This pre-universe of no-space and no-time that “always existed” means that there is NO potentiality for change, since what you’re describing is an immutable state.
Not necessarily at all. I can imagine the pre-universe always existing in a volatile state, a potential waiting to give birth to the universe according to the laws of the pre-universe. Or I can imagine the pre-universe expanding into a universe and then collapsing back into the pre-universe innumerable times before expanding into this universe (which, from the evidence, appears like it will be the last…no Big Crunch for us).
We really don’t know.
Luke K nicely notes the following:
What exactly is it about the universe that shows us it needed a cause, or that it is contingent?
And he’s spot on here. You can’t establish this, so these cosmological arguments have to fail.
Speaking of Luke:
You can’t logically propose anything “pre-” this universe, because then you are applying our concept of time where it doesn’t make sense to. It’s like trying to talk about something in the space beyond the “edge” of the universe.
Well, strictly speaking, we can only go back as far as planck time (a few seconds after the Big Bang) – I’m calling the stuff we can’t access the “pre-universe.” That “stuff” that expanded at the moment of the Big Bang was already there when it started to expand. I agree it doesn’t fit perfectly into the categories of thought that we use to describe the universe, but that’s about the best I can do.
“We don’t know” just about sums it up, and that statement can’t be used to support a claim.
Incidentally, cosmological arguments aren’t empirical evidence, which is what this thread was supposed to be about. Everyone who’s studied logic knows that you can construct a logically coherent argument that is false – logic needs to begin from true premises, premises that you must demonstrate with evidence. And since we’re talking about a time period that – as you yourself say – we can’t make any certain claims about (and thus cannot base our conjectures on evidence), these cosmological arguments are extremely flimsy at best.
Ok, now back to the argument from ghost stories:
NaturalEnquirer(cute name, btw):
A miraculous explanation would seem to be consistent with the facts.
Sure it is. But there’s a huge difference between evidence that is
consistent with a claim and evidence that is sufficient to support a claim. For example, in the case of Fatima, the evidence is equally consistent with a UFO buzzing the place, after aliens had sent transmissions, under the cloak of the local mythology, so that they could have a laugh at the inhabitants of this weird planet.
To switch contexts for a second, the fact that I have been losing my socks is
consistent with the claim that sock gremlins are stealing them, but it’s not
sufficient to demonstrate that.
The evidence at Fatima is consistent with your supernatural claims – just as it is consistent with a number of other supernatural or natural claims – but not sufficient to demonstrate it. And this thread – need I remind you – is about evidence that is sufficient to accept the claim.
Once the supernatural is on the table, the particular supernatural perpetrator is impossible to pin down. But in and of itself, that complication doesn’t disallow the supernatural.
Sure, but that’s not why I invoked that point. I invoked it to show you that even if you could demonstrate that this was a supernatural event, it could not be used as sufficient evidence for your god.
Given two competing natural theories, we have plenty of experience we can draw from to assign probabilities, and say “theory x is 75% like; theory y is 25% likely; probably theory x is true”. I don’t see how you can make such a comparison when one of the candidate explanations is a unique supernatural event.
Well, in any circumstance where are our choices are between something that we know exists and something that we have no evidence for, the odds are always in favor of the thing that we know exists.
If the choice is between simple human error, eyewitness mistakes, and crowd psychology – which are all things that we have good evidence for their existence – and something supernatural, which is something we have no evidence of, the best odds always belong to the side with evidence.
I saw a program many years ago where they had a group witness a staged crime and then give eyewitness testimony of what the criminal looked like. One lady, planted by the experimenters, said she saw the thief had a crooked nose. After she said this, many others in the group started to strongly remember that his nose looked weird – one young man went into rather specific detail about how it almost looked “broken.”
In fact, the guy’s nose was completely normal. These details were being cooked up in the imagination afterwards and then misregarded as memory. This sort of thing does happen all the time, which is why eyewitness testimony is often not very useful for police.
I’m not trying to claim that I know exactly what happened at Fatima, but I am claiming that a bunch of people having a mistaken impression is not sufficient evidence that something supernatural took place. There are all kinds of explanations consistent with the evidence, but the evidence isn’t
sufficient to support the claim that you want it to.