Violinist Argument

[Marc_Anthony]

How would you refute this famous pro-choice argument from a secular perspective?

From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Judith Jarvis Thomson provided one of the most striking and effective thought experiments in the moral realm. Her example is aimed at a popular anti-abortion argument that goes something like this: The fetus is an innocent person with a right to life. Abortion results in the death of a fetus. Therefore, abortion is morally wrong.

In her thought experiment we are asked to imagine a famous violinist falling into a coma. The society of music lovers determines from medical records that you and you alone can save the violinist’s life by being hooked up to him for nine months. The music lovers break into your home while you are asleep and hook the unconscious (and unknowing, hence innocent) violinist to you. You may want to unhook him, but you are then faced with this argument put forward by the music lovers: The violinist is an innocent person with a right to life. Unhooking him will result in his death. Therefore, unhooking him is morally wrong.

However, the argument does not seem convincing in this case. You would be very generous to remain attached and in bed for nine months, but you are not morally obliged to do so.

 

[LilyM]

One crucial area in which the argument falls down is that the violinist is not in his or her predicament because of a choice of the person hooked up to him or her.

Unlike a babe in the womb, who (absent cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or other highly extraordinary circumstances) IS in the womb precisely because of the choice of its mother (the person ‘hooked up to’ that babe) to have sex. No-one (again absent rape or those other circumstances) ‘broke into’ that mother’s house or otherwise forced her to create that baby in the case of a pregnancy.

Another area in which the argument falls down is that there are many other options for keeping the violinist alive than hooking him or her up to that person - use of life support machines or the like. If a babe in the womb that was unwanted by its mother could simply be hooked up to a machine or machines to keep it alive, there probably wouldn’t be a moral issue with its mother not wanting to host it in her womb!

Thirdly - hooking up an adult person to another adult person amounts to what Church teaching calls ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ means of preserving life. We are not obligated to use such measures, the Church permits us to refuse them.

A mother rearing a babe in her womb is NOT employing any such ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ measures, but the same ordinary means by which every babe’s life is preserved and nurtured prior to birth. Like giving Terri Schiavo food and water was simply employing ordinary means of preserving her life. Like in her case, it would be a sin to deny those ordinary means of sustaining life to anyone in need of them, including a babe in the womb.

 

[kamaan]

One crucial area in which the argument falls down is that the violinist is not in his or her predicament because of a choice of the person hooked up to him or her.

Unlike a babe in the womb, who (absent cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or other highly extraordinary circumstances) IS in the womb precisely because of the choice of its mother (the person ‘hooked up to’ that babe) to have sex. No-one (again absent rape or those other circumstances) ‘broke into’ that mother’s house or otherwise forced her to create that baby in the case of a pregnancy.

Another area in which the argument falls down is that there are many other options for keeping the violinist alive than hooking him or her up to that person - use of life support machines or the like. If a babe in the womb that was unwanted by its mother could simply be hooked up to a machine or machines to keep it alive, there probably wouldn’t be a moral issue with its mother not wanting to host it in her womb!

Thirdly - hooking up an adult person to another adult person amounts to what Church teaching calls ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ means of preserving life. We are not obligated to use such measures, the Church permits us to refuse them.

A mother rearing a babe in her womb is NOT employing any such ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ measures, but the same ordinary means by which every babe’s life is preserved and nurtured prior to birth. Like giving Terri Schiavo food and water was simply employing ordinary means of preserving her life. Like in her case, it would be a sin to deny those ordinary means of sustaining life to anyone in need of them, including a babe in the womb.

When we examined this scenario in class, it was presented as a metaphor specifically for pregnancies caused by rape. The point that this example was supposed to prove (according to our teacher) was that abortion should be allowed in cases of rape. In the scenario, unplugging the violinist from yourself would kill him, meaning that the possibility of using life support machines is irrelevant.

When you add these points to the picture, it becomes harder to argue. Ultimately, however, I don’t think that comparing this scenario to abortion makes much sense at all. Abortion is a reality; rogue violinist do not generally kidnap people to attach to their circulatory systems :dts:

(*edited so as not to derail the thread with additional scenarios by same author)

 

[LilyM]

When we examined this scenario in class, it was presented as a metaphor specifically for pregnancies caused by rape. The point that this example was supposed to prove (according to our teacher) was that abortion should be allowed in cases of rape. In the scenario, unplugging the violinist from yourself would kill him, meaning that the possibility of using life support machines is irrelevant.

