What does Divine Omnipotence really mean?

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Thanks for the link. I think I just took issue with you saying “actual existing infinite”. It seemed like you were equating “existing” with “material”. God exists; see my problem?

peace,
Michael
The proper term is “actual infinite.” I placed the “existing” in there to avoid confusion. Apparently I should just stick with the terms that the professionals use. 🙂
 
So if Aquinas figured out an actual infinite was not possible, then why did he still hold that God could have still created a universe without a beginning (and would it be correct to call it an eternal universe)? Or an I remembering my Aquinas wrong?
God is infinite, but only because he is immaterial. If indeed things could always exist without a cause in the material world, then Aquinas’ argument about the necessity of a first cause would be void. I can link you to the portions of the Summa that support this if you wish.
 
tdgesq, your last post was great. You articulated certain things a lot better than I was doing. Thanks.
Yet I barbecued it … just like I’m gonna do to this one :cool:
While I think I agree with your example I do not agree with your summary. I don’t think you could get Aristotle to admit that nothing exists before a human conceptualizes it. In fact, that is absurd and runs counter to how Aristotle viewed human conceptualization anyways.
Holy missed the point batman! Of course Aristotle didn’t think nothing existed before a human conceptualizes it (but he did think nothing could exist before god conceptualizes it). The reason he believed that is he drew an inference using inductive reasoning. In other words the assumption he makes— that constructing something first requires conceptualizing that thing; is an inductive inference drawn from the world around him and the behavior of human beings. To Aristotle “formal cause” was the idea existing in the mind of the builder. The idea or concept of a thing necessarily predicates its construction (in every case, whether we’re referring to humans or god). The only difference is with god (in the mind of Aristotle) is god doesn’t require preexisting knowledge to form a concept, and he doesn’t even require any knowledge concerning the materials that will be used to build that thing, because any being that required points of reference to form a concept (as we do), could not be the first cause. We’re able to imagine sculpting a statute because we know rock exists. If we had no idea substances like marble exist, we wouldn’t be able to imagine sculpting a marble statute. God, according to Aristotle, doesn’t have this limitation. God can form a mental concept without any preexisting point of reference.
The only possible option left to your summary is that God’s conceptualization is necessary. Tell me, what does God’s conceptualization look like, is it the same as human conceptualization? Admittedly by you, it is not. This shows that this summary of yours is not circular and that you are talking about two different things.
I’m showing how Aristotle distinguished between human conceptualization and how a first cause must have formed a mental concept (for lack of a better term). Simply said, a first cause requires no preexisting point of reference to form an idea. Mountains don’t have to exist before god imagines going hiking. They do have to exist before we can imagine going for a hike (according to Aristotle).
Moreover, your point is that if we can find something in nature that doesn’t need to prior-conceptualize then build but only build, then you have disproved the necessity of God’s omnipotence (at least in regard to Aristotle’s supposed argument). Since something doesn’t need prior conceptualization for causation and God doesn’t need prior conceptualization for causation (as do humans), then we can’t say for sure if God is omnipotent based solely on the principle of no prior conceptualization. This is because omnipotence can only be given to one, by definition, and who or what are we going to give it to if there are multiple candidates based on Aristotle’s supposed argument?
Now based on your argument, assuming it’s correct, you only need to have science show something happen without prior conceptualization. You thus bring in quantum fluctuations and other post-enlightenment science. Really, all you need to do is show that an ocean wave doesn’t conceptualize but yet it breaks a rock in two. Or you could show a brain-dead human twitching (not privy to the fact that someone just conceptualized and then ran him over). Randomness or non-randomness is not important to your argument. In fact, one could make the case that a person with a brain defect will randomly conceptualize different things and then act on them. Since Aristotle was privy to rocks and waves, I’m going to go out on a limb and say that he didn’t make the argument you’re attributing to him or at least not the assertion of God’s omnipotence based solely on conceptualization. It seems to me that, if indeed Aristotle said what you attribute to him (I would be very thankful for a reference to his work so I can look it up), that he already had the idea of a first mover or uncaused cause before he talked about conceptualization. In support of this, it’s not conclusive for science to claim that no conceptualization is involved until they have investigated the whole chain of causes (in the sense of explanation) just as in the example of the brain-dead person twitching, not knowing conceptualization (deliberate or not) was behind it. That is why I think Aristotle only talked about conceptualization after knowing about the source for all the causes.
Forget about the brain dead human. Aristotle analogized (most famously) to the sculptor. It’s obvious he couldn’t image something like the randomness of natural selection; and his metaphysics prohibited an idea like that. Complex creation (in the mind of Aristotle) required a creator, and creating anything complex required conceptualization. When Aristotle played on ideas like something cannot come from nothing, random chance fell within the meaning of nothing. If at no step in the chain of causation was conceptualization by an intelligent being required; that would have been tantamount to something from nothing in the view of Aristotle. If at any step in the chain of causation conceptualization wasn’t required (for instance, biological evolution) he would have viewed that as something from nothing.

