T
Touchstone
Guest
If you read any amount of scholarly literature on this, you will notice that a substantial amount of preparatory discussion is devoted to getting the definitions and semantics of terms like “moral” and “empathy” nailed down. Some (earlier) models simply didn’t recognize infant behavior as even potentially ‘empathetic’ because of their working definition of ‘empathy’ – something that, among other things, often presumed a reified and self-conscious theory of mind.I got quite a different impression from a recent Nova program about becoming human. The program illustrated how human infants, more so than any other primates, are attuned to reading and relating to others’ facial expressions and emotions. This is because humans are more likely to share parenting than say chimpanzees. So a human child needs to relate to a wider group of adults - not just their mothers.
So, I remember the program you are referring to, and agree that’s the kind of evidence science is increasingly developing into models that allocate significant “moral grammar” to newborn infants. But remember that that is predicated on a more general and expansive definition of “moral” and “empathetic” than what others have traditionally employed (and yes, that’s part of the thrust of the research, that this traditional view is somewhat obsolete now).
I think you may be overlooking the “intrinsic-ness” of reason. In your view, if the particulars of natural law are uncovered by the application of reason, and I have no problem with that as a working definition or stipulation, that STILL reduces to a “basic equipment” feature of humans. Humans are born with the innate capacity to reason, so by extension, natural law is perfectly “built in” as the inevitable object of the application of that reason.This is a distinction without a difference. To you the only thing you will call natural law is something that was demonstrably present at birth. Others here have been trying to explain that natural law is by definition something that is acquired through the application of reason. You change the definition of natural law to suit your premise. Until you and the others here can agree on the definition of natural law, then any debate on the substance of the issue is pointless. Of course anyone is free to define terms however they wish, as long as they don’t claim those terms are equivalent to someone else’s usage of those same terms.
That is, to say that natural law depends on the application of reason is NOT to introduce any distinction, fundamentally, from something we might be inclined to describe as “written on men’s hearts” in some non-discovered/brute-fact way. It reduces to the same thing – God arranging the features of man such that God’s law is a fact, an objective fact of human experience, no matter whether it comes through “just knowing”, or some form of derived reasoning that inevitably yields to the apprehension of that same God’s law…
-TS