Thomistic cosmological argument - why does causal efficacy need to be given?

[Linusthe2nd]

I found these two articles by Edward Feser helpful concerning quantum mechanics and causality:

edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/oerter-on-universals-and-causality.html

edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html

Now this is the best post you have ever made and it only cost you a dozen and a half words. I would highly recommend that everyone posting here read the two links referenced, especially the second ( but to understand the second, you have to read the first ). I happen to have the book by Weisheipl Feser references ( It cost me $140.00 and that was a bargan. Honestly, they come dear indeed).

This segment from the second link is the most important. But you see, objectors here will not devote the necessary time to puzzle through something so lengthy and complecated!!! They never have and never will - because they are ideologues - as Feser often points out. The following bit is extracted from the second link.

" An interpretation of QM that is both Aristotelian and realist will, naturally, insist that it is not the laws of QM themselves that cause anything, since they are mere abstractions from concrete systems operating in accordance with their substantial forms. Hence it is in virtue of the substantial form of a hydrogen atom that it will behave in the manner described by QM, just as it is by virtue of the substantial forms of material things in general that they will exert a gravitational attraction on one another. Now for the Aristotelian, the substantial form of an inanimate substance is not the efficient cause of its natural operations; rather, those operations flow “spontaneously” from it, precisely because it is in the nature of the substance to operate in those ways. (See James Weisheipl’s Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages for an important treatment of the subject.) Hence that a planet exerts a gravitational pull is just something it does by virtue of its nature or substantial form; it does not need a continuously operating efficient cause to make it exert such a pull. That does not mean that there is in no sense an efficient cause of a thing’s natural operations, but that efficient cause is just that which gave the substance in question its substantial form in the first place, i.e. that which generated the substance or brought it into being. It is not something that needs continuously to operate after the thing is brought into being. Hence the efficient cause of a planet’s exerting a gravitational pull on other objects is just whatever natural processes brought that planet into existence millions of years ago, thereby giving it the nature or substantial form it has. Its exerting that pull is now something it just does “spontaneously,” by virtue of its nature. (Mind you, that does not mean that it can exist or operate even for a moment without a divine sustaining cause; it cannot do so, for reasons I spell out in my ACPQ article … "

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the sciences there is not really such a thing as “the description of events.” To say that an event is uncaused under a particular description does not say anything conclusive about the event. Compare: Kepler’s laws are scientific, noncausal descriptions of the orbits of planets. It does not follow that the orbits of planets have no cause. (And note that this is true even if the orbits of the planets did in fact have no cause. From the existence of a noncausal description, the lack of a cause is not a valid inference.)

One can also postulate consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics. Alex Pruss provides a couple in his book on the principle of sufficient reason. One could forgo the speed of light as the “speed limit” of the universe, which would allow for one causal interpretation of quantum mechanics. One could also postulate that each particle that behaves (to our eyes) indeterministically in fact has a “preordained” set of actions intrinsic to it.

Mind you, neither of these are intended as plausible physical descriptions of quantum mechanics. The point is that there exist consistent causal interpretations of quantum mechanics, which precludes its being used as a counterexample to an otherwise general principle (which one might argue for on separate metaphysical grounds). (Note in this dialectical situation, the defender of a causal principle just needs to provide a consistent defense for the counterexample not to hold.)

A 1999 poll of 90 physicists at Cambridge University recorded 4 supporting the Copenhagen interpretation, 30 supporting a many worlds approach, and 50 undecided, so it is a stretch to say that there is a decisive consensus against a causal interpretation.

Interesting points, but Aquinas assumed for the sake of argument (following Aristotle) that the universe had an infinite past.

Excellent. Looks like you read the two links to Feser, Tombstone gave. See my response in post 41. Actually, Weisheipl guides you to the place where Thomas is expressing these ideas. ( see for example Thomas’ commentary on Phys, VIII, Lec 8, pars 1035 -1036 where Thomas speas of impetus to describe the continued motion of a thrown object. dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Physics8.htm#8 )

You have a wonderful talent for summing up difficult concepts.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

According to Max Born, “From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics there is no quantity which in any individual case causally fixes the consequence of the collision; but also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that there are some inner properties of the atom which conditions a definite outcome for the collision.” And: “On the question of the ‘validity of the law of causality’ we have this opinion: as long as one takes into account only experiments that lie in the domain of our currently acquired physical and quantum mechanical experience, the assumption of indeterminism in principle, here taken as fundamental, agrees with experience.”
Some scientists, such as Einstein disagreed, and have proposed a hidden variables theory which would restore the position of causality.
However, the acceptance of hidden variables in QM is untenable according to Bell’s theorem, which, in one formulation, says that if there is an objective reality, no hiddenvariables theory could give the same results as quantum mechanics in all situations.

