…continued from above
You are wrong to think that.
The idea seems all right to some, but you have to consider not only the material
ramifications of an act, but the spiritual. If a pilot drops a bomb on a legitimate military
target and civilians are killed, the pilot is not guilty of the sin of murder.
But the pilot is doing the kind of event that is statistically certain to kill civilians eventually. The pilot knows that. His commanders know this. Sure, modern bombing is
more precise, and thus relatively
less wicked, than WWII-era bombing. But in every bombing campaign, civilians wind up getting killed.
But if a doctor
performs an abortion, even in cases or rape or incest (for which, ironically, the rapist
would not be killed), or even to save the life of the mother, he has committed the sin of
murder.
Again, it depends on how we are defining “abortion.” A doctor who removes a child from the womb prematurely, risking the death of the child but intending that death, is not committing murder. A doctor who uses a method that intrinsically and directly kills the child
is.
The case at St. Joseph’s is a very difficult one, because on the one hand the method used killed the child, but on the other it appears that the child would have died anyway. I am thus reluctant either to justify or to condemn it. I’m glad it wasn’t my call. If another method was possible, it certainly should have been used.
We can control only our own actions. We cannot control the side effects, we cannot
control the actions of others. We can only control our own actions.
We can refrain from targeting an innocent human being to death; we cannot keep a bomb from killing civilians, only to do what we can to mimimize those deaths. In a just war (ie, in general, not mentioning any particular wars), the danger to civilians exists because the nation needs to act in self-defense.
Modern “just wars” are almost never wars of pure self-defense. They are undertaken to neutralize threats, to stop aggressors, to topple tyrants, to protect national interests, etc.
If the purpose of the “abortion” is to save life, and the death of the child is a side effect, then I don’t see a fundamental difference. In both cases all the following need to be considered:
- The need for the action in the first place: i.e., how grave is the danger to innocent people that needs to be averted by the action
- How grave the risk is to innocents posed by the action; and
- How direct and active the killing of innocents in the action would be.
If the need is dire, then 2 and 3 would have to be very strong to overcome it. In other words, if the action is taken to protect life from grave risk, then the deliberate killing of innocents is still wrong, but putting innocents in danger or even inevitably causing the death of an innocent person who would still die anyway might be legitimate. (For instance, if a criminal is holding a hostage, then how much risk you are willing to take of killing the hostage is going to depend on what you think the criminal would do with the hostage anyway.)
Again, the point I’m making is not that abortion is justifiable but that the same kind of process of moral reasoning takes place whenever we have legitimate reasons for engaging in an action that may result in the death of innocent people.
There is no more way to justify performing the abortion at St Joseph’s than there is to
order an unjust attack on another nation.
That doesn’t make sense. A better parallel would surely be between an unjust war and the majority of abortions, which do not address the very difficult situation faced at St. Joseph’s. My point is that the kind of dilemma faced at St. Joseph’s is essentially of the same kind as that faced by a president or other leader considering an action that is intended to defend life but will also involve the taking of life–almost certainly including innocent life.
Consider this: if you went to potter’s house and he showed you his work and you picked one up and threw it to the ground, would that not be a different action than your
accidentally hitting one with your elbow and breaking it?
Certainly. But if the floor was covered in pots, so that I couldn’t enter the house without breaking pots, and a vandal was already in the house breaking as many pots as possible, I would be justified in entering the house, stepping as carefully as possible, in order to prevent more pots from being broken.
Human life is far more precious than pots, so the analogy may not be a good one. (Breaking pots is not intrinsically wrong–killing an innocent person is.) But it wasn’t my analogy
Edwin