Two universes which are indistinguishable

[STT]

Yes I believe in souls but I don’t see how my thoughts can be external to me. My thoughts are a function of my brain and my mind, they don’t exist apart from me.

Your experience of thoughts is similar to other experiences. They are only personal.

 

[seagal]

Your experience of thoughts is similar to other experiences. They are only personal.

I don’t agree. My thoughts can occur in my brain without any external (name removed by moderator)ut at all, whereas other experiences are the result of my interaction with other things.

 

[STT]

I don’t agree. My thoughts can occur in my brain without any external (name removed by moderator)ut at all, whereas other experiences are the result of my interaction with other things.

I am wondering if that is true. Do you have an argument or evidence in favor of that? Moreover we were talking about thoughts and the fact that they are personal yet they are similar to other experiences. I don’t understand how your comment is related to mine.

 

[Tyrel]

STT, having read the thread so far, I am still at a loss for what you’re trying to ask. I feel as though if you could just clarify a few points, I might be able to give you some food for thought, but as it stands right now if I responded with any kind of depth it would just be a shot in the dark.

Let me, therefore, ask just a few questions. First, do you think that if two hypotheses are empirically equivalent (that is, they make all and only the same predictions about observations, they are explanatorily equivalent in terms of satisfying explanatory desiderata, et cetera), that neither one, insofar as it is differentiated from the other, expresses as possible truth? In other words, are you just a plain old-school positivist who thinks that if expressions cannot be reduced to observation-sentences in principle then they are just vacuous pseudo-propositions?

Second, do you think that if two hypotheses are empirically equivalent then there is no way to rationally motivate and/or justify belief in one to the exclusion of the other? If so, I would like to challenge that.

 

[STT]

STT, having read the thread so far, I am still at a loss for what you’re trying to ask. I feel as though if you could just clarify a few points, I might be able to give you some food for thought, but as it stands right now if I responded with any kind of depth it would just be a shot in the dark.

Lets try.

Let me, therefore, ask just a few questions. First, do you think that if two hypotheses are empirically equivalent (that is, they make all and only the same predictions about observations, they are explanatorily equivalent in terms of satisfying explanatory desiderata, et cetera), that neither one, insofar as it is differentiated from the other, expresses as possible truth?

I am simply saying that we cannot know the truth by striving only to the empirical evidences in this case.

In other words, are you just a plain old-school positivist who thinks that if expressions cannot be reduced to observation-sentences in principle then they are just vacuous pseudo-propositions?

I believe in rationalism too. To me the right approach to know the answer to a question depends on the the question too.

Second, do you think that if two hypotheses are empirically equivalent then there is no way to rationally motivate and/or justify belief in one to the exclusion of the other? If so, I would like to challenge that.

I would be happy to know how you could discard one model in favor of another.

 

[Tyrel]

Well, let’s take an example I use quite often: there is no empirical difference between the neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity, and the now standard Einsteinian one. One posits a preferred reference frame from which absolute time is measured, even if that frame is empirically undetectable to us, while the other denies that there is any such preferred frame. However, one logically entails the A-theory of time, while the other logically entails the B-theory of time. Therefore, I might be able to argue for one theory of time on purely philosophical grounds, and if my arguments are good enough to rationally motivate belief in one or the other philosophy of time, they will be good enough to rationally motivate preferring one model of special relativity over another.

 

[STT]

Well, let’s take an example I use quite often: there is no empirical difference between the neo-Lorentzian interpretation of special relativity, and the now standard Einsteinian one. One posits a preferred reference frame from which absolute time is measured, even if that frame is empirically undetectable to us, while the other denies that there is any such preferred frame. However, one logically entails the A-theory of time, while the other logically entails the B-theory of time. Therefore, I might be able to argue for one theory of time on purely philosophical grounds, and if my arguments are good enough to rationally motivate belief in one or the other philosophy of time, they will be good enough to rationally motivate preferring one model of special relativity over another.

Where is the argument?

 

[Tyrel]

Where is the argument?

