Thomas Aquinas, The Unmoved Mover

[Betterave]

Yes, since they are not blank and in fact are well-known.

Again, that is a useless and nonsensical reply. You blankly assert that they are not blank (ironic!) and for some reason reiterate your claim that they are well-known (as if I had denied this).

I guess from your response that basically assumed I was an idiot and then treated me as such.

I’m sorry you read it that way. I think, however, that you are the one who is basically assuming what I basically assumed. My objections to your view have all addressed the substance (or lack thereof) of your posts here. Please try to focus on that.

I noted that its mathematically demonstrable that something can arise from nothing. Therefore, motion can arise spontaneously.

Go ahead and explain.

Pick any.

How about one of the ones I already critiqued in part one of your reply to me? Got any rebuttals?

 

[Betterave]

I ask: “Non sequitur?”

You reply:

Nope. Probably just not understood.

That’s it. That’s your full reply. And yet you can’t see what I’m saying about the blank assertions, the lack of substance, etc.?

(Please note that I could easily multiply such examples. If you really are unable to understand this simple point, I think I might be better advised to not waste my time attempting to have a reasonable discussion with you about rather more difficult matters. Let me know.)

 

[kbachler]

I ask: “Non sequitur?”

You reply:

That’s it. That’s your full reply. And yet you can’t see what I’m saying about the blank assertions, the lack of substance, etc.?

(Please note that I could easily multiply such examples. If you really are unable to understand this simple point, I think I might be better advised to not waste my time attempting to have a reasonable discussion with you about rather more difficult matters. Let me know.)

Since the text was much longer, and gave explanations, which you choose to ignore, instead picking one word and saying “That’s your full reply” it is quite easy to see that your argument is fallacious.

 

[Betterave]

Since the text was much longer, and gave explanations, which you choose to ignore, instead picking one word and saying “That’s your full reply” it is quite easy to see that your argument is fallacious.

Please go back and read post 55. The fact that “the text” was longer is because “the text” discussed several things - none of them, however, there or subsequently, address an explanation of the *comment *(not “one word,” btw) that I quoted - do they?? So now you’re adding another under-explained response, which seems to combine another non sequitur plus straw man/ignoratio elenchi, to your list of rational blunders. You’re really just proving my point with your replies here.

 

[kbachler]

Please go back and read post 55. The fact that “the text” was longer is because “the text” discussed several things - none of them, however, there or subsequently, address an explanation of the *comment *(not “one word,” btw) that I quoted - do they?? So now you’re adding another under-explained response, which seems to combine another non sequitur plus straw man/ignoratio elenchi, to your list of rational blunders. You’re really just proving my point with your replies here.

Yes, they do address it.

 

[Betterave]

Yes, they do address it.

LOL! Okay; how do they address it? It seems to me that they clearly don’t; nonetheless, I’m asking you, yet again, to explain your (latest) blank assertion. If you can’t do that, why not just admit it? If you can, why not just do it?

 

[kbachler]

LOL! Okay; how do they address it? It seems to me that they clearly don’t; nonetheless, I’m asking you, yet again, to explain your (latest) blank assertion. If you can’t do that, why not just admit it? If you can, why not just do it?

They address it by answering your question/comment.

You asked how it is that our concept of cause is temporal. I replied that brains evolve to develop a concept of cause (and effect) that is temporal in nature, understanding of an arrow of time by nature. Brains that understand this survive and breed. Brains that do not survive this, die and are not selected.

Thomas then (among several other errors, several of which I already quoted and addressed in this thread) attempts to fundamentally change the meaning of cause in various ways, by redefining the nature of cause, including by removing the fundamental attribute of a temporal nature.

Fundamentally, removing the temporal nature of cause is nonsensical, just as it is nonsense to remove the temporal nature of motion (which he also attempts to do.) He attempts to refine things to an “object” “timeless” state, and from that show that God must exist. Besides the fundamental issue of twisting the meaning of words and increasing the potential for equivocation, there is the fundamental issue that by redefining the words in the way he does, he basically assumes the conclusion of “God”. Therefore he commits the fallacy of petitio principii also.

A good example of this is the following which I have previously stated in this thread:

“Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.”

As I said previously:

Notice the petitio principii there - He assumed true what he wished to prove: " the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause" - “the first”: assumes THERE IS A FIRST, “the ultimate” assumes there is an ultimate. He assumes this because this is what is in his experience. But there is no reason for this assumption.

He does not KNOW that there is a first cause and has not shown it. He does not know that there is an ultimate cause, and has not shown it. All he REALLY knows and has is a series of intermediate causes, and from that he cannot deduce what he claims to deduce.

I also previously quoted:

“The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.”

Again, all we need to consider is x + sin (x+ π) = 0

This is a clear case showing a counterexample. Nothingness is equivalent to the sum of two functions of motion. Consequently, we can go from nothing to TWO different types of motion; therefore the motions are efficient causes of themselves.