Continued …
 
Aquinas like Aristotle affirmed that all knowledge ultimately comes to us through the senses. Inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning are two different ways or methods by which we come to know things. Deduction has always been the more certain of the two methods, assuming that the premises involved are true. So I don’t agree with you that Aristotle’s reasoning is built upon induction. That being said, of course induction is vitally important for us to know things about the world. I never said otherwise. All I set out to demonstrate is that your inferences from inductive evidence are simply not valid. They violate the informal deductive principles (fallacy of false alternatives).
Of course Aristotle affirmed the value of deductive reasoning, and of course I didn’t mean to imply he didn’t. I simply noted that his conclusion (omnipotence is logically necessary) was an inference made through inductive reasoning. Geesh!
Not necessary for what? I’m guessing for creation of the universe. Maybe you are right, depending upon how you define “omnipotence.” But the fact is something had to create the conditions for the universe. Everything that exists has a cause. I suspect it is this latter proposition that you disagree with .
Great, I’m glad you agree; omnipotence isn’t a necessary assumption (and that’s all I’m saying). Omnipotence is the ability to do anything, with absolutely no limitations whatsoever (this is the definition according to Aristotle anyway).

As for the idea that everything requires a cause, well of course everything requires a cause, but that doesn’t prove god. We can say at the end of the chain of causation there has to be something that itself wasn’t caused, but energy could easily fit within that criteria. I’m not saying it does, and I’m not even saying god doesn’t exist; I’m simply saying the weight of evidence suggests a more reasonable assumption is god is not omnipotent (at least not in the classical sense of the word).
Easy to conclude, but as we have seen, difficult for you to defend. It doesn’t matter from your perspective whether things are created ex nihilo or not. You would find limitations with God even if all creative acts were ex nihilo, because then quite obviously (from your standpoint) God would lack the ability to allow creative acts from existing matter and material. Again, I suspect that what you really object to is the proposition that everything that exists has a cause.
Garbage, how can you conclude I would find limitations with god even if he created ex nihilo.
It is not as a general rule fallacious to assert an absolute. Your very statement that “as a general rule, it’s fallacious to assert an absolute” is itself an affirmation of an absolute. Furthermore, although omnipotence (depending upon how it is defined) may not be a necessary assumption, the proposition that “everything that exists has a cause” is a necessary assumption from all empirical evidence at our disposal. You say “no,” but you are mistaken.
Geesh, here you go again trying to put words in my mouth. A general rule is not an absolute rule; it’s something that’s usually true. If I meant absolute rule then I would have said absolute rule, or I would have implied necessity, or that it was a universal law, or words to that effect. When someone frames something in a context like “generally speaking” when A happens B usually follows, obviously it’s not asserting an absolute.
Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument does not require any kind of prior conceptualization - entailing a person who is conceptualizing it all. That is an argument by design, which isn’t the argument at issue here even though Aquinas did profer an argument by design. The proposition is this: everything that exists has a cause.
And if we were talking about Aquinas’ cosmological argument this might matter. Again, as noted above, this simple causative principal isn’t something I necessarily dispute (although there’s plenty of little nuances we could quibble about within this idea … but that’s a different issue; now hopefully the red herring train will stop at the station, let’s see).
Evolutionary science provides no evidence that causation is not required for existence or change. In fact, it proves the exact opposite. I am quite comfortable with the conclusions of most evolutionary theories.
Great I’m glad for you. Now with any luck maybe you’re next statement will be relevant to this issue?
You have conflated concepts. While Aquinas and Aristotle may have made teleological arguments for the existence of God, that is not the issue. The issue is whether something can come into existence without a cause. Both Aquinas and Aristotle said that a cause is required. Please give your one example.
NO that’s not the issue. The issue is whether or not everything created requires conceptualization. If it doesn’t, and things can be created through random process, then energy is just as good an explanation of first cause as anything else (at least given the information currently available).
Yes, we do know. According to mathematical set theory, an actual existing infinite is impossible. It is also highly improbable (and when I use that phrase, I mean practically impossible) from scientific observation that something has always existed without a preceding cause. I’m on the side of deductive and inductive reasoning. You are on the side of fairy tales.
I hate to point the obvious, but under your logic, god is impossible. Nonetheless, mathematicians generally accept actual infinities, so what the heck are you talking about?

Moreover, the first law of thermodynamics tells us energy cannot be created or destroyed. You better do some homework :rolleyes:
 
As for the idea that everything requires a cause, well of course everything requires a cause, but that doesn’t prove god. We can say at the end of the chain of causation there has to be something that itself wasn’t caused, but energy could easily fit within that criteria. I’m not saying it does, and I’m not even saying god doesn’t exist; I’m simply saying the weight of evidence suggests a more reasonable assumption is god is not omnipotent (at least not in the classical sense of the word).
Let’s examine the hypothesis that energy is the first cause. Begin examination…
  1. Energy is the first cause.
  2. Why is there energy?
#2 is a perfectly valid question. If it is not necessary that energy exist, then the principle “everything has a cause” leads us to wonder what the cause of energy is.

