What does Divine Omnipotence really mean?

[James_S_Saint]

In my opinion, you are correct: God is not concurrent with us in “time”. He is already infinitely past us. If it occurs before our very eyes, it has already happened. If it occurred in the past, it has already happened.

You are correct when you say that “God has no potency.” And, you are quite correct to further say, “How does it make sense to say He has the power to do something He has not done?” This does not make sense and can’t possibly make sense. We can’t possibly know all that God has done, in our past. We cannot possibly know what God’s immanent creating will reveal to us in the future.

You asked. “does omnipotence entail that every positive contingent fact is due to God’s will?” It must be - at least, in some way. God created its occurrence, AND it has already occurred, or, is concurrently occurring (if this is even possible), but will, nevertheless, be relative to God’s will. And, even here, we can’t precisely know in what manner. We can surmise it from what we know of God’s nature. And those who well know His nature can, I believe, do that accurately.

You are quite a thinker, sir.

jd

 

[tonyrey]

I don’t think it’s wise for us to gloss over the importance of this issue. For example, we might ask how is it possible that an all loving and supposedly all powerful god found the time to cure 65 out of 5 million sick visitors to Lourdes, but ignored the cries of six million Jews (and other German minorities) as they were being slaughtered by Hitlers killing machine?

It’s amusing to read about God “finding the time” when He created time! More significantly, the number of cures at Lourdes greatly exceeds 66. The bureau which includes atheists recognises only those which satisfy very stringent requirements. In 1984 Jean-Pierre Bély was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, completely paralyzed by 1987, brought to Lourdes on a stretcher and fully cured instanteously. How do you explain that?

I suppose there’s all sorts of elaborate explanations we might come up with, but the most logical assumption seems to be that god didn’t help those Jews because he lacked the power to intervene and stop Hitler.

It is impossible to know how many Jews were saved by divine intervention, or a combination of divine and human intervention. In this case it was moral evil that was the cause of the atrocities so it is to be expected that free will entails less intervention - which would defeat the purpose of giving us control over events on this earth.

The same logic goes to questions like why would a god who could truly do anything, create the universe and biological life using a process like big bang cosmology or evolution, if he could simply create things ex nihilo?

This objection fails to recognise the** value** of the process. Moreover Instant Creation seems an absurd hypothesis. Life is valuable because it is dynamic and not an now-or-never affair which may well entail a logical contradiction. Can there be “instant development”? Unless you provide a blueprint with the precise details of how Instant Creation is effected there is no evidence that it is logically feasible.

Why would god only cure illnesses that are capable of healing on their own (even if the chances are low), and not heal amputees or other sick people whose conditions lack any possibility of treatment?

You need to explain how you** know** that multiple sclerosis, for example, capable of healing on its own. As for the spontaneous appearance of a new limb there is no need to describe the worldwide repercussions of such a miracle. I leave you to work out the implications for belief in God…

For these reasons I think omnipotence is an immensely important issue.

You are dead right! It makes us realise there is far more in life than meets the sceptic’s eye…

 

[Prodigal_Son]

That’s the common argument, but I also think it’s valid to question the premise that there could be an unknown “good attribute” in the murder of thousands of infants (as in the Exodus story)? Nevertheless, the real basis of my own objections to the classical view of omnipotence is the science surrounding cosmology and evolution. I know you’ll say there are reasons why god creates using a process rather than ex nihilo (even though you may believe god can, if he wishes to, create without the need for a process).

I think science, the way god works in the present world, etc. infer real limitations on his power. I think he created the universe and triggered evolution by utilizing a process because that was the best means he had at his disposal (and even god lacks a magic wand). I don’t think god prefers cancer patients over amputees, rather I think god’s curative power lies in his abilty to promote healing by inspiring our spirits, and he is limited by the nature he created (in other words god does not cause the spontaneous regrowth of limbs because he lacks the ability to).

I think the physical evidence consistently bears this out.

This is an interesting conception of God, although the question arises: is this God you hypothesize bound by the laws of physics? Is nature an extension of God? More importantly, why should such a god be good and not bad? You decide to scrap omnipotence instead of goodness, and you end up losing any rationale for goodness. Is the god you hypothesize good simply because you want him to be?

