We are cognitively closed to free will and act creation

[Bahman]

In the following, there are two separated argument provided which claim that we are connectivity closed to free will and act creation.

We are cognitively closed to free will:

1a) Creator should be cognitively open to free will
2a) The relation between creator and being should be based on freedom
3a) From (1a), we know that free will should be definable in term of set of prepositions
4a) Consider the number of prepositions/laws to be N
5a) We cannot be free if N is finite
6a) From (2a) and (5a), we can conclude that the number of prepositions/laws should be infinite
7a) From (6a), we are cognitively closed to free will

That is the only way that we could make a reasonable argument which grant freedom to us and allows that creator to be cognitively open to creation at the same time. N has to be infinite with the price that we can never understand what free will is.

8a) From (7a), we cannot be cognitively be open to decisions we perform
9a) In another hand, number of entities (such as love, logical thinking etc) required for performing a conscious decision is finite
10a) We are cognitively close to consciousness and entities

This means that we are cognitively closed to the entities like, pleasure, pain, love, hate, good, evil, etc.

---

We are cognitively closed to act creation

1b) The act creation can be defined in term of a set of prepositions/laws, lets call the number M
2b) M should be finite otherwise the act creation leads to determinism
3b) From (6a) and (2b), we conclude that we cannot find the set of prepositions which define the act creation

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the following, there are two separated argument provided which claim that we are connectivity closed to free will and act creation.

We are cognitively closed to free will:

1a) Creator should be cognitively open to free will
2a) The relation between creator and being should be based on freedom
3a) From (1a), we know that free will should be definable in term of set of prepositions
4a) Consider the number of prepositions/laws to be N
5a) We cannot be free if N is finite
6a) From (2a) and (5a), we can conclude that the number of prepositions/laws should be infinite
7a) From (6a), we are cognitively closed to free will

That is the only way that we could make a reasonable argument which grant freedom to us and allows that creator to be cognitively open to creation at the same time. N has to be infinite with the price that we can never understand what free will is.

8a) From (7a), we cannot be cognitively be open to decisions we perform
9a) In another hand, number of entities (such as love, logical thinking etc) required for performing a conscious decision is finite
10a) We are cognitively close to consciousness and entities

This means that we are cognitively closed to the entities like, pleasure, pain, love, hate, good, evil, etc.

---

We are cognitively closed to act creation

1b) The act creation can be defined in term of a set of prepositions/laws, lets call the number M
2b) M should be finite otherwise the act creation leads to determinism
3b) From (6a) and (2b), we conclude that we cannot find the set of prepositions which define the act creation

Really, Bahman. Can’t you give it a rest on Christmas.

Once again, you can’t put God in a box anymore than you can put faith and reason in a box. If you are putting yourself through all these tortures all the time, what are you getting out of life?

Linus2nd

 

[DaveBj]

We are cognitively closed to act creation

This sentence is confusing. Do you mean that we are cognitively closed to acting like a creation, or do you mean that we are cognitively closed to creating acts? In other words, is “to” a preposition with “act” as its object, or is it an infinitive marker for the verb “act?”

In fact your whole post was confusing. You might want to ditch the philosophical jargon (to which most of us here are “cognitively closed”) and try to make your point in plain English. If you can.

 

[MPat]

This sentence is confusing. Do you mean that we are cognitively closed to acting like a creation, or do you mean that we are cognitively closed to creating acts? In other words, is “to” a preposition with “act” as its object, or is it an infinitive marker for the verb “act?”

In fact your whole post was confusing. You might want to ditch the philosophical jargon (to which most of us here are “cognitively closed”) and try to make your point in plain English. If you can.

Yes, that really was confusing. In other threads only some steps of the arguments tended to be unclearly stated (using undefined terms) or unclearly supported… But in this case almost every single step can be answered by “What exactly does it mean?” or “Where do you get that from?” (often both)…

At the moment there is about the only clear thing about that argument: that it is not likely to be sound…

 

[Bahman]

Really, Bahman. Can’t you give it a rest on Christmas.

Really, Linus2nd, that was my Christmas gift for you.

Once again, you can’t put God in a box anymore than you can put faith and reason in a box. If you are putting yourself through all these tortures all the time, what are you getting out of life?

