What Does It really Mean To Say That The Human Soul Is The "Form" Of The Body?

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Aquinas rejects platonic dualism for Aristotle by saying that the soul is the form of the body. If the soul is the form of the body, then isn’t this just another form of materialism wrapped in spiritual language? And how can the form survive the death of the body if the soul is not itself a separate entity?

I think it will be profitable for me and all of us to get a full understanding of what Aquinas means when he agrees with Aristotle in saying that soul is the form of the body. Is this really compatible with Christian teaching?
 
To Aristotle and Aquinas, the “form of the body” was not in reference to its “shape”, but to the abstract concept of what a human is which is what a “soul” actually means.

A “soul”, much like a “sole”, is the foundation upon which the rest is built. The “form” indicates what the entity substantially is, its fundamental definition (upon which the particulars are filled in, added, and altered).

I don’t see how such would conflict with Christianity. I’m sure it didn’t conflict with Jesus.
 
James_S_Saint said:
To Aristotle and Aquinas, the “form of the body” was not in reference to its “shape”, but to the abstract concept of what a human is which is what a “soul” actually means.

A “soul”, much like a “sole”, is the foundation upon which the rest is built. The “form” indicates what the entity substantially is, its fundamental definition (upon which the particulars are filled in, added, and altered).

I don’t see how such would conflict with Christianity. I’m sure it didn’t conflict with Jesus.
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So the soul is what makes a person a person? But would not functionalism be a better explanation; that a person is the functional outcome of a physical body? Why not?
 
MindOverMatter said:
Does Aquinas support mind body dualism?
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Aquinas holds that the soul is a subsistent thing which is capable of existence separate from the body. This is certainly a dualism of a sort.

It is not as strong as plain Cartesian/Platonic dualism, but it is nevertheless a ‘dualism.’

Aquinas also holds that the operations of the lower parts of the soul belong to the ‘composite,’ and thus that the soul, as subsistent, lacks these powers when separated from the body.

Please cf. Articles 2 and 3 to question 75, posted above, for these answers.
 
RobNY said:
Aquinas holds that the soul is a subsistent thing which is capable of existence separate from the body. This is certainly a dualism of a sort.

It is not as strong as plain Cartesian/Platonic dualism, but it is nevertheless a ‘dualism.’

Aquinas also holds that the operations of the lower parts of the soul belong to the ‘composite,’ and thus that the soul, as subsistent, lacks these powers when separated from the body.
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So when he says that the soul and body are one he does not mean that they are same, but rather that they are dependent upon each other for functionality? Why is this not as strong as the Cartesian dualism? What about the intellect; does the soul still have the power of intellect when separate from the body?
 
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