So assume it is necessary that energy exists. In this case, energy would be a necessary being, a being whose nonexistence was impossible.

Properties of energy, then: cause of all things, necessarily existent.

Once you get that far, why not call energy God? And, once we concede this, how can we say that energy is not omnipotent? It initiates a set of circumstances that compose the universe. Unless we bring in free-will metaphysics or indeterminism (each of which require defenses), we have all subsequent events determined by this being.

The problem is not with claim that God is omnipotent, but with the claim that God is sentient. 🤷 Or else you’re just arguing for indeterminism, which is a hypothesis that is quite a bit too young to have meaningful scientific support.
 
Let’s examine the hypothesis that energy is the first cause. Begin examination…
  1. Energy is the first cause.
  2. Why is there energy?
#2 is a perfectly valid question. If it is not necessary that energy exist, then the principle “everything has a cause” leads us to wonder what the cause of energy is.
First, please keep in mind, I’m not saying energy is the first cause of anything (but I do think it’s perfectly possible). I also think question two isn’t necessary. In other words, energy doesn’t require a reason. The idea that everything requires a purpose or reason could just as easily invalidate god. The question is does the first cause have to be intelligent? We can say it makes sense to think it is, but makes sense (or reasonableness) is different than logical necessity. If we conclude it makes more sense to say an intelligent being is the first cause, would that entity then have had to be omnipotent? I think the proposition that intelligent life could have been first cause is reasonably supportable, but I certainly don’t see any reason to view that proposition as a logical necessity (it’s simply not). It could be true that energy (which may have absolutely no purpose, no reason for being, and could have always existed) is the first cause, and arguments in favor of that view are reasonable. Nonetheless, I find enough reasons to believe an intelligent life (call it a god if you like) does exist, and we do have a soul.
So assume it is necessary that energy exists. In this case, energy would be a necessary being, a being whose nonexistence was impossible.
Properties of energy, then: cause of all things, necessarily existent.
Once you get that far, why not call energy God? And, once we concede this, how can we say that energy is not omnipotent? It initiates a set of circumstances that compose the universe. Unless we bring in free-will metaphysics or indeterminism (each of which require defenses), we have all subsequent events determined by this being.
Let me say again I don’t believe energy is it, the whole shabang. But if it were I wouldn’t be persuaded to become a pantheist, because energy isn’t intelligent (as far as we can tell anyway), nor does it have to be. If energy always existed, and a spontaneous, undeliberate quantum fluctuation caused the inflation which consequently created our universe, and slowly through natural selection we were created, there’s no place in that entire causal chain where intelligence would have been required; and obviously intelligence is encompassed within the definition of omnipotence.
The problem is not with claim that God is omnipotent, but with the claim that God is sentient. 🤷 Or else you’re just arguing for indeterminism, which is a hypothesis that is quite a bit too young to have meaningful scientific support.
I assume you’re saying sentience (not omnipotence) is logically necessary? While that’s certainly a proposition I have less of a problem with compared to saying omnipotence is necessary (when all the available evidence seems to suggest otherwise); I also don’t think you can say sentience is necessary.

At minimum we have enough information to call metaphysical determinism into serious doubt. Science can put together a scenario where the universe basically created itself (and for absolutely no reason). I think the idea of a sentient being makes more sense, but the fact that we can provide an alternative explanation based on real physics (as hypothetical as it may be) in my opinion removes this question from the realm of metaphyics and makes it squarely a scientific question. It’s perfectly possible up until now metaphyics was the best our dumb minds could do, but it has no relationship to actual reality. In fact quantum physics and the principal of uncertainty presents a huge problem for determinism, although it may not be an insurmountable problem. It could be true that quantum fluctuations are predictable, but only over the span of billions or even trillions of years (or something like that). It could be true that notwithstanding the uncertainty inherent in quantum structures, it can be predictable if given enough information; and an entity like a god could predict at least the macro behavior of physical properties (and therefore the consequences of any creative act on its part).

