E
evolwk
Guest
If all three of the conditions required for mortal sin are not present (knowledge, intent, serious matter), does the sin become venial or not a sin at all?
- Status
L
LilyM
Guest
Well, grave matter is always grave matter, so it could only fail on lack of either knowledge or intent. And whether it becomes venial or no sin would, presumably, depend on the degree to which either of those was absent.
Take an example of birth control - if your spouse seriously threatens to kill you or commit suicide unless you have a tubal or vasectomy, that’s a huge degree of duress or coercion that would almost completely remove any intent on your part, making it no sin at all.
If they threatened something lesser, for example to leave you, the level of coercion is less, though in some cases still serious for someone who can’t support themselves or their children. So it may be serious enough to make your sin venial, but is unlikely to make it no sin at all, since in such an event at least some help is often available from family or friends if not from the state.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
Just because someone is under duress to sin, that does not mean that the action is not a sin. If it did, then there would be no sin for a man to deny Christ in the face of death, but this is certainly a sin.
Apart from the objective matter of the act - that is, if the act is moral or immoral in and of itself - the only thing that has impact over whether or not something is a sin in a given case is the freedom of the individual’s will to consent to the act. So long as a person’s will does not consent to an immoral act, then it is not a sin, and so long as the will does consent, then it is a sin. This doesn’t mean, however, that whether or not one wants to do something has any impact at all.
Whether one wants to do something is entirely different from whether one wills it. To want to do something is to desire it. I can want to do something without actually doing it, for example, when I do not eat dessert for the sake of my health.
To will to do something means that a person has used his or her mind to cause his or her body to do some given thing or mind to think some given thing, or that a person has, in the mind, approved of something which is already going on.
For a sin to be a sin at all (formally - that is, for the person to be at all culpable for it as a sin), there has to be full consent of the will. This is different from deliberate consent of the will, which is what is required for a sin to be mortal. This is a common misperception of the Church’s teaching on this point. Many people think that the two are the same thing; they are not.
If an act is not fully consented to by the will, it fails to be a human act, and so cannot be a formal sin, though the act itself is still certainly objectively immoral (it would be called materially sinful, because the matter of it is immoral, even though the form - the circumstances and manner under which the act is commited - is not). To understand this, think about the term “human act.” Animals do things all the time, but they do not will them. Animals operate on instinct - see food, eat food; see female, mate with female; be tired, sleep, etc. Humans have the ability to make choices using their rational faculties. A human act is one in which a person does something under the command or approval of his rational faculties. If one does something half asleep, or in an instinctive way without thinking, this is not a human act, because the person’s reason is not involved. The rational soul has not been involved, in other words.
So it is not as though it is enough to avoid mortal sin that a person really desire not to do something, whether with a sortof half-heartedness or with part of them not totally consenting to it. If a person goes ahead and does something, they have fully consented to it barring some sort of extraordinary circumstance which would interfere with the will - such as mental illness, intoxication, being quite literally only half-awake, etc.
The third condition for mortal sin is actually that one give deliberate consent of the will. This means that the person’s reason has come into play *and * - to add to the ordinary requirement for a merely human act - has evaluated, even briefly, the moral nature of the act before willing it. It is not enough that a person possess the knowledge that an act is gravely sinful, for one can know something without it being brought into rational consideration.
For example, a person may know that striking his mother is gravely sinful, and yet in a flash of anger quickly do so without any time for his mind to think of that fact and make a decision based upon it.
Deliberate consent means, as Fr. Groeschel puts it, that one recognizes that something is gravely sinful yet does it anyways. So for example, I have studied my faith and know that slander is gravely sinful (unless it is over a very trivial matter). If I am in conversation and slander a man offhand without the fact that it is wrong ever coming to mind, it is not a mortal sin. However, if I am about to slander the man, and then remember that it is wrong yet I choose to do it anyways, then it is a mortal sin.
