You misunderstand me. I stated quite clearly that free choices don’t exist unless they have been initiated by a person.
Who knows? Perhaps that is an unanswerable question!
Why can we know our decisions but God cannot, especially since God is sharing His power with us, namely, His divine attribute of free will?
You are assuming we know our non-existent decisions. God knows them as well as we do if they are real.
My point was to show that you are the one that claims to presume that God cannot know our free choices.
Don’t you presume that God knows our free choices?
God knows everything about us except that which is unchosen.
“But the difficulty is: how, from our finite point of view, to interpret and explain the mysterious manner of God’s knowledge of such events without at the same time sacrificing the free will of the creature.”
Again, it seems that you are placing our choice within time. I thought that our free choices were timeless?
Like God’s activity the
results of many of our choices occur in time but like our souls our choices transcend time.
How does the Catholic Encyclopedia support your argument? It does not define free will or free decisions in the same way you are defining them.
It does not even mention whether our potential choices and decisions are knowable.
Do you always know whether a proposition you devise about God’s nature is meaningful?
If it is based upon God’s revelation, then yes, we can be sure of it. And God’s revelation says that the Spirit of God searches and knows all things, even the deep things of God.
It does not say non-existent choices and non-existent decisions are knowable.
Are you saying that our wills are as sovereign and free as God’s?
No. God is omnipotent and He can withdraw our power if He chooses to do so. But He is not inconsistent. Why give us free will in the first place when He knows we will abuse it? Because without free will we are incapable of love.
That’s like saying that our knowledge is of an equivalent quality to God’s–which is essentially what you do. By defining omniscience as “knowing what it is possible to know,” you make literally everything omniscient.
Not at all. The nature of the one who knows has to be taken into account. The Creator obviously knows infinitely more than a creature.
For instance, I am omniscient because I know all that it is possible for me to know.
You are omniscient as far as your finite experience is concerned!
A rock is omniscient because it can know all that is possible for it to know.
Which is precisely nothing! So its omniscience amounts to nescience…
God is omniscient because He knows all that it is possible for Him to know. The only difference is that God knows–presumably, because on your view we cannot even be sure(!)–the most possible things to know.
We have very good reason to believe God knows everything that can be known because we believe He created everything. If you know God knows everything you do not need faith…
Do we not also have other divine attributes, such as reason and love? Can God not know these as well?
God does not know non-existent conclusions and non-existent acts of love - which both presuppose non-existent choices - because they are all unknowable. It is absurd to believe that **which does not exist **can be known. Can you know the content of emptiness?
Free will is a mystery. What I am arguing for is not an exhaustive explanation of what free will is, but for the fact that God knows our free will decisions.
Of course He does - when they exist!
I find your position to be repugnant to both Scripture (which clearly states that God knows all of the ways of man–including His thoughts, decisions, and deliberations) and reason (the history natural theology has consistently defined omniscience as “knowing all true propositions,” not “knowing all possible true propositions.”) You seem to be oblivious to both of these facts.
You seem to be oblivious to the fact that “not knowing all possible true propositions” is precisely what I am maintaining! Anything that is possible is knowable only as a possibility because the realm of possibility is distinct from reality. Truth is correspondence to reality, not to that which does not exist.