The two links you referenced ( especially the second ) address these points and point out that these objections/ conclusions simply side step the issue of the causality in the metaphysical sense. It ignores substantial form and efficient ( essential or instrumental ) entirely. We do not need to find and p(name removed by moderator)oint a physical cause to know that there has to be an efficient cause. These events, if true, are the result of the natural spontaneous activity sourced in the substantial form, which has been given by the essential efficient cause, God.

Linus2nd .

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

How would you explain the double slit arrangements and the position momentum measurements in quantum mechanics which appear to rule out event by event causality and thereby render the ontology of classical physics to be dead?

I don’t and neither do the scientists. Philosophically I would say that they are engaging in natural, spontaneous activity as a principle of their substantial forms. Read you two links again. The same arguments Feser is making apply here.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Once again, I understand the analogy, however I don’t understand why it is necessarily a sound analogy in regard to causality. Why should the same rules apply to a chain of causes? Why should there be something constantly providing some ‘causal efficacy/power’? Why should that be a thing in itself at all?

So if one cause has a property that the other does not have, it necessarily follows that it has potentiality relative to the other? Why?

And how would you prove the claim that each efficient cause itself has an efficient cause?

Instrumental causes receive their efficacy from the ultimate or essential efficient cause. All that is necessary is that this cause or causes ( for there can be multiple ones ) have the power to cause the ultimate effect or effects. And it is not necessary for the efficient cause to accompany the instrumental cause, and it is not necessary for the instrumental cause to accompany the effect/effects in all cases, as in the case of the natural, spontaneous activity caused by the effecient cause providing the substantial form or the modification to that form. Feser address that and so did Thomas ( see his commentary on Physics, VIII, lec 8, para 1035-1036, dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Physics8.htm#8 )

Read the two links provided by Tombstone early on.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

By showing it in a couple of instants, why does that show that all events must have a sufficient cause?

You can read S.T., Part 1, Ques 3 and following and you will see. Basically the First Cause is pure act, such a being has other qualities identifing it is the the One Perfect Being in the Universe. As such, nothing would escape its causal action. Read and come back if you can’t see it. But you said you were reading Aquinas by Feser, keep reading him, he answers this.

Linus2nd

 

[balto]

Why is that? Quantum events are uncaused according to some descriptions and they are not all that simple.

Just to clear up any misconceptions, the definition of simplicity I am considering is “lack of limitations.” The more complex an object is, the more limitations it has on its state of being. If quantum events are not continually occurring, then there is a reason for that limitation. Referring to it as an “event” implies that it is not continually occurring. If there are quantum events (plural) then there is a cause for the distinction between the multiple quantum events. By positing a multiverse aren’t you saying that the cause of quantum events is the multiverse?

 

[polytropos]

I am not sure, but are you speaking about the Bohmian theory of QM, in which positions evolve according to non-local equations? If you are speaking of the Bohm theory, then, of course, we should discuss the objections that Einstein and Pauli and others had to that theory.

I am not discussing Bohmian theory. I am just pointing out the fact that the telephone example is a paradox with faster-than-light travel in general, but it does not in fact extend if faster-than-light travel is limited to quantum events (which is a consistent supposition–and plausible, given what else we know about the universe), since information cannot be sent using quantum events.

My understanding that there is not a complete/consistent Bohmian interpretation right now.

 

[Tomdstone]

I am not discussing Bohmian theory.

OK, but the only other interpretations of QM that I know about, after the Copenhagen and Bohmian, are the
Feynmann path integral
von Neumann approach
Wigner approach
London and Bauer approach
Correlation interpretation
statistical interpretation
Relational interpretation
Reichenbach quantum logic approach
C* algebra approach
Gleason theorem and axiomatic approach
veiled reality approach
hidden variables approach
Nelso and Fenyes approach
modal interpretation
Modified Schrodinger dynamics approach
Ghirandi, Rimini, Weber spontaneous localisation approach
Griffith and Omnes and the consistent histories approach
Everett interpretation
Is your proposal for QM one of these or is it something which has not yet been formulated and written down somewhere?