Linus2nd

Apparently that is what theologians have been doing all their lives. Unless you claim that what they did is vain!?

 

[Bahman]

This sentence is confusing. Do you mean that we are cognitively closed to acting like a creation, or do you mean that we are cognitively closed to creating acts? In other words, is “to” a preposition with “act” as its object, or is it an infinitive marker for the verb “act?”

In fact your whole post was confusing. You might want to ditch the philosophical jargon (to which most of us here are “cognitively closed”) and try to make your point in plain English. If you can.

By cognitively close, I meant we cannot understand no matter how much effort we put on subject matter. That is necessary condition for understanding but not sufficient. When we say we are cognitively open to algebra, it means that we in principle could understand algebra subjected to put effort on understand it. When we say we are cognitively close to act creation, it means that we cannot understand the act as a fish cannot understand algebra.

 

[DaveBj]

By cognitively close, I meant we cannot understand no matter how much effort we put on subject matter. That is necessary condition for understanding but not sufficient. When we say we are cognitively open to algebra, it means that we in principle could understand algebra subjected to put effort on understand it. When we say we are cognitively close to act creation, it means that we cannot understand the act as a fish cannot understand algebra.

“Cognitively close” or “cognitively closed?”

Please don’t misunderstand me; I am not trying to put you down, but just out of curiosity, is English a second language for you?

 

[Bahman]

“Cognitively close” or “cognitively closed?”

Please don’t misunderstand me; I am not trying to put you down, but just out of curiosity, is English a second language for you?

Cognitively closed. Thanks for the correction and yes, English is my second language for me.

 

[DaveBj]

Cognitively closed. Thanks for the correction and yes, English is my second language for me.

Okay, that explains a lot.

When you’re dealing with a subject as complicated as this one, it might be a good idea to have a native English speaker check your posts before you post them

 

[D_Martin]

Seems over complicated.

You have received the life that Adam and Eve had in the flesh, not of your own will, but the will of others to give you the life they have. You have sot to keep that life you have received, or let it be by consuming what is necessary to sustain your flesh. One receives the Life that is of Christ Jesus not of one’s will because it is of the Lord God’s will that you may receive it, and it has to be revealed, in order for one to receive it, and one must let it, as in Light shines into darkness because of the source of the Light is revealed, like a lit lamp is revealed, hence the light.

If one closes the door on that Light not letting it shine in, then one has done nothing but retained his place in the darkness.

Free will? Over rated! A philosopher’s dream boat that takes him no where but where he is already, darkness that results in the death he has already received without his choices, but by the choice of those who gave him the life that results in death.

 

[Bahman]

Seems over complicated.

You have received the life that Adam and Eve had in the flesh, not of your own will, but the will of others to give you the life they have. You have sot to keep that life you have received, or let it be by consuming what is necessary to sustain your flesh. One receives the Life that is of Christ Jesus not of one’s will because it is of the Lord God’s will that you may receive it, and it has to be revealed, in order for one to receive it, and one must let it, as in Light shines into darkness because of the source of the Light is revealed, like a lit lamp is revealed, hence the light.

If one closes the door on that Light not letting it shine in, then one has done nothing but retained his place in the darkness.

Free will? Over rated! A philosopher’s dream boat that takes him no where but where he is already, darkness that results in the death he has already received without his choices, but by the choice of those who gave him the life that results in death.

It is not that complicated. Consider a system that work based on a set of laws with number N. This system cannot be free since the number of laws are finite and it defines the action of system in each circumstances. To have system free one must assume that N is infinite. The rest of argument follows as if N is infinite then we cannot define the system hence we are cognitively close to the system.

 

[DaveBj]

It is not that complicated. Consider a system that work based on a set of laws with number N. This system cannot be free since the number of laws are finite and it defines the action of system in each circumstances. To have system free one must assume that N is infinite. The rest of argument follows as if N is infinite then we cannot define the system hence we are cognitively close to the system.

Closed, Bahman, closed! To be “cognitive close to the system” means to be cognitively near to it.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

One thing is sure, some minds are closed to certain ways of thinking.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

1a) Creator should be cognitively open to free will

As in the other topic, I would like to see a definition of the term “cognitively open.” Does this mean that the Creator should be free? That the Creator should be capable of creating free beings?

