Three sources of morality

[Ron_Conte]

Quotes are from the Compendium, n. 367-369:
“The morality of human acts depends on three sources: the object chosen, either a true or apparent good; the intention of the subject who acts, that is, the purpose for which the subject performs the act; and the circumstances of the act, which include its consequences.”

“A chosen object can by itself vitiate [make evil] an act in its entirety, even if the intention is good.”

“On the other hand, a good end * does not make an act good if the object of that act is evil, since the end does not justify the means. Circumstances can increase or diminish the responsibility of the one who is acting but they cannot change the moral quality of the acts themselves. They can never make good an act which is in itself evil.”

“There are some acts which, in and of themselves, are always illicit by reason of their object. Choosing such acts always entails a disorder of the will, that is, a moral evil which can never be justified by appealing to the good effects which could possibly result from them.”*

 

[Ender]

“The morality of human acts depends on three sources: the object chosen, …; the intention of the subject who acts …; and the circumstances of the act”

“Circumstances can increase or diminish the responsibility of the one who is acting but they cannot change the moral quality of the acts themselves.”

I’ve always found this section somewhat poorly written: immediately after saying there are three sources that determine the morality of an act they go on to say that one of them doesn’t. The morality of an act is determined by the object and the intention; the circumstances mitigate responsibility but do not alter the moral nature of the act.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

I’ve always found this section somewhat poorly written: immediately after saying there are three sources that determine the morality of an act they go on to say that one of them doesn’t. The morality of an act is determined by the object and the intention; the circumstances mitigate responsibility but do not alter the moral nature of the act.

Ender

That part refers only to acts that are intrinsically evil; such acts are evil regardless of intention or circumstance, because the meaning inherent in the act itself is contrary to the moral order intended by God. For intrinsically evil acts, good intention or a good consequence can mitigate the culpability or the degree of seriousness, but cannot make the act good.

Good acts must have

1. good intention
2. the meaning inherent in the act itself must be good
3. the circumstances, especially the consequences of the act, must be good, or at least the good must outweigh the bad

 

[AlanFromWichita]

It sounds like it would be immoral to make a mistake that resulted in bad.

Alan

 

[Ron_Conte]

I was referring to the principle of double effect, under which an act is moral,
if:

1. the intention is good
2. the act itself is not immoral
3. there are two effects to the act, one good and one bad, and the good outweighs the bad

 

[AlanFromWichita]

I was referring to the principle of double effect, under which an act is moral,
if:

1. the intention is good
2. the act itself is not immoral
3. there are two effects to the act, one good and one bad, and the good outweighs the bad

Then does this presuppose the effects are known before the act is committed?

One example is a doctor giving a patient medicine that turned out mostly bad against that patient, even though the prognosis was good. The good effects do not outweigh the bad, but is it immoral if the doctor had know way of knowing it would go that way?

Alan

 

[Huiou_Theou]

This is the one problem area in morality. Double effect, choosing the lesser evil, etc.

Human beings are not given to know the total effect of any given action – eg: we are not omniscient like God, and depend on him for the revelation of actions which are in communion with the best good.

Ignorance, therefore, is one kind of evil in a communion of persons. Ignorance may mitigate responsibility, (or not if it is an intrinsically evil act), but the person still does evil whether they know it or not.

This, similar to the thread on sexuality with contraception in a married state, brings up the idea of some kind of “weighing” of sins. And that is where the morality of Kant, Marx, Hitler, etc. go horribly wrong – for in their calculus of “greater” good they sacrifice God.

The Catholic position is that there are mortal and venial sins, and personal inspection leads me to believe that even within these there are varying levels or “aggrivating” elements. I have not seen a very good treatment of the hard cases proposed in everyday life, but am interested in the progress of this thread.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Then does this presuppose the effects are known before the act is committed?

One example is a doctor giving a patient medicine that turned out mostly bad against that patient, even though the prognosis was good. The good effects do not outweigh the bad, but is it immoral if the doctor had know way of knowing it would go that way?

Alan

Certainly, despite the limits of human knowledge, the effects of an act can be known to a significant effect in advance. We all know that driving recklessly can cause serious harm. We don’t need to know, for purposes of morality, exactly what the harm will be in a particular case. In other cases, we can be morally certain of particular effects. A doctor knows that a patient whose disease goes untreated will die. Even though some exception may occur in rare cases, the moral certainty is great. So he is justified by this foreseen bad effect (death of the patient) in using a treatment that has some modest risk of harm.