The evidence you bring to bear is interesting. God heals a cancer patient but not an amputee. Is there an explanation the Christian can give? Yes. Assume, for a moment, that we lived in a world where amputees often regrew limbs spontaneously. Science could find no cause for this whatsoever; it just happened. Would more people believe in God? You better believe it!

But would that be a good thing? If people had incontrovertible evidence for a God who would determine their eternal destiny, they would no longer have the ability to freely choose the good. There would be fewer injustices in the world, but only because God had committed himself to a reign of terror over the cosmos. When you replace faith with certainty, freedom is compromised.

 

[o_mlly]

If I was misinformed, then you should berate your Catholic brethren on the board for spreading that misinformation.

But you are the only poster “spreading this misinformation.” If your lame defense is to attempt to “blame shift” to others, don’t you think the courtesy of naming them would be only fair?

But I don’t think so. The Catholic teaching that “the end does not justify the means” is something that I happened to see with great delight, because it is something that I also hold true - very strongly.

Good. Then you agree absolving yourself by blaming a category of unnamed others is unethical.

On the other hand, in innumerable threads (about the problem of evil) it has been asserted that God does not allow “gratuitous” evil, only “seemingly evil” acts, which would turn out to be “sheep in wolf’s disguise” (if only we knew the reason for them) - which is in dire contradiction with the “end does not justify the means” dogma. (But I will admit that I am lazy, if that makes you feel good. I see no point in digging up quotes, which can be interpreted according to one’s desire.)

If you would take the time to precisely define terms, you would drastically reduce the reader’s latitude for interpretation. And your use of metaphors only fuels the interpreter latitude. You must define your terms. What do you mean by “gratuitous” or “seemingly” evil acts?

As a matter of fact, I find it vastly amusing and entertaining to present the same problem in slightly different form, and see those Catholics argue vehemently against their previously asserted “truth”.

I think now you arrogantly betray yourself for what you are. I will pray for you; you need it.

 

[R_Daneel]

When you replace faith with certainty, freedom is compromised.

This is not true at all. On the very contrary, having good information about the possible outcomes allows one choose with “open eyes” - so to speak. Infinitely preferable to choose “blindfolded”.

But, just for the sake of argument: let’s suppose you are correct. Why would that be a problem? What is so wonderful and preferable about the kind of freedom which is based on ignorance?

 

[R_Daneel]

I think now you arrogantly betray yourself for what you are.

Don’t judge, lest you should be judged.

But going back to the topic at hand. Do you agree that the end does not justify the means? Do you agree that it is the official Catholic teaching? The terms I used are self-explanatory: “gratuitous evil” would be evil for its own sake (torture performed by a sadistic person comes to mind). Its opposite would be “necessary evil”, something that is not good if considered on its own merit, but in taking the whole picture it can explained as necessary for some greater good, which is preferable, and which cannot be achieved without the “evil”. Yet another example: “a painful surgical procedure which is aimed to restore the health of the patient”.

 

[bridgeforsale]

What does God causing the spontaneous growth of a limb (which all non-theists would attribute to a non-divine origin anyway) have to with God’s omnipotence? You attribute the lack of this particular act on the part of God to be a lack of his ability to do it. That is a bare assumption on your part. Jesus healed the man with the withered hand, but perhaps that is too ancient along with the other miracles recorded by the Catholic Church in this regard. True, cases within the past 30 years of amputee healings are pretty much unheard of. I’m just curious as to how you decided that means God doesn’t have the power to heal such folk. Could it be that he decided not to heal them?

Yes, an act recorded in an ancient text with no correborating evidence (outside the text itself) is not a source I would find reliable (particularly considering how science has continually eroded the bible). The question is whether absence of evidence can or should be considered evidence (or at least a probative fact) in of itself?

I believe the answer is yes, but depending on the context. In this case there are numerous, perhaps thousands (or more) claims that god has miraculously cured people. Therefore, there is a basis to examine miracle claims, and a point of reference and comparison available to us. The pattern is god cures illnesses that could have been cured with no divine intervention (even though the probability of a cure may have been low). Indeed this general statement applies to each and every single modern miracle claim.