2a) The relation between creator and being should be based on freedom

This premise seems ambiguous to me. By “being” do you mean being in general, as the most fundamental aspect of our experience (ie. as that with which the transcendentals are convertible)–or do you mean created being, that which the creator has made?

To recapitulate my question for 1a), by this premise do you mean that the act of creation should be free, that the creator should be free, or that (some) created entities should be free? (Or something else?)

3a) From (1a), we know that free will should be definable in term of set of prepositions

I don’t see how 1a) entails this.

I can’t quite tell what you mean here. Tell me if my interpretation is correct: you mean that if a being is free, then its actions should be definable in terms of some set of counterfactuals (which would be a subset of all propositions)?

For example, if I am free, then my freedom is definable in terms of propositions like, “If a hurricane strikes, polytropos will drive with his family inland” and “If he is feeling very tired and it is earlier than 6:00 PM, polytropos will get a cup of coffee”. (I am not endorsing this view, just asking if that is what you are claiming.)

4a) Consider the number of prepositions/laws to be N
5a) We cannot be free if N is finite

Can you clarify the reasoning behind this? I am inclined to think that 5a) is false. If N is finite, then it still seems like my actions can be free. What does having a finite set of circumstance/action pairs have to do to limiting my freedom? It seems that (without some other unstated premises, which I doubt will be true) one could not reach such a conclusion.

I don’t see what would preclude there from being a finite set of counterfactuals consistent with my freedom. (If the antecedents of the counterfactuals contained a complete state of affairs in each case, then my actions would be significantly determined, but that is a separate issue and does not seem to be related to the quantity of counterfactuals.)

6a) From (2a) and (5a), we can conclude that the number of prepositions/laws should be infinite
7a) From (6a), we are cognitively closed to free will

Again, you will need to clarify the meaning of the terms “cognitively open” and “cognitively closed.”

That is the only way that we could make a reasonable argument which grant freedom to us and allows that creator to be cognitively open to creation at the same time. N has to be infinite with the price that we can never understand what free will is.

Why can we not understand what free will is if N is infinite? Because we could not know all of the counterfactuals “governing” our behavior?

8a) From (7a), we cannot be cognitively be open to decisions we perform
9a) In another hand, number of entities (such as love, logical thinking etc) required for performing a conscious decision is finite
10a) We are cognitively close to consciousness and entities

I don’t understand how this follows.

1b) The act creation can be defined in term of a set of prepositions/laws, lets call the number M
2b) M should be finite otherwise the act creation leads to determinism
3b) From (6a) and (2b), we conclude that we cannot find the set of prepositions which define the act creation

What do you mean by 1b)? That God’s act of creation follows from a set of propositions/laws?

If that is true, then I don’t see how it is consistent with 2b). If God’s creation follows from a set of propositions/laws (which are, I am supposing, distinct from God), then it seems like any act of creation is determined–whether the set of propositions/laws is finite or not.

 

[Bahman]

As in the other topic, I would like to see a definition of the term “cognitively open.” Does this mean that the Creator should be free? That the Creator should be capable of creating free beings?

I meant that any act of system/agent in any given situation is definable/understandable by the builder/creator.

This premise seems ambiguous to me. By “being” do you mean being in general, as the most fundamental aspect of our experience (ie. as that with which the transcendentals are convertible)–or do you mean created being, that which the creator has made?

It simply means that the system should be free to act upon itself and do not act based on some prerequisites implemented by creator.

To recapitulate my question for 1a), by this premise do you mean that the act of creation should be free, that the creator should be free, or that (some) created entities should be free? (Or something else?)

I meant that created entities should be free.

I don’t see how 1a) entails this.

This comes from definability of our actions in any given situation. What is understandable is in principle explicable in term of set of prepositions or otherwise it is not understandable or definable.

I can’t quite tell what you mean here. Tell me if my interpretation is correct: you mean that if a being is free, then its actions should be definable in terms of some set of counterfactuals (which would be a subset of all propositions)?

For example, if I am free, then my freedom is definable in terms of propositions like, “If a hurricane strikes, polytropos will drive with his family inland” and “If he is feeling very tired and it is earlier than 6:00 PM, polytropos will get a cup of coffee”. (I am not endorsing this view, just asking if that is what you are claiming.)

