Three sources of morality

[Ron_Conte]

In order to know if an act is moral or not, one must know the type of act. Concerning killing, one must know more than the mere fact that a human person was killed. Murder is the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being; it is intrinsically evil and always wrong, regardless of intention and circumstance.

Killing may be justified as self-defense, but in this case, the definition of the act is in the second source of morality, the act itself, and not in the third source, circumstances. In moral theology, circumstance is anything other than intention and the definition of the act itself. Things that pertain directly to the defintion of the act, such as that the person is innocent and the killing is direct and voluntary, are not circumstances, but facts essential to define the act itself.

Intrinsically evil acts are always wrong, because they are opposed to the goodness that is God Himself. God is truth, and so lying is always wrong. God created man in His own image, so killing an innocent human being is always wrong.

When the act itself is not intrinsically evil, then the morality depends upon intention and circumstance, as well as on the act itself.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

hmmm…

Luke 24:18 And the one of them, whose name was Cleopas, answering said unto him, Art thou only a stranger in Jerusalem, and hast not known the things which are come to pass there in these days?
Luke 24:19 And he said unto them, What things? And they said unto him, Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, …

Must not be a lie, then – just subtle?

 

[Ron_Conte]

{24:17} And he said to them, “What are these words, which you are discussing with one another, as you walk and are sad?”
{24:18} And one of them, whose name was Cleopas, responded by saying to him, “Are you the only one visiting Jerusalem, who does not know the things that have happened there in these days?”
{24:19} And he said to them, “What things?” And they said, “About Jesus of Nazareth, who was a noble prophet, powerful in works and in words, before God and all the people…
{24:27} And beginning from Moses and all the Prophets, he interpreted for them, in all the Scriptures, the things that were about him.

A question of this type is not a lie. It is merely an attempt by Jesus to raise a subject, so that he could then teach them. Asking questions is a time-honored method of teaching.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

Ron, I agree,

The point of the diversion is just to emphasize what is and is not a lie. Jesus is the truth, but even he can avoid verifying a truth in order to direct the attention of his students elsewhere.

eg: he obviously did know the things which had happened, but did not give to the disciple credit for recognizing the absurdity of his apparently “not knowing”. So, Jesus was still hiding his own identity. To hide some things is not a lie – but what is the crux of a lie verses the “truth”? Since a lie is an “intrinsic” evil, wouldn’t a proper delineation be to explain why hiding the full truth is not always a lie? Jesus is clearly not choosing the lesser evil here, but merely being pedagogical, no?

 

[Ender]

To be moral, the intention and the act itself must be good, and, in the consequences and circumstances of the act, the good must at least outweigh the bad.

I disagree with your interpretation of the catechism in regard to the significance of the consequences and circumstances.

*“The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. … Circumstances of themselves cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.” *(1754)

I do not believe this refers specifically to acts which are intrinsically evil; if that were the case it would be spelled out as it was in 1753: “A good intention … does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered … good or just.” The fact that the circumstances are only secondary elements is because, while they mitigate personal responsibility, they do not affect the underlying moral quality of the act.

If consequences determined the morality of an action then it would be hard to know at what point the actions could be judged as the full consequences of an action might not be known for years. Give me an example of an action that is moral where the outcome is beneficial and immoral where the outcome is harmful.

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

If an act is good, and is done with good intentions, but one can anticipate harmful consequences to that act (not outweighed by other good consequences), then the act is immoral to do.

This is not a matter of dispute in moral theology. You are interpreting the Catechism as if it were the sole source of moral truth. It is not. The Catechism is very brief on every subject. Its brief statements must be understood in the context of the entire Faith.

All three fonts of morality must be good for an act to be good. It is not sufficient for the first two fonts to be good, the third font must also be good.

 

[Ender]

If an act is good, and is done with good intentions, but one can anticipate harmful consequences to that act (not outweighed by other good consequences), then the act is immoral to do.

This sounds like a case of an act with a double effect, one good and one bad. If the good is what is desired, the benefit comes from the good effect and not the bad, the act itself is not evil, and the good outweighs the bad, then the action is moral. If the harm outweighs the good then, yes, it is immoral. That is not what we’re debating.

This is not a matter of dispute in moral theology. You are interpreting the Catechism as if it were the sole source of moral truth. It is not. The Catechism is very brief on every subject. Its brief statements must be understood in the context of the entire Faith.

Just so I understand: your claim is that the Catechism is wrong on the significance of the circumstances by stating that they do not change the morality of an act?

All three fonts of morality must be good for an act to be good. It is not sufficient for the first two fonts to be good, the third font must also be good.