Aquinas’ argument is thus defeated as are your complaints.

 

[Betterave]

Fundamentally, removing the temporal nature of cause is nonsensical, just as it is nonsense to remove the temporal nature of motion (which he also attempts to do.)

It seems to me that you’ve just repeated yourself and not explained anything. In any case, I would have much to criticize in your last post, but let’s start with the sentence quoted above and ask a few very simple straightforward questions, to which you can hopefully give me simple and straightforward answers:

1. Where does Thomas attempt to “remove the temporal nature of motion”?
2. What is his argument?
3. How does it amount to nonsense?

 

[kbachler]

It seems to me that you’ve just repeated yourself and not explained anything. In any case, I would have much to criticize in your last post, but let’s start with the sentence quoted above and ask a few very simple straightforward questions, to which you can hopefully give me simple and straightforward answers:

1. Where does Thomas attempt to “remove the temporal nature of motion”?
2. What is his argument?
3. How does it amount to nonsense?

I understand that it seems that way to you. I suspect it is primarily because of your antagonistic and close-minded approach to the topic. I’m reminded of the phrase “Let those who have ears to hear, hear.”

That said, Examples were already provided. See the original post you questioned, post 39, for example. It seems that you want to harp on “lack of explanations” but then you don’t seem to read what’s provided.

Consider:

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

Aquinas’ argument is one of hierarchy, not one based on the temporal nature of motion. He broadens the definition of motion to be “change” without so stating clearly (not so bad though) but he then attempts to “de-temporalize motion” by introducing a hierarchical concept of potentiality to actuality. But of course, this is implicit nonsense, and of course, although he attempts to work in a hierarchy, the fundamental notional of potentiality implies that things are temporal.

Nothing here hasn’t already been stated; your three questions above were answered previously, and here, YET AGAIN.

 

[charlescritt]

I’ve been half- heartedly paying attention to this thread and while I have some other things to attend to, next week I’ll really participate. Not that I’m a genius, but I have been reading Aquinas with some attentiveness over the past 25 years and I also get Scientific American on a monthly basis. The petitio principii references really got under my skin, because if I was a betting man, I’d bet that not a one of you know Aristotle’s six motions. They were so important that men of honor knew better than to refer to them. Now if you do not know what they are, you cannot even begin to make an honorable argument about the unmoved mover or the proper nature of those hierarchies they spoke of. With out their study, you cannot even know the rules they agreed to argue by. Natural selection can only represent one of the possible six motions and since these motions were so vital to all else and so vital to modern science, it was assumed that the players of their time, unlike the players of our time, knew some thing about them. They could tell how a person argued a point, whether or not he knew the six motions. But please, does anyone know what the six motions are and where do you find them in the literature? It is vital, to understand the terms you are slinging around and to know where to go with them. Anyone?

 

[tdgesq]

Or another: “The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” Again, this statement is known today to be false. It can be shown mathematically, and there are examples within QED. (This is part of what makes QED difficult to understand. Aquinas’ argument SEEMS true, and is within our common experience, but unfortunately, our common experience IS NOT the common experience of the universe.)

I would be interested to see some examples within QED that demonstrate something in existence (a being) is the efficient cause of itself. I know you stated you had given examples, but I couldn’t find them in the thread.

 

[Betterave]

I would be interested to see some examples within QED that demonstrate something in existence (a being) is the efficient cause of itself. I know you stated you had given examples, but I couldn’t find them in the thread.

You couldn’t find them? Oh good - I’m not the only one!

 

[Betterave]

I understand that it seems that way to you. I suspect it is primarily because of your antagonistic and close-minded approach to the topic. I’m reminded of the phrase “Let those who have ears to hear, hear.”

I’m criticizing your position, so I guess I’m antagonistic, and I don’t accept your explanations as being real explanations, so I guess I must be closed-minded.

That said, Examples were already provided. See the original post you questioned, post 39, for example. It seems that you want to harp on “lack of explanations” but then you don’t seem to read what’s provided.

No, I’ve clearly explained where I have seen explanations lacking and I think I’ve made it obvious where and in what respect. You have generally responded so as to confirm these observations. I think that is just obvious. Maybe you aren’t seeing this because of *your *antagonistic and closed-minded approach? Something to consider…

Consider:

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”

Aquinas’ argument is one of hierarchy, not one based on the temporal nature of motion. He broadens the definition of motion to be “change” without so stating clearly (not so bad though)…

That seems false: he does not broaden the definition of ‘motion’ to be ‘change’ - that’s just what motion means here. There is no ‘broadening.’ Why would you think otherwise?

…but he then attempts to “de-temporalize motion” by introducing a hierarchical concept of potentiality to actuality.

Explain.

