D
DrewMcCullough
Guest
I was (am) under the impression that there are certain sins that can never be mortal – namely, sins that are not of a grave nature and therefore can’t meet that one objective criterion for mortal sin.
It’s not hard to imagine a (usually) non-grave sin – for example, a lie – as having manifest grave consequences and somehow entailing mortal sin. But perhaps such sins are best understood as a sort of compound sin, entailing both a falsehood intended to deceive (i.e., a lie) and a separate intention of “grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity,” i.e., the mortal sin.
It’s tricky because the catechism seems to make clear that a lie can be mortally sinful (par. 2484):
“The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity.”
I’m not convinced that this rules out an understanding of a lie as strictly being always venial, and the key may be the words “in itself”: The lie itself may always only constitute venial sin, and the “it” which clearly *can *constitute mortal sin and which does in fact refer to the lie (but perhaps loosely enough) may be referring to this sort of compound sin.
Thoughts? Objections?
Drew
It’s not hard to imagine a (usually) non-grave sin – for example, a lie – as having manifest grave consequences and somehow entailing mortal sin. But perhaps such sins are best understood as a sort of compound sin, entailing both a falsehood intended to deceive (i.e., a lie) and a separate intention of “grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity,” i.e., the mortal sin.
It’s tricky because the catechism seems to make clear that a lie can be mortally sinful (par. 2484):
“The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity.”
I’m not convinced that this rules out an understanding of a lie as strictly being always venial, and the key may be the words “in itself”: The lie itself may always only constitute venial sin, and the “it” which clearly *can *constitute mortal sin and which does in fact refer to the lie (but perhaps loosely enough) may be referring to this sort of compound sin.
Thoughts? Objections?
Drew