Is it fair to wonder why god has never caused the spontaneous regrowth of a limb or say a kidney, and the cures exclusively involve illnesses that could have gotten better on their own? Of course this is a relevant fact. This is the sort of pattern that forms the basis of rational thinking.

 

[bridgeforsale]

This is an interesting conception of God, although the question arises: is this God you hypothesize bound by the laws of physics? Is nature an extension of God? More importantly, why should such a god be good and not bad? You decide to scrap omnipotence instead of goodness, and you end up losing any rationale for goodness. Is the god you hypothesize good simply because you want him to be?

Yes I believe nature is an extension of god. It’s a testimony to his creative work and illustrates his abilities. I think god is only bound by the laws of physics (laws he created) insofar as his interactions with the natural world. In other words, god is a spirit, an intangible. Therefore god himself cannot be measured by physics (because, simply stated, he has no physical attributes, if he did it’s likely physicists would be able to detect him). The question you ask is interesting, why should god be good?

I don’t think it’s necessary for god to be good, but I think there are reasons why we can assume god is good (and we should simply be thankful that he’s good, and not bad).

The evidence you bring to bear is interesting. God heals a cancer patient but not an amputee. Is there an explanation the Christian can give? Yes. Assume, for a moment, that we lived in a world where amputees often regrew limbs spontaneously. Science could find no cause for this whatsoever; it just happened. Would more people believe in God? You better believe it!

But would that be a good thing? If people had incontrovertible evidence for a God who would determine their eternal destiny, they would no longer have the ability to freely choose the good. There would be fewer injustices in the world, but only because God had committed himself to a reign of terror over the cosmos. When you replace faith with certainty, freedom is compromised.

Not necessarily. If god were totally omnipotent, as you say, he could have created a world where limbs regrew naturally (there are, after all, animals in nature that can and do regenerate themselves). Therefore, we’d still be stuck in the same paradigm. God would still be able to conceal his existence if he so desired, but he wouldn’t be limited to administering his curative powers on a discriminatory basis.

 

[o_mlly]

Don’t judge, lest you should be judged.

Fair enough. Just wanted to try to shake you out of your (lazy?) complacent attitude in the forum.

But going back to the topic at hand. Do you agree that the end does not justify the means?

Yes.

Do you agree that it is the official Catholic teaching?

Yes.

The terms I used are self-explanatory: “gratuitous evil” would be evil for its own sake (torture performed by a sadistic person comes to mind). Its opposite would be “necessary evil”, something that is not good if considered on its own merit, but in taking the whole picture it can explained as necessary for some greater good, which is preferable, and which cannot be achieved without the “evil”. Yet another example: “a painful surgical procedure which is aimed to restore the health of the patient”.

Thank you for defining your term. For consistency, Catholics term such evil acts as intrinsically evil – that is, there effects are evil in all places for all people at all times. We would not use the term “necessary” evil as the word as an adjective carries the philosophical connotation that the evil is not contingent. All evil is contingent, that is all evil is dependent on the existence of the good. Evil is the privation of goodness.

Intrinsically evil acts are never permitted in Catholic thinking. You might “google” the principle of the double effect – an act which produces good and bad effects. You would note that one of the four principles guiding the actor on the permissibility of the act is that the good effect(s) must not proceed from the bad effect(s). That is, the end may never justify the means.

 

[James_S_Saint]

Don’t judge, lest you should be judged.

But then don’t fail to accurately assess.

 

[R_Daneel]

Fair enough. Just wanted to try to shake you out of your (lazy?) complacent attitude in the forum.

Hehe, sounds fine.

Yes.

Yes.

Thank you.

Thank you for defining your term. For consistency, Catholics term such evil acts as intrinsically evil – that is, there effects are evil in all places for all people at all times.

I have problem with this. No matter how heinous it might be, I can imagine situations when an act might be justifyable. Of course that depends on the value system we may use - and I am pretty sure that our value systems are widely different.

We would not use the term “necessary” evil as the word as an adjective carries the philosophical connotation that the evil is not contingent.

To clarify: “necessary” here means that it is a logical prerequisite. The philosophical terms “necessary” and “contingent” (existing in all and existing in some possible worlds, respectively) are just linguistics toys, without any deeper meaning. There is nothing “necessary” when it is used in that meaning. The intersection of all the possible worlds is an empty set (mathematically speaking).