Since you reject the Catechism on this issue can you quote any other Church document that supports your claim?

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

The Catechism is not wrong. You are misinterpreting the Catechism.
You are interpreting the Catechism in isolation from the rest of the Faith.

There are three fonts (sources) of morality; all three must be good for an act to be good:

“An act is morally good when it assumes simultaneously the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances.” (from the Compendium, n. 368).

In other words, all three fonts must be moral:

1. the intention or purpose or end sought by the subject
2. the moral object, i.e. the meaning inherent in the act itself
3. and the circumstances, which includes its consequences

The circumstances (3rd font) are anything secondary to the act itself (2nd font). Anything essential to the very nature of the act is not a circumstance in the moral definition of the word. A circumstance is anything that touches on the act itself, but is not essential to it, especially its consequences.

The Catechism is saying that circumstances can determine the morality of an act by making a good act done with good intentions immoral because of harmful consequences. However, it is also saying that circumstances cannot make a bad act, or an act done with bad intent, into a good act.

When I read the Catechism on this point, I understand that these teachings are based on the work of Aquinas in the Summa, just as Veritatis Splendor bases many of its points on the Summa.

 

[Ender]

The Catechism is saying that circumstances can determine the morality of an act by making a good act done with good intentions immoral because of harmful consequences.

Suppose two people commit the same good act for the same good reason but in one case the consequences are beneficial while in the other they are harmful. If your interpretation is correct then, even though they both did the same thing for the same reason, one of them has sinned and the other has not. How is it possible that two people can do the same thing with the same intent and it be a sin in one case and not the other?

The key is that the consequences must be foreseeable; that is, the outcome must be chosen or at least accepted. It is the act of the will that makes the action moral or immoral, not the chance outcome.

“The foreseeable consequences are part of those circumstances of the act, which, while capable of lessening the gravity of an evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species. Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one’s own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure?” (Veritatis splendor 77)

Ender

 

[Ron_Conte]

The key is that the consequences must be foreseeable; that is, the outcome must be chosen or at least accepted. It is the act of the will that makes the action moral or immoral, not the chance outcome.

Yes, the consequences have to be able to be anticipated by the light of reason and based on whatever knowledge was available to the individual. But in the example you gave, if the individual understands that harmful consequences are likely to ensue, and the harm is not outweighed by other good effects, then he sins if he chooses to do the good act, for a good reason, knowing it will harm others. It does not matter if he has not chosen or willed the consequences; he knows that the harmfull effects are likely, and yet he does the act anyway.

An example of this would be the sin of scandal. Certainly, this sin can be committed by choosing to do an evil act. But this sin can also be committed when the intention is to do a good act for a good reason, but knowing that other persons will misunderstand and be harmed. St. Paul gives an example of this in Sacred Scripture.

[1 Corinthians]
{8:9} But be careful not to let your liberty become a cause of sin to those who are weak.
{8:10} For if anyone sees someone with knowledge sitting down to eat in idolatry, will not his own conscience, being infirm, be emboldened to eat what has been sacrificed to idols?
{8:11} And should an infirm brother perish by your knowledge, even though Christ died for him?
{8:12} So when you sin in this way against the brothers, and you harm their weakened conscience, then you sin against Christ.
{8:13} Because of this, if food leads my brother to sin, I will never eat meat, lest I lead my brother to sin.

Paul can eat meat, for it is moral to do so, and he does so with good intent. So then why does he say that he will never do what is moral and done with good intent? Because the consequences may lead his brother, who misunderstands, to sin.

You say that the outcome must be chosen or accepted. But I say that as long as the individual knows that the harm will result (without a greater good as in the principle of double effect), and chooses to do the act, then he has sinned. One cannot go around doing very harmful acts, and claim that it is not a sin because one did not choose or accept that harm. Your neighbor was still harmed, and you knowingly chose an act that would do harm, so the culpability remains.

You said: “It is the act of the will that makes the action moral or immoral, not the chance outcome.”

Certainly, if the will does not knowingly choose, then there is no sin. But it is not correct to fold the other two fonts of morality into the first font by making the will the sole determinant of what is good or bad. There is objective evil in the world, such as to harm one’s neighbor, and it is not justified by saying that the harm that one knew would result was not willed.

 

[Huiou_Theou]

The key is that the consequences must be foreseeable; that is, the outcome must be chosen or at least accepted. It is the act of the will that makes the action moral or immoral, not the chance outcome.

Yes, Ender, you do seem to be warming up to the problem.