There’s too many questions, and a metaphysical system of absolutes is just not possible (or probably even advisable). You might think sticking with well settled ideas is a good default position, but I think that’s debateable. I think cause and effect is obvious enough in our macro world, but it’s not necessarily consistantly true (and even if it were it still wouldn’t have to be true in the case of a first cause, and in fact for all we know the universe could be oscillating and there is no first cause, we simply lack enough information). So I side with the logic of guys like Carl Sagan (but I also think guys like Hitchens make great points when they point to the internal inconsistencies of religion) 🤷
 
Yet I barbecued it … just like I’m gonna do to this one
In order for you to barbecue you need to be willing to roast all the meat, so far you’ve been dancing all around it.
Holy missed the point batman!
Perhaps I innitially missed the point of what you were trying to say, but I arrived there nonetheless by reasoning it out. And that’s not to say your summary wasn’t ridiculously misleading. AND YOUR ASSERTION THAT ARISTOTLE’S REASONING WAS CIRCULAR WAS REFUTED. So we are making progress, no?
It’s obvious he couldn’t image something like the randomness of natural selection; and his metaphysics prohibited an idea like that.
Obviously false, but to you for some reason not so obvious. Do you agree or not that everything has an explanation (whether we can know it or not)? If you agree, then necessarily, a cause that is random or not requires an explanation. And that is all Aristotle needs for a First Move and Uncaused Cause, ect.
Complex creation (in the mind of Aristotle) required a creator, and creating anything complex required conceptualization. When Aristotle played on ideas like something cannot come from nothing, random chance fell within the meaning of nothing.
He may or may not have said that random chance falls under the category of nothing (I would appreciate a reference), but he would have been wrong. However, his framework supports the idea that randomness or no randomness still requires an explanation.
If at no step in the chain of causation was conceptualization by an intelligent being required; that would have been tantamount to something from nothing in the view of Aristotle. If at any step in the chain of causation conceptualization wasn’t required (for instance, biological evolution) he would have viewed that as something from nothing.
I would like a reference, please. But what Aristotle would have thought is slightly besides the point. His framework, properly understood, does not do what you assume it to.

And here is where you are absolutely wrong and your pants fall off: In order to verify that conceptualization wasn’t required for some cause, (whatever cause you wish it to be, whether it is a rock and a wave or even evolution) then one needs to be aware of all the preceding explanations in the chain, right up to the First Cause itself. And since science is not there yet, it couldn’t possibly comment on the presence of conceptualization as of yet. Furthermore, if the First Cause is immaterial, then science has an insurmountable obstacle and will never know.

Again, I don’t think Aristotle made the argument that you’re attributing to him, namely that conceptualization is a requirement for omnipotence. But regardless of what he thought, his framework still stands and proves the necessity of omnipotence from the existence of a First Cause ect.

I honestly don’t know what you could possibly say to get around all of what I have said. Your counter-argument against Aristotle’s supposed argument absolutely fails to prove your conclusion because you have not investigated the whole causal chain all the way to the First Cause. And it is dubious that your counter-argument could be made against Aristotle because it seems to me he only talks about conceptualization after an omnipotent First Cause is already established. And furthermore his framework proves a necessary omnipotence given to the already established First Cause ect. There is no ground for you to stand on (from what I see this conversation is over, but I will of course be willing to continue).

I hope you learned from these debates, at the very least not to make the same mistakes over and over again.

peace,
Michael
 
I honestly don’t know what you could possibly say to get around all of what I have said. Your counter-argument against Aristotle’s supposed argument absolutely fails to prove your conclusion because you have not investigated the whole causal chain all the way to the First Cause. And it is dubious that your counter-argument could be made against Aristotle because it seems to me he only talks about conceptualization after an omnipotent First Cause is already established. And furthermore his framework proves a necessary omnipotence given to the already established First Cause ect. There is no ground for you to stand on (from what I see this conversation is over, but I will of course be willing to continue).
You just don’t understand Aristotle, and quite frankly I’m sick of bickering with you about it … I suggest a trip to Barnes and Noble, or at least some cursory internet research. I’ve explained, and reexplained the very simple foundation of Aristotle’s logic to you at least twice, and I’m done repeating myself.
I hope you learned from these debates, at the very least not to make the same mistakes over and over again.
Yeah, I’ve learned you don’t know what the heck you’re talking about, but you’re also stubborn (and I just don’t have time for this continued nonsense) :rolleyes:
 
I think cause and effect is obvious enough in our macro world, but it’s not necessarily consistantly true
Here’s one of the reasons why you keep saying what you do.

When you read Aristotle, you think cause means scientific cause/effect instead of explanation. Explanation is a much more broad term and encompasses scientific cause/effect.
 
Yeah, I’ve learned you don’t know what the heck you’re talking about, but you’re also stubborn (and I just don’t have time for this continued nonsense) :rolleyes:
I understand every word of what you’re saying about Aristotle. I’m sorry that I’ve destroyed your position. But I will always be willing to talk about any detail you missed or any question you posit (at least in that regard I’m not stubborn).

The floor is yours.
 
Here’s one of the reasons why you keep saying what you do.