You almost get what I meant but not exactly. Consider a simple system which act on a simple law. This means that there is a preposition which can define the action of system on a given circumstance. Preposition is understandable for us since it is based on semantic like a sentence or a formula. Law is what the system functions based upon it. One can say that if there is a system of laws that a system work upon then there exist a set of preposition which define this set of laws. Moreover any system needs a system of laws to function upon it.

Can you clarify the reasoning behind this? I am inclined to think that 5a) is false. If N is finite, then it still seems like my actions can be free. What does having a finite set of circumstance/action pairs have to do to limiting my freedom? It seems that (without some other unstated premises, which I doubt will be true) one could not reach such a conclusion.

No, because the number of prepositions which define the actions of an agent in any given situation is infinite. For each action we can write a preposition which define the action. The number of our actions is infinite hence the number of prepositions needed as well is infinite.

I don’t see what would preclude there from being a finite set of counterfactuals consistent with my freedom. (If the antecedents of the counterfactuals contained a complete state of affairs in each case, then my actions would be significantly determined, but that is a separate issue and does not seem to be related to the quantity of counterfactuals.)

In reality, as it was mentioned, the number of actions an intelligent agent can perform is infinite depending on the situations hence the quantity of counterfactual needed is infinite as well.

I would like to remark the difference between underlying laws/prepositions in another word micro level and what are derived from them in macro level, so called behaviour that can be expressed in term of a preposition like I am drinking tea. Whether the number of underlying preposition is finite is subject of discussion. Please read the last comment.

Again, you will need to clarify the meaning of the terms “cognitively open” and “cognitively closed.”

For what related to us, by “cognitively open” I meant that the action of a system is definable in term of set of finite prepositions. By cognitively close I meant the action of a system is not definable in term of set of finite prepositions. Only God could be cognitively open to a set of infinite prepositions.

Why can we not understand what free will is if N is infinite? Because we could not know all of the counterfactuals “governing” our behavior?

Exactly.

I don’t understand how this follows.

Because we cannot possibly be open to any entity that needs an infinite prepositions for definability purpose. N, the number of preposition which define free will is infinite, and the number of entities which we act upon like love, hate etc is finite hence the number of preposition which are needed to define for example love is infinite.

What do you mean by 1b)? That God’s act of creation follows from a set of propositions/laws?

If that is true, then I don’t see how it is consistent with 2b). If God’s creation follows from a set of propositions/laws (which are, I am supposing, distinct from God), then it seems like any act of creation is determined–whether the set of propositions/laws is finite or not.

This is the tricky part. Consider the case that N is equal to M in this case the system does not have any degree of freedom to act upon which leads to determinism. In another word M must minimally be smaller than N and maximally finite.

 

[polytropos]

I meant that any act of system/agent in any given situation is definable/understandable by the builder/creator.

All right.

It simply means that the system should be free to act upon itself and do not act based on some prerequisites implemented by creator.

This seems like too strong of a criterion. A free system still necessarily depends on its Creator for something, for the Creator sustains it in being at every moment (that is what is signified, in Christian contexts, by “creation”). It also seems to be the case the system need not be free in every case, ie. if a person is forced to perform a single action, he did not perform that action freely, but he is still free (and might perform other free actions). In other words, it is consistent with free will that the system sometimes “act based on some prerequisites implemented by creator.” It would only be inconsistent with free will if the system never could act freely.

This comes from definability of our actions in any given situation. What is understandable is in principle explicable in term of set of prepositions or otherwise it is not understandable or definable.

Clarify for me: an omniscient being knows all counterfactuals, so you are saying that for us to be free, there must exist a set of counterfactuals governing our behavior that God knows? (Otherwise God would not understand our behavior?)

You almost get what I meant but not exactly. Consider a simple system which act on a simple law. This means that there is a preposition which can define the action of system on a given circumstance. Preposition is understandable for us since it is based on semantic like a sentence or a formula. Law is what the system functions based upon it. One can say that if there is a system of laws that a system work upon then there exist a set of preposition which define this set of laws. Moreover any system needs a system of laws to function upon it.

OK… I think I am following. But it does not seem to be the case (necessarily) that a system governed by some laws (like, say, our universe) need be wholly governed by laws (which I am taking to be a tacit assumption of this paragraph, since you are saying that a system of laws is needed).

