B
balto
Guest
Yes, Iâm glad we agree on thisBefore we go any further, I do appreciate your non-confrontational style and also your line of questioning.This is the way we can (hopefully) learn from each other.
I agree with the above, however I think sometimes there is a tendency to say that subjective experiences (I believe they are called qualia?) are really just illusions that are reducible to some objective physical process. But I think this tendency is unfounded and that subjective experiences are indeed real, pertaining to immateriality which I will discuss below.I agree that this would be a false dichotomy. Science does not attempt to answer a lot of questions.
Some of those questions are subjective. An example: 1) âwhy does Joe prefer vanilla flavored ice-cream over the chocolate-flavored one?â. This question pertains to the objective, physical reality, and yet, science cannot answer it â and even if it could answer it, no one would care. But the knowledge is useful, if you wish to give Joe a present by inviting him to an ice-cream-parlor and wish to order for him.
Also, we need to exclude the questions pertaining to the axiomatic systems. One cannot experiment to decide if a proposition within an axiomatic is true or not. If it can be reduced to the axioms, then it is true, otherwise it is not true. (Observe: ânot trueâ does not necessarily mean âfalseâ).
Yes, this is more or less what I was thinking of when I brought up immaterial realities. I think we agree (correct me if I am wrong) that these immaterial realities are indeed as real as the laptop I am typing on. A lot of the contention between abstract-ness and materialism is a consequence of embedded Cartesian dualism in our thinking (i.e. matter and mind are separate, disjoint realities, leading to people either siding with one or the other to the exclusion of the other side). Iâve actually been meaning to start a thread on philosophical proofs for the existence of the immaterial human soul as demonstrated by our ability to exhibit immaterial reasoning. Maybe I should get around to thatThe second problem is that the word ârealâ is undefined. What does âimmaterial realityâ mean? One could say that ideas, concepts, abstractions are examples of âimmaterial realityâ (and that is a philosophical assessment), but then some problems arise. Many critics of science operate under the false impression that materialism considers all reality to be âphysical objectsâ. And that is not true. Physical objects have âimmaterial aspectsâ to them. These are âpropertiesâ (âredâ or âsweetâ are not physical objects), âactivitiesâ (âwalkingâ or âthinkingâ are not physical objects) and ârelationshipsâ (âbehindâ or ânext toâ are not physical objects). Yet, none of these properties, actions and relationships exist independently from physical objects.
Since I donât know (yet) what you mean by âimmaterial realityâ, I will have to stop here, and wait for you to clarify.![]()
I would like to comment on the fairy tale point you made though. You raise a valid point that fairy tales may be internally consist but are not real. Although the physical events are obviously false, they do contain valuable truths in the story themselves (abstract immaterial truths?) For instance, I think G.K. Chesterton had a quote about fairy tales that said something like, and I am paraphrasing: âFairy tales are real not because they tell us that dragons exist but because they tell us that dragons can be beaten.â He was very much into fantasy from what I could tell so Iâm not sure how willing I am to go down that path with him, but itâs useful to think about maybe. I wonder if maybe the converse is true as well; that there are physical realities that, although true, offer no immaterial truths.
ContinuedâŚ