Thomist Unconditional Election vs. Calvinism

[catholictiger]

let me turn the analogy you just gave on its head and show you how it works in my world view.

an Angel will be 60 miles away and he knows that you in freedom will choose to drive to that point. God in his infinite wisdom will put that angel there when you got there freely. He knows that when you see that angel you will convert and follow his ways in freedom. Knowing all of this, he predestines that all this to happen so that you will respond in freedom to his grace. This allows God’s will to be infallible and our response to be free. Thomas, on the other hand, says that it is premotion something that happens without respect to how we would respond to grace.

 

[Wesrock]

Here’s some Catholic thought on “TULIP” by James Akin. It speaks to Thomas’ views on predestination and how it’s similar and different to Reformed thought: ewtn.com/library/ANSWERS/TULIP.htm

What would a Catholic say about this? He certainly is free to disagree with the Calvinist interpretation, but he also is free to agree. All Thomists and even some Molinists (such as Robert Bellarmine and Francisco Suarez) taught unconditional election.

Thomas Aquinas wrote, “God wills to manifest his goodness in men: in respect to those whom he predestines, by means of his mercy, in sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of his justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others… Yet why he chooses some for glory and reprobates others has no reason except the divine will. Hence Augustine says, ‘Why he draws one, and another he draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.’” [15]

Although a Catholic may agree with unconditional election, he may not affirm “double-predestination,” a doctrine Calvinists often infer from it. This teaching claims that in addition to electing some people to salvation God also sends others to damnation.

The alternative to double-predestination is to say that while God predestines some people, he simply passes over the remainder. They will not come to God, but it is because of their inherent sin, not because God damns them. This is the doctrine of passive reprobation, which Aquinas taught [16].

The Council of Trent stated, “If anyone says that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God produces the evil as well as the good works, not only by permission, but also properly and of himself, so that the betrayal of Judas is no less his own proper work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema… If anyone shall say that the grace of justification is attained by those only who are predestined unto life, but that all others, who are called, are called indeed, but do not receive grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema.” [17]

 

[balto]

What distinguishes Thomas from Calvin is free will.

Calvin says God predestins infallible and man has no freedom to resist it. Basically irresistible grace
Thomas says God predestins infallible and man has freedom to resist it. He asserts God’s infallible choice of man’s salvation and man’s freedom to choose salvation. Personally I don’t how Thomas tries to reconcil the following objection: how can man’s freedom be maintained if God’s choice of Salvation is infallible, if person a is predestined for salvation but resists God’s grace how can God’s choice be infallible?

It is maintained because Thomas does not suppose that God’s power is something akin to another created power. He understands God’s creative power as the power (power being understood in an analogous and not a univocal sense here) by which a rational agent is really constituted as having free will. To say that God infallibly selects some for salvation means that there is a fact of the matter that some freely accept God’s offer of grace, which means that God, properly speaking, is responsible for the actual salvation, and that God, in His omniscience and eternity, knows and performs this salvation.

If you suppose that God’s power is a separate entity and man’s freedom is a separate entity, which inevitably occurs once the imagination is given precedence over the intellectual faculties, then yes, you either have to reject God’s omniscience or reject man’s freedom, since a separate power would interfere with the nature of man’s will. If you accept the Thomist distinction between primary and secondary causation, and understand that God’s power is that by which man is constituted as actually being free, then the difficulties dissolve since it seems misguided to argue that the actual constitution and exercise of free will destroys freedom.

The following text is useful for understanding this issue: archive.org/stream/Garrigou-LagrangeEnglish/Predestination%20-%20Garrigou-Lagrange,%20Reginald,%20O.P__djvu.txt. Search for “Appendix III” (second hit, near the bottom of the book, you don’t need to read the whole book, unless you want to of course ), and many of these objections are considered and answered by a “sound Thomist” whose manuscript came under the attention of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange and was included in his work on Predestination. Particularly helpful is the “Catechism of Motion” that is discussed in this Appendix.

 

[balto]

let me turn the analogy you just gave on its head and show you how it works in my world view.

an Angel will be 60 miles away and he knows that you in freedom will choose to drive to that point. God in his infinite wisdom will put that angel there when you got there freely. He knows that when you see that angel you will convert and follow his ways in freedom. Knowing all of this, he predestines that all this to happen so that you will respond in freedom to his grace. This allows God’s will to be infallible and our response to be free. Thomas, on the other hand, says that it is premotion something that happens without respect to how we would respond to grace.