The circumstances, in moral theology, refers to what can be known by the intellect when considering the act. Any act that pertains to morality is an act of will and intellect. Suppose that a patient will die from a particular treatment. But the doctor can only know that the treatment has a low risk of death, and the disease has a high risk of death, and the treatment is usually successful. It is moral for the doctor to give the treatment, even though, in absolute term (in this hypothetical) the patient will die. In the circumstances, as known by the intellect, the good outweighs the bad.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Ignorance, therefore, is one kind of evil in a communion of persons. Ignorance may mitigate responsibility, (or not if it is an intrinsically evil act), but the person still does evil whether they know it or not.

The Catholic position is that there are mortal and venial sins, and personal inspection leads me to believe that even within these there are varying levels or “aggrivating” elements. I have not seen a very good treatment of the hard cases proposed in everyday life, but am interested in the progress of this thread.

Ignorance mitigates responsibility even in intrinsically evil acts. Good intention and any good in the circumstances or consequences also mitigates the culpability for an intrinsically evil act. This is clearly stated in Veritatis Splendor.

Yes, there are more and less serious mortal sins, and more or less serious venial sins. Intent, the act itself, and circumstance can all affect the degree of seriousness of the act.

 

[AlanFromWichita]

The circumstances, in moral theology, refers to what can be known by the intellect when considering the act. Any act that pertains to morality is an act of will and intellect. Suppose that a patient will die from a particular treatment. But the doctor can only know that the treatment has a low risk of death, and the disease has a high risk of death, and the treatment is usually successful. It is moral for the doctor to give the treatment, even though, in absolute term (in this hypothetical) the patient will die. In the circumstances, as known by the intellect, the good outweighs the bad.

Thanks. That makes more sense to me.

Alan

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Ignorance mitigates responsibility even in intrinsically evil acts. Good intention and any good in the circumstances or consequences also mitigates the culpability for an intrinsically evil act. This is clearly stated in Veritatis Splendor.

Yes, there are more and less serious mortal sins, and more or less serious venial sins. Intent, the act itself, and circumstance can all affect the degree of seriousness of the act.

Ron, I am not sure we disagree – but perhaps more clarification would be advisable.

Are you referring to :

1. …
   On the contrary, it[natural law] embraces at its root each of the person’s free acts, which are meant to bear witness to the universality of the true good. By submitting to the common law, our acts build up the true communion of persons and, by God’s grace, practise charity, “which binds everything together in perfect harmony” (Col 3:14). When on the contrary they disregard the law, or even are merely ignorant of it, whether culpably or not, our acts damage the communion of persons, to the detriment of each.
   …
   The negative precepts of the natural law are universally valid. They oblige each and every individual, always and in every circumstance. It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action semper et pro semper, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behaviour is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbour. It is prohibited — to everyone and in every case — to violate these precepts.
   …
   Furthermore, what must be done in any given situation depends on the circumstances, not all of which can be foreseen; on the other hand there are kinds of behaviour which can never, in any situation, be a proper response — a response which is in conformity with the dignity of the person.

Or something else?

I am thinking of this:

1. In order to justify these positions, some authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. A separation, or even an opposition, is thus established in some cases between the teaching of the precept, which is valid in general, and the norm of the individual conscience, which would in fact make the final decision about what is good and what is evil. On this basis, an attempt is made to legitimize so-called “pastoral” solutions contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, and to justify a “creative” hermeneutic according to which the moral conscience is in no way obliged, in every case, by a particular negative precept.

No one can fail to realize that these approaches pose a challenge to the very identity of the moral conscience in relation to human freedom and God’s law. Only the clarification made earlier with regard to the relationship, based on truth, between freedom and law makes possible a discernment concerning this “creative” understanding of conscience.

 

[Ron_Conte]

Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral, regardless of intention or circumstance. However, intention and circumstance can lessen the seriousness of the sin. For example, lying is intrinsically evil and always wrong, but some lies are mortal sins and other lies are venial sins, depending on the intention and circumstances.

Negative precepts that bind universally are still affected, in the degree of seriousness and the degree of culpability, based on intention and circumstance.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Ron,
I agree. The original sentence was qualified with “may”, I didn’t mean intrinsically evil acts can’t be partially mitigated – but I meant they never become right and a certain amount of culpability always exists. Sorry about the unclear sentence.

2Pete 3:16 As also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things; in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction.

