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Mikaele
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In relation to the Holy Trinity, what makes each Person a distinct Person?
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tafan
Guest
Substance - in the Aristotle sense
Complete - Complete nature
Individual - Cannot be further divided,
Complete - Complete nature
Individual - Cannot be further divided,
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dmar198
Guest
A being possessed of a mind and will.In relation to the Holy Trinity, what makes each Person a distinct Person?
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levinas12
Guest
There may a problem with this formulation … persons are singularities - they fall outside species/genus … “person” is not a sortal noun … there is no species of John Doe as John Doe … as a human being, yes … but not as a person … not only is a person not an Aristotelian form … but also, a person is not a form individuated by Aristotelian matter … that’s why singularity is a more appropriate way of referring to persons (than using the word “individual” with its connotation of being a member of a class, or an instantiation of a form) …Substance - in the Aristotle sense
Complete - Complete nature
Individual - Cannot be further divided,
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tafan
Guest
I don’t understand what you are saying. The only aristotle definition I used was “substance” (“as opposed to accident”). I agree the definition of a person as such was not based on aristotle. I listed individuality as one of the properties of a person. I will admit, I was writing from memory, but I thought I had the three properties of theological personhood accurately, and they seem to jive with a quick google check.There may a problem with this formulation … persons are singularities - they fall outside species/genus … “person” is not a sortal noun … there is no species of John Doe as John Doe … as a human being, yes … but not as a person … Aristotle did not know about persons per se … a person is not individuated by Aristotle’s matter … that’s why singularity is a more appropriate way of referring to persons (than using the word “individual” with its connotation of being a member of a class, or an instantiation of a form) …
Anyway, perhaps you could clarify?
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JimG
Guest
True, but it is not being or mind or will that distinguishes the persons of the Trinity: because each person has the same being (essence), the same mind, and the same will. In God, there is only one essence, one being, one mind, one will.A being possessed of a mind and will.
The thing that distinguishes the persons of the trinity is their relation to one another. The Father as Source, the Son as the complete expression of the divine mind, the Spirit as the complete expression of the divine will to love.
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levinas12
Guest
An Aristotelian substance is the union of a form and matter. The form is defined by species and genus. For example, you and I share the same form, that of a rational animal. According to Aristotle, we are individuated by the matter. This philosophical approach is stretched to the breaking point when it is applied to persons.I don’t understand what you are saying. The only aristotle definition I used was “substance” (“as opposed to accident”). I agree the definition of a person as such was not based on aristotle. I listed individuality as one of the properties of a person. I will admit, I was writing from memory, but I thought I had the three properties of theological personhood accurately, and they seem to jive with a quick google check.
Anyway, perhaps you could clarify?
When you ask about an Aristotelian form, you ask a “what” question. But when you ask about persons, you ask a “who” question. There is no species/genus for John and Sally as persons … there is a species/genus for “rational animal”, a form that John and Sally share as human beings. But there is no form of “John” - John is not the instantiation of a “John” form - same with Sally
John is a different “who” than Sally but not because of the matter, not because of the form … each person is a singularity that is “incommunicable”, i.e., not shareable. For a much better presentation of this issue, please see the writings of Robert Spaemann and Robert Sokolowski.
This is what it means to be made in the image of God (who is also a person beyond a species/genus).
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tafan
Guest
I am still confused, just a quick question, are you not saying John different who than Sally because if their idividuality? If so, why does the classic three part definition differ from what you say? Or is your point, the only thing that can define a person is individuality, ie adding two more r requirements for substance and rationality is wrong?John is a different “who” than Sally but not because of the matter, not because of the form … each person is a singularity that is “incommunicable”, i.e., not shareable. For a much better presentation of this issue, please see the writings of Robert Spaemann and Robert Sokolowski.
Sorry, I will try to look up the authors you referenced, but don’t have much time.
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levinas12
Guest
“Person” is tricky … according to Aristotle, the individual “who” of John derives from the matter, not the form … John and Sally have the same form … so the difference between them would be based on the matter … but to say that seems to miss the awesomeness of the “who” … the “who” is an agency … not something passive like matter … and an agency that has its own uniqueness, its own irreplaceability, its own responsibility … no one else can answer for my actions … no one else can die in my place … matter in Aristotle is fundamentally “prime matter” … without any agency, characteristics, distinctions … how can the “who” of the person be based on a philosophical component without any differentiation at all … that is not active …I am still confused, just a quick question, are you not saying John different who than Sally because if their idividuality? If so, why does the classic three part definition differ from what you say? Or is your point, the only thing that can define a person is individuality, ie adding two more r requirements for substance and rationality is wrong?
Sorry, I will try to look up the authors you referenced, but don’t have much time.
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tafan
Guest
levinas12, I am not disagreeing with anything you say. I am just confused about why that is not the same as saying a person is defined by the three elements I cited. It seems that your problem with the classic formulation is you are only paying attention to substance, and ignoring that it also includes rationality and individuality. Have a good day.
BTW, the formulation I cited was not from Aristotle, it came from Bothius in the 5th century. He only used Aristotle’s definition for one of the traits, substance. At least that is my understanding. And I think it is the formulation that Aquinas used, but I have to go back and verify that.
BTW, the formulation I cited was not from Aristotle, it came from Bothius in the 5th century. He only used Aristotle’s definition for one of the traits, substance. At least that is my understanding. And I think it is the formulation that Aquinas used, but I have to go back and verify that.
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