For example, our system could still be governed by counterfactuals of this form: “If a hurricane strikes, polytropos will either drive his family inland or hide with his family in an underground shelter.” (Such a proposition being consistent with free will.)

Furthermore, some specification about the nature of laws would be necessary. I am inclined to say that the laws of nature are the laws of natures, ie. they are abstractions from the characteristic powers of extant substances, not a set of abstract propositions which themselves “govern” the universe. Such laws are “ceteris paribus” and hold “all else being equal.” I’m not sure exactly how this meshes with your argument, but some explication about the nature of laws seems necessary. (Are they just propositions reporting behavior of the system?)

No, because the number of prepositions which define the actions of an agent in any given situation is infinite. For each action we can write a preposition which define the action. The number of our actions is infinite hence the number of prepositions needed as well is infinite.

Premise 5a) states, “We cannot be free if N is finite.” You are here saying that agents can perform an infinite number of actions, so N is infinite.

Do you mean that free agents can perform an infinite number of actions? Otherwise, I don’t see the relationship of this argument with the initial statement of premise 5a).

But if that is the case, then I don’t see why it must be true that a free agent can perform infinite actions. It seems consistent to suppose that some agent could only have a finite number of actions available to him, and yet still should choose between the finite number of possibilities freely. What rules out such a scenario? (This may have some relevance to your next comment…)

I would like to remark the difference between underlying laws/prepositions in another word micro level and what are derived from them in macro level, so called behaviour that can be expressed in term of a preposition like I am drinking tea. Whether the number of underlying preposition is finite is subject of discussion. Please read the last comment.

I take it to mean that you are saying that the number of propositions describing the “micro” level is infinite, even if the number describing the “macro” level is not? If so, I don’t see why that is the case. The number might be astronomically large, but given a system like our universe, it seems like the number of possibilities is bounded by the quantity of matter.

(Taking a possible worlds approach, one could argue that there are infinite possibilities, since additional entities/quantities of matter in the universe should always be consistent. But that does not seem to vindicate the argument, since in the case of free will, the case must be consistent with our world. I also reject realist/Platonist interpretations of possible worlds.)

 

[polytropos]

Exactly.[In response to “Why can we not understand what free will is if N is infinite? Because we could not know all of the counterfactuals “governing” our behavior?”]

I am not convinced by this reasoning. First of all, I am not convinced that it is necessarily the case that free will can only be described by an infinite set of propositions. But even granting that, I am not convinced that we would need to understand every counterfactual in order to understand free will. Certainly, we can’t be “omniscient” toward other people’s free actions, but I don’t think that is a sensible requirement for our “understanding” free will. I’d say, rather, that there is a phenomenology associated with the making of free decisions, which we are cognizant of even if we cannot delineate every possible free action.

Because we cannot possibly be open to any entity that needs an infinite prepositions for definability purpose. N, the number of preposition which define free will is infinite, and the number of entities which we act upon like love, hate etc is finite hence the number of preposition which are needed to define for example love is infinite.

While we’re debating the earlier parts of the argument, I don’t think I have anything to say regarding 8a-10a.

 

[Bahman]

This seems like too strong of a criterion. A free system still necessarily depends on its Creator for something, for the Creator sustains it in being at every moment (that is what is signified, in Christian contexts, by “creation”). It also seems to be the case the system need not be free in every case, ie. if a person is forced to perform a single action, he did not perform that action freely, but he is still free (and might perform other free actions). In other words, it is consistent with free will that the system sometimes “act based on some prerequisites implemented by creator.” It would only be inconsistent with free will if the system never could act freely.

Whether God sustains creation is subject of discussion but it is beyond the subject of this thread. To me God cannot be simple at the same time sustain all complexity related to creation. It is much easier that created entity that has minimal sustainability to exist alone without any intervention and could evolve depending on the situation.

Clarify for me: an omniscient being knows all counterfactuals, so you are saying that for us to be free, there must exist a set of counterfactuals governing our behavior that God knows? (Otherwise God would not understand our behavior?)

