The final sentence of CCC #2309 is very specific, “The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.” Our national leaders make that evaluation. A lot of Catholics don’t like, or even respect, that part of Just War Doctrine.
A soldier in war does not get to choose how he fights the enemy, unless his orders are so blatantly immoral that he has no choice but disobey them. But that soldier must realize his view of the “big picture” may be distorted, and had better be prepared to face the consequences for disobeying such orders. Those consequences could even be immediate summary execution under dire circumstances.
I am a former Marine, and I have been in combat a number of times. So, I know what the UCMJ has to say on the topic, and what ROE are.
My point, or really my question, was where is the moral line between torture and warfare, under Church doctrine. We know that in earlier times, the Church viewed torture as permissible and sometimes desirable, but tends not to have that view today.
The reason for my question was that statements were being made regarding the soul of the torturer, and sinning against the supposed terrorist in the hypothetical situations presented.
In the case of the Bush administration, “the prudential judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good” stated that acts which would normally be considered torture magically became “not torture” and were therefore desirable. Yet, the current administration has changed that policy. So, does this mean that a torturer did not sin under the previous Commander in Chief, but does sin committing the same acts now?
Further, even though ROE are specific as to whom to engage, they are often not specific as to how to engage. I intentionally brought up the use of phosphorous because it is controversial. It is agreed by most to be prohibited under the Geneva Conventions, but is used for “non weapon” uses in combat. Specifically to illuminate an area. However, the result is fairly horrific for anyone which the burning phosphorous comes into contact with. How is this any different than torture?
Finally, I assume that the theory of a “just war” is predicated on some sort of moral relativism. Specifically, that the end justifies the means, because the achieving of the defeat of the enemy through death and destruction will result in less death and destruction in final end. Does this not challenge the notion that any torture is bad, sui generis, if it could in fact be shown to save lives?
As for me, in retrospect I wish that I had applied for conscientious objector status, and if declined then stood for court martial rather than my last deployment. But that is another story…