When you read Aristotle, you think cause means scientific cause/effect instead of explanation. Explanation is a much more broad term and encompasses scientific cause/effect.
You’re still not understanding the nuance here. Let’s start with the assumption that Aristotle talked about more than one thing; but let’s also assume a certain set of assumptions were at the foundation of what he believed and said. One of those ideas was, in a nutshell, everything that is created requires a creator, and before anything can be created it must first be conceptualized by its potential creator. What’s an argument like everything requires a reason really based on anyway? Whose reason was it? Is it our post hoc explanation of things, or does everything require a predicate reason? Obviously Aristotle was saying everything requires a predicate reason. That is before the sculptor builds the statute there’s a reason why he wants to build it (and that reason, along with his understanding of the physical world, drives his conceptualization of the project). There’s a reason why everything happens, except, according to Aristotle at the beginning of it all something must exist that itself has no reason to exist, but gives everything else reason to exist. What is this conclusion based on? Well, quite simply, according to his observations everything does require a predicate reason. But we now know those observations couldn’t see the whole story. He had no idea that there was an invisible quantum world all around him that is not completely predictable; and where things seem to happen for no reason. He didn’t know the laws of thermodynamics, and that the basis of all material (energy) is an infinite resource, which could possible exist for no reason whatsoever (and a random anomaly could have caused our universe, and we could have evolved through a random unguided process for no particular reason whatsoever).

Now-a-days as this old view finds less and less empirical support, the arguments of apologists are along the lines of; how could anyone propose the universe has no meaning, since that would mean intelligent life may have no special purpose, which is an appeal to emotion (with no real substantive value). To begin with in order to assume everything requires a predicate reason you have to assume energy itself requires a reason. If you don’t assume this at least half your logic goes out the window. Then you have to assume something like a random quantum fluctuation could not have been the cause of the universe, or if something like that was responsible for it, then there’s no way it could have resulted in a universe without mystical assistance.

If any of these things are even plausible, you lose the high ground of logical necessity. Well, they’re more than just plausible aren’t they? The law of energy conservation is well established, and we know quantum fluctuations happen. The bottom line is your position is not logically necessary. Sorry to tell you, but you have to actually put some effort into making god make sense (because there’s nothing in logic indicating god must exist; much less supporting an idea like divine omnipotence).

And the worse thing is I can already imagine how you still won’t understand what I’m saying, because I assume you lack the capacity to grasp the big picture here. In other words I can read Aristotle and understand perfectly how one thing flows from the other, and it’s always easy to predict what he’ll say next (because the implications of his assumptions are obvious). I don’t expect everyone to be smart enough to grasp complex topics like this as intuitively as I do, and you’re obviously not (so I know this promises to be a monumental waste of my time).
 
You keep assuming I don’t understand what you’re talking about. You repeated the same thing over and over again like a broken record without specifically engaging any of my points. I am beginning to wonder if you have even read any of my posts. Oh, well, at least I’ve gotten something out of this conversation.
To begin with in order to assume everything requires a predicate reason you have to assume energy itself requires a reason.
Let’s do that. And I’m glad science assumes this too.
Then you have to assume something like a random quantum fluctuation could not have been the cause of the universe, or if something like that was responsible for it, then there’s no way it could have resulted in a universe without mystical assistance.
Wrong. You still for some odd reason think that quantum fluctuations disproves PSR. I think you need a primer on PSR. Now I know it’s wikipedia, but one has to start somewhere:

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_sufficient_reason

Quantum mechanics doesn’t disprove PSR.

This has been already touched upon by previous posters. Stop beating the same (broken) drum.

peace,
Michael
 
You keep assuming I don’t understand what you’re talking about. You repeated the same thing over and over again like a broken record without specifically engaging any of my points. I am beginning to wonder if you have even read any of my posts. Oh, well, at least I’ve gotten something out of this conversation.
Yeah, a free education 😉
Let’s do that. And I’m glad science assumes this too.
Really, so then why, according to science, does energy exist? Oh, and please feel free to provide me with some sources that show a theory of why energy exists, and that the scientific community is in general agreement with this enlightening theory :confused:
Wrong. You still for some odd reason think that quantum fluctuations disproves PSR. I think you need a primer on PSR. Now I know it’s wikipedia, but one has to start somewhere:
Quantum mechanics doesn’t disprove PSR.
This has been already touched upon by previous posters. Stop beating the same (broken) drum.
peace,
Michael
You’re looking at this too simplisticly, and you’re not understanding the relationship between the idea of prior sufficient reason and conceptualization, and how both are required to claim omnipotence is necessary. It’s one thing to say everything must have a predicate reason. A reason in of itself doesn’t have to be an intelligent reason. In other words PSR doesn’t require god. Moreover, you fail to realize that the idea of a god itself violates PSR (so at some point, if there is a starting point to it all and the universe isn’t a giant boomerang, something has to violate PSR).

Aristotle’s specific basis for claiming the necessity of omnipotence was that creation requires predicate conceptualization (not only a predicate reason). I keep mentioning this because it still hasn’t sank into your brain.
 
First, please keep in mind, I’m not saying energy is the first cause of anything (but I do think it’s perfectly possible). I also think question two isn’t necessary. In other words, energy doesn’t require a reason. The idea that everything requires a purpose or reason could just as easily invalidate god.
Not so, because the principle isn’t that every fact must have a cause, nor that every entity must have a cause, but rather that every *event *must have a cause. Necessary truths, such as the truths of mathematics and logic, are uncaused. Most Christians claim that God is a necessary being, that the nonexistence of God is contradictory.