The key word here really is “choose.” To make a choice is to deliberate on something. Mortal sin requires that one choose to do evil when one can choose to refrain from it, which is the reason for the third condition.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
…Continued from #3:
This is why some gravely immoral act can fail to be a mortal sin yet become a venial sin due to the particular state of the person’s will. A person might, knowing something is wrong, will to do it, yet not have deliberately done so. The thing is that this doesn’t happen that often.
This is why when you read the fathers of the Church, and the older saints and popes and Church documents, they don’t talk about these three requirements for mortal sin. They just talk as though X is gravely sinful, so X is a mortal sin. Ordinarily, if one takes the name of the Lord in vain willfully, he has done so deliberately, because to even will the act itself means the rational faculties have come into play. The distinction between what is merely a fully consented to act of the will and a deliberately consented to act of the will is very subtle, and will ordinarily only come into play under unusual circumstances.
The example given, concerning threats, may indeed create this sort of situation. For example, to have a vasectomy takes consent of the will. It’s a very involved act, not one that you can do without really thinking about it. One can’t really do so without willing to do so - even if they don’t desire it. The will has to direct the body to get up and walk to a the hospital, and to say certaask for the procedure, and to sign the papers, and so forth. However, it is possible that a threat has so affected the person’s mind that they are not capable of rational decisions. In other words, someone may be so scared that he really and truly can’t think straight anymore. Thus, even though he wills the vasectomy - his mind is directing his body to do X, Y, and Z - he may not have been able to properly rationally consider - deliberate - on the choice because he is scared to the point where he becomes in at least some way irrational.
This is why the Church has only in recent centuries really begun to talk about these conditions. They go back to medieval canon law in some way, but really they started to become important with Pius X’s catechism. It is now that the Church has a better understanding of psychology and the various things that effect the human mind that She has begun to recognize the true importance of these conditions.
Hope that helps,
Peace and God bless!
This is why some gravely immoral act can fail to be a mortal sin yet become a venial sin due to the particular state of the person’s will. A person might, knowing something is wrong, will to do it, yet not have deliberately done so. The thing is that this doesn’t happen that often.
This is why when you read the fathers of the Church, and the older saints and popes and Church documents, they don’t talk about these three requirements for mortal sin. They just talk as though X is gravely sinful, so X is a mortal sin. Ordinarily, if one takes the name of the Lord in vain willfully, he has done so deliberately, because to even will the act itself means the rational faculties have come into play. The distinction between what is merely a fully consented to act of the will and a deliberately consented to act of the will is very subtle, and will ordinarily only come into play under unusual circumstances.
The example given, concerning threats, may indeed create this sort of situation. For example, to have a vasectomy takes consent of the will. It’s a very involved act, not one that you can do without really thinking about it. One can’t really do so without willing to do so - even if they don’t desire it. The will has to direct the body to get up and walk to a the hospital, and to say certaask for the procedure, and to sign the papers, and so forth. However, it is possible that a threat has so affected the person’s mind that they are not capable of rational decisions. In other words, someone may be so scared that he really and truly can’t think straight anymore. Thus, even though he wills the vasectomy - his mind is directing his body to do X, Y, and Z - he may not have been able to properly rationally consider - deliberate - on the choice because he is scared to the point where he becomes in at least some way irrational.
This is why the Church has only in recent centuries really begun to talk about these conditions. They go back to medieval canon law in some way, but really they started to become important with Pius X’s catechism. It is now that the Church has a better understanding of psychology and the various things that effect the human mind that She has begun to recognize the true importance of these conditions.
Hope that helps,
Peace and God bless!
L
LilyM
Guest
You mean, I presume, as I said, that grave matter is always grave matter.
There are profound differences between denying Christ to preserve your life on the one hand, and choosing to preserve your own threatened life over the lives of your future children on the other.
Christ and His glory are the supreme good, to be preferred to all else, even life itself. So in choosing betwen Christ and our own lives, of course we must choose Christ.
On the other hand, choosing between your own life and that of another or others, preservation of one’s own life is not only perfectly permissible but may well be a duty in some cases. If you’re supporting a family for example, your higher duty is probably to save your life for their sake, rather than saving someone else’s but losing your own and leaving your family without your necessary support.