When you add these points to the picture, it becomes harder to argue. Ultimately, however, I don’t think that comparing this scenario to abortion makes much sense at all. Abortion is a reality; rogue violinist do not generally kidnap people to attach to their circulatory systems :dts:

(*edited so as not to derail the thread with additional scenarios by same author)

I thought it might be the case, which is why I noted that my first objection wouldn’t hold in cases of rape.

Of course none of the above prevents my THIRD point from being valid - the cases of violinist and babe in womb can be distinguished because in the first case extraordinary means are being used to preserve life whereas in the latter it is the ordinary means.

 

[kamaan]

I thought it might be the case, which is why I noted that my first objection wouldn’t hold in cases of rape.

Of course none of the above prevents my THIRD point from being valid - the cases of violinist and babe in womb can be distinguished because in the first case extraordinary means are being used to preserve life whereas in the latter it is the ordinary means.

Yes, that is a good point and very true.

 

[Chris258]

One crucial area in which the argument falls down is that the violinist is not in his or her predicament because of a choice of the person hooked up to him or her.

Unlike a babe in the womb, who (absent cases of pregnancy resulting from rape or other highly extraordinary circumstances) IS in the womb precisely because of the choice of its mother (the person ‘hooked up to’ that babe) to have sex. No-one (again absent rape or those other circumstances) ‘broke into’ that mother’s house or otherwise forced her to create that baby in the case of a pregnancy.

As you have said, your objection here would not apply to cases of rape. Judith Thompson herself admitted that the main thrust of the argument was not directed at cases of abortion as a form of birth control and the like. The argument’s proper purpose is only to challenge the notion that abortion is always and everywhere morally impermissible, not attempt to prove that abortion is always morally permissible. Thus it is especially directed to those, such as us Catholics, who indeed hold that abortion is morally impermissible always and everywhere.

I do not know of many groups, even among Christians, who hold such a strong stance; in fact, Catholics are the only ones I know of. Most Protestants (and all Protestants I have personally known), I believe, generally hold that it is permissible to abort the embryo in cases of rape. Some of our friends here might be able to inform me of Protestant groups who take the same stance as Catholics.

Another area in which the argument falls down is that there are many other options for keeping the violinist alive than hooking him or her up to that person - use of life support machines or the like. If a babe in the womb that was unwanted by its mother could simply be hooked up to a machine or machines to keep it alive, there probably wouldn’t be a moral issue with its mother not wanting to host it in her womb!

This objection moves beyond the confines of the thought experiment. It states explicitly that – according to the judgment of the society of musicians anyway, which I suppose we are to take for granted – that this procedure is the sole known method of preserving the violinist’s life.

Thirdly - hooking up an adult person to another adult person amounts to what Church teaching calls ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ means of preserving life. We are not obligated to use such measures, the Church permits us to refuse them.

A mother rearing a babe in her womb is NOT employing any such ‘heroic’ or ‘extraordinary’ measures, but the same ordinary means by which every babe’s life is preserved and nurtured prior to birth. Like giving Terri Schiavo food and water was simply employing ordinary means of preserving her life. Like in her case, it would be a sin to deny those ordinary means of sustaining life to anyone in need of them, including a babe in the womb.

Here I think you bring up a valid objection. As the argument seeks to prove its point by way of analogy, it loses validity the more it is demonstrated that the two situations are not substantially analogous, as you have done here. However, I am unsure how one would drive this “ordinary vs. extraordinary means” point home to ultimately dismantle the argument. I am assuming you think it is morally permissible to unplug the violinist.

I have had curious reactions to this thought experiment from my friends. One of them even said quite strongly that he thought it would simply be morally impermissible for you to unplug the violinist. And I have to admit that I am attracted to his position. Is the Principle of Double Effect applicable here? If it is, I think it concludes squarely that you cannot unplug the violinist.