If energy is a necessary being, then it doesn’t require a reason, as I said above. But then it sounds an awful lot like God. Every event of our universe, in this case, would have this primordial “energy” as a necessary condition of its occurrence, even “indeterminate” quantum fluctuations. Even randomness must be grounded in existence; and this is clearly a case where necessary truths – not just experimental observations – are relevant.
The question is does the first cause have to be intelligent? We can say it makes sense to think it is, but makes sense (or reasonableness) is different than logical necessity. If we conclude it makes more sense to say an intelligent being is the first cause, would that entity then have had to be omnipotent? I think the proposition that intelligent life could have been first cause is reasonably supportable, but I certainly don’t see any reason to view that proposition as a logical necessity (it’s simply not).
I agree that it’s not a logical necessity – at least, I haven’t heard an a priori argument that proves that God must be sentient/intelligent. There are plenty of a posteriori arguments, however, the arguments for design.
…obviously intelligence is encompassed within the definition of omnipotence.
How so? Omnipotence is the ability to *do *anything logically possible, not the ability to *plan *anything logically possible. Any first cause is omnipotent (sentient or not), if determinism is true.
I assume you’re saying sentience (not omnipotence) is logically necessary?
Nope.
At minimum we have enough information to call metaphysical determinism into serious doubt. Science can put together a scenario where the universe basically created itself (and for absolutely no reason).
This is a fallacy. As soon as you say the universe does not extend infinitely backwards in time, you are committed to some necessary (non-accidental) being to begin it, unless you simply throw up your hands. Otherwise, you’re in a turtles-all-the-way-down scenario.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down
 
Not so, because the principle isn’t that every fact must have a cause, nor that every entity must have a cause, but rather that every *event *must have a cause. Necessary truths, such as the truths of mathematics and logic, are uncaused. Most Christians claim that God is a necessary being, that the nonexistence of God is contradictory.

If energy is a necessary being, then it doesn’t require a reason, as I said above. But then it sounds an awful lot like God. Every event of our universe, in this case, would have this primordial “energy” as a necessary condition of its occurrence, even “indeterminate” quantum fluctuations. Even randomness must be grounded in existence; and this is clearly a case where necessary truths – not just experimental observations – are relevant.
If our concept of god is a fiction then why would it matter if our self-created story coincidently corresponds with one or two aspects (e.g. infinite existence, no prior cause) of energy? It’s not energies fault we felt the need to invent religion, energy can’t think (it just exists, for no particular reason). If you like to call energy god, or a necessary truth, then fine (I’d probably agree with the latter).
I agree that it’s not a logical necessity – at least, I haven’t heard an a priori argument that proves that God must be sentient/intelligent. There are plenty of a posteriori arguments, however, the arguments for design.
The argument from design is a much better argument, I agree (although I would distinguish a purely cosmological argument from design, from something like intelligent design).
How so? Omnipotence is the ability to *do *anything logically possible, not the ability to *plan *anything logically possible. Any first cause is omnipotent (sentient or not), if determinism is true.
If you want to redefine the classical definition of the word, then fine. To Aristotle it wasn’t just anything logically possible, it was anything at all. Moreover, what do you mean by logically possible? Are there any restrictions on god’s power? For instance, do you think god can create ex nihilo?

Without further qualification and proofs, I’ll assume this is a bare assertion.
This is a fallacy. As soon as you say the universe does not extend infinitely backwards in time, you are committed to some necessary (non-accidental) being to begin it, unless you simply throw up your hands. Otherwise, you’re in a turtles-all-the-way-down scenario.
Well, yeah, energy would be a necessary truth, but phrasing it in the context of accidental or non-accidental is nonsensical. If god exists would you say something that itself has no predicate cause, and no reason for existing is either accidental or non-accidental? You can’t couch a necessary truth it those terms. Necessary truths just exist. BTW I also think calling mathematics a necessary truth is debatable. After all the sciences tend to be descriptive of nature (not prescriptive). In other words math or physics merely describes our observations and deductions concerning nature (they don’t invent or create nature). So far, perhaps the only property that can be accurately called a necessary truth, is energy. But science can’t afford to even take basic assumptions like that for granted (just like they can’t afford to constrict themselves within the parameters of philosophical musings, like the chicken or the egg paradox, and dogmatically operate under these sort of assumptions, which have no real substantive value).

Nonetheless, no one has demonstrated to me the logical necessity of divine omnipotence (which is the topic at issue). Respectfully, I’m not interested in debating the larger issue of whether or not god exists (I’m operating under the assumption a god does exist). I also won’t have much time over the next several weeks, so if you want to carry this discussion forward I’d only ask that you restrict your comments directed at me to the omnipotence issue (in the interests of my time, the importance of this issue, and in the interest of keeping the thread focused and productive).
 