All evil is contingent, that is all evil is dependent on the existence of the good. Evil is the privation of goodness.

Not acceptable. Evil is the **intentional **lack of good. The term “evil” cannot be defined without referring to beings who are capable of moral decisions. The sometimes use of “natural evil” is just sloppy wording - unless one believes in God, when there is no such thing as “natural” - and in this case it is an attempt to whitewash God’s responsibility.

Intrinsically evil acts are never permitted in Catholic thinking. You might “google” the principle of the double effect – an act which produces good and bad effects. You would note that one of the four principles guiding the actor on the permissibility of the act is that the good effect(s) must not proceed from the bad effect(s). That is, the end may never justify the means.

I agree that the end - in and by itself - can never justify the means. However, the end and the means - together - may or may not form a justifyable sequence. Yes, I know about the “double effect” principle.

Now, in the light of what you say (the good effects must not proceed from the bad effects) please analyze the defense that “God can mysteriously produce good results from all the evil acts” - because it leads to a contradiction. If the bad prerequistes do not form a logical necessity, then they are gratuitous evils - and God allowing them is not “good”. If they are a logical prerequisite, then the “good” poceeds from the evil - contrary to the Catholic teaching. This is a very serious dilemma - and has no solution. Either way you have a contradiction.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

This is not true at all. On the very contrary, having good information about the possible outcomes allows one choose with “open eyes” - so to speak. Infinitely preferable to choose “blindfolded”.

A person would always make the same choice, unless they were unintelligent. Thus, a world without sin and pain is a scientist’s paradise, because every choice is good in accordance with its intellectual acuity. But such a world has no room for love, because love is not love that loves in hope of gain (an ulterior motive).

But, just for the sake of argument: let’s suppose you are correct. Why would that be a problem? What is so wonderful and preferable about the kind of freedom which is based on ignorance?

That it allows for spiritual realities; it allows a world with two things far greater than pleasure: **trust **and love. In the world you propose, we wouldn’t even have words for these realities.

 

[o_mlly]

…

I have problem with this. No matter how heinous it might be, I can imagine situations when an act might be justifyable. Of course that depends on the value system we may use - and I am pretty sure that our value systems are widely different.

Perhaps we can find a value we agree on. Let’s take the act of murder defined as the premeditated intentional taking of an innocent human life by another. If, as I hope you do, agree that murder as defined is intrinsically evil then under what circumstances would you justify murder? If not murder, how about rape or adultery?

To clarify: “necessary” here means that it is a logical prerequisite.

The phrase being defined, I believe is, “necessary evil.” Your misplaced pronoun above confuses me. What are you referring to as “it”? What is the logical prerequisite that makes evil necessary? If you say, “goodness” then we agree.

The philosophical terms “necessary” and “contingent” (existing in all and existing in some possible worlds, respectively) are just linguistics toys, without any deeper meaning. There is nothing “necessary” when it is used in that meaning. The intersection of all the possible worlds is an empty set (mathematically speaking).

We disagree on the depth of philosophical meaning in the words “necessary” and “contngent.”

“Necessity, in a general way, denotes a strict connection between different beings, or the different elements of a being, or between a being and its existence. It is therefore a primary and fundamental notion, and it is important to determine its various meanings and applications in philosophy and theology.”

And as to contingent:
“Aside from its secondary and more obvious meaning (as, for instance, its qualification of the predicable accident, of a class of modal propositions, and so on), the primary and technically philosophical use of the term is for one of the supreme divisions of being, that is, contingent being, as distinguished from necessary being.”
newadvent.org/cathen/04331a.htm

Not acceptable. Evil is the **intentional **lack of good. The term “evil” cannot be defined without referring to beings who are capable of moral decisions. The sometimes use of “natural evil” is just sloppy wording - unless one believes in God, when there is no such thing as “natural” - and in this case it is an attempt to whitewash God’s responsibility.

Somewhat confusing paragraph. You start with an emphatic “Not acceptable” and proceed to agree with my post – “Evil is the privation of goodness” with an equivocal statement: “Evil is the **intentional **lack of good.” ???

I have defined evil soley by its objective effects. Therefore, the subject or source of evil is independent of its existence. The source may be you or me or a tsunami – if the effects are bad – evil exists.

