This is also a false statement, however (it also doesn’t follow from your previous argument, but that’s another issue). Things that follow on necessary things are not themselves necessary;
I am sorry, but this is REALLY silly on your part. What was obviously meant was things that ONLY follow on necessary things are themselves necessary, when there is no additional contingent cause or explanation, which there isn’t, because God’s creative act is the ONLY cause for the existence of the universe. I guess I need to go ahead and show the obvious.
…for example, the force of gravity is necessary,
No, it isn’t but I’ll let that go.
but my jumping off a cliff and falling is contingent even though the falling is caused by gravity.
Because your jumping off the cliff is contingent.
My falling is contingent because a contingent cause (my will) is a contributing factor in the final outcome, even though the force that drives that final outcome is necessary.
Right you are. But if your jumping were necessary, and gravity were necessary, your falling would likewise also be necessary.
I bring this up merely to point out the flaw in your reasoning. When you’re not thinking through (or at least demonstrating) the actual steps and definitions you will always come to error.
There is no flaw in my reasoning. Perhaps you’re the one who hasn’t thought things through and used actual steps and definitions and therefore has come to error. But since you want it all spelled out, here we go.
- God’s creative act is the only cause of the existence of the universe. (premise from orthodox monotheism).
- If God’s creative act were necessary, the universe would be necessary. (from modal logic - Necessarily if a, then b implies If necessarily a, then necessarily b.)
- If the universe were contingent, then God’s creative act would be contingent. (from 2 and modus tollens).
Now this is really pretty obvious.
It is necessary that He HAS will, yes, but the determination of His will does not follow from Him having a will.
Well this is exactly the point of contention. People like Leibniz disagree. You need to do better than simply argue by assertion.
As a human person it is necessary, not contingent, that I have a will as well (having will is one of the definitions of humanity), but what I determine by that will is not necessary.
In the first place, this is not so obvious if you have been following all the debates on free will. Even the Catholic Church disagrees with you to a point. It maintains the souls in heaven are absolutely incapable of sinning, and the souls in hell are absolutely incapable of repentance. It maintains a soul receiving efficacious grace infallibly (though “freely”) chooses the good. The determinists and compatibilists (soft determinists) also disagree with you insofar as they maintain one’s choice can be completely predetermined by prior factors (which, in a deterministic universe, are themselves completely predetermined).
In the second place, it is still a false analogy in any event - God is an absolutely simple being and we are not.
It can also be said that it is necessary that God willed the universe in a certain sense, on account that God does will the universe, but this is a necessity based on supposing what already is (since I am Ghosty, it’s necessarily true that I am Ghosty), not an absolute necessity based on the nature of will itself (Ghosty is a contingent being, so although I am Ghosty if I am at all, the fact that I am is not absolutely necessary but contingent; this is similar to how falling off the cliff is a contingent action, but the falling is necessary supposing I choose to jump).
This is not the sense I mean “necessary”. I mean necessary in the sense of modal logic, that is, absolute, logical necessity. “Necessary by supposition” simply means unchangeable.
So God necessarily wills, since will is His very being, but WHAT He wills is not necessary, but contingent based on His own council and choice.
And how are His own council and choice not also His very being as well, given that He is absolutely simple?
Or are His own council and choice totally unexplained, uncaused entities?
This is the ENTIRE point of the OP. If the latter, you have an unexplained brute fact. You have an entity with absolutely no explanation for its existence.
What He wills is necessary insofar as His will can’t be blocked, but not in its (the thing willed) very nature.
Sigh… are you just cut-and-pasting from Aquinas or are you actually attempting to follow the argument? The argument is not (and was never made anywhere here) that God’s will is necessary due to
the nature of the thing being willed, but that it might be necessary due to the
nature of God.
God willing the universe, however, is not necessary, and no factors of necessity infringe upon its nature as a simple choice. God does not choose to will (neither do we; we will by definition), but God chooses what to will (as we do).
Again you have not shown this (the formal possibility of God willing something else).
And there are two powerful counterarguments.
God, being supreme Goodness, it is in the nature of His will to diffuse that goodness as much as possible. Therefore, He will create a universe, and it will be the best possible universe so that His goodness can be diffused as much as possible - His nature demands that He do this.
God, being pure act, cannot have an unrealized potency, which conflicts with the traditional view of omnipotence. Saying “God could create a new planet tomorrow” if, in fact, His immutable will is not creating that planet tomorrow, is false, since His will cannot change, because He has no potency. But this means there is no potency in Him to create a new planet.