That is partially correct. Being omniscient means that God knows all infinite counterfactuals at the same time understand any situation to the last certainty. Knowing all counterfactual however remove free will since for any given situation there is only one and only one optimal solution. That is our short-coming that we are not aware of all counterfacutals and cannot fully understand a situation hence we are free to act based on what we understand from situation and our knowledge of counterfacuals.

Moreover, God could not implement all counterfactuals in act creation since this requires a full micro-design hence system cannot be free.

OK… I think I am following. But it does not seem to be the case (necessarily) that a system governed by some laws (like, say, our universe) need be wholly governed by laws (which I am taking to be a tacit assumption of this paragraph, since you are saying that a system of laws is needed).

The system of laws that act creation was based upon are finite and we are cognitively close to them. They are the essence of all counterfacutals which guarantee the emergence of other counterfactuals in creation through intelligent interaction of creation by itself as we interact with situations. This set of laws are not the so called laws of physics.

For example, our system could still be governed by counterfactuals of this form: “If a hurricane strikes, polytropos will either drive his family inland or hide with his family in an underground shelter.” (Such a proposition being consistent with free will.)

That is correct and you are free to act upon since you are not fully aware of the situation and do not know all counterfactual otherwise you would do the best solution for this situation which is unique.

Furthermore, some specification about the nature of laws would be necessary. I am inclined to say that the laws of nature are the laws of natures, ie. they are abstractions from the characteristic powers of extant substances, not a set of abstract propositions which themselves “govern” the universe. Such laws are “ceteris paribus” and hold “all else being equal.” I’m not sure exactly how this meshes with your argument, but some explication about the nature of laws seems necessary. (Are they just propositions reporting behavior of the system?)

We cannot know laws of nature which I think they are different from laws of physics. Laws of physics are deterministic and a system with a complex behaviour cannot emerge from it. Those laws which are the essence of all couterfactual are finite and irreducible. I strongly believe that the laws a system is governed by depends on the form of system, in another word the behaviour a system by two entities is not deducible from two separate entities. Please read the previous comment and feel free to discuss it further.

Premise 5a) states, “We cannot be free if N is finite.” You are here saying that agents can perform an infinite number of actions, so N is infinite.

An agent in principle knows a finite set of couterfactuals which can act upon but we are open to know all couterfactuals. The problem is that N cannot be finite since a free system which govern with N laws cannot be free any longer. In another word the set of counterfactuals which exist should be always larger than number of laws for a system otherwise system saturate and for each situation there is only one and only one solution is available hence system is not free any longer.

Do you mean that free agents can perform an infinite number of actions? Otherwise, I don’t see the relationship of this argument with the initial statement of premise 5a).

A agent that knows a finite number of counterfactuals acts based on them and the freedom of action is deduce from this. We lose our freedom if we know all counterfactuals hence with infinite number of action is possible with finite number of known counterfacuals.

 

[Bahman]

But if that is the case, then I don’t see why it must be true that a free agent can perform infinite actions. It seems consistent to suppose that some agent could only have a finite number of actions available to him, and yet still should choose between the finite number of possibilities freely. What rules out such a scenario? (This may have some relevance to your next comment…)

This I think is clear by now, as the number of counterfacual known has opposite relation with the freedom of action. Suppose you are in a situation with number of options lest call them A, and suppose that number of counterfacuals which clearly define the situation and your mental state are B. If A is bigger that B then you have freedom to act upon A-B states. You are not free to act if A is equal to B and A can never be smaller than B.

I take it to mean that you are saying that the number of propositions describing the “micro” level is infinite, even if the number describing the “macro” level is not? If so, I don’t see why that is the case. The number might be astronomically large, but given a system like our universe, it seems like the number of possibilities is bounded by the quantity of matter.
(Taking a possible worlds approach, one could argue that there are infinite possibilities, since additional entities/quantities of matter in the universe should always be consistent. But that does not seem to vindicate the argument, since in the case of free will, the case must be consistent with our world. I also reject realist/Platonist interpretations of possible worlds.)

First, universe could be infinite in size. Second, what is more crucial for a system to behaves intelligently is not size but the number of degree freedom that system could offer which the latter does depends on form of system. So a finite size system with proper form in principle could have infinite degree of freedom.

 

[polytropos]

Whether God sustains creation is subject of discussion but it is beyond the subject of this thread. To me God cannot be simple at the same time sustain all complexity related to creation.