Ignorance is not only the absence of knowledge, but often the stubborn refusal to learn.

 

[larry85704]

ok, i hear what you are saying. How come the catechism teaches that to kill is not immoral if it is done to save a life?

Specifically, when a person, such as a cop, encounters a criminal assaulting a person he may shoot and kill the criminal. Of course, you must be reasonable, the criminal must be life threatening and refuse to stop. A private citizen can also kill the criminal.

Killing is usually thought to be evil.

After reading your previous posts, where are you getting these quotes? Did I stumble into the wrong web site?

 

[Sure]

ok, i hear what you are saying. How come the catechism teaches that to kill is not immoral if it is done to save a life?

Specifically, when a person, such as a cop, encounters a criminal assaulting a person he may shoot and kill the criminal. Of course, you must be reasonable, the criminal must be life threatening and refuse to stop. A private citizen can also kill the criminal.

Killing is usually thought to be evil.

After reading your previous posts, where are you getting these quotes? Did I stumble into the wrong web site?

Killing per se is neither good nor evil. It requires more information, more detail. When one adds the principal condition of “an innocent person” or “an unjust aggressor” one gets two very different acts that are each of a distinct moral species. Killing an innocent person is intrinsically evil while killing per se is not intrinsically evil.

Hope that helps!

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Ron originally cited the compendium of the catechism of the catholic church (CCCC?).
It can be found here:

vatican.va/archive/compendium_ccc/documents/archive_2005_compendium-ccc_en.html

and I was quoting veritatis splendor because Ron referenced it.

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

I use a word search to find the paragraph numbers quoted, although there might be a faster way to link it – I find that it doesn’t always work so I am just giving the page links.
Anything else from me is the bible… KJV version as I have been messing with it for some time, not because it is all that good.

 

[larry85704]

Ok, “Sure” is saying that killing is sometimes justified. I’d say that telling a lie can also be sometimes justified. I guess just about anything could be sometimes justified if you thought about it long enough.

Isn’t this thread arguing that some acts are never justified? No matter what the circumstances?

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Well, there is much to be discussed before any conclusions can be reached – but a clear example of an intrinsically evil act is to worship the devil in preference to God – for one has to know whom the devil is in order to worship him.

As far as the killing example, I’ll let Ron and Sure progress, because I am mostly interested in Ron’s approach …

 

[Ron_Conte]

Just about any act can be justified by good intention and by particular circumstances and/or consequences of the act …
except acts which are intrinsically evil. Such acts are always wrong because the meaning inherent in the act itself is directly contrary to the goodness of God and His Creation. These acts are never justified no matter what the circumstances.

St. Catherine of Siena said that she would not commit the smallest sin, not even to redeem the whole world from Hell. In other words, even a small immoral act, because it offends God who is infinite, cannot be justified, not even by a very great need.

So lying is always wrong, because God is truth. A small lie may only be a venial sin, but it is still intrinsically evil. Also intrinsically evil: the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being (includes abortion, murder, euthanasia). Murder is always wrong because human life is made in the image of God. Killing animals is not murder because, while all Creation is to some extent a refection of God, human persons are more fully in God’s image since they have free will and the light of reason and an immortal soul.

To be moral, the intention and the act itself must be good, and, in the consequences and circumstances of the act, the good must at least outweigh the bad.

Ron

 

[larry85704]

Hello Ron

Wait a minute, killing a man is morally permitted if the situation calls for it. Lying, not telling the truth, is morally the right thing to do if the situation calls for it. For example, let me tell a newlywed joke. Wife burns the bacon, or the cake, or whatever. Hubby says it is good, when in fact it is awful, to be tactful. He still lied. She knows it. She knows it is awful. In no way is that lied a sin. Maybe it is a joke, but he still said something not true. So killing can be ok, lying can too. If those acts can be ok, what is always evil?

To be moral, the intention and the act itself must be good, and, in the consequences and circumstances of the act, the good must at least outweigh the bad.

Depending on your perspective the act is good or bad.

Doing good is not simple. Living a life that pleases God requires that we do good. A parent that loves a child will use that to justify allowing them to drink beer at home. Because it is better than risk them getting caught, or getting a DUI or killing someone. But, if the kid does go out drinking the parent would also be criticized no matter what they did to stop the kid.

I think that in every act we need to keep in mind that we must please God first. How would God feel about taking the life of someone that just shot a policeman and may shoot him again? How would God feel about lying to your wife and telling her dinner was good?

How do you suppose God would feel?