E
EasterJoy
Guest
It depends on what degree of the elements are present. To work backwards:
Of course, if the wrong committed isn’t a serious matter, but is nevertheless morally wrong and committed with full intent, the sin is venial.
If your intent is mitigated so that you are not fully culpable, you may still be in some way culpable, and so would still be guilty of a sin. It is my understanding that intent that is in-between fully free intent and lack of any meaningful control over intent results in culpability that is venial.
If you know something to be wrong and do it willingly, but in doing so honestly do not realize it is a grave matter, it is still a venial sin.
OTOH, if you had no knowledge and no reasonable responsiblity to know that you did anything wrong, if you had no real power over yourself to decide to do otherwise, either because of serious duress or a truly incapacitating defect of the will, if the action was not morally wrong but only felt wrong, or if your act lead to a seriously bad outcome that was not linked to intention or lack of reasonable care on your part, there is no sin at all. You might easily feel guilty, yet be guilty of no sin.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
I mean that one cannot sin just because his life is threatened and have the culpability mitigated to the degree that a mortal sin would cease to be mortal or a venial sin cease to be a sin.
The only reason that duress would do such a thing would be if it rendered the person incapable of rational thought. It would have to be duress having so great an impact that the victim no longer posessed the mental faculties to make a free choice of the will.
L
LilyM
Guest
Ah, but what if a person is incapable of free ACTION? That’s usually what duress does - it compels you to ACT in ways you don’t will to. Just as in the case of someone who has tourettes and swears uncontrollably or something - the bodily act is independent of the will. Doesn’t require a lack of rational thought at all, just a lack of sufficient control over your actions.
E
EasterJoy
Guest
The question, though, is not whether the duress totally mitigates the sinner’s culpability, but whether the sinner totally cuts off relationship with God by having chosen the sin.
(Why isn’t this thread listed under Moral Theology?)
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
Will is differnet from desire. I can will something I do not desire. In fact, we do this all the time. Someone is told by her boss to do something, and she does not want to, but she goes ahead and does it.
Now when a person is pointing a gun at your head and telling you to do something, you may not be in control of your actions, but you also may still be. It depends on the individual and how that individual person is handling and reacting to the duress. If a person points a gun at me and tells me to do something sinful, if I am rational enough to recognize that I can choose to either commit the action and experience whatever consequences ensue or I can reject the action and experience whatever consequences ensue, then to commit the action would still be a free act and would retain its moral character. I would still be culpable for it.
That’s the basic, purest way of viewing the situation. Various other factors may come into play which would effect whether or not I could recognize that choice, but whatever is going on, what matters is if I can or cannot make that choice.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
A mortal sin cannot cease to be a mortal sin simply by virtue of mitigated culpability, because a mortal sin is of a different genus than venial sin. It is a whole different animal. The lack of deliberate consent changes the nature of gravely immoral act, and so it will no longer be a mortal sin. Duress does not do this unless it renders deliberate consent of the will impossible or in some other way removes it. Duress would mitigate the culpability, but the act would retain its quality. A mortal sin would still be a mortal sin, a venial sin still a venial sin.
Thomas Aquinas addresses this point:
E
EasterJoy
Guest
In other words, the gravity of the action and the seriousness of its effects don’t change, but the effect on the relationship between the sinner and God does change, depending on the degree to which the sinner’s will was in agreement with his or her actions.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
I don’t think so, if I understand what you’re saying correctly.
I mean that if one person denies Christ under threat of death, and another does so apart from threat of death, both will suffer damnation but the one who was under threat of death will suffer less in hell.
This assumes that the threat of death did not cause the individual to lose the ability to make a rational choice or to make a deliberate choice, that neither repented before death, and so forth.
In other words, factors like duress can lessen the culpability of a sin, but they cannot change the genus of the sin. Genus is a technical, Thomistic term. It basically refers to a category or a type of thing. In this case, mortal and venial sin are of different genuses because they are entirely different in that they are - not justin their effects. It is not arbitrary what Grave matter is. What it comes down to is that a mortal sin is an act in which a person sets his final end on something created, but a venial sin is an act in which one, while maintaining God as his final end, misuses one of the means to this end that He has given us.