1. Your good end in choosing to unplug the violinist is your release from the – indeed, unjust – inconvenience and possible injury (physical, financial, etc) of being physically tied to this person for nine months. I think it’s quite safe to assume you are not under immediate danger of death while connected to the violinist, as your death would result in his, and the musicians would not have chosen you. And if we’re comparing this situation to pregnancy, there’s no reason to assume that you would be completely immobile, as mothers certainly retain a variable degree of mobility while pregnant.
2. The act of disconnecting yourself is itself the means to this end. You are not using an evil means to your good end. However, it is a certainty that an evil effect (the death of the violinist) will result from your means, which brings us to the most important point…
3. As per the Principle of Double Effect, an action like this can only be morally undertaken if the good end outweighs the evil effect. And I am very uncomfortable saying that the good of your release from nine months of unjust inconvenience and possible non-lethal injury outweighs the evil of his certain death. Therefore I would have to conclude that unplugging him is morally impermissible.

All this is, of course, assuming that the Principle of Double Effect is applicable here. I do not at this time see any reason why it is not, but I am open to correction by anyone more familiar with the Principle. What are peoples’ thoughts on this last part here concerning the Principle of Double Effect?

 

[DOShea]

When we examined this scenario in class, it was presented as a metaphor specifically for pregnancies caused by rape.

Yes, but you have ask how well does it truly represent a case of pregnancy by rape, AND if it seems to do that, then what conclusions result, are they valid, and can they then be used as a follow-on premise. To do otherwise is putting logic into many boxes and (falsely) concluding that if the logic within each box works, the whole stack will work. That isn’t necessarily so.

If you look at in syllogisms, you get something like:

P. The pregnancy was the result of rape
P. Rape removes any choice I had in the matter (or stated another way, since I didn’t participate willingly in the sexual act, I should not have to bear the responsibility for the results even if the death of another is the result)
C. Therefore I should have the choice to kill the baby.

What happens when you try to use that as a premise?

P. Killing innocent persons is morally wrong
P. Unless the person’s origin was the result of rape
C. Right to life depend on the circumstances of your conception, or, the value of human life is circumstantial, not universal.

If the second conclusion is true, then at what point does a baby conceived by rape acquire protection against murder that is not arbitrarily decided? Birth? Last trimester? What is the causal action or circumstance that makes the baby go from no right to live to a right to live?

Arbitrary decisions are not the basis for morality by definition. The scenario posed is appealing to emotion and is totally unrealistic, imaginary. Has there ever been ONE case of a forced hook up for violinist life? Does it make sense to use an unreal example like that to form the basis of a moral decision that impacts real scenarios? Why not use other real examples that might paint a different picture?

What is the basis for Good Samaritan laws if a person not doing anything but strolling by has no moral obligation, as would be the case for the victim of the rape? If one is in a restaurant and suddenly the fellow at the next table begins choking on his food, can we simply say “Hey, I didn’t cause that, I didn’t willingly participate in the eating, so why am I obligated to help fix it?” Or take the case of a newborn, and the mother doesn’t think she can care for the baby so she leaves it on a doorstep, rings the bell, then takes off. Can a person be considered within moral bounds if they open the door and say, “Oh no, I didn’t participate willingly in the sex act, so I’m simply going to eliminate this human life now because I don’t want the burden?” They can’t, obviously, but the answer to “why not?” is the same as the answer to why not kill a baby conceived as a result of rape.

 

[LilyM]

Yes, but you have ask how well does it truly represent a case of pregnancy by rape, AND if it seems to do that, then what conclusions result, are they valid, and can they then be used as a follow-on premise. To do otherwise is putting logic into many boxes and (falsely) concluding that if the logic within each box works, the whole stack will work. That isn’t necessarily so.

If you look at in syllogisms, you get something like:

P. The pregnancy was the result of rape
P. Rape removes any choice I had in the matter (or stated another way, since I didn’t participate willingly in the sexual act, I should not have to bear the responsibility for the results even if the death of another is the result)
C. Therefore I should have the choice to kill the baby.

What happens when you try to use that as a premise?

P. Killing innocent persons is morally wrong
P. Unless the person’s origin was the result of rape
C. Right to life depend on the circumstances of your conception, or, the value of human life is circumstantial, not universal.

