Very obscure Aquinas question

[steamboatp]

I have been reading St.Thomas Aquinas’ Compendium of Theology (Light of Faith), and as sometimes happens, I am mystified by a short paragraph he wrote. In discussing the trinity (number 52) ,he talks about various types of procession among humans (biological reproduction, intellection, etc.) Then he says:

“In beings that are not composed of matter and form, no distinction can be discerned other than that of the forms themselves.”

Thomas can’t mean that in beings which have neither matter nor form, the form distinguishes them, because that is a self-contradictory sentence.

Maybe he means that there are beings which are composed of only form, but that would be counter to his Aristotelian base.

Most probably he is referring to the fact that God’s existence and essence are identical. But as God is not a physical being, he does not have form- he has essence, which is not the same in this case.

Any ideas? Thanks!

 

[JohnDamian]

Well, we can know that God’s essence and existence are not really distinct; as one cannot be without the other. It is certain that neither could exist independantly of the other, Aquinas applied this only to infinite beings.

Furtheremore, we can know that God’s essence and existence are not conceptually distinct; as they are distinct by some real unity, but not by so much a unity that it is either numeric or independant.

We can also know that God’s essence and existence are not modally distinct; as they are not of the same Genus.

We could say that these things are distinct by some non numerical unity that is within themselves, that is not so great as to be a real unity; but not an abstraction or a conceptual distinction. We can apply the Formal distinction to this, as they are distinct by formalities in their own unity. So, even though the essence and the existence are really identical, their accounts are certainly different and non-inclusive; and as such they are formally distinct.

Aquinas at the time recognised the need for such a distinction, his contempory; Henry of Ghent provided an intentional distinction, which was later developed into the Formal Distinction by Aquinas Critic, Bl Duns Scotus.

So Aquinas knew that they were really identical, but somehow distinct - it was not until other philosophers such as Henry and Duns that this distinction became critically developed into the formal distinction.

 

[Apollos]

“In beings that are not composed of matter and form, no distinction can be discerned other than that of the forms themselves.” Thomas can’t mean that in beings which have neither matter nor form, the form distinguishes them, because that is a self-contradictory sentence. Maybe he means that there are beings which are composed of only form, but that would be counter to his Aristotelian base. Most probably he is referring to the fact that God’s existence and essence are identical. But as God is not a physical being, he does not have form- he has essence, which is not the same in this case. Any ideas? Thanks!

No, he’s not talking about beings that lack both matter and form; he’s talking about beings that have a form but no matter. Although I don’t remember what Aristotle said about matterless forms, I do know that mathematical entities are purely formal albeit abstract; angels however are self-individuating forms (ST 1.50.2, 4), and God, of course, is definitely formal (ST 1.3.2).

 

[ad_altare_Dei]

angels however are self-individuating forms (ST 1.50.2, 4), and God, of course, is definitely formal (ST 1.3.2).

Aquinas means precisely these. Aquinas says, “In beings that are not composed of matter and form, no distinction can be discerned other than that of the forms themselves.” For Aquinas, beings are individuated by matter. That’s pretty basic Aquinas. But in cases in which there is no matter, i.e. angels, etc., the distinction cannot be based on the being composed of this or that matter. If, then, the beings are to be distinguished, they can be distinguished only by differences in forms. So there is human nature, but there is no angel nature. Michael is a unique being that participates in Michaelness, Gabriel in Gabrielness, Raphael in Raphaelness, etc.

steamboatp:

Maybe he means that there are beings which are composed of only form, but that would be counter to his Aristotelian base.

That’s precisely what Aquinas means. There doesn’t seem to be any other way to read that. Be careful not to let the stereotype that Aquinas baptizes Aristotle make you think that Aquinas doesn’t modify Aristotle. He does.

Review the De ente et essentia and the ST on angels if you actually want to know what the angelic doctor says about them.

 

[steamboatp]

I’ll be sure to review those sources. Thanks everybody for the info!

 

[Geremia]

“In beings that are not composed of matter and form, no distinction can be discerned other than that of the forms themselves.”

Matter is what individuates beings. If there is no matter, there is no way to distinguish one being from another. This is why every angel is its own species. That is really amazing to think about. And that God is infinitely above all the angels! Wow!

 

[WmJackP]

Well, we can know that God’s essence and existence are not really distinct; as one cannot be without the other. It is certain that neither could exist independantly of the other, Aquinas applied this only to infinite beings.

Furtheremore, we can know that God’s essence and existence are not conceptually distinct; as they are distinct by some real unity, but not by so much a unity that it is either numeric or independant.

We can also know that God’s essence and existence are not modally distinct; as they are not of the same Genus.

We could say that these things are distinct by some non numerical unity that is within themselves, that is not so great as to be a real unity; but not an abstraction or a conceptual distinction. We can apply the Formal distinction to this, as they are distinct by formalities in their own unity. So, even though the essence and the existence are really identical, their accounts are certainly different and non-inclusive; and as such they are formally distinct.

Aquinas at the time recognised the need for such a distinction, his contempory; Henry of Ghent provided an intentional distinction, which was later developed into the Formal Distinction by Aquinas Critic, Bl Duns Scotus.

So Aquinas knew that they were really identical, but somehow distinct - it was not until other philosophers such as Henry and Duns that this distinction became critically developed into the formal distinction.

John, there you go again (to paraphrase our prez Ron Reagan)…Thomas was an authority borrowing heavily on Plato’s concept of the forms. And in the 12th century (or whenever) it was perhaps as good of an impression of reality as any other. …But, really, John, isn’t this mideval stuff alittle dated now in the 21st century? Can we go on about such arcane questions as “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” and really have any productive discourse about things that matter?

I always enjoy your “spin” on things, john, because you take me back to my “salad days” when I was an impressionable student at a Jesuit high school.

 

[Apollos]

But, really, John, isn’t this mideval stuff alittle dated now in the 21st century?

Can we go on about such arcane questions as “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” and really have any productive discourse about things that matter?

You know *exactly *what the point of that angel-pin question was, WmJack! Shame on you!

I always enjoy your “spin” on things, john, because you take me back to my “salad days” when I was an impressionable student at a Jesuit high school.

 

[JohnDamian]

John, there you go again (to paraphrase our prez Ron Reagan)…Thomas was an authority borrowing heavily on Plato’s concept of the forms. And in the 12th century (or whenever) it was perhaps as good of an impression of reality as any other. …

Drawing ontological distinctions is relevant even to today. It just requries that the understandings of quanta at deeper levels make the designation of quiddities and haecceities somewhat more specific and advanced. The differences between real, conceptual, formal, intentional and modal distinctions still apply today - it is not the logical system that has changed, just our ability to percieve and determine matter and forms more precisely, which allows a greater specificity in quiddities etc.

But, really, John, isn’t this mideval stuff alittle dated now in the 21st century? Can we go on about such arcane questions as “how many angels can dance on the head of a pin” and really have any productive discourse about things that matter?

We can have productive discourse about these things; although that question in particular is one used to mock scholasticism, and I don’t feel any serious theologian has approached it in any systematic way, angels are not corporeal and thus the question is null.

I always enjoy your “spin” on things, john, because you take me back to my “salad days” when I was an impressionable student at a** Jesuit high school**.

Now now, don’t make me jelous, some of us had to settle for Anglican schools