So for example take gluttony. In the mortal sin of gluttony, a person actually sets his end on food. He lives for food. In the venial sin of gluttony, a person misuses food - which is a means to our salvation through nourishing our bodies - and eats too much, but it’s not his final end. He’s not living for food, he just eats too much when he sits down at dinner. The mortally sinning glutton lives to eat, whereas the venially sinning glutton eats to live but just eats too much.
So when a person commits a gravely immoral act under duress, he or she is - unless the person’s reason has been compromised by fear or some such thing - setting as his final end created life rather than the eternal life of God. The person, knowing that the act put before him is contrary to life eternally in Heaven, is choosing to commit it anyways, favoring earthly life over eternal life.
Peace and God bless!
E
EasterJoy
Guest
I don’t think you understand what I meant to say. Your “unless the person’s reason has been compromised by fear or some such thing” is what I meant.
To clarify: duress does not necessarily lessen culpability, but it can.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
What we need to do for the sake of this discussion is to make a clear distinction that both of us are certainly already aware of, namely, between mortal sin and venial sin.
Mortal sin and venial sin are not on a continuum. It is not as though as a person’s culpability for an act increases, it becomes closer to a mortal sin, and as it decreases, it becomes closer to a venial sin. Mortal and venial sins are two different things altogether. In other words, there is a culpability “scale” for mortal sin, and one for venial sin. They don’t meet or cross. There is not some level of culpability for a mortal sin below which is ceases to be a mortal sin, or some level of culpability for venial sin above which it becomes a mortal sin. A mortal sin is one sort of thing, and a venial sin is another sort of thing, and a person who does either sort of thing can be culpable to one degree or another.
So a person who steals a dollar under duress has less guilt than one who does it without duress. The former would suffer less in Purgatory than the latter.
A clear-thinking person who kills a man under duress has less guilt than one who does it without duress, but both have committed a mortal sin. The former will suffer a lesser punishment in hell than the latter.
Let me change your statement to express what I am saying:
duress does not always excuse from mortal sin, but it can.
There is difference between excusing from mortal sin and lessening culpability. Lessened culpability can *never *excuse from mortal sin. What excuses from mortal sin is when one of the elements that constitute a mortal sin are lacking.
A venial sin is an act contrary to the divine law.
A mortal sin is a gave act contrary to the divine law which is commited with knowledge of the act’s gravity and deliberate consent of the will (not full consent - as I said these are two different things).
If the sinner is invincibly ignorant of the act’s gravity, then the act is not a mortal sin, not because the person is less culpable for it, but because the act does not bear the ontological quality of a free human act. If the sinner does not deliberately consent to the act - that is, reflect on the act prior to willing it - then the act is not a mortal sin because the act does not bear the ontological quality of a mortal sin. Culpability is a whole different issue.
E
EasterJoy
Guest
From the CCC 1862:
One commits a venial sin when…he disobeys the moral law in a grave matter, but without full knowledge or without complete consent.
So while a sin of venial gravity cannot be done SO deliberately that it becomes mortal, a sin of mortal gravity can be done with some degree of consent so that it is a venial rather than a mortal sin.
It is not true, then, that a sin of mortal gravity is either mortal or else no sin at all. There is a continuum in terms of consent.
J
Jerry-Jet
Guest
Isn’t the devil behind the proposition that it is hard to commit mortal sin or that mortal sin doesn’t exist?
I believe the devil takes Protestant souls to Hell by getting them to believe that there is no such thing as mortal sin and that he gets some Catholics to Hell by getting them to believe that it is real difficult to commit a mortal sin–they don’t worry about it–and they–like the Protestants who don’t believe in mortal sin–die in a state of mortal sin.
Are such things possible?
And isn’t it also the truth that non Catholics can mortally sin by disobeying the natural law that is engraved on their hearts by God?
And if they do how are they saved absent perfect contrition for their mortal sins?
Look folks–mortal sin is not impossible–it does exist–and Catholics and non catholics alike need to avoid: committing mortal sin and not repenting of it and dying in a state of mortal sin-- because that will lead to Hell!