If the second conclusion is true, then at what point does a baby conceived by rape acquire protection against murder that is not arbitrarily decided? Birth? Last trimester? What is the causal action or circumstance that makes the baby go from no right to live to a right to live?

Arbitrary decisions are not the basis for morality by definition. The scenario posed is appealing to emotion and is totally unrealistic, imaginary. Has there ever been ONE case of a forced hook up for violinist life? Does it make sense to use an unreal example like that to form the basis of a moral decision that impacts real scenarios? Why not use other real examples that might paint a different picture?

What is the basis for Good Samaritan laws if a person not doing anything but strolling by has no moral obligation, as would be the case for the victim of the rape? If one is in a restaurant and suddenly the fellow at the next table begins choking on his food, can we simply say “Hey, I didn’t cause that, I didn’t willingly participate in the eating, so why am I obligated to help fix it?” Or take the case of a newborn, and the mother doesn’t think she can care for the baby so she leaves it on a doorstep, rings the bell, then takes off. Can a person be considered within moral bounds if they open the door and say, “Oh no, I didn’t participate willingly in the sex act, so I’m simply going to eliminate this human life now because I don’t want the burden?” They can’t, obviously, but the answer to “why not?” is the same as the answer to why not kill a baby conceived as a result of rape.

True, it does seem that if one can kill a babe in the womb because they were the result of rape, then potentially, using the same logic, one could kill the same babe at any point AFTER birth if their existence became too burdensome to the mother.

The person then has to differentiate the cases (the most common differentiation being that a baby after birth is more independent of the mother). Not only that, but they have to explain WHY the difference is significant - for example what exactly it is about the level of independence a child has after birth that logically leads to the conclusion that it has a greater right to life.

 

[JohnDamian]

Further speculation is immaterial - no moral person would willingly and specifically cause another one to die for a mere nine months inconvenience.

 

[Chris258]

Further speculation is immaterial - no moral person would willingly and specifically cause another one to die for a mere nine months inconvenience.

We seem to be thinking along the same lines, sir.

I am still quite interested in hearing a Catholic rebuttal to the argument I put forth based on the Principle of Double Effect (see post above), if there is one.

If there isn’t one, then our simple answer to this argument is that we disagree with one of its fundamental assertions: that it would, in fact, be morally permissible to unplug the violinist. If this assertion is false, all discussion of its degree of analogy to any forms of pregnancy are moot for the purposes of discussing the ethics of abortion.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

We seem to be thinking along the same lines, sir.

I am still quite interested in hearing a Catholic rebuttal to the argument I put forth based on the Principle of Double Effect (see post above), if there is one.

If there isn’t one, then our simple answer to this argument is that we disagree with one of its fundamental assertions: that it would, in fact, be morally permissible to unplug the violinist. If this assertion is false, all discussion of its degree of analogy to any forms of pregnancy are moot for the purposes of discussing the ethics of abortion.

The ends do not justify the means for Catholics, so unplugging the violinist would indeed be forbidden, even if a greater “end” could be met.

 

[JimG]

I have difficulty getting worked up about this argument. If there were 1.2 million violinists per year being deliberately killed for the convenience of others, it might be more persuasive.

 

[traillius]

straw man. Comotose patients aren’t kept alive by biological connections to other humans.
Violinists aren’t being killed by the millions every year. And pro-lifers aren’t in favor of babies being kept alive simply because of the benefit the pro-lifers wouldn’t receive if the babies died. We want the babies alive for the sake of the baby, and not because we want to hear the music, which is the premise of the hypothetical. It appears that, in addition to being arrogant enough to assume they understand medicine, and bold enough to break laws, the music lover’s association is selfish enough to consider that they only want to keep the violinist alive because it benefits them. At least based on the available text of the argument, that is the obvious reason. If the violinist lost his string hand, I doubt they would do the same thing.To review, here are some ways that where the comparison fails
Legitimate pro-lifers won’t break the law, or cause unwanted pregnancies.
Pro-lifers won’t trade one life for another, or force someone else to do so, especially not the most innocent lives
If generosity mandates, that would be a moral imperative.
The example only applies to very specific cases, rape and incest. And since the ‘music lovers’ illegally caused the ‘attachment’ its unlikely they themselves would be the very same ones to protest the disconnection on moral grounds. But even if that’s the case, the music lovers are themselves responsible for the connection. So their motivation is questionable at best, and their protests self-serving. Neither the violinist, the connectee, nor any third party, are responsible. They have no vested interest, or bias, in the specific situation, other than wanting what is best for both the violinist and the host, pro bono. ( no benefit to themselves, but for the common good )
And finally, removing the violinist isn’t an invasive quasi-medical procedure done unsafely, and illegally, despite euphemisms and misunderstanding of government, at least in the US. Its unlikely removal of the violinist would cause risk of the host being unable to be connected to other violinists in the future, let alone risk of the host dying along with the violinist.
If a rapist or incest perp said that the mother should keep the baby, this would be a sound analogy, although it would make the protesting party extremely hypocritical. Since this isn’t the case, in the way the argument presents it to sound, the argument fails, on a false premise. Pro-lifers aren’t the fathers of unwanted babies, in almost all cases. Mainly because pro-life people wouldn’t choose to act in a way that would cause or result in the dilemma described.

