it. When we do, it then becomes detectable. Undectectable evidence, therefore, doesn’t exist. So, detectable evidence is infinitely more legitimate. Did that answer your question?
not really. is “detectable” synonymous with “empirical”?
i mean, if all you mean by “detectable” is something like “capable of having an effect on a person”, then i guess i agree with you; in that way, arguments are “detectable”, and mathematical equations, and concepts, and propositions (as opposed to sentences), and numbers, and so on.
if, on the other hand, you’re simply giving a colloquial version of something like the principle of verification (a proposition is meaningful if and only if it is in principle capable of empirical verification or if it is analytical), then i disagree, since propositions of that kind are self-defeating.