It is central to the Catholic conception of God (and follows from most scholastic demonstrations of God’s existence) that the world constantly depends on God for its existence. (It also follows rather directly from the nature of a purely actual being that God is simple.) If those are not working assumptions of the argument, then we are not talking about the same God. (And God’s sustenance of the world does seem relevant to the argument, since it directly affects one’s account of omniscience, omnipotence, and creation. If creation is construed as an event in the past rather than God’s continual sustenance of the world, then you and I are not discussing the same thing.)

That is partially correct. Being omniscient means that God knows all infinite counterfactuals at the same time understand any situation to the last certainty. Knowing all counterfactual however remove free will since for any given situation there is only one and only one optimal solution. That is our short-coming that we are not aware of all counterfacutals and cannot fully understand a situation hence we are free to act based on what we understand from situation and our knowledge of counterfacuals.

Moreover, God could not implement all counterfactuals in act creation since this requires a full micro-design hence system cannot be free.

What do you mean by “optimal solution”? If you mean that given a set of circumstances, there is a counterfactual with a nondisjunctive consequent (the governing state of affairs being the antecedent) that reports exactly how we would act, then I deny that.

If that were the case, we would not be free. Noting that we don’t know all of the counterfactuals does not rescue free will or make us “free to act based on what we understand.” One would not have to know that one is unfree to be unfree (ontologically).

That is correct and you are free to act upon since you are not fully aware of the situation and do not know all counterfactual otherwise you would do the best solution for this situation which is unique.

But your point here seems to depend on there being, in addition, some other proposition governing which of the two options (driving inland or hiding in a shelter) that I will actually take. But it seems quite consistent to suppose that this is not the case: law-like propositions do not determine which of the two routes I will take.

Introducing the notion of a “best solution” does not seem to change this. If my choice is determined, its freedom does not seem to be vindicated simply because I don’t know which of the two was better. (It also does not seem to be the case that my decision is groundless or random if I choose with incomplete knowledge.) It also does not seem to be the case that if I know which solution is best, I am compelled to choose it.

An agent in principle knows a finite set of couterfactuals which can act upon but we are open to know all couterfactuals. The problem is that N cannot be finite since a free system which govern with N laws cannot be free any longer. In another word the set of counterfactuals which exist should be always larger than number of laws for a system otherwise system saturate and for each situation there is only one and only one solution is available hence system is not free any longer.

I don’t agree with a lot of the assumptions here. Can you specify the form of these counterfactuals? You are saying that unless N is infinite, the system will not be free (N being the number of counterfactuals). I still don’t see why this is the case. Freedom seems to depend on the nature of the counterfactuals rather than the quantity.

To clarify, counterfactuals will be of the form “if p, then q.” Having a finite number of counterfactuals is still consistent with free will as long as some counterfactuals contain disjunctions in the place of q.

Adding counterfactuals does nothing for the issue of freedom. The antecedents (p) are states of affairs. Making the amount of counterfactuals infinite does not change the fact that states of affairs determine actions (q). You could say that in our world, there are a finite number of possible states of affairs, so if there are an infinite number of counterfactuals, there would have to (for some state of affairs p1) exist multiples states of affairs q1, q2 such that “if p1, then q1” and “if p1, then q2” are both true. But that actually leads to inconsistencies, since, then, if p1 is the case then both q1 and q2 must be the case (and freedom is not preserved). So it seems like an infinite set of counterfactuals is irrelevant to freedom.

This point is independent of the question of our knowing the counterfactuals, which I think is irrelevant, for a couple reason. For one, our experience (I think it’s fair to say) reports that making free decisions is not a matter of picking from counterfactuals, but of choosing from a finite number of goods (the decision between which is free). Furthermore, the case seems to confuse epistemology and ontology. If each of my actions is determined but I just don’t know it, then I’m still unfree. This tendency to confuse epistemology and ontology is exhibited below:

A agent that knows a finite number of counterfactuals acts based on them and the freedom of action is deduce from this. We lose our freedom if we know all counterfactuals hence with infinite number of action is possible with finite number of known counterfacuals.

Free will can’t consist in choosing between counterfactuals, since the antecedents of the counterfactuals are states of affairs.