I agree that the end - in and by itself - can never justify the means. However, the end and the means - together - may or may not form a justifyable sequence. Yes, I know about the “double effect” principle.

A little muddled, don’t you think? If you take the “end and the means - together” do you not necessarily preclude a “[sic] justifyable sequence.” Either the ends and means are simultaneous or they are not. ???

Now, in the light of what you say (the good effects must not proceed from the bad effects) please analyze the defense that “God can mysteriously produce good results from all the evil acts” - because it leads to a contradiction. If the bad prerequistes do not form a logical necessity, then they are gratuitous evils - and God allowing them is not “good”. If they are a logical prerequisite, then the “good” poceeds from the evil - contrary to the Catholic teaching. This is a very serious dilemma - and has no solution. Either way you have a contradiction.

Let’s start with “God can mysteriously produce good results from all the evil acts.” Yes, there are two different moral agents in this scenario – the evil-doer and God.

If God gifts you an immortal life with a free will, then it would be contradictory, i.e. not good, if God imposed His will over and against yours for that would negate His gift. If God remains faithful to His promise to you – immortal life with a free will, that is good. Further, if God lovingly follows you around to clean up your messes, that’s supremely good.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I don’t think it’s necessary for god to be good, but I think there are reasons why we can assume god is good (and we should simply be thankful that he’s good, and not bad).

What are these reasons? (I agree that God is good, of course, but I think we derive His goodness; we don’t assume it).

Not necessarily. If god were totally omnipotent, as you say, he could have created a world where limbs regrew naturally (there are, after all, animals in nature that can and do regenerate themselves).

Yes, but how would that universe be better than this universe? You seem to think that disability is something more than a relative lack. On the other end of the spectrum, I might wonder why God didn’t make us so that we can fly. There is nothing inherently better about a world in which people can fly, nor anything inherently better about a world in which severed limbs heal. Or perhaps you can point out where the difference is?

 

[R_Daneel]

A person would always make the same choice, unless they were unintelligent. Thus, a world without sin and pain is a scientist’s paradise, because every choice is good in accordance with its intellectual acuity. But such a world has no room for love, because love is not love that loves in hope of gain (an ulterior motive).

No, not necessarily. In that world there still would be scarcity of resources, conflicting interests, which would make choices meaningful. Nonethess, you have a point. I suggest you read the book “Kazohinia”. The English translation is available at mek.oszk.hu/01400/01456/html/ . Now, this book is worth to read on its own right, describing the world as you suggested. There is an extreme amount of helpful behavior which has nothing to do with the emotional aspect of “love”. People would help each other in times of need.

That it allows for spiritual realities; it allows a world with two things far greater than pleasure: **trust **and love. In the world you propose, we wouldn’t even have words for these realities.

In a sense, yes. There would be no “emotional” type of love, but there would be the harmony which comes from “love”, from helpfulness, from mutual respect. And this kind of mutual helpfulness is vastly superior to the haphazard, undependable “emotional” type of love. Yes, there is trust there. People trust each other, to treat them in their own best interest. There might be no “word” for it, but the reality would be there.

The lack of knowledge does not lead to love and trust, it leads to mutual doubt, to possible misunderstandings. If “love” as you say it, depends on these then we would be much better off without it.

 

[StrawberryJam]

Saying that God can do everything (except the logically impossible, which aren’t really “things” to begin with) needs a bit of explication in the light of divine immutability and atemporality; I mean, we have an intuitive idea of what it means, but still.

God’s will is eternal and can’t change. If He has already willed tomorrow that it is going to snow, for instance, He can’t “change His mind”. It’s therefore impossible that He can make tomorrow a warm, sunny day - and yet, tomorrow being a warm, sunny day is certainly logically possible.

So, omnipotence might mean there’s a possible world in which God wills that tomorrow is sunny. But that’s not strong enough. There’s a possible world in which I have control over the weather and make tomorrow sunny. Yes, but you might say, I don’t have control over the weather in “this world” (meaning the relevant accessibility relation is that the past is identical) - I can’t change the course of the atmosphere. Yeah, but neither does God in “this world”, He can’t change His will, if His will is causing the course of the atmosphere.