But of course, this is implicit nonsense, and of course, although he attempts to work in a hierarchy, the fundamental notional of potentiality implies that things are temporal.

But of course your charge here is another blank assertion. So please explain.

Nothing here hasn’t already been stated; your three questions above were answered previously, and here, YET AGAIN.

As I said before, and am forced to say YET AGAIN, you seem to just be repeating the same old blank assertions.

 

[Betterave]

But please, does anyone know what the six motions are and where do you find them in the literature?

I don’t. Are you going to tell us?

 

[kbachler]

Sorry if this is in the wrong place

This is just a brief description of Aquinas’ movement theory. I hope it explains it to those of you who do not know it. I am a full believer in God and so I believe St Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas
Thomas Aquinas states that everything moves. Nothing can move on its own so therefore there must an unmoved mover. Aquinas also talks about potentiality and actuality. Wood has the potential to be hot and fire is actually hot. To make something turn from being potentially hot, there has to be something that is actually hot. EG Fire.

I am also a believer in God. But that doesn’t mean that Aquinas made a good argument. I consider it good for the logic and knowledge available in its day. It doesn’t stand up in a modern sense.

 

[grannymh]

Yes, they do address it.

I really don’t belong on this thread, but I am curious. Have you or anyone else read Aquinas’ Writings on the “Sentences” of Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Question 1

I am still in the introduction, but I find it fascinating to read how and why philosophy addresses the many issues of God.

Blessings,
granny

The quest for truth is worthy of the many adventures of the journey.

 

[kbachler]

I’ve been half- heartedly paying attention to this thread and while I have some other things to attend to, next week I’ll really participate. Not that I’m a genius, but I have been reading Aquinas with some attentiveness over the past 25 years and I also get Scientific American on a monthly basis. The petitio principii references really got under my skin, because if I was a betting man, I’d bet that not a one of you know Aristotle’s six motions. They were so important that men of honor knew better than to refer to them. Now if you do not know what they are, you cannot even begin to make an honorable argument about the unmoved mover or the proper nature of those hierarchies they spoke of. With out their study, you cannot even know the rules they agreed to argue by. Natural selection can only represent one of the possible six motions and since these motions were so vital to all else and so vital to modern science, it was assumed that the players of their time, unlike the players of our time, knew some thing about them. They could tell how a person argued a point, whether or not he knew the six motions. But please, does anyone know what the six motions are and where do you find them in the literature? It is vital, to understand the terms you are slinging around and to know where to go with them. Anyone?

I have read Aristotle’s Physics, where he defines motion, and Metaphysics where he defines substance, potentiality and actuality. I made a point of including sections of Categories, Prior Analytics, and Posterior Analytics when I taught logic. I also read Organon, Politics and Nicomachean Ethics… It has been some time since I have reviewed these (they generally don’t come up in an average week.) I had the good fortune of participating in a Great Books program, both as a student and later as faculty; the works were required reading.

I am familiar with his four causes, which are intended to answer the question “why” - he is not using cause (generally) in the same sense we use it today.

Aristotle primarily covers this in two places: Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2, although some principles also arise elsewhere (Posterior Analytics for example.)

A summary of the four causes is:
The material cause: “that out of which”, e.g., the bronze of a statue.
The formal cause: “the form”, “the account of what-it-is-to-be”, e.g., the shape of a statue.
The efficient cause: “the primary source of the change or rest”, e.g., the artisan, the art of bronze-casting the statue.
The final cause: “the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done”, the artisan wanted to cast the form of the statue - perhaps to express creativity or perhaps for money.
Another example: health is the end of walking, losing weight, prescription drugs, and surgical care.

Were you thinking of the Four Causes when you thought of the six motions?

 

[davidv]

I am also a believer in God. But that doesn’t mean that Aquinas made a good argument. I consider it good for the logic and knowledge available in its day. It doesn’t stand up in a modern sense.

Since God hasn’t changed, what has modernism have to do with anything?

 

[kbachler]

Since God hasn’t changed, what has modernism have to do with anything?

Aristotle’s logic (used by Aquinas) has known flaws. Aquinas’ argument (sometimes taken as proofs when they were intended to be indications) also have known flaws, sometimes induced by the underlying weaknesses in Aristotle’s logic.

God hasn’t changed, but man’s ability to build a logical argument has. Man’s understanding of nature has. Man’s understanding of logic, of time of material, of motion, has.

 

[onenow1]

I know this may sound wildly speculative - but let’s assume the truth of string theory. Then, the first moving mover (analogous to the fixed sphere of stars in Aristotle) are the vibrating strings that are the basis for everything else. And the strings are always vibrating - so here’s where the simultaneous movement comes in. Now, what “moves” the strings … well, the Divine violinist

Again, just speculating …

Love it ! Divine Melody infusing our imaginations from the beginning.

God Has Blessed you Levi !