If a child at first confession is capable of confessing Mortal sin to a priest–don’t tell me that it is Rare that an adult would committ a mortal sin or that an adult isn’t just as needing of confession to a priest after mortal sin as a child is!
If you don’t want to Perish–Do Penance!
I believe the devil takes Protestant souls to Hell by getting them to believe that there is no such thing as mortal sin and that he gets some Catholics to Hell by getting them to believe that it is real difficult to commit a mortal sin–they don’t worry about it–and they–like the Protestants who don’t believe in mortal sin–die in a state of mortal sin.
Are such things possible?
And isn’t it also the truth that non Catholics can mortally sin by disobeying the natural law that is engraved on their hearts by God?
And if they do how are they saved absent perfect contrition for their mortal sins?
Look folks–mortal sin is not impossible–it does exist–and Catholics and non catholics alike need to avoid: committing mortal sin and not repenting of it and dying in a state of mortal sin-- because that will lead to Hell!
If a child at first confession is capable of confessing Mortal sin to a priest–don’t tell me that it is Rare that an adult would committ a mortal sin or that an adult isn’t just as needing of confession to a priest after mortal sin as a child is!
If you don’t want to Perish–Do Penance!
L
LilyM
Guest
Hang on - there’s no such thing as someone acting under duress whose capacity, whether it be their mental or physical capacity (and one has to be physically as well as mentally free to be culpable for a grave act) HASN’T been compromised by fear.
The element of compulsion is inherent in the definition of what duress IS, for example from the Merriam-Webster online dictionary:
"**duress: **
1: forcible restraint or restriction
2: compulsion by threat; specifically : unlawful constraint"
Without that level of force and compulsion, I’d say it doesn’t actually fit under the definition of duress, but is merely a lesser threat.
And as much as I respect St Thomas, I think he may be wrong here - the genus that doesn’t change is that of grave matter. Mortal sin, by its definition, depends on more than that unchanging element of grave matter - it depends on the existence of full knowledge and free will as well.
And even grave matter is not always quite as black and white as you seem to think either - for example with gluttony. Peoples’ attitudes to food can not be so simply divided as you have done, rather they are on a spectrum.
You can, without actually living for food, still overeat to the extent that it seriously compromises your health, for one. Which fact of itself can possibly tip the balance over into it being mortally sinful.
This is one reason why the sacrament of confession exists - many sins need to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine even their mortal or venial nature, let alone the sinner’s culpability for them. Few sins have been said to be objectively disordered or grave in all circumstances
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
LilyM and EasterJoy, I’m just going to address both of your comments in one thread, because it will be simpler and because the misunderstandings that you have are essentially the same.
Mortal sin and venial sin are not two different types of the same thing. They are two radically different things.
The effect of one (venial) is harm to the self in the form of the attachment to created things that develops with its commission. This is what is known as temporal punishment, and it must be dealt with before entrance into glory, either here on earth or in Purgatory.
The effect of mortal sin is the separation from God which, if it is persisted in until death, will remain for all eternity.
Now, the reason that these effects are different is not because of the culpability involved. If we were to look at sins as earning “points,” it is not the case that a mortal sin is worth so many points that it separates one from God, whereas venial sins do not. Obviously, if this were the case than committing enough venial sins would also cause separation from God. Rather, it is that there is some way in which mortal sin is ontologically different from venial sin.
We have to understand first of all, as I am sure you do, that sin is not merely a matter of violating commands. It is not as though God has merely places us into Heaven or Hell based upon our success or failture to obey a set of rules or laws. This is the way that it was expressed to the people of Israel, and it is the way that is has most often been spoken of throughout Jewish and Christian history due to the fact that it simply is easier to put it in these terms than to discuss the core metaphysical reality of it. I don’t think we have any disagreement on this, by the way, I am merely explaining it as a part of my greater explanation.
The metaphysical reality of sin is that God created us with the ultimate end - or goal - of loving Him and receiving His love, but our first parents chose created things over that, and we continue to do so. Sin is, in its essence, in one way or another choosing creation over the Creator.
