I’m going to quote something that I had posted in another topic here.
According to Royo Marín, there are two fundamental principles when it comes to lust.
- First principle: “La lujuria o delectación venérea, tanto la consumada o perfecta como la no consumada o imperfecta, DIRECTAMENTE BUSCADA fuera del legítimo matrimonio, es siempre pecado grave y no admite parvedad de materia.”
That is, lust or venereal delectation, whether it is consummated (perfect) or unconsummated (imperfect), DIRECTLY WILLED outside legitimate matrimony, is always a mortal sin and there isn’t parvity of matter.
I think it explains itself.
- Second principle: “La lujuria perfecta o imperfecta, involuntaria en si misma, pero INDIRECTAMENTE PERMITIDA al realizar una acción de suyo buena o indiferente, puede ser pecado grave, leve o ningún pecado, según las razones que se tuvieron para realizar aquella acción y el comportamiento observado al producirse el placer venéreo no buscado.”
That is, perfect or imperfect lust, involuntary in itself, but INDIRECTLY ALLOWED while doing an action that’s good in itself or indiferent, can be a mortal sin, a venial sin or no sin at all, according to the reasons one has had in order to do that action and his behavior while the venereal pleasure (not willed) was being produced.
Further explanations of the second principle:
1 - There are actions which are able per se to excite venereal pleasure, such as seeing something that’s frankly obscene or touching someone in an obscene way.
1.1 - Among them, there are actions which influence the disordered effects in a proximate and notable way and it is certain or at least almost certain those effects will be produced. Examples: looking at someone’s dishonest parts or reading something that’s too obscene.
1.2 - Moreover, there are actions which influence the disordered effects in a remote and slight way. Examples: looking at or talking to someone beautiful.
2 - There are actions which don’t have anything to do with venereal pleasure, but could indirectly (per accidens) lead someone to it, such as eating too much or taking a hot shower.
3 – There are actions which excite some people (e.g. young people) in a proximate and notable way but, on the other hand, excite other people (v.g. very old people) in a remote and slight way or even don’t excite them at all.
4 – While doing an action that’s good in itself or at least indiferent, but produces or may produce disordered effects, there may have been gravely proportionate reasons, insuficient reasons or no reason at all to do so.
Taking all of that into account, we come to the following conclusions (second principle):
5 – It is a grave sin to do, without gravely proportionate reasons, an action which excites venereal pleasure in a proximate and notable way, whether it is because of the action itself or someone’s special psychology, even if it isn’t followed by that pleasure. One cannot expose himself to a proximate danger of sin if there isn’t a gravely proportionate reason. For instance, it is licit for a doctor to recognize the patient if it’s necessary, as long as he rejects any deliberate consent to the pleasure that may be produced. Someone who is totally sure because of a large experience some action which is good in itself or at least indiferent will not excite him at all wouldn’t sin, even if that same action is gravely provocative to others. But of course this subjective coldness cannot be invoked to legitimate an action that’s bad in itself, such as watching an immoral show, because the person would sin at least because of the scandal and the cooperation with evil.
6 – It is a venial sin to do, without fair reasons, an action which could excite venereal pleasure only per accidens or in a remote and slight way, as long as this pleasure isn’t directly or indirectly willed. Examples: some excess when it comes to eating and drinking, as well as looking at or talking to someone beautiful. That’s because, even though these actions influence the venereal pleasure only per accidens or in a remote and slight way, and, of course, assuming this pleasure isn’t directly or indirectly willed, doing them without any reason involves some disorder, at least of imprudence and temerity. However, as this disorder doesn’t directly affect lust, it only constitutes a venial sin, as long as, of course, the person doesn’t consent in a disordered pleasure that may be unexpectedly produced.
7 – It is not a sin at all to do, with fair reasons (e.g. necessity, education, utility or convenience), the actions treated in the previous item (6 – per accidens or in a remote and slight way). Moreover, it is not a sin at all to do, with gravely proportionate reasons, the actions treated in the antepenultimate item (5 – in a proximate and notable way), as long as the person takes every kind of precaution and rejects any kind of pleasure that may be produced. However, if the action were so exciting and the person’s own weakness were so great that he was morally sure the pleasure would be produced and there wouldn’t be enough strength to reject the consent, it would be illicit to do it, even if the person had to quit his own job in order not to be exposed to it anymore, because it isn’t licit to anyone to expose himself to a certain or practicaly inevitable danger of sin.