This is actually the problem with Molinism, not Thomism. Your example of the angel converting someone presupposes that free will does not exist, because it presupposes that our wills are determined entirely by circumstances external to ourselves. God knows your response is freely given because He sees things from your first person point of view. In other words, He knows it as your free act. It is not the case that He simply knows with absolute certainty what the set of circumstances are so He can deduce with certainty how you must respond in those circumstances. If that is the case, then God is responsible for souls being lost in Hell since He deliberately did not place them in salvific circumstances.

Premotion is the only theory that preserves free will since premotion is not posited as a complete being. It is the means by which an agent becomes actively indifferent from a state of merely being passively indifferent. In other words, it is the means by which one becomes actually free. God knows your free act infallibly without destroying freedom because He knows your act from the inside-out, not the outside-in.

 

[John_Martin]

Some plus Some does not equal 100%
Some Predestined plus Some Reprobate does not equal 100% of all humans to Thomas, and VERY FAR FROM IT.
For him,
Some plus Some plus SOME = 100%
Some Predestined so that Christ would appear
PLUS
Some Reprobate so that Christ would suffer without any conditional question that it might not happen
PLUS
the rest of us that have Gratuitous Grace calling to us, and Sanctifying Grace at our disposal to become in act like our Brother Jesus.

If you read Thomas, you would have to see that he would have ended the Summa at Predestination in Part One if it were true that Some plus Some were to equal 100% of all people. There would be no Second or Third Parts.
But Grace is the principle of the third grouping of the 100% of all people. If you overlook that group, you lose Thomas.

 

[catholictiger]

This is actually the problem with Molinism, not Thomism. Your example of the angel converting someone presupposes that free will does not exist, because it presupposes that our wills are determined entirely by circumstances external to ourselves.

I said nothing like this. Maybe Molinism does but I said nothing like this. What you have to understand is there is no time in God, he is completely outside of time, so he knows EVERYTHING that happens at the moment he creates everything. To put it another way God’s providence guides our free choices to lead us to salvation, he is like the kind hand leading us but not pulling us.

God knows your response is freely given because He sees things from your first person point of view. In other words, He knows it as your free act.

But if he predestined me to be saved than I can’t reject him. That is basic logic, don’t try to make sense of it by saying, well God sees our actions as free. At-least to me it doesn’t seem to work.

It is not the case that He simply knows with absolute certainty what the set of circumstances are so He can deduce with certainty how you must respond in those circumstances. If that is the case, then God is responsible for souls being lost in Hell since He deliberately did not place them in salvific circumstances.

This is far from what I argued. Before a word is ever on my mouth you know it through and through. This psalm doesn’t take away our freedom it shows that God knows everything even what we will do in the future.

Premotion is the only theory that preserves free will since premotion is not posited as a complete being. It is the means by which an agent becomes actively indifferent from a state of merely being passively indifferent. In other words, it is the means by which one becomes actually free. God knows your free act infallibly without destroying freedom because He knows your act from the inside-out, not the outside-in.

does not resolve the problem.

Again I can’t make it clearer than what I’m about to make it

Person A is predestined to be saved by God unconditioned by his merits. So Even if Person A resists the grace of God he will still be saved, at least logically. If God predestines someone without respect to how someone will respond to that grace than it follows that God chooses people despite how they will react. I’ve heard it said from Thomists that man will not resist even though he is free to, that sounds inconsistent to me.

Let me try to explain it as simply as possible. IF God predestines and that is infallible that will be realized. Man though is free which appears to make it logically follow that God’s predestination can’t be infallible because may can resist the grace necessary for savlation.

My main objection is I don’t thin Thomas fixes this problem simply by asserting man is free despite God’s predestination. The positon I’m trying to posit takes man’s dispensation into consideration.

 

[balto]

I said nothing like this. Maybe Molinism does but I said nothing like this. What you have to understand is there is no time in God, he is completely outside of time, so he knows EVERYTHING that happens at the moment he creates everything. To put it another way God’s providence guides our free choices to lead us to salvation, he is like the kind hand leading us but not pulling us.

I do understand all of that and this is all part of the Thomist understanding of predestination. I am getting this nagging feeling that you and I are really mostly in agreement on this point here but that we are not interpreting the terminology the same way.

But if he predestined me to be saved than I can’t reject him. That is basic logic, don’t try to make sense of it by saying, well God sees our actions as free. At-least to me it doesn’t seem to work.