In short
EPIC FAIL ( SEE ABOVE)

 

[traillius]

Aside logical fallacy, inconsistency, and invalid comparison, the argument fails because it
a) wants a non-moral solution to what it acknowledges is a moral issue
and
b) it defines morality as that which ‘feels’ or ‘seems’ right, as in appropriate and convenient for oneself. That is a flawed definition of morality. At least it is for those whose moral compass ( i.e. catholics and non-catholic pro-lifers ) point outwards from oneself to an unchanging standard rather than inwards towards one’s own fluid needs and desires.

 

[Just_Lurking]

The above violinist analogy is aimed at mainstream pro-lifers.

For Catholic moral theology, the analogy for a women who cannot support a pregnancy getting raped would be if the violinist’s life-support machine had a malfunction that would slowly poison the person’s body until both the person and the violinist would die, yet it is still not permissible to detach the machine.

 

[Prophesy]

This is another hypothetical situation that I posting in the argument with the person who employed the violinist situation (the refutation of the violinist question isn’t based on answering a particular question, but based on the nature of hypothetical situations.

There is an out of control trolley and it’s travelling rapidly down it’s track. You notice that the trolley is about to come upon a track-switch. The track already in place will lead the trolley to a group of 5 non-critically injured people who will not be able to escape its path. However, on the other side of the track-switch is a single non-critically injured person who will also not be able to escape its path. Immediately in front of you is the lever to switch the rails. So the question is:

a). Do you do nothing and permit the 5 people to die?

b). Do you pull the switch and cause the 1 person to die?

-Prophecy

 

[traillius]

reminds me of a video I saw, the train operator had to pull the lever to save a train carrying dozens of passengers, however his son would be crushed to death if he did so. He pulled the lever. Later on, he saw one of the passengers, a young lady who had seem him crying as the train passed. The lady was carrying a baby, She had been pregnant during the train incident. Then the man was joyous, that he had saved all those lives, and the good brought from his sacrifice of his son helped to ease the pain.

I suppose in the scenario you presented, It would depend on the demographics. All human life is valid, and its better for fewer to die than more to die, if any must die at at all. If the five on the one side were all criminals, for instance, while the one on the other side was a small child, I might be more willing to choose to have the five killed. Making no decision would still be making a decision. I can’t make an informed or willing decision in the case put forth, so I am not completely culpable. But in this case, knowing nothing about the individuals’ situations, based only on numbers, which is the only criteria I would be able to use, I would choose the one to die, rather than the five, I would then ask for forgiveness, and try to bring some good out of the tragedy.
However this is not valid comparison. Rarely, in the case of pregnancy, is the mother’s life at stake. If, for example, there is an ectopic pregnancy, and the mother’s life is at stake, which does happen, the most moral thing to do would be to remove the entire fallopian tube containing the pregnancy. Doctors would be saving the life of the mother. An unintended consequence would be that the unborn human would be killed. What would be morally wrong would be for the baby to be removed, while the surrounding tissue was left intact. To those who say the mother shouldn’t pay with infertility… Well first, there are two fallopian tubes. Second, any woman, I would think, would gladly give up fertility to save their own life, even if the death on an unborn human was the indirect, but not purposeful, secondary effect. I am not a woman, but this isn’t a gender based issue. Its a moral one. I have never been, for instance, a black person either , but that doesn’t mean I can’t say its wrong for a black to kill an hispanic person just because he doesn’t want to be inconvenienced by him, for any specific length of time. One human’s right to Live ALWAYS trumps another’s right to a lesser benefit than life itself.
If partial or full infertility resulted, then adoption is an option. If the mother had previous children, I expect she would be happy enough to be there for them, that infertility would be a small price to pay. I am not sure what medical procedures to treat infertility are allowed by catholic teaching. Should anyone be indignant, I know about that of which I speak. My wife is 100% infertile, without third party medical involvement. We have adopted a child. Due to extensive medical, physical, psychological, and financial complications, its highly unlikely we will be adopting any other children. And we cannot afford, nor would she be allowed to try, for health reasons, third party pregnancy remedies. Surrogacy is not even an option, due to the nature of her infertility. I know this is personal, I just wanted to show that I don’t speak out of ignorance.