You could further argue, yes, but in this world the reason why it’s going to snow tomorrow is because God willed it, not because I willed it. Fine, but that gets at the question I want to ask: does Divine omnipotence entail that every positive contingent fact has as its reason God’s will?

Thoughts?

You would need to be divine and omnipotent to know what it means. Everything else describing it would be insufficient.

 

[R_Daneel]

Perhaps we can find a value we agree on. Let’s take the act of murder defined as the premeditated intentional taking of an innocent human life by another. If, as I hope you do, agree that murder as defined is intrinsically evil then under what circumstances would you justify murder? If not murder, how about rape or adultery?

Immediate disagreement on the definition of “murder”. The word highlighted (innocent) is an emotionally loaded term and also undefined. Besides, in Catholic terminology, there is no “innocent” person. Even a newborn is “guilty” on account of the assumed “original sin”. My definition of murder is “the premeditated, intentional taking of a human life” - the same as yours without the phrase “innocent”. And there are justifyable murders, for example in self-defense.

The phrase being defined, I believe is, “necessary evil.” Your misplaced pronoun above confuses me. What are you referring to as “it”? What is the logical prerequisite that makes evil necessary? If you say, “goodness” then we agree.

“Evil” in this case is something we dislike, like inflicting pain on someone. In the case of a painful medical procedure the uninitiated might see pain inflicted, without understanding that the pain is logically necessary to heal the patient. Such an infliction of pain is justified - as long as it is not excessive. Example: suppose someone is bitten by a poisonous snake. The doctos has no antidote, and must perform an amputation to save the person’s life. This procedure is justified. However, if the doctor does have an antidote, then the amputation is no longer justifed, the patient’s life could be saved without it. As you can see - hopefully - the evaluation of the procedure does not just “hang in the air”, the circumstances must be evaluated.

We disagree on the depth of philosophical meaning in the words “necessary” and “contngent.”

What else is new? A “necessary” being is one which exists in all possible worlds. A “contingent” being is one which exists in some, but not all possible worlds. The expression “possible world” denotes a hypothetical world, which is different from our existing reality in some respects. I can prove it mathematically that the intersection of all possible worlds is a “null-world”, there is no such thing as a “necessary” being. Therefore the concept of “necessary” existence is vacuous.

Somewhat confusing paragraph. You start with an emphatic “Not acceptable” and proceed to agree with my post – “Evil is the privation of goodness” with an equivocal statement: “Evil is the **intentional **lack of good.” ???

I have defined evil soley by its objective effects. Therefore, the subject or source of evil is independent of its existence. The source may be you or me or a tsunami – if the effects are bad – evil exists.

Except that a tsunami is not “evil”. It is a sloppy usage of the word. A cat causing pain and frustration to a mouse - when “playing” with the mouse - is not evil, because the cat does not know what it does. Since you insist on proper definition of words (and I agree with you), let’s do precisely that, and define “evil” properly.

A little muddled, don’t you think? If you take the “end and the means - together” do you not necessarily preclude a “[sic] justifyable sequence.” Either the ends and means are simultaneous or they are not. ???

Not at all. “Together” does not mean temporal simultaneousness, it was supposed to mean: “contemplated as a logical cause and effect”.

Let’s start with “God can mysteriously produce good results from all the evil acts.” Yes, there are two different moral agents in this scenario – the evil-doer and God.

If God gifts you an immortal life with a free will, then it would be contradictory, i.e. not good, if God imposed His will over and against yours for that would negate His gift. If God remains faithful to His promise to you – immortal life with a free will, that is good. Further, if God lovingly follows you around to clean up your messes, that’s supremely good.

This has nothing to do with the dilemma I presented. Please go back and read it again.

 

[bridgeforsale]

What are these reasons? (I agree that God is good, of course, but I think we derive His goodness; we don’t assume it).

I think one sign of this goodness is the general direction of evolution (not only biological evolution, but also social evolution, including the development of morals). I think if you look at this on a graph, you would see a general upward progression of human morality (notwithstanding deep downward spikes along the way). God created a framework where the trajectory of evolution travels a certain way, a direction I think must be interpreted as good. If we assume a god exists, which this analysis does, I think it also makes sense to attribute this feature to god.