“The foreseeable consequences … Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one’s own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure?” (Veritatis splendor 77)

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

Excellent. And to add an earlier thought from veritatis splendor:

There are many who say: Who will make us see good? And in reply to the question he says: The light of your face, Lord, is signed upon us, thereby implying that the light of natural reason whereby we discern good from evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else but an imprint on us of the divine light".
(Veritatis splendor 42)

But if it is an imprint, it is no longer just us – but the image of God within us. At some point, the greatest good is only known through some type of communion with God – and the distortion of that image becomes an impediment.

This also touches on a related and somewhat undecided topic for me regarding what the “participation” in trinity is: the difference (if any) between the presence of the Holy Spirit, and the Grace which we receive. ( The difference, whatever it is, is Thomistic too, but not rigourously defined in any Dogma that I know of. )

But Ender – although I agree with your initial comment very much – the opposite idea becomes dangerous – for if one can say “I didn’t know how it would come out” then they can always justify most actions by simply looking for a mere chance that the act would not achieve its goal. Yet this can become a practical excuse to commit probable evil acts.

Shoot into a dark room in ones own house – and say “but I didn’t know someone was actually in there.”

Is it evil to do target practice, did he acutally know, is checking being paranoid?

Reply: but you could have checked!

–yes, but I didn’t KNOW.

Although this is a poor example, use a little imagination (that physical calculator in your head which is fallen but attached to the spirit which chooses the good through the imagination.)

One can certainly “overthink” a problem, but what is “rasonable” and what is “paranoid”?

Hitler, Stalin, and others certainly used their imaginations.

 

[Ender]

… although I agree with your initial comment very much – the opposite idea becomes dangerous – for if one can say “I didn’t know how it would come out” then they can always justify most actions by simply looking for a mere chance that the act would not achieve its goal. Yet this can become a practical excuse to commit probable evil acts.

I didn’t mean to imply that simply because we cannot know for certain what the consequences of an action will be we are therefore not morally liable for our action. This is analogous to the way the civil law works. If someone is hurt because of my negligence I am morally and civilly responsible but if someone is hurt as a direct result of my action where that outcome could not reasonably be foreseen then I am neither morally nor civilly responsible. I have not committed an immoral act even though the consequences of that act were harmful. That is, it is not the outcome that determines my culpability but the deliberate choices I made based on the information available to me.

One difference between moral and civil law is that in the first instance there is no civil penalty for negligence if no one is hurt but I am morally indicted whether or not someone is injured. Again, the outcome does not change the moral nature of the action. In this case the fact that the outcome was not harmful (and could even be beneficial) does not change the fact that I have sinned because of my negligent, dangerous act.

Ender

 

[Huiou_Theou]

I didn’t mean to imply that simply because we cannot know for certain what the consequences of an action will be we are therefore not morally liable for our action. This is analogous to the way the civil law works. If someone is hurt because of my negligence I am morally and civilly responsible but if someone is hurt as a direct result of my action where that outcome could not reasonably be foreseen then I am neither morally nor civilly responsible. I have not committed an immoral act even though the consequences of that act were harmful. That is, it is not the outcome that determines my culpability but the deliberate choices I made based on the information available to me.

One difference between moral and civil law is that in the first instance there is no civil penalty for negligence if no one is hurt but I am morally indicted whether or not someone is injured. Again, the outcome does not change the moral nature of the action. In this case the fact that the outcome was not harmful (and could even be beneficial) does not change the fact that I have sinned because of my negligent, dangerous act.

Ender

Great, I mostly agree – and have only one clarification to ask of you. The paranoid person “sees” the possibility of fault where others do not – eg: If “I” give this rabbit manure away as fertalizer, and it has deadly bacteria in it – the whole world might die (or at least the person “I” give it to).

Would you say, that although the paranoid person is “negligent” in his own eyes (generally only) that he therefore sins? And the fact that no sickness actually results is totally irrelevant to the issue?
( Consider the person mildly ill – who gives the manure out of stupidly offering it before worrying about “possible” consequences – and then agonizing when actually giving the fertalizer … )

 

[Ender]

Would you say, that although the paranoid person is “negligent” in his own eyes (generally only) that he therefore sins?

1753: *“On the other hand, an added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good (such as almsgiving)”

*If a person believes he is doing an immoral act he is sinning whether or not his understanding of the act is correct. This is because his intent is immoral - which makes the action immoral.

And the fact that no sickness actually results is totally irrelevant to the issue?

The fact that the person is paranoid and that no harm actually arises from his action may lesson his guilt but the action is still a sin. These are aspects of the circumstances that surround the act; they mitigate individual responsibility but do not alter the essential nature of the action.