 

[Just_Lurking]

True, it does seem that if one can kill a babe in the womb because they were the result of rape, then potentially, using the same logic, one could kill the same babe at any point AFTER birth if their existence became too burdensome to the mother.

The person then has to differentiate the cases (the most common differentiation being that a baby after birth is more independent of the mother). Not only that, but they have to explain WHY the difference is significant - for example what exactly it is about the level of independence a child has after birth that logically leads to the conclusion that it has a greater right to life.

This point is addressed in the original essay (see here):
Second, while I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to survive outside the mother’s body; hence removing it from her body guarantees its death. But they are importantly different. I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist, but to say this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn round and slit his throat. You may detach yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill him. There are some people who will feel dissatisfied by this feature of my argument. A woman may be utterly devastated by the thought of a child, a bit of herself, put out for adoption and never seen or heard of again. She may therefore want not merely that the child be detached from her, but more, that it die. Some opponents of abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt–thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of despair. All the same, I agree that the desire for the child’s death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

This point is addressed in the original essay (see here):
Second, while I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of the unborn child. It is easy to confuse these two things in that up to a certain point in the life of the fetus it is not able to survive outside the mother’s body; hence removing it from her body guarantees its death. But they are importantly different. I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist, but to say this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn round and slit his throat. You may detach yourself even if this costs him his life; you have no right to be guaranteed his death, by some other means, if unplugging yourself does not kill him. There are some people who will feel dissatisfied by this feature of my argument. A woman may be utterly devastated by the thought of a child, a bit of herself, put out for adoption and never seen or heard of again. She may therefore want not merely that the child be detached from her, but more, that it die. Some opponents of abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt–thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of despair. All the same, I agree that the desire for the child’s death is not one which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the child alive.

It seems here like that what this person is trying to say is that pregnancy is different enough from raising a child AFTER pregnancy to be ale to justify abortion in cases of rape.

I disagree. Suppose the child is born prematurely. It is completely dependent upon the Doctors running special machines to keep the child alive. The Doctors must work day and night.

The parents of this child have decided they do not want the child. They have put the child in the care of the Hospital.

Even though the child is being taken care of beyond what most would consider ordinary means, is it morally permissible for the Doctor (say the head Doctor) to stop care of the child because of the incredible burden put on the child and the hospital?

An argument that justifies abortion also justifies infanticide.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

This is another hypothetical situation that I posting in the argument with the person who employed the violinist situation (the refutation of the violinist question isn’t based on answering a particular question, but based on the nature of hypothetical situations.

There is an out of control trolley and it’s travelling rapidly down it’s track. You notice that the trolley is about to come upon a track-switch. The track already in place will lead the trolley to a group of 5 non-critically injured people who will not be able to escape its path. However, on the other side of the track-switch is a single non-critically injured person who will also not be able to escape its path. Immediately in front of you is the lever to switch the rails. So the question is:

a). Do you do nothing and permit the 5 people to die?

b). Do you pull the switch and cause the 1 person to die?

-Prophecy

Pull the switch. I am not actively killing one person, I am saving five people, which has the unfortunate effect of causing one person to die. Still, this is an unintended but unfortunately impossible to prevent circumstance if I want to save the five people.