I don’t think you are understanding predestination the way a Thomist understands it. It is not “predestination + free will”, as if the two are completely disjoint and non-overlapping. If that is how things are then yes, it is silly to try to argue that predestination allows for free will since predestination obviously would necessarily determine the will. The Thomist understands that the individual’s free response to grace is part of what it means to be predestined.

Of course you cannot reject God if you are predestined because your predestination includes your free acceptance of grace. It’s like asking whether I can reject God’s grace supposing I accept His grace. The question doesn’t make any sense.

Person A is predestined to be saved by God unconditioned by his merits. So Even if Person A resists the grace of God he will still be saved, at least logically.

The above should help clear up this issue. On this reading, there’s no such possible set of circumstances where A is predestined yet resists (do you mean reject, since one may resist initially but then accept later?) grace.

If God predestines someone without respect to how someone will respond to that grace than it follows that God chooses people despite how they will react.

If by “react” you mean “freely respond to grace”, then predestination includes that, which is why I think we are mostly in agreement. If by “react” you mean “future works”, then it does not include that, but I don’t think that is what you mean (just elaborating to prevent reader confusions).

I’ve heard it said from Thomists that man will not resist even though he is free to, that sounds inconsistent to me.

That is entirely reasonable given the above clarifications.

Let me try to explain it as simply as possible. IF God predestines and that is infallible that will be realized.

Agreed.

Man though is free which appears to make it logically follow that God’s predestination can’t be infallible because may can resist the grace necessary for savlation.

If you suppose that it is “predestination + free will”, then yes, that would follow. You either reject omniscience or free will. God’s predestination is infallible since it includes the individual’s free response to grace. The Thomist calls it “unconditional” because it is not the case that the individual or their will is somehow prior to grace or predestination. I suspect this is where the disagreement is.

 

[fhansen]

The Thomist understands that the individual’s free response to grace is part of what it means to be predestined.

This does still seem a bit contradictory though-and makes me wonder if that’s not the reason the CCC puts “predestination” in quotes here:

600 To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of “predestination”, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace: “In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.” For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.

Maybe the term, though Scriptural, really isn’t the most precise one for the purpose of describing God’s plan for and interaction with man?

 

[balto]

This does still seem a bit contradictory though-and makes me wonder if that’s not the reason the CCC puts “predestination” in quotes here:

600 To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of “predestination”, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace: “In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.” For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.

Maybe the term, though Scriptural, really isn’t the most precise one for the purpose of describing God’s plan for and interaction with man?

That’s probably a good suspicion. The original term would have been in ancient Greek I am assuming, which would be translated to English at some point, and then, since languages evolve, people may even come to view the same English word differently over time. So a prior culture may not have brought certain biases to bear on certain doctrines just due to accidental cultural differences.

 

[catholictiger]

I do understand all of that and this is all part of the Thomist understanding of predestination. I am getting this nagging feeling that you and I are really mostly in agreement on this point here but that we are not interpreting the terminology the same way.

I don’t think you are understanding predestination the way a Thomist understands it. It is not “predestination + free will”, as if the two are completely disjoint and non-overlapping. If that is how things are then yes, it is silly to try to argue that predestination allows for free will since predestination obviously would necessarily determine the will. The Thomist understands that the individual’s free response to grace is part of what it means to be predestined.

Of course you cannot reject God if you are predestined because your predestination includes your free acceptance of grace. It’s like asking whether I can reject God’s grace supposing I accept His grace. The question doesn’t make any sense.

The above should help clear up this issue. On this reading, there’s no such possible set of circumstances where A is predestined yet resists (do you mean reject, since one may resist initially but then accept later?) grace.

If by “react” you mean “freely respond to grace”, then predestination includes that, which is why I think we are mostly in agreement. If by “react” you mean “future works”, then it does not include that, but I don’t think that is what you mean (just elaborating to prevent reader confusions).

That is entirely reasonable given the above clarifications.

Agreed.

If you suppose that it is “predestination + free will”, then yes, that would follow. You either reject omniscience or free will. God’s predestination is infallible since it includes the individual’s free response to grace. The Thomist calls it “unconditional” because it is not the case that the individual or their will is somehow prior to grace or predestination. I suspect this is where the disagreement is.

Let me quote from a document I just read in order to try to understand this. This comes from Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott. I know nothing of this Author but I have a trust in my professor who gave me this document. I have a paper version of the qoute so I have to copy it straight from the text instead of copy and paste so there will likely be mistakes.