Moreover, you fail to realize that the idea of a god itself violates PSR (so at some point, if there is a starting point to it all and the universe isn’t a giant boomerang, something has to violate PSR).
You made this assumption as well with Aritotle’s framework. I don’t know how familiar you are with Aquinas, but he would say that even God requires a reason for His existence (So I disagree with both you and Prodigal_Son on this point). And that the reason is found within Himself. Not only would God be a necessary being, but his necessity would be necessitated. I’m all for other necessary truths (for example energy).

Consequently, if you wonder why energy isn’t looked on as God, Prodigal_Son already answered your question. The uncaused cause, first mover, ect. starts to build up certain qualities that would rule energy, as we know it now, out.
If you want to redefine the classical definition of the word, then fine. To Aristotle it wasn’t just anything logically possible, it was anything at all. Moreover, what do you mean by logically possible? Are there any restrictions on god’s power? For instance, do you think god can create ex nihilo?
I think Aristotle would agree with the statement that omnipotence was the power to create anything that’s logically possible. Aristotle thinks that the laws of our thought conform to the laws of logic which are part of the laws of reality (I don’t know if he would include specifically imagination or not).

If you would ask God to create a square circle, He wouldn’t do it because you actually didn’t ask Him to do anything. Your request didn’t make sense.
Necessary truths just exist.
Why should necessary truths get special priviliage to dodge PSR?

And, unlike Prodigal_Son, I do think that conceptualization is part of what it means to have omnipotence. And again, I think you have to be aware of the entire causal chain to rule out the presence of conceptualization. And again, conceptualization isn’t necessary to reach the position that God is necessarily omnipotent (regardless of Aristotle’s supposed stance; which you didn’t reference for me, sadly: is it in his metaphysics, physics, what?).

So says me. And I too won’t be able to answer for a while because I’ll be out of town.
 
Of course Aristotle affirmed the value of deductive reasoning, and of course I didn’t mean to imply he didn’t.
Well, ultimately it was a conclusion made from inductive and deductive reasoning. Please give your credentials concerning Aristotle. Mine are these: I have read the Nicomachean Ethics in its entirety and have read portions of his Metaphysics and Physics from undergraduate level philosophy courses. I am probably more familiar with his works from reading Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, in which he refers to Aristotle repeatedly as “the Philosopher.” I would like to know your personal background in this area.
Great, I’m glad you agree; omnipotence isn’t a necessary assumption (and that’s all I’m saying). Omnipotence is the ability to do anything, with absolutely no limitations whatsoever (this is the definition according to Aristotle anyway).
What I said is that depending upon how omnipotence is defined, it may not be a necessary assumption. I can link you to the posts if you think I said something otherwise. Aquinas DID NOT define omnipotence as “the ability to do anything, with absolutely no limitations whatsoever.” Here is Aquinas citing Aristotle as to the meaning of omnipotence:

I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, “God can do all things,” is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways.

newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm#article3 (Emphasis added).
As for the idea that everything requires a cause, well of course everything requires a cause, but that doesn’t prove god. We can say at the end of the chain of causation there has to be something that itself wasn’t caused, but energy could easily fit within that criteria.
If you believe everything has a cause, then why did you float the idea that quantum fluctuations provide evidence that some things exist without a cause? :confused: And energy does not fit into the criteria, because somebody can always ask where energy came from. I have always limited God’s omnipotence in this discussion to His creation of the universe. Regardless of what you believe Aristotle’s definition of “omnipotence” to be, I don’t see how you could have a reasonable basis for denying the proposition that God is the ultimate cause of the universe.
Garbage, how can you conclude I would find limitations with god even if he created ex nihilo.
Because your method of induction logically (or not as the case may be) would allow you to come to the same conclusion. Your flawed method of inferring things from lack of evidence would allow you to conclude that God isn’t omnipotent regardless of whether you observed him create ex nihilo or not. More to the point, in an earlier post you affirmed your belief in the ability of science to regenerate a severed limb. Even if you personally witnessed the regrowth of an amputated limb, you would attribute it to a natural cause - perhaps aided by the human scientific intervention. What is garbage is your suggestion that if you saw a human limb spontaneously regenerate, suddenly you would be a believer in God. That is garbage.
A general rule is not an absolute rule; it’s something that’s usually true. If I meant absolute rule then I would have said absolute rule, or I would have implied necessity, or that it was a universal law, or words to that effect.
I doesn’t matter if you place modifying language in your proposition. It is still an absolute. It is absolutely true according to you that “as a general rule, it’s fallacious to assert an absolute …” Then it is absolutely true that as a general rule it is fallacious to assert an absolute. It is still the assertion of an absolute. And you do assert an absolute below with respect to the First Law of Thermodynamics.
Again, as noted above, this simple causative principal isn’t something I necessarily dispute (although there’s plenty of little nuances we could quibble about within this idea … but that’s a different issue; now hopefully the red herring train will stop at the station, let’s see).
I’m not making any statement about omnipotence other than this: the existence of the universe had a cause, and that cause is what we call God. I’ve not made any other claim about God’s omnipotence than this. Not that he is a personal being. Not that he heals amputees. Nothing of the sort.
 