Well, I could append a variety of arguments here. Let’s try one (a reductio). If the A-theory of time were true, then which propositions were true and which false would constantly be changing as things went from future-tense true, to present-tense true, and from present-tense true to past-tense true. If God were omniscient, he would have to know all truths. Therefore, if God were omniscient, his mind would have to be changing every moment of every day in order to keep track of the rollover of (tensed) propositions. If God is divinely simple, however, then God’s mind cannot change in this way over time, for that would introduce distinctions in God which violate divine simplicity.

1. 
   *]God exists
   *]If God exists, then God is omniscient and metaphysically simple
   *]If the A-theory is true then truth is constantly changing
   *]If truth is constantly changing and God is omniscient, then God’s mind must be constantly changing.
   *]If God’s mind is constantly changing then God isn’t metaphysically simple
   *]Therefore, the A-theory of time is false
   *]If the A-theory of time is false, then the B-theory of time is true
   *]Therefore, the B-theory of time is true.
   *]If the Lorentzian interpretation of relativity is true then the A-theory is true.
   *]Therefore, the Lorentzian theory of relativity is false.
   *]If the Lorentzian theory of relativity is false, then the Einsteinian theory of relativity is true.
   *]Therefore, the Einsteinian theory of relativity is true.

 

[STT]

Well, I could append a variety of arguments here. Let’s try one (a reductio). If the A-theory of time were true, then which propositions were true and which false would constantly be changing as things went from future-tense true, to present-tense true, and from present-tense true to past-tense true. If God were omniscient, he would have to know all truths. Therefore, if God were omniscient, his mind would have to be changing every moment of every day in order to keep track of the rollover of (tensed) propositions. If God is divinely simple, however, then God’s mind cannot change in this way over time, for that would introduce distinctions in God which violate divine simplicity.

1. 
   *]God exists
   *]If God exists, then God is omniscient and metaphysically simple
   *]If the A-theory is true then truth is constantly changing
   *]If truth is constantly changing and God is omniscient, then God’s mind must be constantly changing.
   *]If God’s mind is constantly changing then God isn’t metaphysically simple
   *]Therefore, the A-theory of time is false
   *]If the A-theory of time is false, then the B-theory of time is true
   *]Therefore, the B-theory of time is true.
   *]If the Lorentzian interpretation of relativity is true then the A-theory is true.
   *]Therefore, the Lorentzian theory of relativity is false.
   *]If the Lorentzian theory of relativity is false, then the Einsteinian theory of relativity is true.
   *]Therefore, the Einsteinian theory of relativity is true.

1. 
   I agree with your argument about the fact that A-series of time is in conflict with God’s omniscient and Divine simplicity. I however have difficulty to see how one can resolve the conflict between B-series of time and God’s omniscient and Divine simplicity. Past, now and future are all real in B-series. This at first glance is consistent with God’s omniscience and Divine simplicity. Things however are subject to motion. This means that we need a reference point in block universe to keep track of changes. The position of this point is however subject to change which God should be aware of it. Therefore there is a conflict between B-series of time and God’s omniscience and Divine simplicity.

 

[Tyrel]

I agree with your argument about the fact that A-series of time is in conflict with God’s omniscient and Divine simplicity. I however have difficulty to see how one can resolve the conflict between B-series of time and God’s omniscient and Divine simplicity. Past, now and future are all real in B-series. This at first glance is consistent with God’s omniscience and Divine simplicity. Things however are subject to motion. This means that we need a reference point in block universe to keep track of changes. The position of this point is however subject to change which God should be aware of it. Therefore there is a conflict between B-series of time and God’s omniscience and Divine simplicity.

I don’t follow your argument here. If motion is given a standard interpretation consistent with the Minkowskian idea of a block universe, what is change other than a relation between states at different times? If change consists in a relation between times, why think that poses any difficulty for God’s omniscience or simplicity?

 

[STT]

I don’t follow your argument here. If motion is given a standard interpretation consistent with the Minkowskian idea of a block universe, what is change other than a relation between states at different times? If change consists in a relation between times, why think that poses any difficulty for God’s omniscience or simplicity?

It is question of now and whether God knows it or not. He is not omniscient if He doesn’t know it.