The Thomists, the Augustinians, the majority of the Scotists and also individual Molinists (Suarez, St. Bellarmine) teach an absolute predestination (ad gloriam tantum), therefore ante praevisa merita. According to them, God freely resolves from all Eternity, without consideration of the merits of man’s grace, to call certain men to beatification and therefore to bestow on them graces which will infallibly secure the execution of the Divine Decree (ordo intentionis). In time God first gives to the predestined effective graces and then eternal bliss as a reward for the merits which flow from their free cooperation with grace (ordo executionis)

This isn’t exactly clear, but I believe he is trying to explain what you are defending. My problem with the above position is that which he explains that man cooperates with grace freely, God will infallibly secure the execution of the divine decree. Basically meaning it’s going to happen. I understand what he is trying to explain, but I’m having trouble understanding how freedom can exist if God freely calls some men to beatification and this is an infallible call. So if God calls me to beatification this is going to happen, even if I’m obstinate to his grace.

The other side

Most of the Molinists, and also St. Francis of Sales, teach a conditioned predestination (ad gloriam tantum), that is, post and propter praevisa merita. According to them, God, by his scientia mediea, sees beforehand how men would freely react to various orders of grace. In the light of this knowledge he chooses, according to His free pleasure a fixed and definite order of grace. Now by His scientia visionis, He knows infallibly in advance what use the individual man will make o the grace bestowed on him. He elects for eternal bliss those who by virtue of their foreseen merits perseveringly cooperate with grace, while he determines for eternal punishment of hell, those who, intentionis and the ordo executionis coincide.

The best way I understand the above is that God, knowing all things before they happen, elects freely who he will give the grace for beatification and those who will be destined for the eternal punishment of hell. This isn’t an easy position to understand and I think that may be causing the confusion in me personally and maybe in this thread.

Personally I believe this position upholds freedom and God’s infallible predestination better than the Thomistic position. This isn’t a perfect position though, from my very limited understanding of it, there seems to be the problem that God is saving us based on our merits, which we know is a heresy. But If I understand their view well enough, our merits don’t merit us salvation, rather God in his infinite mercy gives us grace apart from our merits, but in his infinite knowledge he knows how man will respond to his grace, and in that knowledge he predestines those he calls to glory.

Long post, but this is a complex topic.

 

[catholictiger]

This does still seem a bit contradictory though-and makes me wonder if that’s not the reason the CCC puts “predestination” in quotes here:

600 To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of “predestination”, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace: “In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place.” For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness.

Maybe the term, though Scriptural, really isn’t the most precise one for the purpose of describing God’s plan for and interaction with man?

I’m glad you posted this quote from the CCC, while it doesn’t endorse in any way or even close to doing it, the Molinist position it does seem to lean that way. “He includes in it each person’s free response to his grace.” That sounds like he conditions his predestination on our free response to grace.

here the CCC also explains something I hope everyone understands. All moments of time are present in their immediacy in God. For us who are bound by time, we only experience time in its immediacy in the present which has no length and quickly passes into the past. In God past present and future are all the same to him. To use an analogy the way we experience the present he experiences all time this way. When he created me in my mother’s womb he at the same time knew every response to his grace I would make, and in that knowledge he predestined me either to heaven or to hell. Even though this predestination is set and infallible we still freely cooperate with his grace and have the power to reject it because even though it is known in the mind of God our future is not truly set in stone. Ultimately it is a mystery how God can know our future choices but we are still free in choosing them.

 

[fhansen]

I’m glad you posted this quote from the CCC, while it doesn’t endorse in any way or even close to doing it, the Molinist position it does seem to lean that way. “He includes in it each person’s free response to his grace.” That sounds like he conditions his predestination on our free response to grace.

here the CCC also explains something I hope everyone understands. All moments of time are present in their immediacy in God. For us who are bound by time, we only experience time in its immediacy in the present which has no length and quickly passes into the past. In God past present and future are all the same to him. To use an analogy the way we experience the present he experiences all time this way. When he created me in my mother’s womb he at the same time knew every response to his grace I would make, and in that knowledge he predestined me either to heaven or to hell. Even though this predestination is set and infallible we still freely cooperate with his grace and have the power to reject it because even though it is known in the mind of God our future is not truly set in stone. Ultimately it is a mystery how God can know our future choices but we are still free in choosing them.