Ender

 

[Huiou_Theou]

1753: *"
The fact that the person is paranoid and that no harm actually arises from his action may lesson his guilt but the action is still a sin. These are aspects of the circumstances that surround the act; they mitigate individual responsibility but do not alter the essential nature of the action.

Ender*

Yes, your response is quite reasonable from what we have seen so far.

So a paranoid person, who is objectively wrong, still sins when performing an imaginary act – because their will is malformed.
Ok. I understand this view – although the gravity of the sin becomes a question mark to me now.

The paranoid person THOUGHT they were doing something gravely wrong – though objectively they were not, in other words they were ignorant of the truth.

But, how is it that guilt is mitigated – I mean, freedom to choose appears at the root of the sin here, so what is the principle of lessening the guilt for that choice… ?

Roman 2:15 Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another; )
Roman 2:16 In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.

 

[Ender]

The paranoid person THOUGHT they were doing something gravely wrong – though objectively they were not, in other words they were ignorant of the truth.

But, how is it that guilt is mitigated – I mean, freedom to choose appears at the root of the sin here, so what is the principle of lessening the guilt for that choice… ?

This is getting pretty deep here but I think your next question answers this:

Or, perhaps, is it that guilt always includes the same amount for that of the thought (even a scrupulous one), and then an additional amount for the damage done?

It surely seems to me that to intend to sin and fail is less evil than to intend to sin and succeed. Since the act performed by the paranoid person is not sinful he is guilty only of his intent whereas the person who intentionally performs an act which is sinful is guilty both of the intent and responsible for the consequences so his guilt is greater.

I think … I have found no source that directly answers this question.

I did, however, find this which goes to the disagreement between Ron Conte and me about whether the circumstances of an action can define its moral nature. Ron said yes, I said no … and the answer is: it depends.

Aquinas (I/II,18,10 ad 2) *“A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.”

(10) “Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.”*

Ender

 

[AlanFromWichita]

Aquinas (I/II,18,10 ad 2) *“A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.”

(10) “Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.”*

Pardon if this has already been addressed, as I have not followed the entire thread…

It seems to me that “place,” used in this context, specifies a different act – theft from a holy place is a different act than theft from a non-holy place. Disrobing in public, for example, is different than disrobing in a private place.

Maybe that’s his point. I guess it depends how you define the “sameness” of an act.

Alan

 

[Sure]

Pardon if this has already been addressed, as I have not followed the entire thread…

It seems to me that “place,” used in this context, specifies a different act – theft from a holy place is a different act than theft from a non-holy place. Disrobing in public, for example, is different than disrobing in a private place.

Maybe that’s his point. I guess it depends how you define the “sameness” of an act.

Alan

Once the principal condition is introduced the act becomes fundamentally different. With your disrobing example, the princ. cond. of “in public” changes the act to one of “disrobing” to one of “exhibition”.

It’s interesting that Aquinas uses two words “conditio particularis” and “conditio principalis” in his work. Somehow, both are usually translated as “circumstance” which obviously leads to confusion.

 

[Ender]

It seems to me that “place,” used in this context, specifies a different act – theft from a holy place is a different act than theft from a non-holy place.

I wasn’t satisfied by Aquinas’ example. Stealing is already a sin and even though stealing from a church may be sacrilege that doesn’t change the nature of the act. I do understand his point even though I don’t think his example properly illustrates it.

Ender

 

[Huiou_Theou]

… I am morally and civilly responsible but if someone is hurt as a direct result of my action where that outcome could not reasonably be foreseen then I am neither morally nor civilly responsible. I have not committed an immoral act …"

manslaughter?

One difference between moral and civil law is that in the first instance there is no civil penalty for negligence if no one is hurt …
Ender

This vaguely reminds me of a piece I read some time ago in CA regarding the fast before communion. It once was from midnight to the time of reception – but now it is but an hour. The point of the piece was that the ‘Law’ (which is a duty of respect) was not intrinsic to the relationship between food and the presence of the Eucharist – eg: mixing of the Eucharist with food was not intrinsically evil. To support the point two arguments were made – that there is no penalty specified in law (therefore it couldn’t be too important) and secondly that one could eat immediately afterward.
The act itself is not immoral, so the circumstances are the only thing which can make the act immoral.

Also, I am not sure I understand what you said – "in the first instance ( “moral law” ) there is no civil penalty?
Sort of a mixed analogy…

Isn’t it proper , though , to have a moral penalty for a moral negligence? And a civil penalty for a civil negligence (even if no one is “hurt”) – eg: leave a child in a hot car in a parking lot (negligence!!!) if the police find her (even if not hurt) there will be penalties – possibly even the temporary / permanent loss of the child.

Oh well, I segue…