If we assume god is intelligent (and I think we must assume this, or describing our creator as a god wouldn’t make much sense) then it’s logical to assume he wouldn’t have created a world where there was a substantial risk of backfire (or where the result could substantially deviate from his desired result, or where there was a significant risk the world he created would turn against him). God would want a world that reflected him, at least as much as possible. Therefore, it makes sense to believe god is good.

Yes, but how would that universe be better than this universe? You seem to think that disability is something more than a relative lack. On the other end of the spectrum, I might wonder why God didn’t make us so that we can fly. There is nothing inherently better about a world in which people can fly, nor anything inherently better about a world in which severed limbs heal. Or perhaps you can point out where the difference is?

Better or worse isn’t the question, it would avoid logical contradiction and a discriminatory result if god created a world where limbs and other organs could regrow naturally. An assumption of absolute omnipotence must assume god could have created any world he wanted to; and it must also assume that god knew this problem would develop before the point change became impossible (and in fact an assumption that there could have been a point where change became impossible itself dilutes omnipotence).

Therefore, either god desired a contradictory and discriminatory result, or he is not omnipotent in the classical sense.

 

[PJM]

=NowAgnostic;6101268]Saying that God can do everything (except the logically impossible, which aren’t really “things” to begin with) needs a bit of explication in the light of divine immutability and atemporality; I mean, we have an intuitive idea of what it means, but still.

God’s will is eternal and can’t change. If He has already willed tomorrow that it is going to snow, for instance, He can’t “change His mind”. It’s therefore impossible that He can make tomorrow a warm, sunny day - and yet, tomorrow being a warm, sunny day is certainly logically possible.

So, omnipotence might mean there’s a possible world in which God wills that tomorrow is sunny. But that’s not strong enough. There’s a possible world in which I have control over the weather and make tomorrow sunny. Yes, but you might say, I don’t have control over the weather in “this world” (meaning the relevant accessibility relation is that the past is identical) - I can’t change the course of the atmosphere. Yeah, but neither does God in “this world”, He can’t change His will, if His will is causing the course of the atmosphere.

You could further argue, yes, but in this world the reason why it’s going to snow tomorrow is because God willed it, not because I willed it. Fine, but that gets at the question I want to ask: does Divine omnipotence entail that every positive contingent fact has as its reason God’s will?

Thoughts?

QUOTE…

"Omnipotence is the power of God to effect whatever is not intrinsically impossible. These last words of the definition do not imply any imperfection, since a power that extends to every possibility must be perfect. The universality of the object of the Divine power is not merely relative but absolute, so that the true nature of omnipotence is not clearly expressed by saying that God can do all things that are possible to Him; it requires the further statement that all things are possible to God. The intrinsically impossible is the self-contradictory, and its mutually exclusive elements could result only in nothingness. “Hence,” says Thomas (Summa I, Q. xxv, a. 3), “it is more exact to say that the intrinsically impossible is incapable of production, than to say that God cannot produce it.” To include the contradictory within the range of omnipotence, as does the Calvinist Vorstius, is to acknowledge the absurd as an object of the Divine intellect, and nothingness as an object of the Divine will and power. “God can do all things the accomplishment of which is a manifestation of power,” says Hugh of St. Victor, “and He is almighty because He cannot be powerless” (De sacram., I, ii, 22).

As intrinsically impossible must be classed:

1.Any action on the part of God which would be out of harmony with His nature and attributes;
2.Any action that would simultaneously connote mutually repellent elements, e.g. a square circle, an infinite creature, etc." end quote

 

[o_mlly]

Immediate disagreement on the definition of “murder”. The word highlighted (innocent) is an emotionally loaded term and also undefined. Besides, in Catholic terminology, there is no “innocent” person. Even a newborn is “guilty” on account of the assumed “original sin”. My definition of murder is “the premeditated, intentional taking of a human life” - the same as yours without the phrase “innocent”. And there are justifyable murders, for example in self-defense.

…

Before we can argue we must first paradoxically agree. And we cannot.

You will not persuade me on your own authority and I do not believe I will persuade you on either the Catholic teaching authority or U.S. jurisprudence ( first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, and justifiable homicide are all legal concepts at odds with your simplistic defintion of murder). So let’s part, friend.