. . . continued
NO that’s not the issue. The issue is whether or not everything created requires conceptualization. If it doesn’t, and things can be created through random process, then energy is just as good an explanation of first cause as anything else (at least given the information currently available).
That is your issue. It isn’t Aristotle’s, Aqunias’, or mine. Even if you were correct about Aristotle on this issue - so what? How about deal with what ultimately caused the existence of the universe. That is all I, me, tdgesq, has ever asked of you. Are you going to deal with it or not?
I hate to point the obvious, but under your logic, god is impossible. Nonetheless, mathematicians generally accept actual infinities, so what the heck are you talking about?
You are wrong. Please name a single example of an accepted actual infinite, whether it comes from the mouth of a mathematician or not. The impossibility of infinity only applies to the material and corporeal world. This is not an arbitrary conclusion. Things that materially exist have the attribute of extension. Things that are immaterial do not.
Moreover, the first law of thermodynamics tells us energy cannot be created or destroyed.
So then the First Law of Thermodynamics is an absolute? 😛 Sure it is. The problem you have is that these laws are limited by there very formulation by processes involving a thermodynamic system. I agree with that. There weren’t any thermodynamic systems before the creation of the universe. Haven’t you ever wondered why scientists don’t seriously go around claiming that the First Law of Thermodynamics disproves the existence of God? 😉
 
Well, ultimately it was a conclusion made from inductive and deductive reasoning. Please give your credentials concerning Aristotle. Mine are these: I have read the Nicomachean Ethics in its entirety and have read portions of his Metaphysics and Physics from undergraduate level philosophy courses. I am probably more familiar with his works from reading Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, in which he refers to Aristotle repeatedly as “the Philosopher.” I would like to know your personal background in this area.
I have a professional degree, which includes plenty of philosophy (including Aristotle and metaphysics more generally speaking). Moving on, it shouldn’t be very difficult to see where Aristotle drew the conclusion that before we build something we have to think about what it is we want to build.

You might say, broadly speaking, deduction moves from theory to confirmation whereas induction moves from observation to theory. Could the conclusion that all created things require predicate conceptualization be deductive? I suppose you could try and frame it that way, but it seems like poor argument structure (at least given the information we have today). Today this could only be couched as a theory drawn from inductive reasoning. In induction, very simply, we make observations, notice patterns, and thereby draw inferences.
A deductive argument looks like this:
  1. All fish on earth eventually die
  2. Tuna is a type of fish on earth
  3. Therefore, all tuna fish on earth will die
Aristotle could not have known whether or not all things require a creator who first conceptualized, and then created, in the same way we know all fish on earth will die. He made an observation, which was, before any human being sets out to create anything he must first conceptualize what it is he wants to create. This is true in every known case of any human being who intentionally creates anything, so the pattern is obvious. From that observed pattern he formed a theory.

The reason why Aristotle concluded the unmoved mover (e.g. first cause) must be omnipotent was drawn from his four causes, namely the idea of “formal” cause. Don’t get me wrong, formal cause does apply to human beings (so much should be obvious). However, it doesn’t appear to have broad application in nature (at least not in every case). There are things that appear to be created for no apparent reason (although cosmological arguments from design are very good arguments, they’re not logically necessary, nor do they require omnipotence).
What I said is that depending upon how omnipotence is defined, it may not be a necessary assumption. I can link you to the posts if you think I said something otherwise. Aquinas DID NOT define omnipotence as “the ability to do anything, with absolutely no limitations whatsoever.” Here is Aquinas citing Aristotle as to the meaning of omnipotence:
I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, “God can do all things,” is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways.
First let me concede right off the bat I’m not an expert in the works of Thomas Aquinas. I think I own a copy of Summa Theologica, and I’ve read some of it (years ago), but I can only take so much Aquinas. I did, however, recently (for the purposes of this discussion) find the exact quote you’re using here & I was obviously pleased to learn Aquinas might have actually agreed with me on this little tiny point.

I would say being able to create something, even if you couldn’t do it ex nihilo, and were limited to manipulating energy (and creating through a process like we actually see in nature) is powerful enough for me. I’m not sure why people demand that god must have a level of power that seems highly improbable given what we know. You can say absence of evidence is not in itself evidence, and my conclusions are drawn from induction, which of course they are (and I fully concede the limitations of induction). Nonetheless, without Aristotle’s very specific argument (based on his view of formal cause) the logical necessity of omnipotence evaporates. All the evidence we have today strongly suggests Aristotle’s argument in this area is probably wrong.

Continued …
 
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