In venial sin, one continues to hold God as his final end. He takes God’s creation and inordinantly uses it, but He does not forsake God. So the glutton inordinantly uses food. LilyM made the point that there is a spectrum to this, and she is entirely correct.
In mortal sin, one does not do this. In mortal sin, one - and he may hardly realize it in this life, as the great Frank Sheed put it - sets a created thing as his final end and goal. The individual forsakes God so as to find his ultimate happiness in a thing. It is the difference between getting lost on a drive and purposefully choosing a different destination altogether. They aren’t the same thing - they’re an entirely different thing. If one sets out to go to Maine but gets lost, he still intends to get to Maine. If one sets out to go to Maine but then decides to go to Florida, this is entirely different. One cannot rightly say that this person has gotten lost. Rather, he has chosen a different goal.
So when I spoke of gluttony, I fully recognized that there is a spectrum. There is, however, the definitive choice to live for food as opposed to anything on the spectrum that Lily speaks of. It’s ontologically different. It’s a definitive choice to accept the enjoyment of the pallet as the final goal and end in life.
Part of the problem is that we tend to view these three conditions for mortal sin as causing or creating mortal sin, rather than identifying it. Mortal sin is really setting something other than God as one’s final goal in life. The three conditions don’t cause this to happen - they allow us to identify when it has. This can actually be seen in the grammar of the Catechism’s definition:
“Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.”
In a mortal sin, a person, knowing that something is gravely immoral - that is, diametrically contrary to God’s love - chooses to do it anyways. Because it is entirely opposed to God’s love, and because the person knows this, he cannot do it unless he utterly rejects God. This is another area in which I think we are in agreement.
See the next post for the disagreements.
Mortal sin and venial sin are not two different types of the same thing. They are two radically different things.
The effect of one (venial) is harm to the self in the form of the attachment to created things that develops with its commission. This is what is known as temporal punishment, and it must be dealt with before entrance into glory, either here on earth or in Purgatory.
The effect of mortal sin is the separation from God which, if it is persisted in until death, will remain for all eternity.
Now, the reason that these effects are different is not because of the culpability involved. If we were to look at sins as earning “points,” it is not the case that a mortal sin is worth so many points that it separates one from God, whereas venial sins do not. Obviously, if this were the case than committing enough venial sins would also cause separation from God. Rather, it is that there is some way in which mortal sin is ontologically different from venial sin.
We have to understand first of all, as I am sure you do, that sin is not merely a matter of violating commands. It is not as though God has merely places us into Heaven or Hell based upon our success or failture to obey a set of rules or laws. This is the way that it was expressed to the people of Israel, and it is the way that is has most often been spoken of throughout Jewish and Christian history due to the fact that it simply is easier to put it in these terms than to discuss the core metaphysical reality of it. I don’t think we have any disagreement on this, by the way, I am merely explaining it as a part of my greater explanation.
The metaphysical reality of sin is that God created us with the ultimate end - or goal - of loving Him and receiving His love, but our first parents chose created things over that, and we continue to do so. Sin is, in its essence, in one way or another choosing creation over the Creator.
In venial sin, one continues to hold God as his final end. He takes God’s creation and inordinantly uses it, but He does not forsake God. So the glutton inordinantly uses food. LilyM made the point that there is a spectrum to this, and she is entirely correct.
In mortal sin, one does not do this. In mortal sin, one - and he may hardly realize it in this life, as the great Frank Sheed put it - sets a created thing as his final end and goal. The individual forsakes God so as to find his ultimate happiness in a thing. It is the difference between getting lost on a drive and purposefully choosing a different destination altogether. They aren’t the same thing - they’re an entirely different thing. If one sets out to go to Maine but gets lost, he still intends to get to Maine. If one sets out to go to Maine but then decides to go to Florida, this is entirely different. One cannot rightly say that this person has gotten lost. Rather, he has chosen a different goal.
So when I spoke of gluttony, I fully recognized that there is a spectrum. There is, however, the definitive choice to live for food as opposed to anything on the spectrum that Lily speaks of. It’s ontologically different. It’s a definitive choice to accept the enjoyment of the pallet as the final goal and end in life.