 

[polytropos]

Is your proposal for QM one of these or is it something which has not yet been formulated and written down somewhere?

As I’ve said, my interpretations are not meant to be plausible physical interpretations, so they are not interpretations defended by any physicists. That is, indeed, not the point. The point is that they are consistent with both empirical data and the principle of causality. (I don’t hold that they are true, just that they show that the empirical data of quantum mechanics is not inconsistent with a causal interpretation.)

 

[Tomdstone]

The point is that they are consistent with both empirical data and the principle of causality.

Unless you specify and name which interpretation of QM you are talking about, your argument is unconvincing.

 

[polytropos]

Unless you specify and name which interpretation of QM you are talking about, your argument is unconvincing.

Which is fine, because it’s not really intended to be convincing or true, just consistent. The monad interpretation produces results identical to the Copenhagen interpretation. It just stipulates that each particle that appears to behave indeterministically is actually predetermined to causally behave the way it does. I’m not trying to convince you that it’s true (I don’t even believe it’s true). But ex hypothesi it produces results identical to the Copenhagen interpretation, and it does not generate a contradiction, so it is consistent, which is all I need to exonerate the principle of causality.

 

[Tomdstone]

The monad interpretation produces results identical to the Copenhagen interpretation.

Let’s see the proof that it does.

 

[polytropos]

Let’s see the proof that it does.

I don’t think you understand the type of defense I am making. Take the Copenhagen interpretation. Rather than supposing that there is no cause for a particle behaving whatever way it behaves when it seems to behave indeterministically, suppose that it is internally caused to behave as it does because it has been eternally predetermined to behave whatever way it does. This account is consistent and by hypothesis would explain the exact data of the Copenhagen interpretation if it were true (since it just stipulates that the “random” behavior of particles under the Copenhagen interpretation is instead caused internally).

We can agree that this interpretation is most likely false. I certainly would not be the one to suggest that a physicist accept it. But my point in offering it is not to convince you of its truth. It is consistent with the data of quantum physics and with the principle of causality. Hence the inference from the data of quantum mechanics to the falsity of the principle of causality is unwarranted, since it is not the case that the data of quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the principle of causality.

 

[Tomdstone]

I don’t think you understand the type of defense I am making. Take the Copenhagen interpretation. Rather than supposing that there is no cause for a particle behaving whatever way it behaves when it seems to behave indeterministically, suppose that it is internally caused to behave as it does because it has been eternally predetermined to behave whatever way it does. This account is consistent and by hypothesis would explain the exact data of the Copenhagen interpretation if it were true (since it just stipulates that the “random” behavior of particles under the Copenhagen interpretation is instead caused internally).

We can agree that this interpretation is most likely false. I certainly would not be the one to suggest that a physicist accept it. But my point in offering it is not to convince you of its truth. It is consistent with the data of quantum physics and with the principle of causality. Hence the inference from the data of quantum mechanics to the falsity of the principle of causality is unwarranted, since it is not the case that the data of quantum mechanics is inconsistent with the principle of causality.

It is inconsistent with the BB theory, because you are assuming it is eternally predetermined and according to the BB, time is not eternal but begins at the start of the BB.

 

[polytropos]

It is inconsistent with the BB theory, because you are assuming it is eternally predetermined and according to the BB, time is not eternal but begins at the start of the BB.

Sorry, I don’t know why I wrote “eternally.” Just predetermined is fine, say, since the existence of the particle.

 

[Tomdstone]

Sorry, I don’t know why I wrote “eternally.” Just predetermined is fine, say, since the existence of the particle.

Please see: Why Pre-Determinism Cannot - Quite Literally - be Logical, Rational…
youtube.com/watch?v=Qw3sscNujL4

 

[polytropos]

Please see: Why Pre-Determinism Cannot - Quite Literally - be Logical, Rational…
youtube.com/watch?v=Qw3sscNujL4

We’ve already discussed this (my original response in #30). Letter quantum events be predetermined is not tantamount to denying free will unless one is committed to reductionism, which I’m not.