Yes, in Catholic teaching the emphasis will always include man’s *choices *to one degree or another; grace is always resistible.

 

[balto]

Let me quote from a document I just read in order to try to understand this. This comes from Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma by Dr. Ludwig Ott. I know nothing of this Author but I have a trust in my professor who gave me this document. I have a paper version of the qoute so I have to copy it straight from the text instead of copy and paste so there will likely be mistakes.

I have heard many good things about this source and would like to read it myself at some point.

This isn’t exactly clear, but I believe he is trying to explain what you are defending. My problem with the above position is that which he explains that man cooperates with grace freely, God will infallibly secure the execution of the divine decree. Basically meaning it’s going to happen. I understand what he is trying to explain, but I’m having trouble understanding how freedom can exist if God freely calls some men to beatification and this is an infallible call. So if God calls me to beatification this is going to happen, even if I’m obstinate to his grace.

I am not really sure I understand it completely either, but I think that the Thomist would say that grace is not complete in itself: it constitutes the free will as being actively free rather than merely potentially free. So grace isn’t something that exists separately and on its own. I think you are intending something like this as well, it’s just that Thomists seem to have this thing were everything has to be defined and articulated in precise terms. I think the Thomists are concerned about salvation based on works, as you indicated in your post, which is why they have this conceptual apparatus about grace and premotion being not a “concrete being” but “fluid being in the state of becoming”.

The best way I understand the above is that God, knowing all things before they happen, elects freely who he will give the grace for beatification and those who will be destined for the eternal punishment of hell. This isn’t an easy position to understand and I think that may be causing the confusion in me personally and maybe in this thread.

I don’t think you are causing confusion. You have been exceedingly clear and charitable in your posts . I realized after a couple of posts that the intention behind certain posts may not be what the text suggests on a first reading, since this a complex issue as you indicated and our language may necessarily have difficulty in doing it justice regardless of how it is formulated. So the fault may lie more on me. I think if readers are able to use either explanation to be able to balance the truth that God’s free election does not conflict with our free will but is consistent with it, then I think we have done well.

 

[Richca]

I’m a cradle Catholic who is relatively new to examining the finer points of free will and how the Catholic understanding relates to Calvinism. I feel that I have a decent grasp on how Molinist (Conditional) election is compatible with the Catholic conception of free will. However, I am having trouble understanding how to reconcile the Thomist (Unconditional) view. I find myself asking what separates this position from some of the more liberal forms of Calvinism? The Catholic Encyclopedia page “Controversies on Grace” addresses the issue, but it’s a bit dense for me to fully grasp. Could anyone with a more thorough understanding provide an intelligible but not dumbed-down explanation of the Thomist view of Unconditional Election, how it is distinct from Calvinism, and how it can be reconciled with the doctrine of free will?

A book I highly recommend reading concerning the subject at hand is “Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God” by Fr. William G. Most. Fr Most goes into the historical theological history concerning the teaching and thoughts of the fathers, doctors, and saints of the Church as well as the official teaching of the Church in her documents. He also studies deeply the thought of St Thomas Aquinas. The book can be found online.

The phrase “Thomist unconditional election” may not be quite accurate depending on what is exactly meant by it as well as what St Thomas actually taught and not the interpretation giving to him by some of his disciples and thomists. According to Fr Most, two opposing views concerning predestination can be found in Aquinas’ writings, one which he inherited from St Augustine and his interpretation of Romans 9, the other from 1 Timothy 2:4, two views which he simply did not know how to reconcile so he left them stand as is (cf. the book from Fr Most).

St Thomas’ line of reasoning from 1 Timothy 2:4 is the teaching of the Church. What is most important here is the official teaching of the Church which I think can be summed up in what some posters have already quoted from the CCC#600, namely :“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of “predestination”, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace.” God created us with free will and we must freely cooperate with his grace to be saved. Humans being can resist or not resist God’s grace by their free will. This is the teaching of the Church as well as Holy Scripture. Jesus says “**If **you love me, you will keep my commandments” (John 14: 15).

 

[oldcelt]

Surely, free will and predestination are a mystery, but I see no problem with accepting them, given that a number of paradoxes arise when I consider the nature of reality. For example: can it be demonstrated that God is free? How can something come from nothing? How “long” was it before God created? etc.