Part of the problem is that we tend to view these three conditions for mortal sin as causing or creating mortal sin, rather than identifying it. Mortal sin is really setting something other than God as one’s final goal in life. The three conditions don’t cause this to happen - they allow us to identify when it has. This can actually be seen in the grammar of the Catechism’s definition:
“Mortal sin is sin whose object is grave matter and which is also committed with full knowledge and deliberate consent.”
In a mortal sin, a person, knowing that something is gravely immoral - that is, diametrically contrary to God’s love - chooses to do it anyways. Because it is entirely opposed to God’s love, and because the person knows this, he cannot do it unless he utterly rejects God. This is another area in which I think we are in agreement.
See the next post for the disagreements.
L
Lazerlike42
Guest
The main issue seems to be in regard to the difference between “full consent of the will” and “deliberate consent of the will.” Any sin constitutes a choice, or it is not a sin. An animal is incapable of theft because an animal is incapable of choice - lacking a free will with which to choose. In theology, this is called a human act. Any act to which the will does not consent is not a human act. Thus, autonomous responses are not human acts, and, for instance, a person can get sexually aroused without sinning at all. Therefore, if an act lacks full consent of the will, it cannot be even a venial sin. To understand full consent, move your arm up. You just gave full consent of the will to do that. Your arm moved because you willed it to. The human will is that which directs our actions.
Deliberate consent is different than full consent. In deliberate consent, a person in some way reflects on the prospect of a particular action and does it anyways. This reflection may last only a split second. What matters is that the rational faculties of the mind a) recognize the moral nature of the act and b) agree to will the act. It may be a good or a bad act. I can deliberately consent to feeding the hungry, and I can deliberately consent to commiting adultery. When I do so, I recognize the moral nature of the act and will it. It is possible that I might not recognize the moral nature of the act and yet will it, or that I may have my reason clouded by external factors - including duress - such that I am not able to make such a rational choice.
This is the key. Certainly it is possible for duress to cloud a person’s mind so as to remove the possibility of deliberate consent. However, this is not necessarily the case.
This is really the problem. The will is not the desire or anything similar to that. It is the “I am going to do X now.” Just because a man is pointing a gun at me and telling me to walk, that doesn’t mean that my will is not free. My personal will is free. I am presented with the choice of how to use it - to accept death or to obey the gunman - but the will is free. The will ceases to be free only when the human mind is so distressed by duress that it cannot function properly or evaluate rationally. When that man is pointing his gun at me, it is still up to me to move my legs, just like when I asked you to move your arm earlier. That is the will. The deliberation comes when reason is applied to that as a determining factor, such as when I choose to or not to move my leg for some reason.
Peace and God bless
Deliberate consent is different than full consent. In deliberate consent, a person in some way reflects on the prospect of a particular action and does it anyways. This reflection may last only a split second. What matters is that the rational faculties of the mind a) recognize the moral nature of the act and b) agree to will the act. It may be a good or a bad act. I can deliberately consent to feeding the hungry, and I can deliberately consent to commiting adultery. When I do so, I recognize the moral nature of the act and will it. It is possible that I might not recognize the moral nature of the act and yet will it, or that I may have my reason clouded by external factors - including duress - such that I am not able to make such a rational choice.
This is the key. Certainly it is possible for duress to cloud a person’s mind so as to remove the possibility of deliberate consent. However, this is not necessarily the case.
This is really the problem. The will is not the desire or anything similar to that. It is the “I am going to do X now.” Just because a man is pointing a gun at me and telling me to walk, that doesn’t mean that my will is not free. My personal will is free. I am presented with the choice of how to use it - to accept death or to obey the gunman - but the will is free. The will ceases to be free only when the human mind is so distressed by duress that it cannot function properly or evaluate rationally. When that man is pointing his gun at me, it is still up to me to move my legs, just like when I asked you to move your arm earlier. That is the will. The deliberation comes when reason is applied to that as a determining factor, such as when I choose to or not to move my leg for some reason.
Peace and God bless
- Status