VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL
What we are trying to do is reduce crime This paper sets forth a concept for reasonable violent crime control, based on three principles:
• Targeting. The biggest payoff comes in targeting anti-violence legislation on those who commit violent acts, not on applying broad-brush restrictions to everyone.
• Incapacitation. Experience has shown that incapacitation (through incarceration) reduces the number of crimes committed by violent felons over their criminal careers.
• Enforcement. Many attempts at controlling violence have failed in the past due to lack of enforcement.
We target the violent criminal through two laws;
- Possession of a firearm in the commission of a violent crime.
- Possession of a firearm by a previously convicted violent criminal
We must carefully word these laws to ensure we don’t target the wrong people – we’re not after kids who hunt squirrels out of season. We do this by making the gun crime dependent on another crime – a violent crime, such as murder, armed robbery, rape, and so on.
We incapacitate the violent criminal through mandatory sentencing. Although politically incorrect, mandatory sentencing is proven to work in incapacitating criminals. In this case the sentence is 10 years, mandatory, and consecutive with any other sentence. And additional 10 years, mandatory, and consecutive, is added for each subsequent offense.
A holdup of a local 7-11, for example, would net the criminal 5 years on the state, and he would typically serve two. But before being released, he would serve an additional 10 years for using a firearm in a violent crime.
If he did it again after release, this time he would get 20 years for use of a firearm in a violent crime, second offense, and 10 years for possession of a firearm by a previously-convicted violent criminal, for a total of 30 years. A third stickup would net fifty years.
We get enforcement by reserving prosecution of these crimes to a specialized office in the Justice Department. They would prosecute ONLY these two crimes. If they fail to prosecute, they go out of business. If they prosecute vigorously, they will build up a backlog of work, and according to the natural law that governs bureaucracies, will get more funding, more personnel, and more promotions.
They cannot plea bargain away anything – because they have no jurisdiction over any other crimes and nothing to gain from a plea bargain. They cannot be persuaded not to prosecute, because that would go against their interests.
They can be counted on to be vigilant of crimes committed in the various states, because state prosecution for the basic crime will facilitate federal prosecution of the firearms charges.