I have read many, many prophecies from different Saints, and what amazes me is that so many of them - many of which are startlingly accurate - have come true. This indicates that God, Who is not subject to time, knows the future; everything is present to Him. Does this mean that our will is not free? I would answer in the negative. Firstly, because the truth of these prophecies suggest that Jesus’ words about free will are true. Secondly, because God’s infinite knowledge also extends to His own acts, but it cannot be deduced from this that God is not free. His knowledge is simultaneous with everything that ever has been or will be; but it does not follow that God’s knowledge causes these things, any more than His knowledge caused Himself.

That might sound a bit abstract, and it is, but it is almost impossible to unpack such lofty thoughts without writing a book!

Paradoxes are the issue, and always have been. If God is all good, why would he order the slaughter of children? If people are predestined to a foregone and preordained end, where is free will? No amount of dogma or mystery can explain way these rather simple contradictions.
The explanations I have seen are completely inadequate and rely purely on revelation…no facts, no evidence…revelation.

John

 

[thinkandmull]

Predestination to heaven is infallible because it is a positive good and thus God’s eternal knowledge and approval of it is different from His eternal knowledge and acceptance of people going to hell.

The point that people must keep in mind when reading Thomists (not necessary Aquinas himself) is that they believe God has the power to give a grace and know what the person will do with it WITHOUT God looking into the future. That is, the person CAN choose one or the other, but infallibly WILL choose one, and God knows which one that is. I’ve thought about this, and it seems very deep, but I think it actually completely does away with free will.

 

[thinkandmull]

This is actually the problem with Molinism, not Thomism. Your example of the angel converting someone presupposes that free will does not exist, because it presupposes that our wills are determined entirely by circumstances external to ourselves. God knows your response is freely given because He sees things from your first person point of view. In other words, He knows it as your free act. It is not the case that He simply knows with absolute certainty what the set of circumstances are so He can deduce with certainty how you must respond in those circumstances. If that is the case, then God is responsible for souls being lost in Hell since He deliberately did not place them in salvific circumstances.

Premotion is the only theory that preserves free will since premotion is not posited as a complete being. It is the means by which an agent becomes actively indifferent from a state of merely being passively indifferent. In other words, it is the means by which one becomes actually free. God knows your free act infallibly without destroying freedom because He knows your act from the inside-out, not the outside-in.

Molinism is actually directly spoken of by Augustine and Aquinas. God knows what you truly did (but actually didn’t do) in infinite situations. He put these infinite pieces together to form history. Take prophecy for example. God looks at Adam and Eve, and knows what they will do, and what their descendants will do. He tells Steve (no pun intended) there in the garden what will become of the human race. And more than this. Prophecy means that God told Adam and Eve themselves, and that the prophecy was an ornament added to what God already knew would happen. This is mind blowing. God knows the future, and then slightly alters that future by telling people what would happen in the first series, changing the first series by knowledge of what would happen in that series. So why would God then put the history together the way it is? Certainly people are not condemned for what would have been their choice in another life, but what they actually did in the flesh on this earth. The only explanation I can think of as to why there are reprobates instead of all elect is that some elect could only have been saved if they had known others were being damned, and God desired those people very personally to go to Heaven, and so allowed the others to be created with their choice to sin.

 

[thinkandmull]

Paradoxes are the issue, and always have been. If God is all good, why would he order the slaughter of children? If people are predestined to a foregone and preordained end, where is free will? No amount of dogma or mystery can explain way these rather simple contradictions.
The explanations I have seen are completely inadequate and rely purely on revelation…no facts, no evidence…revelation.

John

It’s a different topic, but the Bible doesn’t say that God commanded the killing of children BEFORE the age of reason. As with people living till 600 years old, back then children may have been guilty of free will sin by age 3 for example. Perhaps these were the only ones slain. Perhaps these were the only ones living in those cities.

 

[thinkandmull]

Please not, that even a strict Augustinian would say that God desires all to be saved. They too reject Calvinism. But they would say God desires MORE than some be saved and some fail, to show God’s mercy and justice. I do not believe in this idea

 

[oldcelt]

Predestination to heaven is infallible because it is a positive good and thus God’s eternal knowledge and approval of it is different from His eternal knowledge and acceptance of people going to hell.

The point that people must keep in mind when reading Thomists (not necessary Aquinas himself) is that they believe God has the power to give a grace and know what the person will do with it WITHOUT God looking into the future. That is, the person CAN choose one or the other, but infallibly WILL choose one, and God knows which one that is. I’ve thought about this, and it seems very deep, but I think it actually completely does away with free will.

I agree entirely that it would…that’s why I’m where I am to a large extent.

John